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Abstrac 
Venture Capital Financing in India: 
A study of Venture Capitalists' Valuation, Structuring, and Monitoring Practices 
Venture capital as a source of financing high technology, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) is well established in the developed economies. Now, this 
activity is becoming a focus of attention in emerging markets. India has 
registered a significant growth in terms of the amount and number of venture 
capital funds. But there is no academic research to date, devoted to 
understanding how this new investor class behave through the investment cycle. 
This research is the first-ever investigation of how venture capitalists in India 
conduct the Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring of their investments. After 
introduction, the thesis presents an overview of the Indian economy, followed by 
its financial landscape. The third chapter covers a survey of the economic 
contribution that SMEs make and the funding problems they face, together with a 
review of the Indian venture capital sector. 
An extensive literature review on venture capital research follows. After finding 
the research gaps, a theoretical framework, based on the adverse selection, 
moral hazard, corporate governance, and the asymmetric information that 
characterises the risk capital market is used. Eight hypotheses are developed to 
test how venture capitalists address the adverse selection through (a) a variety of 
information sources used in preparing the valuation memorandum, and (b) 
applying various quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the realistic 
value. How do they address moral hazard by (a) using covenants in their deal 
structures, and (b) what financial products are used to minimise the risk? Finally, 
how frequently and extensively do they monitor their investee companies to 
overcome the information asymmetry and corporate governance problems? 
Data from 40 of the most active 42 venture capitalists operating in India were 
gathered. Then, the data were analysed using Chi Square, Cluster Analysis, 
ANOVA and Logistical Regression. 
The results present a descriptive profile of the Indian venture capital sector, 
including the characteristics of the fund management teams, the sectors and 
stages of investments and the tests of the hypotheses. This is followed by 
methodical statistical analysis by splitting the sample based on seven 
demographic characteristics. The final chapter includes the conclusion, 
recommendations and the implications of this research for the venture capitalists, 
entrepreneurs and regulators. Finally, future research areas are suggested that 
may further improve the understanding of the venture capital market in India. 
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Chapter -I INTRODUCTION 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have played a significant role in the 
economic development of the developed and developing world. SMEs have 
created more jobs, produced more technological innovations and have earned 
precious foreign exchange for the third world and the developing countries. 
However, this segment of the industry has always been at a disadvantage in 
terms of receiving financial resources. 
Venture capital financing has filled, to some extent, this gap in the form of 
providing risk capital to seed and start-up level business enterprises. Modem 
venture capital finds its roots in the US, when some financiers began funding 
new technology projects after the World War II. The success of this mode of 
financing, characterised by the emergence of some of the most respectable 
technology companies in the world, led to the proliferation of venture capital in 
the UK, Continental Europe, Japan, South East Asia, and now to Eastern 
Europe, South Asia and Africa. 
Along with its success, venture capital financing is also flawed by the very risky 
nature of its funding. Some of the most common problems faced by venture 
capitalists are adverse selection, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. 
Academic research in venture capital also began in the US and then moved to 
UK, Continental Europe and South East Asia. Now the focus is moving onto the 
fast moving markets of Eastern Europe and South Asia. 
The Indian venture capital industry had more than 30 active players, together 
managing over US$ 1 billion (The Economic Times; July, 27; 1999). There is 
adequate scope to conduct empirical research and study on the Valuation, 
Structuring and Monitoring practices of Indian venture capitalists. These have 
been largely neglected areas and the research examines these three critical 
areas, on which largely relies the success of venture capital investment, against 
the findings of existing research. However, 'empirical research in venture capital 
is not easy. There are few tapes to spin. Because of that difficulty, comparatively 
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little has been done, and the opportunity to develop results that are novel and 
important is great (Barry, 1994; p. 11). 
The objective of this research is to study the valuation, structuring and monitoring 
practices of venture capitalists in India. This objective is achieved through a 
questionnaire based empirical survey. Since there is no time series data 
available on Indian venture capital industry to study such practices, techniques 
like cluster analysis, ANOVA, Chi Square, and Logistic Regression are used to 
arrive at statistically reliable results. 
In addition to studying the three focus areas, data on some general 
characteristics of the venture capital funds and fund managers are also collected 
in order to develop a possible linkage between these characteristics and the 
valuation, structuring, and monitoring practices. This information is subsequently 
used in dividing the entire sample on the basis of seven demographic factors. 
The theoretical base of this research focus is derived from the theories of 
adverse selection, moral hazard, corporate governance and asymmetric 
information. In order to carry out the research and present the results on 
'Valuation, Structuring, and Monitoring' practices in the Indian venture capital 
sector, the entire thesis is divided into 10 chapters. This chapter presents the 
introduction to the entire research by briefly explaining the contents of each of 
the following nine chapters. 
The second chapter begins with a literature review on the significance of SMEs in 
economic development and the hurdles they face in order to grow. After 
identifying the paucity of finance as a major growth hurdle, in both developed and 
emerging economies, the way in which venture capital has filled this gap by 
providing risk capital to young, start-up companies with little asset base is 
explained. In the process, the entire venture capital investment cycle is 
explained. Then, the academic research performed on the subject is examined 
and possible areas of research are identified. 
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After having identified the research gaps that exist within the present literature, 
an overview of Indian economy, its financial system including capital market is 
presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the role of SMEs in the development 
of global economies and also in Indian economy and ascertains their problems. 
Then, we examine the evolution, present status, impediments and prospects of 
venture capital in India. It is important to note that this is the first-ever doctoral 
research on the subject in India. Therefore, no previous references were 
available to this research and most of the information came from a few scattered 
papers (Mitra, 2000; Dossani and Keeney, 2001), a postgraduate dissertation 
(Sarika, 1999), and two books written on the subject in the mid 1990s (Mishra, 
1996; Verma, 1997). 
Chapter 5 presents a brief theoretical framework followed by an extensive 
literature review that focuses on the previous studies related to the hypotheses of 
this research only. After surveying each segment of literature, hypotheses to be 
tested in Indian venture capital market were developed. There are a total of eight 
hypotheses that were developed in this chapter, out of which two relate to 
Valuation and three each are concerned with the Structuring and Monitoring 
parts of this research. 
Chapter 6 deals with the research methodology adopted for this research. This 
includes a discussion on various research techniques available and the most 
suitable one for this research. It discusses in great detail the instruments used for 
this research and explains how it was developed through a process of pilot 
studies and pre-tests. Then it explains the route to actual data collection and the 
response rate. This chapter also briefly discusses the statistical techniques used 
in the subsequent analysis. 
Chapter 7 presents a descriptive part of the results, together with the initial 
hypotheses test results. It begins with'an overview of the Indian venture capital 
industry and presents exact statistics, based on empirical evidence rather than 
conjecture or estimates used so far. This descriptive chapter also touches upon 
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areas that, though not directly connected to the hypotheses, were indirectly 
linked to them. For instance, after discussing valuation techniques, the discount 
rates used by venture capitalists in India were also ascertained. Similarly, as well 
as finding out the type of reports sought by venture capitalists for monitoring 
purposes, we also asked how that information was used. 
Chapter 8 identifies, if there are demographically triggered groupings of venture 
capitalists, by using cluster analysis and ANOVA. Chapter 9 uses Chi Square 
and Logistical Regression for assessing the statistical significance of 
demographic characteristics in implementing the Valuation, Structuring and 
Monitoring practices, and further revalidates the results of chapters 7. Finally, the 
conclusions and implications of this research are presented in chapter 10. 
The results of this study are expected to trigger further interest in academic 
research on Indian venture capital industry. They should also help the industry to 
evolve more cohesive and comprehensive Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring 
techniques that could lead to higher rates of success. The research will have 
implications for policy makers in developing an appropriate legislation or 
regulatory framework. Additionally, it will also serve as an important guide to 
existing players and new entrants. Also, entrepreneurs who are prospective 
users of venture capital or private equity will know precisely what capital 
providers look for in these three areas. This will minimize the rejection rate of 
new proposals and will reduce the time, presently taken, between the application 
for funding and disbursement of funds. 
Finally, this research may also be used for'lslamisingr the conventional venture 
capital practices. As appendix J illustrates, there are striking similarities between 
the cotemporary venture capital and the principles of Islamic Finance, a rapidly 
growing industry in the Muslim world. Therefore, some of the most controversial 
issues namely, fund structuring, discounting rates and the use of preferred stock 
are analysed in the light of Islamic financing principles. 
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CHAPTER 11 - VENTURE CAPITAL 
2.1 Introduction: 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have historically played a dominant role 
in the industrial evolution of both developed and developing countries. Folster 
(2000) argues that many countries support the creation of new firms, based on 
the presumption that the total number of jobs increases when a person moves 
from unemployment or regular employment to self-employment. Small firms have 
made a significant contribution in introducing innovative products, generating 
employment, payment of taxes to the Exchequer and so forth. Thus their share in 
the Gross Domestic Product has invariably been vital. Applauding the role of 
entrepreneurial enterprise as an engine of economic growth and the considerable 
public attention they garnered in the 1990s, Berger and Udell (1998) believe that 
'this focus stems from the belief that innovation - particularly in the high tech, 
information, and bio-technology areas - is vitally dependent on a flourishing 
entrepreneurial sector (p. 614). 
Against this background, this segment of the economy has faced acute problems 
in setting up new ventures and funding expansion - Chapter III discusses this in 
greater detail. Reid (1993) suggests that something prevents rapidly growing 
SMEs from maintaining their growth trajectories. Reid (1998) argues that an 
attempt to solve this problem through higher gearing increases exposure to risk, 
and may create vulnerability to debt-servicing crises. He further mentions the 
typical collateral related constraints and also the possibility of the lenders making 
a severe, pre-emptive move to force the enterprises into liquidation in case of a 
looming repayment crisis. Diamond (1991) points out that young firms, and firms 
with intangible assets, may need to be equity financed because their assets have 
little or no liquidation value. If they are financed by debt, their managers 
effectively give full control to the bank from the start. Shleifer and Vishy (1997) 
argue that, instead of giving control away to the bank, such firms often have 
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highly concentrated equity ownership by the entrepreneur and venture capitalists. 
Therefore, equity is considered better for the financial health of SMEs. 
Thus was born the concept of 'venture capital activity that is aimed primarily at 
SMEs' (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997; p. 16). 'The investment of venture capital 
funds in growing enterprises is a remarkable feat of financial engineering' (Barry, 
1994; p. 3). Venture capitalists provide equity financing rather than loans to 
young companies in exchange for part ownership of the company. Thus, 
entrepreneurs avoid interest payments and can achieve profitability more quickly 
(Biekpe, 2001). For venture capitalists, the realization of profits usually comes in 
the form of public listing or trade sale (Bleackley et al, 1995). 
Venture capitars niche exists because of the structure and rules of capital 
markets' (Zider, 1998; p. 132). Commercial banks and other lending institutions 
require an established track record and collateral before considering any 
application for funds. This attitude of financial institutions has always left a 
funding gap for potentially viable ventures with either insignificant collateral to 
offer or little history of success. Therefore, 'risk sharing and lack of funds drive 
entrepreneurs to seek venture financing' (Amit et al., 1990; p. 106). 
Once they invest, venture capitalists actively work with the company's 
management by contributing their business experience and industry knowledge 
gained from helping other young companies (Biekpe, 2001). Additionally, 
financial guidance and expertise is an important characteristic of venture capital 
financing (Fenn and Liang, 1998) that provided value addition to newly 
established projects in US and Western Europe so far. However, emerging 
market economies represent a further environment where venture capital is 
expected to play its due role in funding business enterprise (Karsai et al., 1998). 
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2.2 Definition of Venture Capital: 
"We define venture capital as an activity by which investors support 
entrepreneurial talent with finance and business skills to exploit market 
opportunities and thus obtain long term capital gains" (Shilson, 1984; p. 208). 
An influential UK venture capitalist and the founding editor of The Venture Capital 
Report (Reid, 1998) further added: "venture capital is invested in high-risk 
venture (typically new companies and new technologies)". 
Therefore the following characteristics emerge as the bedrock of venture capital: 
" Equity Financing; 
" Managerial assistance; 
" Rewards through capital gains; 
" Long term investment; and 
" Investment in young start-up companies. 
Since SMEs continue to face competition from larger corporations having 
financial muscle power, many governments felt the need to create a dedicated 
source for funding this sector. In 1931, the British government instituted a study 
led by Macmillan for ascertaining the funding problems small businesses face. 
The Macmillan committee published its report, during the depression in 1931, 
highlighting a perceived structural failure within the financial system which meant 
that unquoted small and medium sized firms requiring long-term investment 
capital were unable to afford an approach to the capital market and were poorly 
catered for by banks (Coopey, 1994). The study concluded that SMEs 
encountered serious difficulties in acquiring long term funding and equity capital. 
Similar studies carried out in the US between 1935 and 1940 arrived at an 
identical conclusion (Dominguez, 1974). In view of such authenticated reports, 
many developed countries in the West drew up plans to support SMEs in 
garnering risk capital. 
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2.3 History of Venture Capital: 
The broad concept of "venture capital' dates back for centuries (O'Shea, 1996). 
The roots of the venture capital industry lie as far back as the fifteenth century 
with the activities of merchant venturers who were active traders in the Far and 
Middle East where they also set up commercial enterprises (Reid, 1998). It is 
also believed that primitive venture capital was originally practiced in the Arabian 
Peninsula even in the pre-Islamic era. Cizakca (1995) finds the root of Venture 
Capital in the Islamic world. He argued that the Italians borrowed the Islamic 
version of Venture Capital 'Mudaraba concept', in the tenth century and it then 
spread throughout Europe. However, as discussed in Appendix J, Mudaraba 
offers some characteristics of venture capital, but differs in others. 
Although not operating in the form of Venture Capital' as such, the phenomenal 
growth of the German economy is also attributed to the venture-capital-like 
functioning of the German banking system. 'German banks are partners, often 
controlling partners, in many of the largest and most successful enterprises. 
Many of them have been nursed from their earliest beginnings by the banks, and 
largely owe their success to guidance received from them' (Foxwell, 1917; p. 
512). 
The men who direct the German banks are all the time in close touch with the 
iron and coal industries, the manufacturing and trading classes, and the ocean 
steam-lines (Bankers' Magazine, 1906). Not only have the banks promoted most 
of the industrial joint-stock companies, and retained part of their share capital, 
their managing directors remain members of the boards of these companies (The 
Economist, 1911). Thus, the German banks were not mere lenders or passive 
capital providers and it was consequently recognised that 'it was the close union 
between the financial expert and the captains of industry that gave German 
industry its remarkable efficiency' (Foxwell, 1917, p. 521). 
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2.4 Evolution of Contemporary Venture Capital: 
"The origins of the term 'venture capital' appear to lie with the American financier 
John Whitney. After World War II he set up a US$ 10 million fund, with the 
purpose of making risk investments. His partner Benno Schmidt suggested the 
term 'venture capital' over lunch, as best combining the sense of both risk and 
adventure, and Whitney approved it on the spot" (Reid, 1998; p. 17). However, 
Risk Capital in its institutional form came into existence in the US in 1946 with 
the formation of American Research and Development (ARD) by MIT President 
Karl Compton, Harvard Business School Professor Georges F. Doriot, and local 
business leaders (Gompers et al. 1998). In this, as opposed to private 
individuals, the firm provided risk capital for new and rapidly growing small firms, 
primarily in the manufacturing and hi-tech sectors (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). 
During the nineteenth century the Scottish investment trusts were leaders in 
providing private funds for investment companies engaged in high-risk ventures 
like railways and canals. But modem venture capital emerged in the UK in the 
1930s, when Charterhouse launched a specialist fund whose purpose was the 
provision of equity finance for fast-growing, new small businesses (Reid, 1993). 
While in US, the unprecedented success of J. H. Whitney and Company, and 
Payson & Tarsk was a major indicator to new entries in the Industry (Dominguez, 
1974). This trend led to radical change in the attitude of governments with regard 
to solving the problems of SMEs in mobilizing long-term risk capital and 
improving small-company-building-know-how (Dominguez, 1974; Bygrave et al, 
1992). As a result of its unprecedented success and overwhelming government 
support, the industry grew rapidly in the subsequent years. 
2.5 Spectrum of Venture Capital: 
The venture capital sector now forms an indispensable part of the present 
business and finance structure of economies. Broadly, there are four distinct 
ways in which venture capital investments are managed: 
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2.5.1 Business Angels: 
Angel investing is a process in which a wealthy person or group places funds in a 
venture without taking on the consulting role of venture capitalists (Barry, 1994). 
They invest relatively small amounts of equity in small firms primarily in order to 
gain financially but often also to participate in the growth of young ventures 
(Roberts, 1991). The role of angels declines sharply, however, at later stages of 
firm development when larger sums are typically required for undertaking 
expansion (Freear and Wetzel, 1990). 
Most of the informal investors in US have a preference for investing in high 
technology enterprises (Haar et al., 1988). Conversely, business angels have 
much more limited involvement in the financing of such firms in the UK. In 
addition, their US counterparts are less likely to finance start-ups (Mason and 
Harrison, 1994). The informal venture capital market in the USA is over twice as 
large as the private placement market and eight times larger than formal venture 
capital investments in terms of the amount invested (Gatson, 1989). 
2.5.2 Corporate Venture Capital: 
Corporate venture capital (CVC) or inter-firm investments are very common in 
the highly industrialised countries like US, Europe and Japan (Asset Alternatives, 
1996). In this form of venture capital, large cash-rich companies, typically multi 
national corporations, make equity investments in smaller, unlisted, privately held 
companies for financial rewards and strategic objectives (Seigel et al., 1988; 
O'Shea, 1996). 
The first corporate venture capitalist was probably Du Pont. It took a 38 per cent 
stake in General Motors in 1919 - one of its customers at the time (Rind, 1994). 
Over 100 US corporations were involved in indirect CVC, and corporations were 
still significant fund investors in 1988 (Winters and Murfin, 1988). 
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CVC investments are made both directly and indirectly. Direct investments are 
made when companies spot an investment opportunity on their own and then 
take the initiative to carry out due diligence. If the investment appears attractive 
from the standpoint of long term goals of the business, then often a minority 
stake is taken for the purpose of expanding markets, tying up raw material 
sources, blunting competition, product development etc (Reid, 1998). CVC units 
are often more interested in a particular strategic goal, such as having a window 
on new technology (Elango et al., 1995) or markets, than in rate-of-return 
(Gibson and Blake, 1992). In other instances, pure financial motives drive an 
equity investment in high potential young ventures. Ooghe et al. (1989) estimated 
that some 17 percent of formal venture capital was tied to CVCs. 
Indirect CVC typically takes shape when large organizations contribute to the 
corpus of an independent, professionally managed venture capital fund. In this 
category too, there could be sector specific funds backed by a corporate venture 
capitalist that can create future synergies for its business (Seigel et al., 1988). 
2.5.3 Formal Venture Capital: 
Within the venture capital array, the formal venture capital is the most researched 
and hence widely recognized segment. Though this may not be the largest 
segment in terms of fund size, it is certainly acknowledged as the most organised 
constituent of the private equity investment business. 
Development of entrepreneurial talent had been the original focus of the venture 
capital industry. As discussed above, it was found to be difficult for talented 
entrepreneurs to raise the requisite capital for setting up new ventures, due to 
their lack of proven track record and inability to offer collateral. 
Venture capital funds are often considered to be the dominant source of post 
start-up equity finance for growth oriented technology-based companies (Freear 
and Wetzel, 1990) and their role in providing finance for start-up companies has 
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also been identified (Rosenstein et at., 1989). Global proliferation of venture 
capital industry stemmed largely from the US where advanced technology firms 
such as Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Netscape and Sun Microsystems and a 
number of service firms including Federal Express, Staples and Starbucks 
(Gompers et at. 1998) were created through venture capital. Apple Computers, 
Data General, Intel, Prime, Tandem and Digital Equipment figured among the 
more spectacular success stories of venture capital investments (Clark, 1987). 
On the other hand, the industry has also been involved in some spectacular 
failures (Sahiman, 1990). Well known examples include Ovation Technology 
(Knights and Sahlman, 1986a), Osborne Computer, Ztel and Gavilan, where 
venture capitalists lost their entire investments (Sahlman, 1990). However, these 
failures did not deter the flow of funds into this sector and its growth continued 
unhindered. 
2.5.4 Social Venture Capital: 
Lately, due to a perceptible neglect of the social sector, there has been some 
interest in what can be described 'Social Venture Capital'. Recent estimates 
suggest that close to 40 percent of venture or venture like disbursements in the 
US - and more than half of early stage investments - came from "social" sources 
whose primary aim was not a high economic return (HBS, 1999). 
Wadell (1995) investigated nine venture capital organisations that took equity 
positions with socially guided as well as financial goals. He identified four 
emerging models: socially guided venture capital networks; socially guided 
private funds; Specialised Small Business Development Corporations; and Equity 
Community Development Corporations. Some of these investors also see 
themselves as making particularly valuable contributions to society by developing 
particular types of enterprises such as environmentally sensitive, or those that 
are employee or minority owned. Wadell analysed forty-nine deals executed by 
six such organisations to assess their financial and social outcomes. While 
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admitting lack of clarity in their approach, he concluded: 'These organisations 
clearly differ from other venture capital organisations. They have developed 
explicit missions, different investment profiles and have emerging different 
associational networks' (p. 337). 
European and Asian nations have also undertaken many similar initiatives. While 
their structures vary, the efforts have been predicated on two shared 
assumptions: (a) that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms, 
at least in certain regions and industries, and (b) that the government can identify 
firms where investments will ultimately yield high social returns (HBS, 1999). 
However, Lerner (1996) believes that many of the problems encountered by 
corporate venture programmes also bedevil social venture initiatives. Among 
them are the difficulty of balancing multiple objectives, the investors' frequent 
failure to appreciate the long-run nature of these investments and the struggle to 
design an appropriate compensation scheme. 
On the supply side, Cooke and Wills (1999) explored the extent to which social 
capital is advantageous to SME growth. They define social capital as communal 
property involving civic engagement, associational membership, high trust, 
reliability and reciprocity in social networks. They found that, in a sizeable 
proportion of programme-funded firms in Denmark, Ireland and Wales social 
capital building was associated with enhanced business, knowledge and 
innovation and performance. Similarly, Besser (1999) argues that businesses 
that support their local communities will be more successful. Their point is based 
on the premise that business support of the community will be recognised and 
rewarded by residents in their roles as customers, employees, professional 
service providers, suppliers, voters, bankers etc. This in turn will make socially 
responsible businesses more successful. He tested this hypothesis on a random 
sample of 1,008 small business owners and managers in 30 small Iowa 
communities. His findings showed that business success is significantly 
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associated with business operator's support for and commitment to the 
community. 
2.6 Global Venture Capital: 
Until the late 1970s, venture capital as an institution had primarily been a US 
phenomenon (Henderson, 1989). Shortly after World War II, a few wealthy 
families like the Rockefellers started financing emerging industries. The success 
of these pioneers began to attract the attention of many institutional investors to 
enter into the venture capital industry. 
'From beginnings in the US, they quickly traversed the Atlantic, spreading first to 
the UK then throughout Europe' (Wright et al., 1991; p. 1). In UK, the first venture 
capital entity, Investors in Industry (3i), was established in 1945 by the Bank of 
England (which held 15 per cent of its shares) and the major clearing banks in 
order to provide long-term finance to growing firms (Reid, 1998). The UK also 
registered venture backed success stories but not on the scale of the US. Some 
of the outstanding performers backed by 3i were Rodime, Xenotron, and Spring 
Ram (Clark, 1987). 
In a study of the European venture capital industry during the early 1980s, 
Tyebjee and Vickery (1988) concluded: "venture capital is as yet in its infancy in 
Western Europe... . the investment activity manifested by European venture 
capitalists has been relatively small" (p. 123). But this situation quickly changed 
and, between 1985 and 1991, British venture capitalists invested over £ 7.3 
billion to make the UK the largest European venture capital industry (Robbie and 
Murray, 1992). Between 1981 and 1984, aggregate European venture capital 
investments were about 22 per cent of US figures for the corresponding period. 
But, in 1988, more capital was committed to the combined venture capital pools 
in the UK and Europe than in the US (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). In 1989, 
there were 93 venture capital companies across Europe, registered with 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), managing £ 1.15 billion 
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(Financial Times: 30 November, 1989). But in 2000, EVCA represented venture 
capital companies that had invested an aggregate of 34.9 billion Euro over 10, 
440 companies (www. evca. com). In UK, although leading corporations are 
consolidating and shedding employees, a rash of high-tech companies funded 
with private equity were thought to be driving the country to unprecedented levels 
of prosperity unimaginable 30 years ago (Christensen et al., 2001). This situation 
has changed in the aftermath of a worldwide technology meltdown. 
Although Japan established three Small Business Investment Companies in 
1969, they did not become truly significant. The next stirrings in Japan were in 
early 1970s when a few private venture capital firms were formed. Various 
economic strains, mostly stemming from the 1970s oil crisis, coupled with lack of 
liquidity in investment exit routes, ended Japan's initial venture capital boom 
(O'Shea, 1996). A part of the reason for slower than expected growth in venture 
capital is: 'because the Japanese industrial and social context is so different from 
the American' (Clark, 1987; p. 27). In 1982, venture capital investment in Japan 
totaled approximately US$ 90 million and this amount went up to US$ 6 billion by 
1989 (Leinbach, 1991). Recently, the money available for private equity 
investment in Japan grew from $17.8 billion in 1995 to $25 billion in 1999 
(Christensen et al., 2001). 
In 1994, global venture capital represented over US$ 90 billion of assets 
(O'Shea, 1996). However, Persaud (2001) believes that cross-border private 
equity flows have already leapt from $268 billion in 1995 to $1.1 trillion in 2000. 
2.7 Venture Capital in Emerging Markets: 
World Bank figures show that 77 percent of the world population lives in 
developing countries (Schwartz, 1994). The late 1980s and early 1990s 
witnessed a massive expansion of venture capital activity that now has global 
presence across Europe, Asia and Australia. By 1990 more than half of all 
venture capital under management worldwide was outside the United States. 
15 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
It appears that venture capital is becoming a major variable in the new venture 
creation process in Asia (Scheela, 1994). The Asian venture capital pool 
increased from US$ 9.9 billion in 1988 to US$ 26.2 billion in 1993, implying an 
annual growth rate of 21.5%. Similarly, the cumulative investment increased from 
US$ 4.5 billion in 1989 to US$ 11.6 billion in 1993 at an annual growth rate of 
26.7% (AVCJ, 1994). Developing nations are increasingly seen as an attractive 
investment environment by private equity funds (HBS, 2000). In 1995, for the first 
time, private venture capital investments grew by a greater dollar amount in Asia 
than anywhere else. With US$ 33.4 billion under management at the end of 
1995, the pool of private equity in Asia had risen 27 percent in two years (Segal, 
1996). Thus, according to International Herald Tribune (November 14,1996), the 
growth is even more dramatic outside Japan. Money under management grew 40 
percent in 1995 alone. Some 70 percent of the funds are sourced from the US 
and UK (Karsai, et al., 1998). One source that is likely to become increasingly 
important for private equity funds is retirement savings in the developing nations 
themselves. East Asian nations have very high saving rates, often about 30 
percent of GDP (HBS, 2000). 
In Korea, the government has been supporting venture capital firms since the 
1980s as part of its program to develop high-technology industries. As a result, 
the number of formal venture capital firms had radically increased from only four 
in 1986 to 56, by 1991, managing an aggregate fund size of US$ 1.15 billion 
(Rah et al., 1994). 
In Taiwan, there were 29 venture capital firms in 1994, with the largest managing 
a fund size of US$ 44.5 million. The combined fund size managed by all the 29 
funds was US$ 150 million (Pandey and Jang, 1996). 
At the end of 1987, there were only four active venture capital firms in Singapore 
(AVCJ, 1988), but, by 1991, eighty venture capital firms existed (Economic 
Development Board, 1991). The Industry started in 1985 with US$ 100 million 
under management which increased to US$ 1.2 billion by 1991 (AVCJ, 1993). 
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Launching the first venture fund in 1984 with the value of an amount equivalent 
to US$ 5.5 million, Malaysia had 17 funds in 1994 managing an aggregate 
amount of US$ 175 million (Boocock, 1996). Even 'African governments are 
increasingly aware that venture capital investing is critical to the growth of their 
economies' (Biekpe, 2001; p. 10). 
However, the most successful experience to recreate Silicon Valley-style venture 
capital practice is Israel, where the government played a significant role in 
encouraging the growth of venture capital (Autler, 2000). A report prepared by 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2000) estimated the size of Israeli Venture capital 
industry in 1999 at over US$ I billion. 
Much of the interest in private equity investment in developing nations must be 
attributed to their economic progress over the past decade (HBS, 2000). While 
developed economies grew at an inflation adjusted annual rate of 1.9 percent 
between 1990 and 1995, emerging market economies grew at 5.2 percent 
(Deirde, 1995). Another critical factor in the growth of private equity investing in 
developing countries has been the perception of diminishing investment 
opportunities in the developed nations, particularly the US (HBS, 2000). 
The emerging market economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
represent a further environment in which venture capital has a role to play in the 
financing of business enterprise' (Karsal et al., 1998; p. 203). They believed the 
value of amounts already invested in Hungary was in the region of US$ 400 to 
500 million in 350 - 400 investee firms until 1995. Similarly, in Poland the venture 
capital under management was over US$ 750 million in 1996. Slovakia was 
found to be the most underdeveloped of the three countries with only US$ 96 
million in 1996. Table I-A below summarises the perceptible change that took 
place in emerging markets. Similarly, as figure 2-A shows, Asian venture capital 
volumes have increased three fold between 1998 and 2000. 
17 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Table 2.1: Capital Market related Indicators for Emerging Markets 
Indicator 1985 1990 1994 
Stock markets in developing countries 
Countries with functioning stock markets 31 36 58 
Number of listed domestic companies 8,916 12,541 17,115 
Capitalization US$ billion 171 612 1,929 
Capitalization as % of developed markets 3.8 6.9 14.6 
Value traded as % of capitalization ji] 25 35.1 55.2 
Number of new issues 1,112 2,714 
Value of new issues US$ billion jib 12.7 58.1 
International equity funds for emerging markets 
Number of funds 17 232 953 
Assets under management US$ billion 1.3 13.7 105.8 
As % of stock market capitalization 0.8 2.2 5.5 
Venture capital Industry 
South East Asia [2] 
Number of funds 1 - 123 
Capital under management US$ million 28 2,956 
Eastern Europe and FSU 
Number of funds - <10 84 
Capital under management US$ million - <150 4,500 
Source: Emerging Markets Data Base, IFC. Washington; Notes: [1] E)dudes Taiwan (China). 
[2] E )dudes Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan (China). 
However, threats accompany every opportunity. Several private equity investors 
reluctantly enter a developing market because of the scarcity of trained technical 
talent and lack of infrastructure. They also find intellectual property protection to 
be weak or the enforcement of these rights questionable (HBS, 2000). 
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Figure 2-A: Growth in Asian Venture Capital Industry 
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2.8 Academic Research in Venture Capital: 
'Empirical research on venture capital was virtually non-existent before the 
decade of the 1990s. It is not easy to do, mainly because of lack of data, but 
some good examples do now exist, and unanswered questions are available in 
abundance' (Barry, 1994; p. 11). Success stories of venture backed companies 
leading to substantial financial gains made by venture capitalists evoked interest 
in academic research in this area. Until the 1980s this subject failed to attract 
much research but since the end of 1980s, due to its importance in economic 
development, employment generation, exports and new product development, 
research on venture capital has exploded covering various aspects of this activity 
(Amit et al., 1990; Fiet, 1991; Lerner, 1994; Gompers et al., 1998; Wright et al., 
1999). 
Venture capital may seem such a practical subject that there is no need to 
approach it from the standpoint of theory. But Reid (1998) refutes this and adds 
that `a theory of venture capital would be a good organizing principle for 
channeling thoughts along consistent, orderly lines of reasoning' (p. 21). 
19 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
It is almost impossible to analyze all the areas that have been subjected to 
research in venture capital. Therefore, this section will briefly mention some of 
the areas researched in the past. However, the section on venture capital 
investment process, later in this chapter in general and chapter V in particular, 
will focus on the past studies that are relevant to this research. Cooper and 
Carleton (1979) focused on the partitioning of the final payoff, arguing for venture 
capitalists using a mix of debt and equity to minimize value loss. They believe 
that pure equity contracts are not an ideal policy. Chan (1983) focused on the 
role of venture capitalists as well-informed intermediaries, preventing the 
collapse of the market for outside equity caused by adverse selection. Chan et 
al. (1990) put forward a complete theory of venture capital contracting, 
emphasizing the investee's skills, and conditions determining the subsequent 
control of the investment. 
Amit et al. (1990) studied the relationship between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur from the principal-agent perspective. Under the assumption of risk- 
neutral investor and risk-inverse investee, they conclude that, if the investee's 
ability is common knowledge, risk sharing with the investor will inevitably follow. 
Similarly, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) examined how the venture capitalist as 
an inside investor resolves conflicts of interest and information asymmetries. 
However, the greatest research emphasis has been placed on the investment 
decision. Prominent work in this area has been Tyebjee and Bruno (1984a), 
MacMillan (1985), Roberts (1991) Fried and Hisrich (1994) and Boocock (1996). 
The portfolio of venture capital firms has also been studied in greater detail (Hutt 
and Thomas, 1985; Brophy, 1981; and Bygrave and Timmons, 1985). 
Among the other aspects of venture capital that have caught the attention of 
academic researchers are: Role of venture capital in the economy (Chan, 1983; 
Bygrave and Timmons, 1992); Adverse selection (Amit et al., 1990; Lerner, 
1994); Sources of information and risk avoidance (Fiet, 1991; Green et al., 1991) 
studied the geographic coverage of the venture capital industry and its 
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performance in various parts of the world. Wright et al. (1999) examined the role 
venture capital has played in executing management-led leveraged buy-outs. 
Gompers et al. (1998) identified the factors affecting venture capital fundraising. 
Cross-country studies have been conducted by O'Shea, (1996), covering twenty 
OECD countries, Manigart et al (1999) East European economies, and Knight 
(1993) encompassing Canada, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region. 
Besides numerous studies on virtually every aspect in US venture capital 
industry, country-wise academic research in other developed countries like 
Europe: (Tyebjee, 1988; Dennerlein, 1989; Roure, 1990; Ooghe et at., 1991; 
Wright and Robbie, 1991,1992,1996,1998,1999; Korea: (Rah, 1994); Japan: 
(Choy, 1990); Canada: (Fells, 1984; Knight 1988; McNaughton, 1991); New 
Zealand: (Norman, 1989 and Perry, 1991); Australia: (Ryan, 1991); Singapore: 
(Scheela, 1994) have been well received in academic and professional circles. 
Similarly, emerging markets studies like China: (Choy, 1990); Malaysia: 
(Boocock, 1996); Taiwan: (Pandey, 1996); Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: 
(Karsai et at., 1998); Israel: (Autler, 2000) and South Africa: (Biekpe, 2001) have 
demonstrated that venture capital has now grown into a truly global industry. 
However, the growth in venture capital activity has resulted in too much 
competition among the investors for good quality investment opportunities. This 
has also shifted the focus of investments by some investors from a very early 
stage of business cycle to a relatively late stage of investments providing 
exclusively expansion capital or buy-out funding (Wright and Robbie, 1998). As 
discussed below, this late stage phenomenon is called private equity rather than 
venture capital. 
2.9 Venture Capital versus Private Equity: 
As noted earlier, venture capital has traditionally been associated with equity 
investment in the form of seed capital for early start-ups engaged in research and 
development, product or market developments etc. However, O'Shea (1996) 
argues that 'many venture capital funds define their investment strategy 
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according to which investment stage they finance' (p. 19). Elango et al. (1986) 
argue that the basic difference between the venture capital firms who invest in 
later stage only and the rest is that the former place a much greater emphasis on 
accounting information because of its availability. Wright and Robbie (1998) 
contend that the early stage investors have no option but to rely on non- 
accounting information. In the US, start-up financing peaked in 1983, accounting 
for 43 per cent of the deals financed, then declined steadily from 1985 onwards 
and accounted for only 10 percent in number and 9 per cent in value terms 
invested in 1989 (O'Shea, 1996). However, with growth and change in the nature 
of business, demand for equity and equity based hybrid products like preference 
shares has given birth to a new phenomenon called private equity. 
In private equity, investors are willing to invest in mature, established companies 
in need of funds to augment working capital, expansion or diversification by way 
of acquisitions and refinancing of existing debt or equity (Wright and Robbie, 
1998). The private equity market has been among the fastest growing markets 
for corporate finance in the U. S. In the last fifteen years, the organized private 
equity market has grown from roughly US$ 4.7 billion to about US$ 100 billion 
while venture capital, during the same period, has grown from US$ 3 billion to 
US$ 90 billion (O'Shea, 1996). These private equity firms compete with 
traditional venture capital companies for investments in firms in financial distress 
and firms seeking buy-out financing. 
Bygrave & Timmons (1992) suggest that two factors have led to the 
transformation of the venture capital industry in U. S. These factors have replaced 
classic venture capital skills that add value in company formation, building and 
harvesting, with financial engineering know-how that concentrates on short-term 
gains. They used the terms venture and merchant capital, respectively. 
2.10 The Venture Capital Investment Process: 
The process of venture capital begins, as shown in the diagram below, much 
before the commonly believed starting point of deal origination With the formation 
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of the management team that has to raise funds from different investors' (Fassin, 
1998; p. 3). If the venture capital is an independent fund, then the process begins 
from the time venture capitalists develop their business plan and commence their 
fund raising activity by targeting long-term fund providers like insurance 
companies or pension funds (Hutchings, 1987). If it is a captive fund, sponsored 
by a bank or financial institution or it is corporate venture capital activity (Robbie 
and Murray, 1992), then their respective parents provide budgets in their long- 
term financial planning for such investments. They spend less time and effort on 
the fund raising activities although some internal lobbying is required to push 
their case through (Fassin, 1998). 
Source: Wright and Robbie, 1998; P. 535. 
However, the topics that have attracted most research on venture capital have 
focussed on the investment process after the venture fund has been established. 
At this stage, a typical venture capitalist goes thorough the following cycle: 
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2.10.1 Deal Generation: 
At the very outset of the venture capital investment process, it is crucial to 
generate financially viable deal flow (Lockett and Wright, 1999). This process is 
subjective and every venture fund has a distinct strategy for sourcing potential 
investment deals to meet their long-term goals with regard to sector, size of the 
project, location and stage of investment, etc. Also the received proposals must 
have the potential to generate target rates of return (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1985). 
The difficulties faced by venture capitalists because of entrepreneurs' search and 
decision process, and increased competition between venture capitalists serve to 
highlight the importance of a deal generation strategy (Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
Various intermediaries based networks like accountants, merchant bankers, 
stockbrokers, and business school alumni are reported to play a key role in the 
match making of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (Lloyd and Mason, 
1984; Storey et al., 1989). In some instances, governments may act as 
intermediaries, most notably by establishing networks which match individual 
investors with entrepreneurs (O'Shea, 1996). 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) argue that, even if venture capitalists open their doors 
for 'cold deals', without any introduction, they seldom invest in them. Deal 
generation is closely linked at the strategic level to a venture capitalist's 
preferences with respect to deal size as well as to the availability of information 
and the recruitment of venture capital executives with the specific skills to seek 
out transactions (Murray, 1995). However, a survey of eighteen largest UK 
venture capitalists by Cranfield (1990) shows that, in order to reduce the 
constraint of a deal flow controlled by third parties, a number of venture 
capitalists have embarked on direct marketing. Fassin (1998) reasons that, since 
venture capital is an intangible service that cannot be touched, heard or smelled 
by the client, venture capitalists use different marketing tools like public relations, 
advertising and proactive marketing research for ensuring continuous deal flow. 
Leveraged buy-outs have also emerged as a new source of business for venture 
capitalists in recent times. For instance, in 1989, buy-outs accounted for 61 
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percent of investment value made by British venture capital firms (Wright et al., 
1991). This upward trend continued and in 1995, they accounted for 73 percent 
in terms of value (BVCA, 1996). In the face of competitive pressure and 
diminishing returns, Thompson et al. (1997) found that venture capitalists are 
becoming proactive in identifying management buy-outs, investor led buy-out, 
and divestment candidates, resulting from corporate refocusing programmes. 
2.10.2 Initial Screening: 
Despite initial care in generating requisite deals, numerous unwanted proposals 
are received which are weeded out at the earliest possible stage, through a 
preliminary screening process, to save venture capitalists' time and costs. 
Manigart et al. (1997) argue that, due to possible agency problems caused by 
information asymmetry and moral hazard issues (theoretical details are 
presented in chapter 5), the screening of deals is extremely important. Therefore, 
all the deals received by venture capitalists go through a screening stage that 
enables venture capitalists to form an initial view about the project. Venture 
capital firms often screen as many as a thousand deals a year' (Fiet, 1995; p. 
556). Only about 10 percent of proposals reach the stage of detailed due 
diligence (Robbie and Murray, 1992). Most proposals are screened on the basis 
of the coverage and structure of business plan, concept of the project, details of 
entrepreneur and management team etc. (MacMillan et al., 1984; Dixon 1991). 
MacMillan et al. (1987) show that the most important criteria used by venture 
capitalists, at this stage, are entrepreneurial personality and experience, with less 
reliance being placed on market, product and strategy. However, in a follow up 
study by Fried and Polonchek (1993), venture capitalists were more concerned 
with market acceptance and less demanding of high rates of return and early 
exit. Fried and Hisrich (1994) conclude that venture capitalists use three generic 
screening criteria for investments: the viability and novelty of the project; the 
integrity, track record and leadership skills of management; and the possibility for 
high returns and an exit, before proceeding to detailed evaluation. 
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2.10.3 Due Diligence: 
After initial screening, a large number of proposals received are declined on 
several grounds including project concept, technology, entrepreneur's lack of 
proven track record, and unrealistic assessment of the market (Robbie and 
Murray, 1992). Then, venture capitalists perform extensive due diligence before 
investing. Thus, they minimize investment risk by getting to know the 
entrepreneur or the management team, the product, and the market potential 
presented in the business plan (Manigrat et al., 1997). 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) divide this stage into two phases and feel that progress 
from Phase Ito Phase II stems from the positive shift in the perception of venture 
capitalists in a given project. Phase I entails collecting additional information and 
comparing it with the business plan submitted by the entrepreneur. In Phase II, 
venture capitalists tend to develop `emotional attachment' to a proposal and this 
is where the second stage of evaluation begins. At this juncture, the amount of 
time and costs involved in a proposal rise leads to a shift in evaluation goals from 
looking at the possible factors of rejecting, to determining what the obstacles to 
the investment are and how they can be overcome. 
The process of venture capitalists' decision making for investment has evoked 
considerable interest from academic researchers. Most prominent among these 
studies are: Tybejee et al. (1984a); MacMillan et at. (1985); MacMillan et at. 
(1987); Hisrich (1990); Hall (1993); Rah (1994); Fried et at. (1994). All these 
studies have generally confirmed the findings of previous researchers, in that the 
weight given to various factors, and ranking assigned to them, in evaluation were 
quite similar. MacMillan et al (1985) argued that the evaluation characteristics 
can broadly be grouped in six categories: 
a. Entrepreneurs' personality; 
b. Entrepreneurs' experience; 
c. Product characteristics ; 
d. Market characteristics; 
e. Cash flows; and 
f. The venture team 
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This was also confirmed by a subsequent study by Boocock (1996). There is 
however very little evidence to suggest whether these criteria have turned out to 
be useful in making an investment successful. Only MacMillan et al. (1987) 
addressed this issue and studied the performance of the same set of venture 
capitalists that were interviewed earlier. 
The biggest deficiency noticed by later researchers is that the information 
gathered from venture capitalists was based on ex post data collection 
techniques. Hall et al. (1993) point out 'results could be biased due to 
inaccuracies in the recall ability of the venture capitalists, specially in trying to 
differentiate between the criteria that leads to success vis-ä vis those that lead to 
failure' (p. 26). However, a variety of issues broadly categorized as time 
restrictions, cost constraints and situational factors, may directly impact on the 
level of due diligence (Harvey and Lusch, 1995). 
2.10.4 Valuation: 
A valuation is only required for the proposals that are not rejected at the first 
stage (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Steier and Greenwood, 1995). Several 
sensitivities are run on the original business plan to determine different possible 
scenarios `because it is difficult to forecast future cash flows in the typically highly 
uncertain environment of a start up' (Wright and Robbie, 1998, p. 538). Evidence 
suggests that venture capital projects are typically valued by applying one or 
more valuation techniques to the financial and accounting information contained 
in the business plan submitted by management to the venture capitalist (Wright 
and Robbie, 1996). 
Valuation methods are also linked to the investment culture of a particular 
country. Manigart et al. (1997) suggest that the most widely used technique in 
the UK is the multiplication of past or future earnings with some price-earnings 
ratio. The same study concluded that in the Netherlands and Belgium the most 
commonly used valuation method is the discounting of future cash flows (DCF), 
and in France it is the book value of the net worth. 
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Besides these traditional techniques, Dixit & Pyndick (1995) proposed the 
methods used in Options theory. Substantial failure ratio in venture capital 
investments (and the subsequent diagnosis of asymmetric information as the 
main cause) moved researchers to explore options theory. The investor has no 
obligation to make a subsequent investment, but can wait until new information 
reveals the true nature of potential benefits. Since further investment is a right, 
not an obligation, the investor possesses a valuable option on the value of the 
investee. Therefore, this method seems promising under certain conditions. 
As mentioned earlier, most of the venture capitalists in practice use more than 
one method to determine the bidding price of a proposal. This stage leads to 
protracted negotiations on the entry price. 'This issue is often the largest 
financing hurdle for venture funds and owners to work through' (The Economic 
Times: 4 September, 2000). It invariably remains the effort of the investors to 
strike the deal at the lowest possible price because 'the value of the company 
determines the proportion of shares they receive in return for their investment 
and thus their ultimate return. It is important for entrepreneurs, too, because a 
valuation that is too low will lead to an excessive dilution of their share in the 
company' (Manigart et al., 1997; p. 30). Indeed 'the wrong price for a security 
does not affect firm value. It just transfers value from one security-holder to 
another' (Myers and Majluf, 1984; p. 213). 
2.10.5 Structuring: 
'Once a venture capital fund is raised, the venture capitalists must identify 
investment opportunities, structure and execute deals with entrepreneurial teams' 
(Sahlman, 1990; p. 503). Appropriate structuring of venture capital investment 
has important implications for the ability of venture capitalists to earn their target 
rates of return (Wright and Robbie, 1998). 'The deal needs to be structured so 
that the investor, investee and VC firms are all comfortable with their positions' 
(Gibson and Blake, 1992; p. 41). Structuring of a venture capital deal can broadly 
be classified into three categories: Investment product e. g. types of instruments 
used in making and controlling investment; specific covenants included in the 
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term sheet or the subscription agreement; and staging of investments for limiting 
the downside risk of an investment. 
Since some venture capital contracts protect venture capitalists against dilution 
of their stake in the venture in such instances, the cost of this transaction may be 
borne by the entrepreneur (Hoffman & Blakely, 1987). Bygrave (1987) believes 
that, to control risk, venture capitalists should seek to specialize in order to 
exploit their technical and product expertise. The specialization hypothesis 
implies venture capitalists will have portfolios that are less diversified across 
companies, industries and financing stages. 
Norton and Tenenbaum (1992), through a survey of 98 venture capitalists, 
examined how strategies to manage risk can affect the choice of investment 
product (equity, preferred stock and debt). They found that the most frequently 
used financing choice is preferred stock. In their follow up study, Norton and 
Tenenbaum (1993) reconfirmed that venture capital investors lean heavily toward 
the overall use of preferred stock, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of 
various risk, product, environmental and financial factors. They concluded that 
debt financing is most prevalent in deals involving taxable income, available 
collateral, and products that are "recession proof. Similarly, common equity 
positions are more prevalent in deals with a strong economic environment and 
where risk can be reasonably controlled. 
Venture capitalists use a variety of mechanisms to encourage entrepreneurs to 
perform and reveal the true picture of performance. The covenants cover 
staggering of financing into several rounds; basing the compensation of 
entrepreneur and senior functionaries on the value created ('equity rachets'); 
preserving mechanisms to force agents to distribute capital and profits; and 
amendments in the Articles of Association, requiring approval for certain actions 
to be sought from the venture capitalists (Sahlman, 1990). 
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2.10.6 Syndication: 
An equity syndicate involves a number of different venture capital firms taking an 
equity stake in an investment (Lockett and Wright, 1999). Syndication of deals, 
whereby a number of venture capitalists jointly participate in the equity funding 
under the direction of a lead investor, has been widely practiced in UK (Robbie 
and Murray, 1992). Muhammad (1999) believes that there are two primary 
reasons for which venture capitalists resort to syndication of investments in 
ventures they choose to participate in. First, they seek to diversify risk by sharing 
information about the investee company and capitalize upon the expertise of 
more informed co-investors in making and monitoring investment. Thus, 
investors tend to develop a peer group that also serves to generate deals for 
each other. Second, depending upon the life of each venture capital fund, if a 
close-ended fund is due for redemption, then the co-investors transfer their pre- 
mature investments to each other. This provides the easiest possible exit route to 
a venture capitalist for an investment that is not yet ripe for public listing or trade 
sale. Transferring equity to an inside investor reduces time and costs of due 
diligence for both buyer and seller. 
Bygrave (1988) also finds that an important reason for syndication is to share 
information to reduce uncertainty and this may be as important as spreading of 
financial risk. However, Manigart et al. (2000) found little evidence to support this 
view in their survey of the venture capitalists in the US and four European 
countries. The benefits must also be shared if one wishes to avoid a flood of bad 
projects (Ravid & Spiegel, 1997). However, Murray (1991a) argues that the 
popularity of large syndicates has decreased. This is partly due to disputes over 
the timing and method of exit but also a reflection of an increasingly competitive 
market. 
Virtually confirming Robbie and Murray's argument, Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1992) believe that syndicated deals are less likely to result in common equity 
financing. Syndication helps to spread financial risk but in common equity deals it 
also spreads control among several investors. To lessen inter-investor 
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disagreements among equity holders, the dilution of control through syndication 
is not a favorable option for venture capitalists' (p. 3). 
In his landmark research on syndication by venture capitalists, Lerner (1994a) 
used a sample of 271 private biotechnology firms. He concluded (p. 1) that 
'experienced venture capitalists primarily syndicate first-round investments to 
venture investors with similar levels of experience. In later rounds, established 
venture capitalists syndicate investment to both their peers and to less 
experienced capital providers. When experienced venture capitalists invest for 
the first time in later rounds, the firm is usually doing well. Syndication also often 
insures that the ownership stake of the venture capitalists stays constant in later 
venture stage'. Venture capitalists, may in effect, 'search over time for syndicate 
partners with whom they are able both to complete transactions and undertake 
effective monitoring' (Wright & Robbie, 1998, p. 543). 
2.10.7 Monitoring: 
'We need each other. We're in the same lifeboat; once we've cut the mooring and 
written the cheque and are rowing out to sea with the guy (sic), we can either pull 
in the same direction or we can hit each other over the head with the oars' (a 
venture capitalist quoted in Sapienza, 1989). 
It is important to choose the right entrepreneur, project and the price, but that is 
not the end of a venture capitalist's job. Gupta (1986) studied New Enterprise 
Associates, a venture capital firm founded in June 1978. It grew from 3 partners, 
2 offices, 6 portfolio companies, and $16.45 million in raised venture capital to 10 
partners, 5 offices, 90 portfolio companies, and $126 million in raised venture 
capital in 1984. It is not the largest venture firm nor does it give the highest 
returns to investors, but it has earned a reputation for strong, steady 
performance. He attributed the fund's success to its hands-on involvement in the 
management of venture capital investments - recruiting managers, monitoring 
cash flow, and finding potential customers. Its 10 partners sit on 75 boards of 
directors and represent a range of expertise, including operations, technology, 
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banking and retailing. Thus, an appropriate monitoring strategy ensures a 
rewarding relationship during the investment tenor. 
Shoebridge (1986) argued that, in the UK, instances of "hands-on" venture 
capitalist investments are increasing where a member of the venture capitalist 
company is appointed to the board of the recipient company. He found that there 
are three distinct, yet overlapping, roles played by this non-executive director. (1) 
duties pertinent to any non-executive director, including providing public relations 
advice, (2) monitoring duties owed to all investors, including requiring frequent, 
quality information about the company, and (3) special duties performed as a 
representative of the venture capitalist company, which add value to the 
company. Those duties involve commitment, time, expertise and money. 
Companies needing venture capital should not view hands-on directors as 
necessary evils but should view them as important new resources. Also a 
constant watch over the functioning of the project facilitates a quick change in the 
policy of the investor with regard to the relationship. Gompers (1995) states that 
venture capitalists periodically gather information and maintain the option to 
discontinue funding projects with little probability of going public. Gompers has 
even mentioned a few indicators that alarm a venture capitalist and lead to more 
frequent monitoring such as decreases in industry ratios of tangible assets to 
total assets, higher market-to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities. 
Mitchell et al. (1995) analyzed the key concepts of principal-agent to investigate 
influences on venture capitalists' accounting information requirements as used in 
their dealings with investees. They interviewed 20 leading venture capitalists, 
managing over 3/4 of all UK venture capital funds. The results established that a 
number of key concepts of principal-agent analysis are mirrored in the financial 
communication process between venture capital investors and their investees. 
They reveal the venture capitalists' appreciation of the dangers of moral hazard 
and information asymmetry (detailed theoretical discussion is presented in 
chapter 5). It is shown that, as a consequence, their information demands are 
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designed to provide safeguards through bonding arrangements. Such 
arrangements establish and define an information flow that can be utilized as the 
basis for frequent and regular monitoring. 
Rosentein et at (1993) studied the boards of directors of 162 venture capital 
backed high-tech companies in north California, Boston, and north and central 
Texas focusing on the composition of the boards, and board members' activities. 
The study found that the boards were small, increasing in size as the company 
progressed, and tended to be dominated by venture capitalists. Evaluation of 
CEOs is the primary focus of outsider board members, while monitoring financial 
performance, serving as a sounding board to the management, and 
recruiting/replacing the CEO are other important functions. 
Falconer et al (1997) gathered data on 12 venture capital companies and a 
similar number of their investee companies, focusing on accounting information 
system development. They found that investee's systems to meet the post- 
investment monitoring requirements of the investor are investigated during due 
diligence. Any upgrading that is thought to be necessary is then made a pre- 
disbursement condition. In an uncertain world, the efficacy of decision-making is 
heavily conditioned by the quality of information available to the entrepreneur. 
The study also lends credence to the argument that the strengths of the 
accounting package become most relevant when there is a requirement for 
unforeseen additional funds or re-financing. Such an event would probably imply 
some degree of contract re-negotiation, involving issues such as the realignment 
of equity stakes and the further refinement of the information interchange 
represented by the system. 
Communication is also recognized as an effective tool of monitoring venture 
capital investments. Sahlman (1990) noted, "venture investors visit each portfolio 
company an average of 19 times per year and spend 100 hours in direct contact 
(on site or by phone) with the company. Since each venture capitalist is 
responsible for almost nine investments and sits on five boards of directors, the 
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allocation of time to each portfolio company is considerable" (p. 508). Better, 
more frequent, and more open communications between entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists appear to result in more cooperative strategy choices 
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Similarly, research suggests that frequent 
interactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists ensure that any 
problems encountered when establishing relationships are solved quickly 
(Sapienza, 1992). 
2.10.8 Exit: 
Exit mechanisms are crucial for a healthy venture capital industry (O'Shea, 
1996). Appropriate timing and route of exit is essential for securing the venture 
capitalists' desired rate of return. 'Most money in venture capital is earned on 
firms that eventually go public' (Gompers et al., 1998; p. 156). Philip (1999) 
points out that Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are not the only exit avenues for 
venture capitalists. Selling out to another company is becoming the strategy of 
choice. However, venture capitalists still prefer to take their companies public 
because the public markets tend to pay more for stock than do sophisticated 
buyers in the trade (Fassin and Lewis, 1994). 'While in US and Canada, sales to 
portfolio investors are the most common exit route, in Europe trade sales and 
buy-ins and buy-outs are the most widely used' (O'Shea, 1996; p. 16). 
After studying investment realization in UK and France, Bleackley et al. (1995) 
conclude that IPOs are still the most preferred exit route available to the venture 
capitalists. However, too much reliance on this mode often delayed cashing out 
of investments due to lackluster primary capital markets. Therefore, venture 
capitalists began looking for alternative routes, resulting in selling their stakes to 
institutional investors and trade sales to corporate buyers seeking strategic 
acquisitions. Karsal et al. (1996) believe that the most common form of exit for 
smaller and more troubled companies appears to be sale of the venture 
capitalists' shares to the other owners of the business i. e., the entrepreneurs. 
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Gannon (1999) argues that, despite a red-hot market for venture backed IPOs, 
mergers and acquisitions abounded in the first half of 1999, refuting the notion 
that the rise in M&A activity in the past was due to a dull IPO market. Rather, 
sales of smaller companies to more established corporate entities increasingly 
have become a necessary part of today's business. Also 'most of the companies 
being acquired are healthy successful businesses. Fifteen years ago, most 
acquisitions were because the company couldn't go public' (Gannon, 1999; p. 3). 
This investment process has created a positive economic effect for the 
developed markets, and is poised to play a similar role in the developing 
economies. 
The next section briefly discusses the contribution of venture capital at the macro 
level of economies, notably job creation, export earnings, and technology 
development. 
2.11 Macro Economic Impact of Venture Capital: 
Venture capital is a key source of long-term funds to SMEs (O'Shea, 1996). 
However, this sector usually receives less support from the banks when it comes 
to raising funds. Despite this limitation, SMEs have worldwide played a significant 
role in the economic expansion of both developed and developing countries. 
Coopers and Lybrand (1993) studied venture capital backed firms in both France 
and the United States and found that, in comparison to more established 
corporations, these younger enterprises produced far more jobs for equivalent 
equity investment. These companies also generated over three times more 
export sales per dollar of equity. A survey conducted by the Dutch employer 
federation VNO produced similar results in the Netherlands (VNO Survey, 1994). 
An effectively utilised inventory of venture capital is a necessary precondition for 
growth and development (Hoffman, 1972). Advances in technology and science 
are occurring at a greater pace today than at any other time in history. About 85 
percent of all the scientists who have ever lived are alive today (Swartz, 1991). 
There is an increased global awareness that a modem economy cannot reach its 
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full potential without nurturing the innovation of its entrepreneurs, and that 
realisation enhances the prospects for venture capital (Schwartz, 1994). 
Venture capital backed start-ups are an important source of innovation and 
technological development and serve as a major source of new wealth creation 
in the United States (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Similarly, start-up companies 
backed by venture capital are acknowledged as having the greatest potential for 
success of all new businesses in the United States (Mairer and Walker, 1987). In 
fact, venture capital backed initial public offerings have accounted for one third of 
the market value of all IPOs in the US each year (Sahlman, 1990). 
In contrast to the Fortune 500 companies, which, on average, consumed US$ 
59,510 of equity capital per new job, venture-backed companies required just 
US$ 42,914 per job. Their labour force comprises more highly skilled 
professionals (53%) than does the labour force in general (13%), and they 
employ far fewer administrators (10%) than the Fortune 500 (25%). These 
companies also generated nearly four times more export sales per dollar of 
equity than the Fortune 500 companies (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). 
Historically, in the US, these ventures have created approximately 230,000 jobs 
and have spent over US$ 5 billion on research and development annually 
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1991). For example, from 1991 through 1995, U. S. 
venture-backed companies created new jobs at a rate of about 34 percent 
annually, while Fortune 500 companies reduced jobs at a rate of about 4 percent 
annually. During the same period, venture-backed companies' revenues 
increased 38 percent while Fortune 500 companies' revenues increased only 3.5 
percent (Biekpe, 2001). Even in terms of providing returns to investors, venture 
capital has beaten all other investment avenues in the US, as shown in figure 2- 
B below: 
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Figure 2-B: American Venture Capital Generates Higher Returns 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
Q 
ý\ 
` o*ý 
Sý Jam, ý° -oma F 
G oý 5'` qtQ ýý' 0° 0° 
55 
``'p 
lea ez 10 ec1 
J ý. \I GoýQ <<o 
Average Annual Returns 1945-1997 (%). Sources: Morgan Stanley Research; Dimensional 
Fund Advisors; Hobotson Associates; National Association of Retailers; FactSet Research 
Systems and Venture Economics 
The global economic downturns during the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions. Large multinational corporations increase 
profit margins essentially by reducing costs in the form of layoffs. Simultaneously, 
governments are rapidly pursuing privatization programmes for public sector 
enterprises and thus curtailing their role as major employers (Frydman et al., 
1993). The World Bank estimates that 80 countries in recent years have made 
privatization a primary public policy concern. More than 7,000 large-scale 
privatizations have been undertaken, at an annual rate of US$ 25 billion 
(Megginson et al., 1994). Many of these newly privatized enterprises are 
undercapitalized and desperately need to modernize. The simple distribution of 
shares to employees or others will not solve their need for financing. In many 
cases the national capital markets are not well developed, and access to offshore 
markets is confined to the largest firms. Consequently, governments and the 
private sector are turning to private equity to fill the investment gap (HBS, 2000). 
Also, with the reduced opportunities for employment in larger companies and 
government, the attention has turned to self-employment and small firms as 
being an important source of new jobs. Entrepreneurship has a vital role to play 
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in creating them. In some countries, such as Canada, an important proportion of 
all new employment growth in the first five years of the 1990s came from self- 
employment and micro-enterprises (Ernst and Whinney, May, 1994). In the 
United States, for instance, the very smallest firms - those with between one and 
four employees - created 450,000 jobs in 1995, or 35% of the jobs created in that 
year (Sergio, 1998). A similar situation occurred in England and to a smaller 
extent on the continent (Fassin, 1998). 
Besides innovation in high-tech industries and job creation, venture capital 
investors are specifically targeting socially oriented goals in the US. 'Venture 
capitalists in the social investment tradition are sometimes referred to as "social 
purpose" equity investors. Some of these investors see themselves as making 
particularly valuable contributions to society by developing particular types of 
enterprises such as environmentally sensitive ones or ones which are employee 
or minority-oriented' (Waddell; 1995; p. 324). 
The first ever survey conducted by the British Venture Capital Association to 
assess the impact of venture capital on the UK economy concluded that it has 
contributed significantly to the economic growth and global competitiveness of 
the UK. Also, venture capital backed enterprises outperformed leading UK 
companies in terms of average annual growth rates in sales, revenue, pre-tax 
profits, total net assets and job creation (BVCA, 1996). Such outstanding 
contributions made by the venture capital industry motivated many developing 
countries in Eastern Europe and Asia to lay the groundwork for promoting this 
sector and remove major hurdles in its development. 
In India too, SMEs have played their due role in the economic growth since 
independence. About 3 million SMEs employing nearly 16.7 million people, 
account for 35% of India's exports and 40% of Industrial manufacture 
(www. sidbi. com). Therefore, 'the role of small firm finance in financial system 
architecture is just beginning to attract research attention' (Berger and Udell, 
1998; p. 614). 
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2.12 Conclusion: 
After pointing out the significance of a flourishing entrepreneurial sector, this 
chapter defined Venture Capital' as primarily long-term, value-added, equity 
investments in young start-up companies. Then, four different ways in which 
venture capital investment takes place (namely Business Angels, Corporate 
Venture Capital, Formal Venture Capital, and Social Venture Capital) were 
explained, followed by the development of this industry in both the developed 
and the emerging markets. 
Major areas of academic research were briefly reviewed, and the difference 
between 'Private Equity' and Venture Capital' elaborated. Academic research 
has divided the venture capital investment process into seven distinct stages, 
from deal 'Origination' to 'Exit'. Each of these stages was discussed in the light of 
existing research., Finally, the macro economic contribution of venture capital for 
various economies in terms of job creation, export earnings and technology 
developments was presented. 
India is an emerging economy with a relatively nascent venture capital industry. 
In the knowledge of this researcher, only Sarika (1999) has studied the Indian 
venture capital industry from a purely academic perspective. She examined the 
difference in the screening techniques between foreign and Indian venture capital 
companies. Sarika et al. (2000) identified Structuring and Monitoring of venture 
capital as potential research areas in India. Thus, the next chapter will begin with 
an overview of the recent history of Indian economic growth. This will be followed 
by a brief examination of the evolution and current status of its financial system 
including the venture capital sector. 
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CHAPTER III - INDIAN ECONOMY AND FINANCE 
3.1 Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, the history, development and the process of venture 
capital was discussed. The role this mode of finance has played for the macro 
aspects of various economies was also reviewed. It was concluded that the 
horizon of academic research on venture capital is now expanding to emerging 
markets in Eastern Europe and South Asia. In this chapter, major macro 
economic issues concerning the Indian economy, prior to examining the 
evolution and present status of its financial system will briefly be reviewed, as the 
'economic and financial environment forms the backdrop to the formation of the 
venture capital industry' (Dossani and Kenney, 2001; p. 8). 
3.2 Indian Economy: 
India has a long history of economic development, beginning from the rule of 
Mughal dynasty, through to the British rule between 1757 and 1947. During the 
two hundred years of British rule, India experienced roller-coaster eco-political 
developments (Deodhar, 1998). Here, economic developments since 1947 will 
be examined to determine what India has gained or otherwise on the economic 
front. 
The triad of democracy, socialism and economic planning has been declared the 
cornerstone of India's economic and political philosophy ever since her inception 
in 1947 as an independent sovereign state. Since 1950, India's approach to 
economic development has been within a framework of planning. But the 
centralized planning in India has not been equated with the suppression of 
private enterprise. Although there is large public sector, India's basic approach to 
economic organization has been that of a mixed economy (Balasubramanyam, 
1984). 
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The formation of a Planning Commission took place in March, 1950 (Agarwal, 
1997). This is supposedly an independent, macro economic planning vehicle. 
The Planning Commission was created to guide the economy in accordance with 
the socialist pattern of society (Joshi and Little, 1994). The Commission sets up 
Five-year Plans. targeting 'basic objectives of growth, employment, self-reliance 
and social justice' (Dutt and Sundaram, 2000: p. 241). As a result of periodic 
review, necessary directional changes are affected to take account of new 
opportunities and challenges. India has had 9 successive plans since 1950. 
The average rate of growth of net national product per annum between 1950 
and 1980 was 3.5 per cent and was comfortably ahead of the population growth 
rate of around 2 per cent per annum (Balasubramanyam, 1984). Due to the 
socialist pattern of economic planning, the economic responsibilities were largely 
shared by the government with a fairly sheltered private sector. 
Consequently, as indicated in figure 3-A, GDP at factor cost has failed to 
demonstrate any specific growth pattern. Beginning from 2.3 per cent in 1951-52, 
it touched a high of 7.6 per cent in 1958-59 before dipping to -3.7 per cent in 
1965-66, the year of Indo-Pak hostilities. Again, in 1975-76, it registered a growth 
rate of 9 per cent before going negative to -5.2 percent in 1979-80. This decline 
was linked to the domestic unrest caused by the imposition of emergency rule by 
the Congress government led by former Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi. 
Interestingly, this was a turning point. India has never since witnessed a negative 
growth, while touching an all time high of 10.6 percent in 1988-89. Since 1993- 
94, the growth rate has been consistently above 6 percent, barring 1997-98 when 
it declined to 5 per cent. With five governments having succeeded'one another in 
the past two years (Daneels, 1998), the slowdown in the overall rate of growth of 
GDP from 7.8 percent in 1996-97 to 5 percent in 1997-98 and then improving 
marginally in 1999-2000 to 5.9 percent was therefore not surprising (for more 
information see Economic Survey of India, 1999-2000). 
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Figure 3-A: GDP At Factor Cost - Growth Rate (%) 
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India had historically been an agrarian based economy and even after its 
independence, the share of agricultural output dominated the GDP structure. The 
share of agriculture and allied activities is, however, declining since 1947 as it 
stood at 59 per cent in 1950-1 and came down to 44 per cent in 1975-6 and 
further down to 37 percent in 1979-80 (RBI, 1980-1). In 1989, it accounted for 
only 30 per cent of Net Domestic Product (CSO, 1991) and 30 percent of GDP in 
1994 (World Development Report, World Bank, 1996). While the share of the 
manufacturing and services sectors has increased from 9.93 per cent and 26.6 
percent respectively in 1950-1 to 13.80 per cent and 36.27 percent respectively 
in 1975-6 (RBI, 1980-1). Table 3.1 illustrates that the GDP composition between 
1995 and 1999 has almost remained unchanged. Also, these figures do not paint 
an encouraging picture when compared with other advanced countries and also 
with regional rivals China and Pakistan as shown in table 3.2 below. Table 3.3 
shows major sectoral growth rates since 1974. 
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Table 3.1: Percentage Distribution of GDP Composition (1995 to 1999) 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
1995 33 43 24 
1996 30 46 24 
1997 31 46 23 
1998 29 47 24 
1999 29 46 25 
source: i ne tconomic burvey or inaia t1aaa--uuu) 
Table 3.2: International Comparison of GDP Composition (1994) 
Country Agriculture Industry Services 
U. S. A. * 2 26 72 
Canada* 3 30 67 
Belgium 2 31 67 
U. K. * 2 32 66 
Japan 2 40 58 
China 21 47 32 
India 30 28 42 
Pakistan* 26 24 50 
Sri Lanka* 23 25 52 
Rrigures of uur uistndunon are or i aas; source: vvona manic, vvures ti aaz) ana (1 uvo) 
Table 3.3: Average Sectoral Growth Rates 1974 -1997 
Sector 1974 - 79 
V Plan 
1980 - 85 
VI Plan 
1985 - 90 
VII Plan 
1992 - 97 
VIII Plan 
Basic Industries 8.4 8.3 7.4 6.8 
Capital Goods Industries 5.7 7.1 15.7 8.9 
Intermed. Goods Industries 4.3 6.2 5.5 8.5 
Consumer Goods Industries 5.5 6.5 6.6 6.6 
(a) Durables 6.8 15.2 12.1 13.2 
(b) Non-durables 5.4 5.3 5.4 4.9 
source: ministry of inaustry, rianadooK of inaustriai statistics (lauf). 
As indicated in figure 3-B, both industrial and services sectors have registered a 
significant growth over the last six years. However, for a country that generates 
28 percent of its GNP from agriculture and only 46 percent from industry 
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(Ramachandran and Ramnarayan, 1993), rapid industrial development largely 
depends upon the smooth and swift availability of cheap credit (Gouri, 1996). 
Figure 3-B: Sectoral Growth Rate 
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Though privatization of the Indian economy is continues to be vigorously mooted, 
such initiatives have been one of the biggest failures of Indian economic reforms 
(Gouri, 1996). As table 3.4 shows, privatization efforts have fallen way below 
annual targets. Federal budget 1999-00 earmarked five Public Sector Enterprises 
for partial privatization, envisaging to raise Rs. 100 billion, but owing to political 
uncertainty, only Rs. 14.79 billion was raised up to 31.12.1999. 
Table 3.4: Disinvestment in Public Sector Undertakings (Rs. Million) 
YEAR Target Achievement 
1991 - 92 25,000 30,380 
1992 - 93 25,000 19,130 
1993 - 94 35,000 NIL 
1994 - 95 40,000 48,430 
1995 - 96 70,000 3,620 
1996 - 97 50,000 3,800 
1997 - 98 48,000 9,020 
1998 - 99 50,000 53,710 
1999 - 2000 100,000 14,790* 
Source: Economic Survey of India 1999 - 2000 
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3.2.1 Employment: 
India is an under-developed though a developing economy. The nature of 
employment, therefore, sharply differs from the one that prevails in industrially 
advanced countries. There has been change in the sectoral composition of the 
employment structure during the period 1972 to 1987. While 74 percent of the 
workforce was engaged in agriculture in 1972-73, its share in 1987-88 came 
down to about 66 percent. Correspondingly, the shares of the secondary sector 
and the tertiary sector have increased accounting for 15 percent and 19 percent 
of the workforce respectively (Dutt and Sundaram, 2000). 
On the basis of the data collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation 
(NSSO) every 5 years, estimates of growth of employment for the 15 year period 
(1972-73 to 1987-88) have been prepared. During this period, employment is 
estimated to have grown at the rate of 2.21 percent per annum. Table 3.5 shows 
growth rates of employment in organised sector - both public and private - 
between 1991 and 1998. 
Table 3.5: Growth rates of Employment in Organised Sector (%) 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
1991 1.52 1.24 
1992 0.80 2.21 
1993 0.60 0.06 
1994 0.62 1.01 
1995 0.11 1.63 
1996 (0.19) 5.62 
1997 0.67 2.04 
1998 (0.09) 1.72 
bource: manning commission (1 J9 ). 
On the other hand, table 3.6 reflects a miserable picture of educated youth, in 
search of employment. Although the rate of employment has a positive co- 
relation with industrial growth, a corresponding look at tables 2.3 and 2.5 clearly 
shows that employment has not risen at the rate of industrial growth. 
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Table 3.6: No. of Job-seekers Registered with Employment Exchanges (Figures in 00,000s) 
December Educated Unskilled Total 
End Matriculate Higher 
Secondary 
Graduates 
and Post 
Graduates 
Total Manual 
laborers 
and others 
1961 4.63 0.71 0.56 5.90 12.43 18.33 
(78.5) (12.0) (9.5) (100) 
1971 12.97 6.05 3.94 22.96 28.04 51.00 
(56.5) (26.3) (17.1) (100) 
1981 50.08 23.25 16.85 90.18 75.66 165.94- 
(55.5) (25.8) (18.7) (100) 
1991 131.11 55.16 38.07 224.34 138.66 363.00 
Note: Figures in brackets represent percentages of total educated unemployed 
Compounded Annual Growth rates (%) 
1961-71 10.9 23.9 21.5 14.6 8.5 10.8 
1971-81 13.4 13.1 14.5 13.5 11.1 12.3 
1981-91 10.1 9.0 8.5 9.5 4.6 8.15 
source: tenire Tor monitoring inaian economy, 1 aas 
The goals of planning emphasize a steady annualized growth rate of about 5 to 6 
percent, ......., a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, a balanced 
pattern of regional development, lesser dependence on foreign aid by pursuing 
policies of export promotion and expansion of basic, heavy industries with the 
object of building an industrial base of the economy (Agarwal, 1997). Dutt and 
Sundaram (2000) believe that'there is no doubt that a judicious and harmonious 
process of development requires a balancing of these objectives. More and more 
expert opinion is veering round the view that an employment oriented strategy of 
industrial development provides the best answer to the challenge of 
unemployment and under-employment posed to an under-developed economy 
like India' (p. 393). Given the track record of SMEs in generating more 
employment, a venture capital backed SME oriented policy can partially solve 
this low level of employment problem. Table 3.7 below shows that the growth in 
the industrial labour force in India is lagging behind compared to even its smaller 
neighbors. 
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Table 3.7: Percent Distribution of Labor Force 
Country Year Agriculture Industry Services 
India 1980 70 13 17 
1995 64 16 20 
Pakistan 1980 62 15 23 
1995 56 20 24 
Sri Lanka 1980 52 18 30 
1995 49 21 30 
China 1980 76 14 10 
1995 74 15 11 
UK 1980 3 38 59 
1995 2 29 69 
Japan 1980 11 35 54 
1995 7 34 59 
USA 1980 3 31 66 
1995 3 28 69 
, source: vvoria ueveiopment rceport (1 gut) 
3.2.2 Inflation: 
Many transitional economies have been confronted with relatively high levels of 
inflation. This results mainly from pressure from the public sector to fund large 
government budget deficits (Herms and Lensink, 2000). In India, a proper study 
of price movements and the value of the rupee since 1950-51 requires the 
existence of wholesale price index (WPI) of all commodities with 1950-51 as the 
base year (Agarwal, 2000). Although the Government of India launched such a 
price index, it abandoned the series in the mid sixties, only to start a new series 
with 1960-61 as the base year. In fact, according to Dutt and Sundaram, (2000), 
'in its anxiety to prevent people from making a real comparison of the continually 
rising price level and rapidly declining purchasing power of the rupee since 1950- 
51, the Government has been changing the base year every decade - from 1950- 
51 to 1960-61, later to 1970-71 and finally to 1981-82' (p. 419). The usual plea 
taken by the Government is that the new series has a considerably larger 
coverage of items, grades and markets and that it is also based on a large 
number of quotations. Due to changes in the base every decade, it is untenable 
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to make any valid and broad comparison of price movements since economic 
planning was introduced in 1950-51. 
One of the declared objectives of the First Plan was to combat inflationary 
pressures. Aided by bumper crops, the first plan virtually succeeded in attaining 
this objective. This, coupled with the favorable movement of prices, encouraged 
the Government to launch still more elaborate plans and undertake a still greater 
degree of deficit financing. Throughout the Second Plan period, there was a 
gradual and steady rise in prices; the price level rose by 20 percent by 1965 
(Agarwal, 1997). The price position during the Third Plan deteriorated badly. 
Table 3.8: Price Movement during the Sixth Plan (1970 - 71 = 100) 
Year WPI Rate of Inflation 
1979-80 218 - 
1980-81 256 17.4 
1981-82 281 9.8 
1982-83 289 2.9 
1983-84 316 9.4 
1984-85 228 7.0 
Table 3.9: Price Movement since 1990 (1980-81 =100) 
Year WPI Inflation Rate 
1990-91 183 10.3 
1991-92 208 13.7 
1992-93 229 10.1 
1993-94 248 8.4 
1994-95 275 10.9 
1995-96 296 7.6 
1996-97 315 6.9 
1997-98 330 4.9 
1998-99 355 7.5 
Source: Economic Survey, 1998-99 
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The Chinese invasion of India towards the end of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan conflict 
in 1965 and the consequent hike in defense expenditure together with the 
serious famine of 1965-66 were responsible for a rapid rise in prices. The upward 
price movement continued throughout the Fourth Plan (1969-74). The second 
Indo-Pak war in 1971 resulted in large influx of refugees from Bangladesh, 
widespread failure of crops due to lower than average monsoon, and an increase 
in crude oil prices were some of the contributors to galloping inflation (Dutt and 
Sundaram, 2000). While table 3.8 captures the price movement during the Sixth 
Plan, table 3.9 reflects the price movement since 1990. 
It is virtually impossible to single out one factor for the persistent price rises in 
India. Some of the key factors are mounting government expenditure, deficit 
financing, an increase in money supply and, last but not least, the role of 
unaccounted money also called black money. The total expenditure of both 
Central and State Governments had risen from nearly Rs. 7.40 billions in 1950- 
51 to Rs. 370 billion in 1980-81 and nearly Rs. 3,812 billion in 1997-98 (Dutt and 
Sundaram, 2000). Table 3.10 shows deficit financing in India since 1981-82 while 
table 3.11 depicts money supply and monetary resources with the public. At the 
same time, it is estimated that income tax evaders and black-marketeers had 
approximately Rs. 5,000 billion unaccounted money in 1997-98 (The Economic 
Times, November 1999). While the depreciating Indian currency as a result of 
persistent inflation is making India exports competitive, this phenomenon is also 
partly responsible for keeping long-term investors capable of bringing in Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) mainly through venture capital at bay. 
Table 3.10: Deficit Financing in India since 1981-82 (As percent of GDP) 
Year Revenue deficit Fiscal deficit 
1981-82 0.2 5.4 
1990-91 3.5 8.4 
1995-96 2.7 5.5 
1997-98 3.3 6.3 
1998-99 (Revised) 3.8 6.5 
uce; i erne r inance Lommission 
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Table 3.11: Money Supply and Monetary Resources with the Public (Rs. Million) 
Year Money Supply with the 
Public (M1) 
Aggregate Monetary 
Resources (M3) 
1970-71 73,400 109,600 
1980-81 231,200 553,600 
1990-91 927,700 2,788,100 
1997-98 2,672,220 8,253,900 
, source: Keserve ttanK of inaia, tteport on currency ana t-inance, i i'-uti voi. n 
3.2.3 Foreign Direct Investment: 
One of the foundations of the new industrial policy has been to create a 
congenial environment for foreign investors and accelerate FDI flow into the 
economy. FDI is considered to be a safer way to attract capital compared to 
Portfolio Investment (PI). The primary reason is that FDI is long-term compared 
to PI and there is little fear of capital flight. Mutual Funds invariably invest in PI 
while Venture Capital is always in the form of FDI. Table 3.12 indicates sector- 
wise approvals of FDI between August 1991 and August 1999. The table shows 
clearly that more than half the amount approved (57 percent FDI) is for the 
infrastructure sector. The consumer sector has been a distant second at 12.9 
percent, while in terms of number of approvals, capital goods and machinery top 
the list at 3221, followed by consumer goods, during the same period. 
Table 3.122 Sector-wise Annrnvals of FDlmbetween 1991 and 1999 (Rs. Million) 
SECTOR No. of Approvals Amount Approved Sectoral Share 
%a 
Infrastructure 1353 1163840 57.7 
Capital goods 3221 218480 10.8 
Consumer goods 1786 259610 12.9 
Miscellaneous 1532 178790 8.9 
Services 1665 197610 9.8 
Strategic goods 1 30 0 
TOTAL 9568 2018360 100 
source: tconomic Survey oT inaia iu- zuuo 
The alarming aspect is not approvals but the actual inflow that unfortunately 
paints a bleak picture. Table 3.13 provides annual break down of FDI approvals 
against actual flows since 1991. It is disheartening to note that, barring 1991 and 
1998, the actual inflow has lingered around 20 percent of the approvals. 
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Table 3.13: Foreign Direct Investment in India: Actual Flows vs Approvals (Rs. Million) 
Year Approvals Actual Inflow Percentage of inflows 
against approvals 
1991 7390 3510 47.7 
1992 52560 6750 13.1 
1993 111890 17860 16.1 
1994 135900 30090 22.1 
1995 374890 67200 18.7 
1996 394530 84310 21.4 
1997 571490 120850 21.1 
1998 287830 91160 32 
TOTAL 1938480 421730 21.7 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 1999. 
Therefore in the global context, 'it is worrying to note that India's share in 
developing countries inflow declined from 1.9 percent in 1997 to 1.4 percent in 
1998' (Economic Survey, 1999 - 2000; p. 101). It is interesting to note that, 
despite being a rapidly growing industrial nation, and having achieved a 
consistent absolute growth, India has never attracted more than 2 percent of the 
total FDI flow into the developing countries. Table 3.14 shows India's FDI 
investment against its regional rivals. Low level of FDI is also one of the reasons 
for an uncomfortable Balance of Payments situation in India. 
Table 3.14: Foreign Direct Investment in some of the Developing Countries (US$ Million) 
COUNTRY 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
China 11156 27515 33787 35849 40800 44236 45460 
India 233 550 973 2114 2426 3351 2258 
Indonesia 1777 2004 2109 4346 6194 4673 -356 
S. Korea 727 588 809 1776 2325 2844 5143 
Malaysia 5183 5006 4342 4178 5078 5106 3727 
Philippines 228 1238 1591 1478 1517 1222 1713 
Thailand 2114 1805 1364 2068 2336 3733 6969 
TOTAL 51108 78813 101196 106223 135343 172533 165936 
India's Share (%a) 0.4 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.4 
source: wona investment Keport, unites Nations, ii 
Given the characteristics of PI and FDI, it is more advantageous for developing 
countries like India to attract FDI than Pl. This form of investment will provide 
more long-term growth and employment against PI that is often abused by 
speculators and leads to instability in the capital markets. 
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3.2.4 Balance of Payments: 
The balance of payments of India is classified into (a) balance of payments on 
current account, and (b) balance of payments on capital account. The former 
includes: (1) visible trade relating to imports and exports; (2) invisible items 
namely receipts and payments for services like shipping, banking, insurance, 
travel etc.; and (3) unilateral transfers such as donations. 
Table 3.15: Balance of Payments Summary 1990 - 2000 (US$ million) 
1990-91 1993-94 1995-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
Exports 18477 22683 26855 32311 34133 35680 84298 
Imports 27915 26739 35904 43670 48948 51187 47544 
: POL 6028 5754 5928 7526 10036 8164 6433 
Trade Balance -9438 -4056 -9049 -11359 -14815 -15507 -13246 
Invisibles (net) -242 2898 5680 5449 10196 10007 9208 
Non-factor 
Services 980 535 602 -197 726 1319 2165 
Investment -3752 -3270 -3431 -3205 -3307 -3521 -3544 
Income 2069 5265 8093 8506 12367 11830 10280 
Pvt. Transfers 461 368 416 345 410 379 307 
Official Grants 
Current Account -9680 -1158 -3369 -5910 -4619 -5500 -4038 
Balance 
External 2210 1901 1526 883 1109 907 820 
Assistance (net) 
Commercial 2248 607 1030 1275 2848 3999 4362 
Borrowing (net) 
IMF (net) 1214 187 -1143 -1715 -975 -618 -393 
Non-resident 1536 1205 172 1103 3350 1125 1742 
deposits (net) 
Rupee debt -1193 -1053 -983 -952 -727 -767 -802 
service 
Foreign 
Investment (net) 103 4235 4807 4615 5963 5353 2312 
(1) FDI (net) 97 586 1228 1954 2651 3525 2380 
(ii) Flls 0 1665 1503 2009 1926 979 -338 
(iii) Euro equities 
& others 6 1984 2076 652 1386 849 270 
Other Flows (net)+ 2284 2800 2604 -2235 -1131 -606 -174 
Cap. Account total 8402 9882 8013 2974 10437 9393 7867 
Reserve use 1278 8724 -4644 2936 -5818 -3893 -3829 
(-increase) 
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The latter shows the implications of current transactions for the country's 
international financial position. The surplus and the deficit of the current account 
are reflected in the capital account. Changes in the foreign exchange reserves of 
a country, which are an index of the current strength or weakness of a country's 
international payments position, are also included in the capital account 
(Agarwal, D. C., 2000). Table 3.15 shows a summary of India's balance of 
payments history since 1990. The volatility of PI is reflected under investments 
by Foreign Institutional Investors (Flls) and Euro equities. Contrastingly, FDI flow 
into India appears more stable. Due to this reason, emerging markets should 
concentrate on framing regulations for attracting more FDls compared to PI. 
However, in reality, it is happening the other way around. Most of the developing 
countries are opening up their capital markets to cash-rich Flls. They usually take 
a short-term view of a particular market and dump it with a slightest of economic 
or political volatility. Development of strong regulatory framework that can attract 
FDI in the form of venture capital is perhaps the best strategy that developing 
countries can formulate for their economic growth. 
3.3 Financial System: 
In recent years, financial system development has gained increasing attention, 
both in academic and policy circles. It is acknowledged in the recent literature, 
that the financial system plays a crucial role in economic development (Levine, 
1997). In particular, the subject has been discussed in the context of the 
developments in transitional economies (Herms and Lensink, 2000). Pagano 
(1993) provides a theoretical contribution showing how financial development 
may have a positive effect on growth. He stressed the role of financial institutions 
like banks, in providing important services such as facilitating trading, hedging, 
diversifying and pooling of risk, which stimulates savings mobilization, and 
allocating financial savings to the most efficient investment projects by screening 
and monitoring borrowers. 
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Knowledge of exactly how the design of the financial system may help to improve 
welfare is of particular importance to transitional economies, since they still have 
options to influence the direction of development of their financial system (Herms 
and Lensink, 2000). The choice of a particular financial system has direct 
implications for the type of financial institutions to be established, for regulatory 
and supervisory design and for the choice of government policies (Szego, 1993). 
In India, there are two major segments to the financial sector: organized; and 
informal. Very little is researched or documented about the latter. It consists of 
rural and urban moneylenders whose activities are outside direct Government 
control (Dandekar, 1996). Thus, from the standpoint of this research, only the 
organized sector will be examined. 
With respect to financial system design in developing economies specific 
questions are of particular importance. In the choice of establishing financial 
institutions, one important question relates to the role of stock market (Herms 
and Lensink, 2000). The interventionist attitude of the Government in Indian 
capital markets stemmed from its desire to reduce the influence of traditional 
moneylenders in the rural credit market. In 1955 the Imperial Bank of India, the 
largest Indian commercial bank was nationalized and renamed as the State Bank 
of India, and charged with the task of expanding into rural areas. The 
nationalized banking system became an instrument of social policy' (Dossani and 
Kenney, 2001; p. 13). This was followed by the nationalization of the life 
insurance business and the setting up of the Life Insurance Corporation of India 
in 1956. Finally, in 1969 all large Indian commercial banks; and in 1972 all 
insurance companies were nationalized (Dandekar, 1996). 
The Government also created a whole array of financial institutions to perform 
specialized lending functions. Their deposit and lending rates and credit 
allocation policies are the subject of detailed government control. Overall, India's 
organized financial structure is complex (Joshi and Little, 1994). 
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3.3.1 Central Bank: 
In developing economies, the central bank has two main tasks. First, it is 
responsible for the reform and safeguarding of the payment system. Second, it 
aims at contributing to a stable banking system by acting as the lender-of-last- 
resort (Herms and Lensink, 2000). As shown in chart 3-A, Indian central bank, 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) stands at the apex of the financial structure and 
performs the traditional central banking functions, but with a development 
orientation. In addition to conducting monetary policy, it plays a lead role in 
promoting the creation and development of financial institutions and acts as a 
watchdog to regulate financial markets (www. rbi. org. in). 
3.3.2 Commercial Banks: 
The commercial banking system is, by far, the most dominant segment of the 
financial sector, accounting as it does for over 80 percent of the funds flowing 
through the financial sector (Business Standard; April 24,1996). The banking 
sector is broadly divided into four categories in India: State Bank Group, the 
largest banking group in the country; Public Sector Banks that are wholly owned 
by the Government; Domestic Private Sector Banks; and Foreign Banks. The 
commercial banks are overwhelmingly the most important financial 
intermediaries in the system and hold 85 per cent of the combined assets of 
financial institutions. There are now 105 commercial banks of which 27 are in the 
public sector and hold 81 per cent of commercial bank assets. There are 53 
private banks, of which 44 are foreign; they together account for about 18 per 
cent of bank assets (Economic Survey, 2000: p. 50). There are stringent rules 
governing the expansion of branches of foreign banks. Although there has been 
some relaxation, there is still not a level playing field between nationalized and 
foreign banks (Dutt and Sundaram, 2000). 
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Chart 3-A: Indian Financial System 
Source: Dutt and Sundta-am, 2000 
Table 3.16: Net Profits of Commercial Banks 
Central Co-operative Banks 
Rs. Million 
Reporting Banks 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1995- 66 1997-98 
State Bank Group 2440 2800 3560 7930 24600 
Public Sector Banks 5590 -36480 -47790 -11600 25700 
Private Banks 770 600 1490 5570 8400 
Foreign Banks 3200 -8420 5730 7490 6300 
source: uutt ana 5unanaram, 2000: p. 769 
Also, there are 121 regional rural banks set up to provide credit to the weaker 
sections of the rural population. Since nationalization, the number of bank offices 
increased enormously, but simultaneously their profitability declined sharply due 
to Government controlled reserve and lending policies. The majority of the loans 
are advanced to 'priority sectors' on the direction of ruling Governments. Also, a 
substantial part of commercial banks' portfolio comprises of working capital limits 
made available to industry. 
Table 3.16 shows the profitability figures of commercial banks from 1992 to 1998. 
It is evident that, barring 1992 to 1996 when the Indian financial sector was 
shaken to its foundation due to a large securities scam, Indian commercial banks 
have reported decent profitability. It could fuel economic growth if these banks 
are also permitted to co-invest in venture capital funded SMEs. This will provide 
an additional funding avenue for budding entrepreneurs who often find it difficult 
to sell their projects to sophisticated foreign venture capital funds. 
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3.3.4 Development Finance Institutions (DFIs): 
Since independence, many DFIs have been established to provide medium and 
long-term credit to industry. Some of these operate mainly at the national level, 
lending to large industries. Others operate at state level and cater to regional 
industry. Apart from the internal generation of funds, the DFIs rely on borrowing 
from multilateral financial institutions for raising funds. 
Initially, there was no direct borrowing from the public, but since financial market 
liberalization began from the mid 1980s, DFIs commenced tapping funds directly 
from the public through medium to long-term bonds (The Economic Times; July 
1,1997). The major national level DFIs are: the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI); the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI); the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI); and Industrial Investment Bank of 
India (IIBI). Of these, IDBI is the largest in terms of its balance sheet. These 
institutions generally form a syndicate for lending to large industrial projects but 
they can also go it alone, if the funds requirement is not large. However, they are 
statutorily required to place a substantial proportion of their funds in government 
securities (www. rbi. org. in). 
In addition to the above DFIs, there are other institutions that provide industrial 
finance, primarily in the form of investments in shares and bonds. The front-line 
institutions in this category are the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), the General 
Insurance Corporation of India (GIC), and the Unit Trust of India (UTI) as shown 
in Chart 3-C. These institutions also raise funds directly from the public. The 
National Agriculture Bank for Rural Development (NABARD) is the main 
agriculture financing institution that operates its schemes through large 
commercial banks in rural areas. Besides, there are a large number of State 
Financial Corporations (SFCs) within the provincial boundaries of each state, 
while local cooperative banks provide rural finance for agriculture. 
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Chart 3-B: Capital Market Structure in India 
Gilt-edged Market Securities Market DFIs Fin. Intermed. 
I Primary Market Secondary Market 
IFCI ICICI SFCs IDBI IIBI UT! 
Merchant Banks Mutual Funds Leasing Venture Capital 
Companies Companies 
Source: Dutt and Sandhamm, 2000 
Others 
3.3.5 Capital Markets: 
Stock market development and other aspects of financial market development 
take place simultaneously and complement each other (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1996). In addition to bank finance, share issues provide possibilities for 
raising external funds (Herms and Lensink, 2000). While commercial banks are 
subject to bank runs, which force banks to liquidate long term projects, stock 
markets probably have a much more important role in stimulating productive 
investment. Stock markets may also help to overcome problems of asymmetric 
information* when countries begin to liberalize their financial sector without 
having a well functioning equity market (Cho, 1986). Herms and Lensink (2000) 
argue that equity markets, in contrast to banks, do not suffer from moral hazard* 
and adverse selection* largely, due to statutory disclosure requirements. 
Theoretical discussion on Information asymmetry. moral hazard and adverse selection Is presented In chapter 5. 
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Empirical studies have generally been quite positive about the role of stock 
market development in promoting economic growth. An outstanding example is 
the study by Atje and Jovanovic (1993) that concluded that stock market trading 
and economic growth were strongly correlated for a group of 40 countries in the 
1980s. Using the same framework, Murinde (1996) finds evidence for a positive 
effect of stock market development on the growth rate of the Pacific Basin 
countries. In a recent study, Levine and Zervous (1998a) suggested that a well- 
developed financial system, including effective stock markets, has positive 
effects on the performance of firms. 
However, the role stock markets play in stimulating economic growth is not 
undisputed (Herms and Lensink, 2000). It is argued that stock markets stimulate 
investments in short-term projects since they continuously evaluate managers 
(Stein, 1989). Also highly liquid stock markets, with a substantial amount of small 
shareholders and hence diffuse ownership, may decrease incentives to monitor 
the investment carefully (Levine, 1997). There are others who argue that stock 
markets do not have an important role to play since only a small part of corporate 
investment is financed by means of equity. Stock markets may even have a 
negative effect since they are merely 'casinos' (Herms and Lensink, 2000). 
Singh (1997) is one of the most vocal opponents of the views that stock markets 
are crucial for a process of long-run economic growth. He argues that 'even in 
developed economies, stock markets do not perform the monitoring, screening 
and disciplinary role very well' (p. 774). He points out that the situation is even 
worse in the emerging markets 'due to underdevelopment of regulatory 
infrastructure' (p. 775). Moreover, in most transitional economies the stock 
markets are very thin. This may lead to excessively volatile share prices 
(Scholtens, 2000). Recent developments in the Asian financial markets seem to 
confirm this (Herms and Lensink, 2000). Contrary to the analysis of Cho (1986), 
Kumar (1994) argues that stock markets have more problems with asymmetric 
information than banks. Since a comprehensive discussion on the pros and cons 
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of stock markets is beyond the scope of this research, the following is a brief 
profile of Indian capital markets. 
Figure 3-C: Market Capitalization of BSE 
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The first Indian stock markets were established during the British rule in the 
nineteenth century (Schrader, 1997). Following a major shift towards the open 
door economic policies, resulting in an acceleration of the pace of liberalization in 
1991, stock market growth in India has been explosive with an investor base of 
40-50 million individuals (The Economic Times, December 17,1999). The 
capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the largest in India and the 
oldest in Asia, crossed Rs. 11 trillion (US$ 256 billion) by January, 2000, 'putting 
India among the top ten markets in the world by market capitalization (Business 
Standard, February 15,2000, p. 4). Market capitalization and number of listed 
companies indicate the depth and breadth of the capital markets, one of the pre- 
requisites for successful venture capital sector. Deep and broad capital markets 
provide exit routes to venture capital investors. Figure 3-C shows BSE's market 
capitalization since 1991. Also, the Indian stock market, with over 8000 listed 
companies, was the largest in the world (BSE Bulletin, 2000). While this 
buoyancy in the market has provided an avenue for large and established 
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businesses for raising long-term capital, as figure 3-D indicates, the financing of 
SMEs continued to be daunting (Chitale, 1989). SMEs generally receive their 
external funding in private equity rather than public markets (Berger and Udell, 
1998). 
Figure 3-D: Priority Sector Deployment of Gross Bank Credit 
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In the midst of all this, the stock exchanges in India have never performed at 
global standards in the areas of transparency, efficiency and investor protection. 
Herms and Lensink (2000) acknowledge that the development and regulation of 
stock markets play a key role in the financial system architecture in transitional 
economies. 'To counter these deficiencies and to regulate the capital market, the 
Government of India set up the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 
1988' (Dutt and Sundharam, 2000; p. 801). Initially, SEBI was set up as a non- 
statutory body but in January 1992 it was made a statutory body. Since then, 
SEBI has taken a number of steps to introduce improved practices and greater 
transparency with the objective of investor protection and bringing the Indian 
capital market to global standards (www. sebi. org. in). 
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3.3.6 Non Banking Finance Companies (NBFCs): 
In order to improve the access of small savers and borrowers to financial 
services, it is essential to invigorate domestic intermediaries because of their 
proximity to the eventual savers and borrowers, and their ability to understand 
customer needs (Barger, 1998). In India, NBFCs play a vital role of financial 
intermediation by carrying out transactions such as leasing, hire purchase, bill 
discounting, factoring, securities trading and foreign exchange transactions for 
individuals and the corporate sector. Such companies also manage mutual funds 
through separate asset management vehicles (www. sebi. gov. in). 
There are about 40,000 NBFCs and their number continues to grow (Dutt and 
Sundharam, 2000). According to RB! report on Currency and Finance, (1997 - 
98), the aggregate deposits of 13,970 NBFCs totaled Rs. 3,571 billion 
compared to Rs. 2,953 billion in the previous year, an increase of nearly 21 
percent. The larger players, numbering 2,376, accounted for 63 percent of the 
deposits (RBI, 1998). They compete with commercial banks in taking deposits 
and advancing loans (Sarika, 1999). However, growth of this sector has been 
marred by a series of financial scandals in that some companies have left 
thousands of depositors losing their hard-earned savings. 
Conversely, multi-national companies operating in this sector such as merchant 
banks or investment banks have played a significant role in offering specialized 
non-fund based services to the Indian corporate sector. They have brought 
unmatched financial power and global expertise with them and helped Indian 
companies in financial engineering, mergers and acquisitions, fund raising from 
overseas capital markets etc. 
While funding by local banks, credit institutions and NBFCs are potential 
alternatives, these sources are unlikely to achieve the desired goals in the 
absence of good quality borrowers among SMEs (Sarika, 1999). On the other 
hand, venture capitalists are not mere fund providers. They are, rather, active 
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financial partners. Therefore, Snyder (2001) believes that the 'challenge is to 
change SME culture by making equity investment the norm or the "first port of 
call", rather than the last resort. Also, even the reluctance of entrepreneurs to 
give up even some of their equity causes funding problems' (Financial Times; 
March 1,2001; p. 14). 
3.4 Conclusion: 
In this chapter the modern economic history and the present status of the Indian 
economy was broadly examined. Although, taking a macro economic perspective 
only, this approach gives an adequate grasp of the past and present features of 
the Indian economy, especially in the areas of GDP structure and growth, foreign 
direct investment, employment status, inflation, balance of payments and money 
supply etc. The financial system prevailing in India since independence is also 
reviewed and major stumbling blocks in its growth are identified. It was essential 
to understand the economic foundation before examining the status of SMEs and 
the venture capital sector in India. 
The next chapter will examine the global experiences of small businesses, 
particularly the obstacles to their growth. Then, the significance of small business 
in a developing economy like India will be examined. Then, we will move to see 
how venture capital, one of the most high profile developments in corporate 
finance in this century, can help in funding the growth of small enterprises. 
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CHAPTER IV - SMALL BUSINESSES AND VENTURE CAPITAL 
4.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the economic and financial system 
in India. Despite political uncertainty, and an uneven growth profile, the country is 
clearly on the path of growth. In this chapter, the importance of small businesses 
in an international perspective will be examined followed by the role of SMEs in a 
growing economy like India. We then proceed to examine the history, current 
status and prospects of venture capital/private equity and discuss how it can 
provide a much needed impetus in the development of India's industrial sector in 
general and more specifically in the areas of infrastructure and innovative 
sectors, termed the "new economy". 
4.2 Small Business; Global Experience: 
Small and medium sized enterprises have played a crucial role in economic 
development (Sen, 1980). They have contributed to employment (Birley, 1987), 
the encouragement of entrepreneurship (Cook, 2000), exports, and the 
production of appropriate goods and services (Berry and Levy, 1994). The 
significance of this sector in the overall economic development is not, however, a 
product of the present era. Even historically, small businesses have attracted the 
attention of economists and policy makers. Clay (1932) argued that in the British 
economy'not only are the great majority of firms small, but most of the firms that 
are now large began as small firms' (p. 226). 
A cornerstone of a competitive industrial society is the emergence of new 
ventures. The continuous entry of new companies into the industrial scene is of 
extreme social and economic importance. It raises the threshold of technology, 
thereby creating the potential for increased productivity (Huntsman and Hoban, 
1980). A study conducted by the US Commerce Department found that 95 
percent of all radical innovations since World War II have come from new and 
small companies, rather than large, established ones (Bygrave & Timmons, 
1992). Without new entrants, any economy is destined for long-term decline. A 
76 
Chapter 4 SMEs & Venture Capital in India 
number of studies have shown that the sustained, healthy, and long-term 
development of a region, in part, depends on creating conditions conducive to 
new company formation and small company growth (Hoffman, 1972). Shapero et 
al. (1969) concluded that there is likely to be more pay-out for long-term 
development and growth in ten small companies each with a US$ 1 million 
payroll than in one large company with a US$ 50 million payroll. 
After studying the role of specialist financial intermediaries in the financing of 
SMEs in the UK, Boocock and Goacher (1987) concluded that 'there is 
widespread recognition of the importance of the small business sector, and of the 
value of its contribution to the health of the national economy. The availability of 
financial support to this sector is, therefore, an issue of the utmost significance' 
(p. 44). Similarly in the US, small technology based firms are more effective 
contributors, compared to large and established players, to the generation of new 
jobs, innovative technology, productivity, price stability and favorable 
international trade (Wetzel, 1982). Almus and Nerlinger (1999) also found the net 
employment effect of new technology based firms founded since 1990 to be 
positive compared to non-innovative firms. Similarly, Brixy and Kohaut (1999) 
studied the impact of new firms on job creation in the eastern part of post- 
unification Germany. They found that nearly 50 percent of all jobs were 'to be 
found in firms established after 1991' (p. 152). In common with the US and other 
studies quoted above, Anderson (1994) predicted that most new job creation in 
Malaysia is likely to occur in the small business sector. 
Past research emphasized the importance of finance for the development of 
smaller enterprises and for overcoming the constraints faced by them, 
particularly with respect to their access to credit (Levy, 1993). Many surveys 
have sought to capture the range of factors that inhibit the growth and 
development of small firms (Cook, 2000). In a study conducted by The World 
Bank, around 90 percent of small enterprises indicated that credit was a major 
constraint to new investment (Parker et al., 1995). Also, poorly developed 
infrastructures put SMEs at a competitive disadvantage compared to larger ones. 
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Collier and Mayer (1989) indicated that banks are more likely to be sources of 
finance for smaller enterprises in poorer countries, since the role of financial 
institutions is related to the life cycle of enterprises and economies. On the other 
hand, Boocock (1995) believes that we are likely to witness a movement away 
from debt to equity based firms, as illustrated by the experience with venture 
capital in Malaysia. In a counter-argument, DemirgucKunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) examined firm debt maturity in 30 countries during the period 1980 - 1991. 
They argued that in countries with active stock markets, large firms have more 
long-term debt. Stock market activity is not correlated with debt levels of small 
firms. By contrast, in countries with a larger banking sector, small firms have less 
short-term debt and their debt is of longer maturity. 
Improved access to finance will reduce the cost disadvantage of smaller 
enterprises relative to large enterprises and contribute to their increasing share of 
GDP (Cook, 2000). The considerable empirical work examining the issue of 
whether or not financial liberalization has eased the financing constraints of 
SMEs has so far yielded mixed results, which generally, do not provide an 
encouraging picture for lower income economies (Steel, 1994). Kariuki (1995), 
concluded after a survey of SMEs in Kenya, that credit to this sector declined 
after liberalisation due to higher nominal interest rates and increases in other 
transaction costs. In a survey of entrepreneurs in 214 Hungarian SMEs, it was 
found that access to finance was one of the major problems they faced, with this 
being a particular constraint on their ability to increase the level of technology in 
their firms (Roman, 1991). Similarly, Ivy (1997) found that 44 percent of a sample 
of new SMEs in Slovakia faced problems relating to finance. 
Meire and Pilgrim's (1994) study of enterprises in Bangladesh, Nepal and the 
Philippines found that only enterprises towards the large end of the scale had 
viable access to formal sector finance. They also found high transaction costs for 
smaller loans. Also, despite specific programmes aimed at SMEs, only between 
12 percent and 33 percent of those surveyed were found to have access to 
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formal credit. The formal sector credit was also found to be out of reach for SMEs 
in Ghana and Tanzania (Dawson, 1993). 
On the contrary, Levenson and Willard (2000) measured the extent to which 
small businesses were able to access the external credit finance they required in 
the late 1980s. Data from a national survey in the US showed that only 2.4 
percent of firms did not obtain the funding for which they applied in 1987 - 88. 
Another 2.17 percent faced some short-run constraints but received the credit for 
which they applied by the end of survey period. Additionally, 4.22 percent were 
estimated to have been discouraged from applying due to expected denial. They 
conclude that'the total number of credit constrained firms seems quite small' (p. 
92). Hajar (1989) drew the same conclusion while studying the obstacles in the 
growth of SMEs in Saudi Arabia. 
Though this indicates that financial constraints faced by SMEs appear to be a 
phenomenon of the under-developed world only, a crisis of another kind is 
cropping up in developed countries. Recent research in the US reveals that a 
wave of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of banks and 
other financial institutions raises a policy concern that the larger organizations 
created as a result may reduce the availability of credit to small business (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Some studies have analyzed the dynamics of M&As and 
compared small business lending by the consolidated institutions before and 
after M&As (Keeton, 1996,1997; Peek and Rosengreen, 1998; Strahan and 
Weston, 1998). The most common findings are that the post-merger consolidated 
large banking organizations tend to reduce small business lending. 
On balance, SMEs are playing a vital role in the industrial development, despite a 
noticeable financial crunch. In addition to these constraints, 'as a small business 
grows and develops, there is an increasing need for the introduction of formal 
structures, systems, procedures and controls' (Gorman and Doran, 1999; p. 60). 
Therefore, SME research is not confined to assessing growth constraints from a 
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funding perspective. McMohan (1999) studied financial reporting practices 
among SMEs engaged in manufacturing in Australia. He concluded that better 
financial reporting may be viewed as an important enabling factor in realising 
growth aspirations of such concerns. In a study of 150 small firms in Scotland, 
Smith (1999) investigated the performance of the micro firm in the early years of 
its life cycle. He found that the use of IT has a highly significant positive 
association with performance. Batten and Hettihewa, (1999) surveyed 73 small 
firms in Sri Lanka and found that most firms under utilize assets, use existing 
rather than the latest technology and are reliant upon family savings. This 
attitude may inhibit their growth in most situations. 
On the other hand, innovative thinking is presenting increasingly new 
opportunities to small businesses. During 1993 - 94, Roper (1999) explored how 
strategy choice changed subsequent business performance in Irish small 
businesses. He argued that small firm performance is shown to depend strongly 
on strategy choice. He concluded that one strategy choice that had positive 
effects on both profitability and growth was the development of new export 
markets. Lautanen (2000) studied export oriented Finnish small firms in 1995. He 
concluded that 'the smaller the firm, the faster is the adoption of the export 
strategy' (p. 120). Even Pakistan, Italy and Brazil present good examples of 
economic success in terms of export competitiveness and growth that have been 
achieved by clusters of small enterprises in these countries (Cook, 2000). 
It is nevertheless evident from the Sri Lankan experience that the credit access 
problem for smaller enterprises will not be solved simply by encouraging 
competition among private banks but is more likely to involve forms of support 
(Levy, 1993), like venture capital as VCs take a very close interest in their 
investee companies and provide management with advice, "hands on" support 
and industry connections' (O'Shea, 1996; p. 16). Additionally, private equity offer 
highly structured contracts to small businesses (Berger and Udell, 1998) that 
could be suitable to the specific requirements of each SME. 
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Thus, it can be concluded from the research conducted in various parts of the 
globe that SMEs have played a significant role in developing new technology, 
generating employment, earning foreign exchange. However, barring a few rich 
countries, they face financial constraints in order to grow in almost every country. 
Venture capital has filled this -gap to some extent. But even this mode of 
financing is at a nascent stage in most parts of the world. The next section will 
examine SME status in India. 
4.3 SMEs in India: 
SMEs have a long history and great importance to India. The leaders of the 
Independence movement were supporters of this sector as an alternative to 
"exploitation" by multinational firms (Dossani and Kenney, 2001). Their 
importance was briefly summarised in the Industrial Policy Statement of 1956: 
'they provide immediate large-scale employment; offer a method of ensuring a 
more equitable distribution of the national income and facilitate an effective 
mobilisation of resources of capital and skill which might otherwise remain un- 
utilised' (Planning Commission, 2"d-Five Year Plan, p. 47). 
In 1950, the Government of India allowed all SMEs to have a capital investment 
(total asset purchase) of Rs. 0.5 million. This parameter kept on changing over a 
period of time. In 1966, the SSIs were defined as businesses with a fixed 
investment of less than Rs. 0.75 million. This limit was revised upwards to Rs. 1 
million in 1975 and was further raised to Rs. 2 million under the Industrial Policy 
Statement of 1980 (Dutt and Sundharam, 2000). In 1985 it was set at Rs. 3.5 
million and subsequently raised to Rs. 6 million in 1990. 
In December 1995, the Government of India appointed an Expert Committee 
under the Chairmanship of Abid Hussain to suggest measures for improving the 
growth of SMEs. The Committee submitted its report in January 1997. Among 
others, the Committee recommended immediately raising the threshold limit of 
investment to Rs. 30 million as it was observed that the low capital base was 
rendering these units un-competitive (Dutt and Sundharam, 2000). 
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Presently, over three million SMEs contribute 40 percent to India's industrial 
manufacture (www. sidbi. com), employing 16.7 million persons and account for 
35 percent of its exports. This sector has registered an annual growth rate of 
nearly 10 percent in the last five years and the target growth rate is 15 percent 
(The Economic Times, September 26,1999). Table 4.1 shows the role of SMEs 
in three major areas: production, employment generation and exports. 
Government provides protection to SMEs by reserving 837 items for exclusive 
production by them. In 1990, recognising the potential of SMEs and the financial 
constraints this sector faced, The Small Industries Development Bank of India 
(SIDBI) was established by the Government under a special Act of Parliament in 
April 1990 (Dutt and Sundharam, 2000). 
Takle 4.1: Production- Emnlovment and Einorts in Small Scale Sector 
Year Production Rs. Million Employment 
('000) 
Exports Rs. Million 
1973 - 74 73000 39.70 3930 
1980 - 81 280600 71.0 16430 
1985 - 86 612280 96.0 27690 
1990 - 91 1553400 125.3 91000 
1991 - 92 1787000 130.0 138830 
1992 - 93 2093000 134.0 177850 
1992 - 94 2416480 139.4 253070 
1994 - 95 2939900 146.6 290680 
1995 - 96 3562130 152.6 394700 
1996 - 97 4126360 160.0 392490 
1997 - 98 4651710 167.2 439460 
CAGR 
1973-74 to 1980-81 21.4 8.7 22.6 
1980-81 to 1990-91 18.6 5.8 18.6 
1990-91 to 1997-98 16.9 4.2 25.3 
-. oiuce: seuerun rive rear man, vaume u 
Stevenson and Coveney (1997) reported, after a survey of the 100 fastest 
growing unquoted companies in the UK, that financing was the most frequently 
self-reported obstacle to growth for small businesses. More or less the same 
picture emerges in analyzing the reasons for closure of small scale industry in 
India. 'Small firms were starved for capital and Indian banks provided no 
resources for entrepreneurial firms' (Dossani and Kenney, 2001; p. 14). Table 4.2 
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shows that financial and marketing problems, together, contribute almost 50 
percent of the causes of closure. As demonstrated in chapter 2, venture 
capitalists do not just provide funding to small businesses but they offer 
marketing and other networking inputs to investee companies as well. Therefore, 
this is the perfect setting for a vital venture capital role in India. 
Table 4.2: Reasons for closure of Small Businesses (1980 to 1988) 
No. Reasons Percent 
1. Financial problems 34.7 
2. Marketing problems 14.4 
3. Raw Material problems 5.6 
4. Disputes among owners 3.7 
5. Natural calamity 3.4 
6. Labour problems 2.2 
7. More than one reasons (combined) 16.5 
8. Other Reasons 19.4 
Total 100 
Faroe: cmpuea a compurea Tran i ne rtepcn a tree Secona An inaia census or abi urms (iay). P. ita. 
While the Enterprise Development Programmes (EDPs), initiated by the Indian 
government, have been instrumental in motivating entrepreneurs to set up 
independent enterprises, their decision to expand and invest depends upon the 
availability of the technological opportunities (Pandit and Siddharthan, 1998). 
Also, many of those entrepreneurial firms wanting external funding have difficulty 
locating it (Wetzel, 1993), particularly from more conventional sources like 
commercial banks. Figure 3-E on page 72 shows a comparison of priority sector 
credit deployment in India. Though there is a downward trend in all the three 
sectors, the decline is sharper and steeper in the case of gross bank credits to 
SSIs in the last four years. 
The creation of an environment favouring SME development may not be 
sufficient to explain why some enterprises improve their performance and others 
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fail. The response of SMEs to structural adjustment reforms, underway in 
developing economies, is more likely to be related to a wide range of factors 
including internal enterprise characteristics, the level of development of 
economies, infrastructure and the institutional and political framework that 
reinforces the sectors development (Cook, 2000). This is aptly summarised by 
Bryce (1965; p. 77): 
Properly defined and realistically approached, the small-industry field is important 
and can contribute much to the whole process of industrialisation. If confused by 
sentimentalism and approached emotionally with little regard to the costs and 
benefits involved, small industry development can easily become a missionary 
movement which accomplishes little but which diverts scarce resources of 
development funds and people away from other activities. 
4.3.1 Challenges: 
The situation is even more challenging in an economy treading on the path of 
privatization because financial intermediaries participating in the equity dilution of 
public enterprises are faced with the challenge of fund raising (Gouri, 1996). Not 
only is the household saving rate low in India, but innovative financial products 
are also missing to meet the requirements of discerning investors. This is more 
crucial due to the Govemment's apparent efforts to attract private sector 
investments for developing the precarious infrastructure sector (Sarika, 1999). 
With the projected economic growth of 8.5 percent per annum by 2006 from 5.5 
percent in 1998-9, investment in infrastructure is likely to rise from 5.5 percent to 
8 percent of GDP over the same period (Singh, 1998). Unlike conventional 
projects, such projects are capital intensive, having long gestation periods and 
therefore cash deficits in the initial years of their operations. Thus they are 
funded on cash-flow basis rather than traditional asset financing, entailing 
complex documentation and structuring. 
Therefore, what is needed is a long-term investment horizon and 'patient' 
finance, both of which are central in late industrialization (Amsden 1989, quoted 
by Singh and Weisse, 1998). Gompers et al. (1998) argue that, if the economy is 
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growing rapidly, there may be more attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
start new firms that eventually increase the demand for venture capital. They 
further state that 'growth in GDP, increased returns in the stock market and 
greater research and development expenditure would all be potential proxies for 
demand conditions' (Gompers et al., 1998, p. 155). 
The main banking system, with its focus on long-term relationships and lending, 
is capable of shielding the firm from instabilities in financial markets (Knight, 
1998). Consortium lending practices with lead banks mostly taking a small equity 
stake ensure a strong incentive to evaluate credit risk effectively and monitor 
investments after disbursement of funds. In India, the lead bank system has 
ensured adequate long-term funding for sound industrial projects and has largely 
been a catalyst for achieving post-independence industrial growth (Singh and 
Weisse, 1998). Moreover, the legacy of an over-regulated economy has resulted 
in unrelated diversification, and a preference for public holding (dispersed 
ownership) over bulk institutional holding (Business Standard; November 17, 
1998). However, issues surrounding capital structure for small businesses are 
generally different from those that are most important for larger corporations 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Cobham and Subramanium (1998), based on their analysis of firm-level data 
from two micro-samples of Indian firms (i) the RBI cumulative firm-level data set 
(1981-90) and (ii) the ICICI data set (1982-90), suggest that small firms in India 
make as much or more use of equity finance than large firms, primarily through 
informal investors. They conclude that it may be better to encourage equity 
finance of the existing form through these informal networks of family, friends and 
family contacts together known as business angels (Sarika, 1999). However, 
Muzyka et al. (1996) point out that new ventures carry high levels of risk. Under 
these circumstances, entrepreneurs are less likely to fund the business on their 
own or through private sources. 
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Market failure in entrepreneurial financing leads many viable projects to remain 
unfunded (Amit et al., 1998). Entrepreneurs having sound technical background 
with little managerial exposure desire the more formalized approach of a venture 
capital firm to aid them in establishing appropriate managerial systems and 
controls (Ehrlich et al., 1994). 'At the level of small and risky ventures, access to 
capital market is restricted. Presumably, not all entrepreneurs can self-finance 
their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. 
Venture capital offers them a source of funds that is designed for use in risky 
settings' (Barry, 1994; p. 11). 
Venture capital has traditionally been an extremely attractive source for raising 
funds in developing technologies, industries and innovations that help economies 
grow (Patricof, 1989). Although the venture capital industry itself plays a smaller 
role in the overall new business formation, ventures supported by venture capital 
firms not only have a significantly lower failure rate (Bygrave and Timmons, 
1986), but also have a multiplier effect on the founding of other firms and even on 
whole industries (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). 
Many developing countries realized that one way to fuel the economy is by 
lowering taxes on capital gains, thereby encouraging equity investment (HBS, 
2000). A study conducted by OECD in 1985 shows that there is possibly no 
substitute for venture capital as a source of funds and management skills for new 
technology firms, and it is not possible for SMEs to develop without the country 
having a venture capital market (Mishra, 1996). Even more than a decade back, 
the potential for venture capital in India was estimated at US$ 100 million 
(Business World, 1989). However, these figures have long been revised and by 
November 2000, about US$ 1.1 billion of venture capital funds were already 
invested (The Economic Times, December 9th, 2000). 
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4.4 Venture Capital in India: 
The earliest discussion of venture capital in India is traced back to 1973, when 
the government appointed a commission to examine strategies for nurturing 
SMEs (Nassocom, 2000). Existing literature on the Indian venture capital industry 
is limited to analysis of the evolution of the industry, giving an overview of the 
institutional framework and touching upon policy recommendations (Mishra, 
1996). Though recently some attempt has been made to provide insights into the 
practices and procedures in venture capital financing (Verena, 1997), extant 
literature is conspicuous by the absence of a detailed analysis of the functioning 
of the venture capital market (Sarika, 1999). 
4.4.1 Evolution: 
Each country has its own structures, institutions and policies and venture capital 
industries have peculiar characteristics (Manigart, 1993). The growth of venture 
capital in India has followed a gradual sequence of events (Verma, 1997). Like 
the MacMillan Report in the UK in 1931, in India the need for venture capital was 
stressed in 1972 by The Bhatt Committee, constituted for identifying ways and 
means for the development of small and medium enterprises. In recognition of 
the problems of the new entrepreneurs and technocrats in setting up ventures 
(Verma, 1997), the Committee recommended the formation of a Rs. 1000 million 
venture capital fund (Mishra, 1996). 
Taking its cue from the committee's recommendation, IFCI took the initiative of 
sponsoring the first venture fund in 1975 named The Risk Capital Foundation 
and later renamed as Risk Capital and Technology Finance Corporation of India 
Ltd. (RCTC) in 1988 (Verma, 1997). It has been IFCI Venture Capital Funds Ltd. 
since 1999 (Business Standard, September 9,1999). The objective was to 
supplement promoters' equity and encourage talented professionals and 
technocrats to set up new ventures. In 1976, IDBI followed suit and floated a 
seed capital scheme through its captive venture capital division to finance 
innovative projects in the SME sector. Tybejee and Vickery (1988) stressed that 
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the size of the technology sector is crucial. Mishra (1996) also reiterated that the 
technological revolution sweeping across India in the 1980s, coupled with 
mounting import bills, necessitated the commercialization of lab-technology 
which further stimulated the institutionalization of the venture capital industry. 
As financial institutions and banks developed their own specialized investment 
machinery to enable them to track technical developments and nurture promising 
companies, the National Technology Policy of 1983 envisaged a positive role for 
venture capital and set guidelines to encourage the exploitation of indigenous 
technologies (Verma, 1997). This was followed by the decision of the ICICI in 
1984 to allocate funds for providing assistance to economic activities, in the form 
of venture capital. In 1994, SIDBI also set up a small venture capital fund. A 
conscious policy decision of the development institutions for promoting venture 
capital was vital at a time when small enterprises with a capital base of below Rs. 
30 million were restrained from accessing equity through the primary capital 
markets (Mishra, 1996). 
The seventh five-year plan (1985-90) reiterated the need for such finance 
(Mishra, 1996), that led the government to announce the creation of a Rs. 100 
million venture capital fund in 1985, with the objective of providing equity capital 
for pilot projects attempting commercialization of indigenous technology (Verma, 
1997). It is pertinent to note that, by this time, this activity essentially backed by 
Government owned institutions, was taking place in the absence of formal 
venture capital guidelines in India. Following an evaluation of the prospects for 
venture capital in the private sector by the United Nations Development 
Programme and the Technology Policy Implementation Committee (TPIC) in 
1987 (Mishra, 1996), the Government of India announced formative guidelines 
and permitted concessional treatment for capital gains in the union budget of 
1988-89. The budget proposals recognized the significance of risk capital, 
primarily for projects with a fund base of Rs. 100 million or less, and announced 
preferential treatment of 20 percent tax on long-term capital gains arising out of 
the divestment of initial investment by such companies (Mishra, 1996). 
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The guidelines, which delineated a scheme for the establishment and functioning 
of venture capital companies in the private sector in consortium with banks and 
financial institutions, covered a comprehensive framework for the operation of 
funds including investment sectors (excluding service sector); ceilings on each 
investment (minimum 5 percent and maximum 24% of the total corpus); nature of 
investments (only unlisted companies); instruments (only equity) etc. 
(www. sebi. org). Though anticipated, the first set of guidelines gave little impetus 
to the formal venture capital as it laid down a number of restrictions and left a lot 
to be desired (Sarika, 1999). 
The year 1988 proved a watershed in the history of the Indian venture capital 
sector and set the tone for the entry of private sector players. The Working Group 
of the Development of the Capital Market, set up by the Planning Commission, 
also made relevant observations on the organization and financing of the venture 
capital industry in 1989 (Mishra, 1996). The group also highlighted the lack of 
funding support for SMEs with a capital base of less than Rs. 50 million in 
adopting and commercializing new and indigenous technology (Verma, 1997) 
4.4.2 Present Status: 
Subsequent years saw the emergence of few venture capital funds in both public 
and private sector. 'After several false starts in the past 11 years, the venture 
capital business is on the threshold of leapfrogging. Over the past four years, it 
has been gathering momentum, mainly led by foreign funds' (The Economic 
Times, December 29,1999; p. 11). In 1993, the venture capital industry grouped 
under the banner of the Indian Venture Capital Association (IVCA), essentially to 
lobby the government for concessions and also to disseminate information on its 
activities. As figure 4-A projects, the membership of IVCA jumped from 11 in 
1995 to 28 in the year 2000. Similarly, compared to Rs. 67.28 billion invested in 
622 projects during the year 1996, the industry invested Rs. 100 billion in 691 in 
1997 and Rs. 125 billion in 728 projects in 1998 (Business Standard; September 
19,1999). 
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While figure 4-B shows instruments used in funding over the same period, figure 
4-C shows investments across various regions within India, together with 
Offshore Investments from within India. Most of the I. T. related industries are 
based in the South, while the Western region is generally the most industrialised. 
This distribution is also evident in the venture capital investment pattern in the 
figure below in that the majority of investments flow in these two regions. 
Verma (1997) classifies the India venture capital industry into six broad 
categories: companies promoted by all-India financial institutions (IFIs); funds 
sponsored by state level development financial institutions; companies set up by 
overseas investors including banks, financial institutions and Non-resident 
Indians; funds promoted by commercial banks; corporate venture funds 
sponsored by private sector companies; and lastly, funds jointly sponsored by the 
domestic private sector companies along with IFIs and offshore or multilateral 
development agencies. They are primarily structured as 'trust funds' under the 
Indian Trust Act, 1882 (Sarika, 1999), and are managed independently by their 
sponsors, the main contributors to their fund. Unlike formative years when the 
majority of the contribution to their fund came from IFIs compared to overseas 
investors, in 1999 the contribution of overseas sources touched 50.79 percent of 
the total pool of funds against 25.86 percent shared by IFIs (IVCA, 1999). 
The industry is heterogeneous in terms of the size and mode of operation (IVCA, 
1997). While some funds do not have any restrictions about the region or type of 
investment, others are industry or region specific. Some of the companies 
function both as investment and fund management companies. A number of 
offshore funds operate in India, while many domestic funds that were active only 
within India have also floated overseas funds. For instance, SIDBI have recently 
launched a US$ 100 million Information Technology Fund essentially to provide 
equity support to entrepreneurs setting up projects in the US Silicon Valley 
(Business Standard, September 17,1999). However, as the number of offshore 
funds has risen over the last few years, their domestic counterparts have 
remained relatively stagnant (Wright et al., 2000). 
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Figu re 4 -A : Members of IVCA 
Source: Venture Activity, 1998 
Figure 4-C: Investment by Region in 1998 
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Figure 4-C above clearly demonstrates that a vast majority of venture capital 
funds have been invested in the South of the country followed by the West. In the 
South, Bangalore has emerged as the hub of the IT revolution in India. As 
chapter 7 shows, more than half the investments made by the participants of this 
research are made in the 'ITMT' sector (some reasons of IT growth in chapter 7). 
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Figure 4-B: Instruments of Venture Capital Funding 
'The volatility in venture fundraising is mirrored by a similar volatility in the IPO 
market' (Gompers et al., 1998, p. 158). After the government's intent to liberalize 
financial markets, both secondary and primary capital markets witnessed a 
frenzy of activity in early 1990s. Figure 4-D shows the number of IPOs hit the 
market between 1990 and 1999 (Prime Database, 2000). 'Till 1995, companies 
needing money could easily go to the public market, whether they had a credible 
plan or not' (The Economic Times, December 29,1999; p. 7). This resulted in 
numerous fly-by-night-operators raising funds at huge premium that could not be 
Figure 4-D: Amount (Rs. million) of Funds Mobilised through IPOs 
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justified by the intrinsic value of the respective papers. Consequently, as shown 
in figure 4-E the primary market nose-dived and total IPOs had fallen from 1,350 
in 1995-96 to 715 in 1996-97 and 51 in 1997-98 (Business Standard, September 
1,1998) while the worst came during 1998-99 when there were only 18 IPOs 
(Business Standard, May 28,1999). Therefore, existing venture funds were 
sitting on investments, 'waiting for an opportune moment for exit' as stated by 
one of the venture capitalists who participated in this research. 
4.4.3 Impediments: 
Some obstacles in the development of venture capital industry are discussed 
based on research done so far. With companies in India finding it difficult to raise 
loans, there may not be any substitutes for venture capital in the true sense 
(SEBI, 1999). However, at the same time, the legal and regulatory framework is 
not particularly conducive to the growth of the industry (Sarika, 1999). 
Figure 4-E: Number of 1POs (Debt & Equity) 
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Venture funds are presently regulated by three different authorities i. e. the RBI, 
the SEBI and the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). The funds need to 
adhere to three different sets of guidelines that are mutually contradictory (SEBI, 
1999). In May, 1998 the SEBI set up a working group to list various issues which 
currently deter the growth of the venture capital industry (The Economic Times, 
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May 19,1998). SEBI sought to harmonize the multiple regulatory issues 
(Business Standard, September 23,1999), that have left the existing sets of 
guidelines broadly contradicting each other in the following manner: 
o SEBI regulations provide for investments in equity shares and equity-based 
products as well as providing any other assistance in any other manner to 
companies where share investments have been made. But CBDT guidelines 
say that the venture capital companies can invest only in the form of equity, to 
qualify for the tax concessions. This limits the scope for profitable investments 
by venture capital companies. 
o Though SEBI regulations permit investments in listed financially weak or sick 
industrial companies (as well as in listed companies where venture capital 
companies or funds have already made investments prior to listing), CBDT 
guidelines do not provide the same flexibility. 
SEBI regulations permit investments in all unlisted companies regardless of 
their sector of operation - excluding the financial sector. But CBDT regulations 
limit investments to companies manufacturing and producing certain articles, 
like software, and in the business of development, maintaining and operation 
of infrastructure projects (The Economic Times, 19 May, 1998). 
u As per SEBI regulations, there is no ceiling on the investment that venture 
capital companies can make, however CBDT guidelines prescribe a ceiling of 
40 percent of the paid-up capital of the investee company (The Economic 
Times, 25 January, 1999), nor can it invest more than 20 percent of the fund 
in any one company (Sarika, 1999). Also venture capital utilises complex 
financial instruments which meets the requirements of various stakeholders in 
an investee company. Globally, these instruments take the form of convertible 
preference shares and convertible debt with innovative structuring (Norton 
and Tenenbaum, 1992,1993). Currently, only offshore funds have the 
advantage of using these sophisticated financial products because they are 
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regulated under a different set of guidelines. Permitting domestic funds to use 
such instruments 'would make exit from small companies easier (Business 
Standard, August 5,1998; p. 7). Similarly, there is an anomaly between 
offshore and domestic funds. While the former pay no taxes, the latter have to 
pay maximum marginal tax (Business Standard; 5.8.1998). 
Q Also, there is a difference in the application of regulations between domestic 
and overseas venture capital funds (SEBI, 1999). Domestic funds are 
required to register with the SEBI while foreign funds are routed through RBI. 
Additionally, whereas offshore funds operating in India are registered in 
Mauritius for taking the advantage of minimal taxation under the double 
taxation avoidance treaty between Mauritius and India, domestic funds have 
to apply to the CBDT for tax exemptions because they are not similarly 
exempted (Sanka, 1999). 
In addition, venture capital funds are not allowed to raise funds directly from the 
public through the capital market route. They can raise capital on the basis of 
private placement from financial institutions and high net-worth individuals, yet 
insurance companies, provident funds - the largest source of venture capital 
funds providers in the US and Europe (Fassin, 1992) - are barred from making 
investments in India. Even Mutual funds were refrained until very recently, but in 
order to meet a long-standing demand of the venture capital industry, RBI now 
permits them to invest up to 5 percent of their fund base into a venture capital 
fund or company (The Economic Times, April 20,1999). For detailed regulatory 
hurdles and policy recommendations see (Dossani and Kenney, 2001). 
For facilitating the fund raising options of small and mid-cap companies and 
providing an easy exit route to venture capitalists, the Over The Counter 
Exchange of India (OTCEI) was established in 1994, (OTCEI Report) on the lines 
of NASDAQ, US. Similar second-tier markets already existed in Europe. The 
Unlisted Securities Market in the United Kingdom in 1980, the Seconde Marche 
in France in 1983, and the Parallel Market in the Netherlands in 1982, were 
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launched to provide the mechanism by which venture capitalists can liquidate 
their equity position, after the venture is quoted on these financial markets 
(Tyebjee & Vickery, 1988). Malaysia also has a 'Second Board', a secondary 
market specially created for small to mid cap companies seeking public listing 
(Anderson, 1994). 
While other recognized stock exchanges in India stipulate a minimum issued 
capital of not less than Rs. 30 million, eligibility for listing on OTCEI is Rs. 3 
million only. Similarly, recognized exchanges require a minimum 25 percent of 
equity to be offered to the public, but it is only 20 percent in the case of OTCEI 
(The Economic Times, September 22,1998). Also, unlike other exchanges, 
OTCEI does not insist on a three year record of profitability (The Economic 
Times, December 9,1999). 
However, even after six years of operations, the OTCEI has proved to be a non- 
starter, having 1000 largely inactive members (The Economic Times, September 
20,1999). Figure 4-F shows the total number of companies listed on OTCEI 
since 1997, while figure 4-G demonstrates their market capitalization compared 
to paid-up capital for the same period. A number of reasons have been cited by 
experts for its lackluster performance. First, its launch coincided with the most 
prolonged lull the Indian capital market has ever witnessed. Second, some shady 
companies deceived the investors at the very outset of its operations by charging 
high premiums. Third, its members were too under-capitalized to take sizeable 
positions in its listed securities; limited liquidity proved detrimental for this 
initiative. Finally, even on a technological front, India lacked appropriate 
infrastructure to support comprehensive on-line trading six years back. 
In an effort to revive this 'NASDAQ of the East', SEBI has permitted OTCEI to 
trade in unlisted securities (The Economic Times, December 9,1999), launched 
under the brand 'Growth Equity Market' (GEM). The objectives are: (a)'to provide 
an exit route for venture capital and private equity investments and (b) promote 
organised trading in Unlisted Securities' (OTCEI, GEM, p. 2). 
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4.4.4 Prospects: 
'The need to develop the venture capital industry has gained prominence as the 
avenue for raising resources has reduced following the lull in the primary market' 
(Business Standard, August 9,1999; p. 5). During 1997 and 1998, venture 
capital funds in India have invested Rs. 360 billion while, in the same period, only 
Rs. 140 billion was raised through the public equity market, demonstrating that it 
was venture capital funds that took up the challenge posed by new entrepreneurs 
when the Indian primary market was in the depths of despair (Business 
Standard, September 23,1999). 
However, compared to developed venture capital markets, India is still far behind 
in terms of size. The annual venture capital investments in the US in 1995 were 
0.50 percent of GDP. In the UK VC industry amounts to 0.31 percent of its GDP, 
in France the comparable figure is only 0.07 percent, in the Netherlands 0.15 
percent and in Belgium 0.06 percent (Manigart et al, 2000). In India the venture 
capital investments in 2000-01 were a mere 0.004 percent of GDP. 
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Figure 4-G: Paid up Capital Compared to Market 
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In recognition of the growing significance of the venture capital industry because 
'in international markets this industry operates as a resourceful avenue for 
companies that intend starting up new venture' (Business Standard, August 9, 
1999; p. 5), the RBI and the SEBI set up two different committees. The SEBI 
Committee looked into the functioning of venture capital in India, and suggested 
ways to facilitate and accelerate its growth, while the RBI committee focused on 
issues such as resources raising, exit options, taxation issues, corporate and 
securities laws and exchange control regulations pertaining to venture capital 
industry (Business Standard, August 9,1999). 
The SEBI Committee in its report recommended permitting limited partnership 
structure (not discussed in details due to its irrelevance for this research - for 
details, see Gompers, 1998), the use of preference shares as an investment 
instrument and issuing sweat equity to promoters (Business Standard, October 
13,1999). It further recommended that venture funds should get single-window 
clearance; a three year tax pass through to avoid Mauritius route (it enables 
venture capitalists to save tax under the double-taxation-avoidance-treaty 
between India and Mauritius); tax exemption to venture capital funds registered 
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with SEBI (as this is allowed to only Mauritius based entities); foreign funds being 
allowed to park their remittances in foreign exchange in a bank in India or 
outside; permission to invest at least 70 percent of the total funds in unlisted 
equity shares and remaining 30 percent in IPO, preferential allotment or debt; 
and permitting domestic funds to invest up to 25 percent of their funds in 
companies incorporated outside India (The Economic Times, December 9, 
1999). The government has still not taken a final view on these recommendations 
and SEBI regulations will have to be amended before their implementation. 
However, this will serve to boost the industry 'which can easily have more than 
500 entities registered' (Business Standard, December 29,1998, p. 9). 
Also, the government's sincerity towards supporting the venture capital industry 
can be judged by the credit policy statement of 1999, issued by RBI. Investments 
into venture funds by banks will now classify as priority sector lending. The 
overall ceiling of investments, which was 5 percent of the incremental deposits, 
will stand enhanced to the extent of banks' investment in the venture fund (The 
Economic Times, April, 1999). 
On the demand side, there seems no better time for the industry in terms of 
economic outlook. There are 280,000' qualified software professionals in the 
country (The Economic Times, December 9,1999), and some of them can surely 
be nurtured as high class entrepreneurs. Information technology may be able to 
do for the Indian economy what oil did for Arab countries in the 60s and 70s and 
exports did for Asian Tiger economies in 80s and 90s (The Economic Times, 
December 19,1999). Similarly, despite being the world's largest producer of tea 
and milk and being the second largest producer of fruits and vegetables, rice and 
sugar, India is not a dominant force in the world market, because only 1.3 
percent of the product is processed (Business Guide to India, 1997). The US $ 
70 billion global processed food industry is vital to India's prosperity and there is 
huge scope for investment in technologies, skills and equipment (The Economic 
Times, December 9,1999). Also, 'venture capital is being viewed as the most 
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attractive means spearheading growth not only in sunshine industries, but also in 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals' (The Economic Times, May 9,1999; p. 4). 
Over 1000 new Information Technology and intemet companies were expected 
to be set up in India in the year 2000 and India is likely to be the largest hub of 
entrepreneurial activity in the world, after USA (The Financial Express, January 
5,2000). This will pave the way for increased investment avenues for the venture 
capital industry. It is interesting to note that the least capital intensive industries, 
the prime targets for venture capitalists like 'software, food products, cosmetics, 
trading etc. received only 5 percent of investments, and earned 29 percent return 
on capital employed between 1993 - 1997. Against this, capital intensive 
industries like steel, cement oil and gas received 79 percent of the capital during 
the same period and earned slightly over 11 percent return' (Business Standard; 
November 17,1998; p. 14). 
4.5 Conclusion: 
The role SMEs play in world economies was briefly examined, followed by their 
role in India. Major impediments in their growth globally and also causes for their 
closure in India were identified. Venture capital emerged as a highly innovative 
form of financing young, start-up companies with unique characteristics. 
In India, the institutionalization of venture capital began with the efforts of state 
sponsored financial institutions. However, as regulatory framework strengthened, 
more foreign venture capital institutions started investing. However, the role of 
state in a free market environment is to stay away from the business of 
'business'. As India integrates into global markets, its venture capital outlook also 
appears very promising. However, this sector is being increasingly taken over, as 
chapter VII will uncover, by private sector in general and foreing players in 
particular. With efforts to create a conducive regulatory environment, together 
with more political stability and a vibrant capital market, the venture capital 
industry is poised to play a significant role in India's industrial march into the 21st 
Century. 
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5.1 Introduction: 
Having reviewed the literature on venture capital, it was clear that not only are 
Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring of venture capital deals untouched 
areas for research in India, but venture capital as a subject for academic 
research itself is uncultivated. 
After deal generation, screening and evaluation if the project still appears 
financially attractive, venture capitalists determine the value of the investee 
company to arrive at an entry price (Manigart et al., 1997). At this stage, 
venture capitalists are locked in prolonged negotiations with entrepreneurs to 
decide whether or not they want to invest in a project (O'Shea, 1996). There 
are, typically, limited valuation techniques available to venture capitalists 
(Karsai et al., 1997). Valuation of a deal is primarily a function of investors' 
perceived risk and their own target rates of return (Wright and Robbie, 1996). 
Study on the Indian venture capital sector by Sarika (1999/2000) concluded 
that 'Indian venture capital scenario throws open research opportunities on 
areas like structuring and monitoring of venture capital deals' (p. 21). Norton 
and Tenenbaum (1992) also stressed the need to investigate other areas of 
deal structure including 'specific term sheet provisions, and why some venture 
capitalists use, while others disdain, common equity as an investment vehicle' 
(p. 27). The significance of these two areas is underlined by Coase (1960) 
when he states ' In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make 
sure that the terms of the contract are being observed ' (p. 15). 
After this stage, typical Principal - Agent problems are encountered due to the 
nature of investment. Since venture capital is by definition risk capital, 
designing or structuring an investment contract is vital to limiting the down- 
side risk and ensuring the success of investments. Therefore, 'additional work 
is needed to better understand the theory and process of venture capitalist 
risk control' (Rosman and O'Neill, 1993; 460). While venture capital investing 
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takes place in an environment of uncertainty and unmeasurable risks, 
investors utilize a variety of strategies to help to identify and to limit such risks 
(Ruhnka and Young, 1990). As a result, more comprehensive contracts are 
formulated to influence the agent's behaviour (Pettit and Singer, 1985). Still, it 
is believed that the agency problem cannot be addressed in the venture 
capital contract, even if the investor is considered to be a partner 
(Mohammed, 1999). Because venture capitalists are not involved in the day- 
to-day functioning of the project both partners, investors and entrepreneurs 
are un-evenly informed. Therefore, Osnabrugge (1998) believes that certain 
pieces of information, having a material affect on the venture and the contract, 
are available to one party and not to the other. This is why'empirical evidence 
suggests that investors adopt specific methods in their contract with the 
entrepreneur to control agency problems' (Muhammad, 1999; p. 134). 
Muhammad (1999) asserts that, after making the financial investment, many 
investors apply different strategies to monitor the performance of ventures 
and behaviour of entrepreneurs to ensure their quality. Norton (1995) 
contends that venture capital investments are mostly backed by intangible 
assets and trust in the ethics and abilities of the entrepreneurial team. 
Moreover, one of the most important events in the early life cycle of any 
entrepreneurial firm that harbours serious growth ambitions is the infusion of 
external capital (Reid 1996a). This could lead to significant changes in the 
firm's ownership composition, affect its growth rate and consequently its size 
and organisational structure. Due to these reasons, the demand for 
information (Monitoring) about the firm is stimulated (Reid, 1998). 
5.2 Scope of the Research: 
In order to avoid replication of previous studies on extensively researched 
areas like the Evaluation of Investment Criteria, this research has sought to 
remain focussed on the Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring of Venture 
Capital deals. The study commences with the explanation of the theoretical 
linkages of the three focus areas. Then we move on to identify crucial 
dimensions in each of these areas, on the basis of existing literature. The next 
107 
Chapter 5 The Analytical Framework 
stage is to develop appropriate hypotheses in each of these areas. There are 
two crucial dimensions to valuation: 
(i) Information sources on which valuation of a business is based. 
(ii) Valuation techniques used in arriving at an entry price. 
Similarly, structuring is viewed differently from different perspectives. Broadly, 
it can be classified into three categories: 
a) The conditions or covenants that are used in the investment contract 
for limiting the downside risk of investments. 
b) If staging of investment is used, the milestones set as 'a condition for 
further capital disbursements. 
c) The type of financial products used in funding a business venture. 
On the other hand, different monitoring strategies are adopted by capital 
providers for ensuring that funds are deployed in line with the agreed 
covenants/terms in the contracts. Therefore, we will also investigate: 
(i) Information gathered through periodic statements and personal 
discussions. 
(ii) CEOs in the investee companies are replaced to enhance the value of 
investments. 
(iii) The most common reasons cited for CEO replacement. 
There are almost as many definitions of Venture Capital as there are venture 
capital firms' (Gibson and Blake, 1992; p. 41). For the purpose of this 
research a broad definition of venture capital is adopted that encompasses 
the full venture capital spectrum from classical early stage growth 
opportunities to later stage investments such as management buy-outs 
(Wright et al., 1992; Zahra, 1995). The scope of this definition reflects general 
developments in venture capital markets (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992) and 
also appears to be appropriate to the investment opportunities and financial 
needs of privately-owned enterprises (Karsai et al., 1998) in India. 
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This research seeks to focus on formal venture capital funds or companies 
only. In other words, informal private equity providers, popularly known as 
business angels, are excluded from the scope of this study. In the chosen 
category, companies or funds that have made at least three investments have 
been researched. The objective is to ensure that they have adequate 
experience in valuation, structuring and monitoring venture capital deals. 
5.3 Research Objectives: 
The venture capital industry outside the United States has grown explosively 
in recent years and now stands larger than the US industry (Elango et al., 
1995). Although the subject of much less research than the US industry, there 
appear to be differences by geographic region throughout the world (Bygrave 
and Timmons, 1992). Therefore, by focussing on India, this research seeks to: 
A) Develop the profiles of Funds and the fund management teams along 
with their investment policies; 
B) Identify the sources of information and valuation methods for arriving at 
an entry price; 
C) Identify the most common conditions included in the venture capital 
investment contracts; 
D) Identify the most popular financial instruments used in making venture 
capital investments; 
E) Identify the detailed breakdown of information that is required from 
investees for monitoring venture capital investments; 
F) Determine whether close monitoring leads to the replacement of CEOs 
in the investee companies; 
G) Common factors that lead to CEO dismissals. 
H) Thus, formulate and test hypotheses on how formal venture capital 
investors cover their down-side risk during: 
1. Post-evaluation stage i. e. valuation of deals 
2. Post-valuation stage i. e. contracting or structuring of deals, 
3. Post-investment stage i. e. how effective monitoring is carried out 
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RESEARCH BJECTIVES 
Characteristics of te Fund Managers and their 
Risk Management Strategies in India 
I 
Characteristics ý Risk-management Strategies 
> Fund Managers' Age, 
> Fund Managers' Qualifications, 
¢ Fund Managers' Experience, 
Post-evaluation: Valuation 
Post-valuation: Structuring 
Post-investment: Monitoring 
5.3.1 The Demographic Characteristics of Venture Capital Funds: 
This objective of gathering this information is to build a profile of Venture 
Capital Funds in India. In chapter 7, the entire data set is collectively analysed 
in order to test the hypotheses developed in section 5. In addition to 
developing a thorough understanding of the general characteristics of the 
Venture Capital Funds, the aim is also to determine the influence these 
characteristics have, if any, on the results presented in chapters 8 and 9. 
o Fund Size; 
Q Fund Origin; 
o Fund Age; 
o Investment Stage; 
Q Investment Sector; 
o Portfolio Size; 
Q Investment Size; 
5.4 Theoretical Framework: 
Unless there is a theoretical underpinning in academic research like this, it 
fails to add value to the existing literature. However, the objective of this 
chapter is not to expand the existing theory substantially or develop a new 
theory, as this is primarily an empirical study. Nevertheless, the existing 
theoretical literature relevant to the focus of this study will be briefly reviewed, 
and the areas where this research will add to the existing knowledge base will 
be identified. 
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Theoretical framework begins by briefly discussing the theory of the firm, as it 
relates to every structure of business organisation including venture capital. 
Then we will move to review the theoretical work done so far on principal- 
agent relationship with specific reference to venture capital industry. This will 
be followed by a theoretical review of adverse selection. This concept is 
critical to the valuation process and techniques employed in screening out 
artificially over-valued investment proposals, a key focus of this research. 
Then the theory of contracts will be examined. This is also closely linked with 
the structuring of venture capital deals, another focus of the present research. 
Finally, the theories of corporate governance and moral hazard will be 
discussed in the context of monitoring venture capital investments. 
5.4.1 Theory of the Firm: 
The separation of ownership and control in the modem business structure 
retains a central position in writings about the economic theory of the firm 
(Demsetz, 1983). This issue was very effectively raised about three-quarters 
of a century back by Berle and Means (1932). They argued that the 
separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests 
of owner (read: venture capitalist) and of ultimate manager (read: 
entrepreneur) may, and often do, diverge and where many of the checks that 
formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear. 
As discussed during the literature review in Chapter 11 and later in this 
chapter, this is one of the challenges being faced by venture capital financing. 
Young, capital-starved entrepreneurs often approach venture capitalists for 
funding their seed or start-up projects, primarily based on new concepts or 
untested technologies. Initially, the venture capitalist(s) hold a major stake in 
the venture by providing the bulk of funding, while entrepreneurs manage the 
day-to-day operations. 'For these reasons there would seem to be a demand 
for an ongoing supervision of management or for a linking of the interests of 
management to those of shareholders' (Demsetz, 1983; p. 387). 
5.4.2 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationship: 
Similarly, in a venture capital set-up, striking similarities with the problems 
identified in a principal-agent environment are noticed. Principal-agent 
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analysis is concerned with situations in which one party, the agent, acts on 
behalf of another party, the principal (Reid, 1998). If both parties are utility 
maximisers there is a strong possibility that the agent will not always fulfil the 
contract in the best interest of the principal (Muhammad, 1999). Jensen et al. 
(1978) argue that this principal-agent relationship exists in all organisations 
and at every level of management. Chan et al. (1990) view the venture 
capitalist as the principal and the owner-manager of a firm as the agent. 
Eisenhardt (1989) believes that there are typically two problems that emanate 
from such an arrangement: (a) when the principal and the agent pursue 
divergent interests and it is expensive for the principal to verify what the agent 
is actually doing and; (b) the problem of risk-sharing when they have different 
attitudes towards risk. Thus they support different actions to achieve the 
stated objectives. 
Principal-agent analysis has from its inception been a widely adopted 
modelling perspective in economics (Sappington, 1991). Reid (1998) believes 
that, with the exception of Sahlman (1990), its acceptance in areas like 
accounting and finance has been slower. Reid finds it strange because the 
accounting and financial systems of firms provide a much more detailed 
information structure than economics can typically offer. Norton (1995) points 
out that fewer financial settings contain as many potential agency problems as 
venture capital. Muhammad (1999) argues that 'in an agency relationship 
such as risk capital financing, it is the principal provider of funds, who bears 
the risks for the agent's actions and this complicates the relationship' (p. 132). 
Amit et al., (1990) have viewed the relationship between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneur in principal-agent terms. In a framework that assumes a 
risk-neutral investor and risk-averse investee, they find that if the investee's 
ability is common knowledge, risk-sharing with the investor will inevitably 
follow. Agency theorists consider how incentives and the availability of 
information affect the relationships between principals and agents (Harrison 
and Harrell, 1993). In the context of pre-investment information asymmetry, 
they further argue that When an agent has private information about the 
projected future performance of a project, the principal is unable to completely 
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monitor the agent's actions, and information asymmetry prevails. Here, the 
potential for goal conflict between the principal and agent arise' (Harrison and 
Harrell, 1993; p. 636). This leads to potential adverse selection problems 
where the agent overstates his capability to deliver certain results. 
5.4.3 Theory of Adverse Selection: 
Because of the lack of information transfer, investors face the risk of adverse 
selection (Muhammad, 1999). Without information transfer, the market may 
perform poorly. Akerlof (1970) believes, that under asymmetric information, an 
average price will be offered to all proposals, which will drive good quality 
projects away. Kanodia et al. (1989) examined the problem of adverse 
selection in a project evaluation context. Their argument revolves around the 
model that the manager has more private information about the viability of the 
project than the owner or investor. Therefore, the manager will choose to 
continue or discontinue a project in the light of his advantageous position of 
possessing private information. They argue that when managers discontinue 
a failing project, it reveals information of managers' failure that damages their 
prospective employment opportunities. However, Kanodia et al. do not 
provide empirical evidence to support this contention. 
To address the adverse selection problems faced in a venture capital 
environment, Wright & Robbie (1996) argue that 'it may be expected that 
venture capitalists seek ways of reducing the adverse selection problem and 
of taking risk and uncertainty into account. Additionally, they may make use of 
a variety of valuation techniques and adjustments to expected rate of return 
from potential investments in order to identify the scope of adverse selection 
problems' (p. 22). One of the greatest challenges that venture capitalists are 
faced with is to determine the correct valuation of the business they aim to 
invest in. A correct entry price in a start-up or early stage business provides 
them the opportunity to earn the desired rate of return on their investments. 
Entrepreneurs know their own collateral, moral character and business 
prospects better than the venture capitalists. In essence, they possess inside 
information about the enterprise for which they seek funding (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). Moreover, venture capital deals typically take place in the absence of 
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established benchmarks (Manigart et al., 1997). Therefore, investors have to 
rely heavily on various other methods to address the possible adverse 
selection problems. 
Venture capitalists face a general adverse selection problem (Karsai, et al., 
1998). In order to prevent the adverse selection problem, investors invest in 
specific information. Harrison and Harrell (1993) also believe that the adverse 
selection problem can be avoided by 'developing more complete information 
systems, thus eliminating private information' (p. 636). One of the ways to 
choose the right project is to identify the most preferred sources of information 
that investors use in developing their valuation models, because investors 
would benefit from ascertaining the true characteristics of entrepreneurs and 
the quality of their proposed ventures (Jensen and Meckling, 1978). It is in this 
context, that one of the hypotheses is developed in this chapter where we 
investigate the sources of information Indian venture capitalists use to 
determine the entry price of their investments. 
Amit et al. (1990) examined the adverse selection problem from a screening 
perspective, while we will seek to understand this from the valuation 
standpoint in India. Additionally, the specific valuation techniques used by 
venture capitalists further refine the quality of investments they make. 
Forward looking methods based on Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) use 
different rates of discounting in order to dilute the possible over-estimates 
made by the agent in terms of his capabilities or the market size etc. It is often 
believed that high discount rates discourage investments in highly uncertain, 
long-term projects (Hayes and Garvin, 1982), but in venture capital high 
discount rates are also part of a more complex process of investing and 
managing the agency problem (Sahlman, 1990). 
Prudent investors would only invest if they expected to earn a return with a 
positive net present value more than any other projects with the same level of 
risk (Barney et al., 1986). However, 'the nature of the adverse selection 
problem may not be constant with all entrepreneurial ventures, but may vary 
with the stage and sector of an investment (Wright & Robbie, 1998; p. 538). 
Therefore, it will be explored whether different discounting rates are applied in 
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the valuation process in India, depending upon the stage and sector of 
investment. All these strategies, together, comprehensively address the 
adverse selection problem in a venture capital environment. 
5.4.4 Theory of Contracts: 
An organisation is the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among 
owners of factors of production and customers. These contracts specify the 
rights of each agent in the organisation, performance criteria on which agents 
are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The theory of optimal contracts under conditions of uncertainty has received 
considerable attention (Harris and Raviv, 1979). A deeper understanding of 
the nature of contracts has emerged as the legal-rule emphasis associated 
with the study of discrete contracting has given way to a more general 
concern with the contractual purposes to be served (Williamson, 1985). 
Mitchell's (1992) three-way discussion of contracts discloses that contracts 
are a good deal more varied and complex than is commonly realised. It further 
suggests that governance structures vary with the nature of the transaction. 
Williamson (1979) believes that there are three dimensions that characterise 
transactions: (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which they recur, and (3) 
the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred. 
Hicks and Simon (1979) argue that, of the three, uncertainty is widely 
conceded to be a critical attribute. In a risky investment like venture capital, 
contracting or structuring plays an important role in limiting the risk. 
The literature has identified two primary approaches, concerned with the 
optimal contract between principal and agent (Hart, 1995), and the incomplete 
contract approach (Spier, 1992). The first approach relies on the premise that 
contracts can be complete. More comprehensive contracts can be formulated 
to influence the behaviour of the agent (Pettit and Singer, 1985). Such 
contracts can either be behaviour-based or outcome-based. The former are 
aimed to ensure that the agent behaves as per the original agreement 
(Sappington, 1991). They include efforts to control the behaviour of the agent, 
primarily to align it with what was contractually agreed (Jensen and Meckling, 
1978). In the venture capital context, such efforts may range from budget 
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restrictions, approval for restructuring and further fund raising, to board 
representation and appointment of auditors. An outcome- based contract 
motivates behaviour by co-alignment of the interest of the agent with that of 
the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). Examples of this type of contract include 
equity ratchets for entrepreneur, staging of investment on the achievement of 
certain milestones and relaxation of some stringent covenants included in the 
original contract etc. Sahlman (1990) observes that venture capitalists are 
also protected against competition by pre-emptive rights. 
The basic objective of structuring the contracts is to minimise the high degree 
of risk involved in venture capital investments. Fiet (1995) identified two types 
of risk: market risk; and agency risk. Market risk stems from unforeseen 
competitive conditions. It depends upon the size, growth and accessibility of 
the market, and on the existence of a market need (Scherer, 1980; Porter, 
1980; Barney et at., 1989). Agency risk, on the other hand, is the degree of 
uncertainty that either the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist will pursue his 
own interest rather than comply with the requirements of the contract (Aichian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). This usually refers to the venture 
capitalist's risk that the entrepreneur will pursue his or her own interest at the 
expense of those of the venture capitalist. Fiet (1995) concludes that venture 
capitalists attach more importance to market risk than agency risk. The 
reason he points out they are less concerned about agency risk is 'because 
they have learned how to protect themselves from it using stringent boilerplate 
contractual provisions' (p. 566). In this research, widely used covenants by 
Indian venture capitalists will be identified in order to mitigate the agency risk. 
Similarly, Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that imperfect contracting allows 
managers to take actions that are in their own best interests and not 
necessarily those of shareholders. Through stringent contracts, venture 
capitalists may also seek to replace the under-performing managers. 
Bergemann and Hege (1998) contend that the entrepreneur controls the 
allocation of the funds and the investment effort is unobservable to the 
investor. Therefore, 'one of the most challenging problems in venture 
financing is to determine when to release funds for continued development' (p. 
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704). They suggest that the efficient solution can only be achieved by a long- 
term contract which allows for intertemporal risk-sharing, in that the venture 
capitalist subsidises continuation of the project toward the beginning in 
exchange for higher expected profits at the end. Wright and Robbie (1998) 
argue that'an important theoretical issue arises which concerns how contracts 
are to be structured under these conditions of multi-stage investment 
decisions' (p. 542). In this research, we will also identify the milestones widely 
used by venture capitalists in India for staging investments. 
There are other aspects of structuring that have been widely covered by past 
researchers. Chan et at. (1990) explore the optimal transition of control 
between entrepreneur and venture capitalist in a model with initial uncertainty 
about the skill of the entrepreneur. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) show that a 
fraction equity contract may give robust optimal incentives if it is efficient to 
allocate the control rights to venture capitalist. Wright and Robbie (1998) 
however contend that, with entrepreneurial-led financing, this situation does 
not hold as there does not exist a fully revealing signalling equilibrium which 
would resolve asymmetric information problems. Berglof (1994) considers 
convertible debt in a framework of incomplete contracts to transfer control 
rights to the value-maximising party. Trester (1998) argues that the problem of 
an entrepreneur dissipating the firm's assets can be mitigated if the investor 
has an option to declare default and seize the assets. Wright and Robbie 
(1998) believe that 'little theoretical attention has been devoted to the range of 
financial instruments used by venture capitalists' (p. 544). Therefore, we will 
also identify whether venture capitalists in India control down-side risk by 
using different financial products, based on the stage and investment sector. 
5.4.5 Theory of Corporate Governance: 
Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a 
corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such 
that their interests are protected (John and Senbet, 1998). They point out that 
'the entrepreneur, and other corporate insiders control the key decisions. 
Given the separation of ownership and control that is endemic to a market 
economy, how the stakeholders control management is the subject of 
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corporate governance' (p. 372). Barney et al. (1989) examine the influences 
on the degree to which elaborate governance mechanisms are used by 
venture capitalists; they found that high agency risks and business risks were 
associated with more elaborate governance structure. 
Karsai et al. (1995) argue that the power of suppliers of finance can be 
exerted through the governance mechanisms they introduce in their 
relationships with venture capital firms, notably in terms of the reporting 
requirements they impose. They believe that this has been 'a neglected area 
in venture capital research, it may be expected that as markets develop more 
detailed reporting requirements are formulated' (p. 3). The board of directors 
is central to corporate governance mechanisms in market economies (John 
and Senbet, 1998). The role of directors' remuneration in providing incentives 
for directors to promote the long term performance and enterprise activities of 
the firm is well-documented within the agency theory literature (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Thus, we will investigate whether Indian venture capitalists 
insist on proportional representation on their investee companies' board, and 
whether directors are vested with the power to replace the CEOs of their 
investee companies or not. 
Similarly, the supply of audited accounting information is a crucial aspect of 
corporate governance, as it bridges the information asymmetry between 
directors and external fund providers, and also provides a report of directors' 
stewardship (Whittington, 1993). Also, the inclusion of non-executive directors 
increases the board's effectiveness at monitoring management for the 
prevention of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996). However, 'the quality 
of accounting information is difficult to quantify (Short et al., 1999; p. 344). 
Like corporations, venture capital firms raise money to invest in projects. But 
the governance systems used by venture capital organisations and traditional 
corporations are very different (Sahlman, 1990). Therefore, we will investigate 
the frequency and extent of monitoring reports and other means of monitoring 
the business activities of the investee companies in India. 
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5.4.6 Moral Hazard Theory: 
The existence of moral hazard is a common problem across different 
situations. It is intrinsic to risk-sharing situations with information asymmetry 
(Reid, 1998). Reid also points out that, at the post-investment stage, as the 
venture capitalist assumes the role of principal and the investee firm's 
directors the role of agent, their relationship places the principal in a position 
where the problem of moral hazard has to be addressed. Reid et al. (1995) 
show that venture capitalists attempt to manage the risks involved in their 
activities through tight monitoring and an unwillingness to bear all the risk in 
order to address moral hazard issues. Sweeting (1991a) and Mitchell et al. 
(1995) show that accounting information demands are designed to deal with 
moral hazard and information asymmetry problems. They found that 
accounting information flows were typically required on a more regular basis 
and more detailed basis than are statutorily required for quoted companies. 
However, it may not be prudent to compare the information requirements of 
two sets of companies operating at different stages. Quoted companies are 
usually well-established, with a proven track record of sales and earnings. On 
the other hand, venture capital-backed investments are early stage with 
typical teething problems. Therefore, a constant and detailed vigil on their 
performance is always desirable. We will address these questions in our data 
collection and investigate the frequency, nature, and break-up of the 
information gathered by venture capitalists in India. 
Reid (1998) observes that increased frequency of reporting is, like increased 
scope of reporting, an aspect of the generally greater intensity of post- 
investment reporting required by the venture capitalist. He further points out 
that 'in terms of the agency approach this attenuates moral hazard, and 
further promotes contractual efficiency by more precise control of the 
investee's firm' (p. 143). Gompers (1995) finds evidence to support the view 
that monitoring process provides valuable information which enables the 
venture capitalist to cut-off new financing in the light of negative information 
about future returns, and provide more financing and a greater number of 
rounds of financing in the more successful transactions. 
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Next, in the light of the above theoretical framework, we will conduct an 
extended literature review. Then, the hypotheses will be developed that will be 
based on both the theoretical discussion and further literature review. 
5.5 Risk Management Strategies: 
5.5.1 Valuation: 
'Return is the motivating force in the investment process. It is the reward for 
undertaking the investment' (Jones, 2000; p. 124). According to financial 
theory, the return that an investor requires is a function of the non-diversifiable 
risk of the investment (Brealey and Myers, 1996). The higher the risk, the 
higher the required return should be (Damodaran, 1994). 
Despite the established general corporate finance principles, differences may 
arise in their application between countries. Previous cross-country studies 
have demonstrated differences between markets on the behaviour of 
investment analysis (Manigart et at., 1997). German investment analysts use 
technical analysis more significantly than do their UK counterparts who rely 
more on net asset per share and dividend growth model (Pike et at., 1993). In 
respect of the venture capital industry, previous studies have stressed the 
heterogeneity of markets across differing countries (Wright et al., 1992; 
Sapienza et at., 1996). Therefore, 'differences may also be expected in the 
approaches to the valuation of VC projects as well as the information used' 
(Manigart et at., 2000; p. 6). 
The pricing and terms of financing agreement between an investor and the 
investee can help or hurt the anticipated reward-to-risk ratio (Ruhnka and 
Young, 1991). The wrong price fora security issue does not affect firm value, 
it simply transfers value from one security holder to others (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Due to adverse selection and information asymmetry problems (Amit et 
al., 1993), valuation is one of the most crucial phases in arriving at a decision 
(Manigart et al., 1997). The extent of mis-valuations due to adverse selection 
may well depend on the characteristics of the securities issued by the firm 
(Nachman and Noe, 1994). Manigart et at. (1997) identified three sequential 
steps for the valuation process. First, information is gathered on the venture, 
its management team and its business prospects. Second, this information is 
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used to appraise the risk of the venture and hence the required rate of return 
on the investment, and to estimate the future cash flows and profit potential. 
Finally, one or more valuation methods is used, combining the elements of 
risk, return, and cash flows in order to assess the value of the company. 
5.5.1.1 Valuation Information: Venture capitalists' assessment of the value of 
a company in a developing nation is often problematic (HBS, 2000). The 
problem may be compounded because information about the value of the 
project is imperfect and revealed over time (Cooper and Carleton, 1979; 
Bergemann and Hege, 1998). The subjectivity of valuations is an international 
phenomenon (Manigart et al., 2000). In the nascent stage of the investee 
companies, valuation is often difficult and quite subjective (O'Shea, 1996). 
Unlisted companies also have fewer statutory disclosure requirements, that 
makes the gathering of information more difficult than listed companies 
(Manigart et al., 1997). 
Arnold and Moizer (1984) surveyed six investment firms that made 
investments in listed companies. They concluded that 'the most influential 
sources are perceived to be the company's annual profit and loss account and 
balance sheet and its interim results' (p. 202), while the second most 
important source was discussions with the personnel of the company. 
However, for unlisted company valuations, one of the most significant sources 
of information is the business plan (MacMillan et al., 1987), together with 
historic accounting data - balance sheet and profit and loss accounts, and 
future accounting data - the cash flow forecasts (Manigart et al., 1997). The 
managerial track record of the entrepreneur and his familiarity with the project 
and the industry may also give some indication about the future success of 
the project (Amit et al, 1993). 
Entrepreneurs may not disclose - deliberately or inadvertently - crucial 
information or give a biased view of important facts that could lead to an 
unrealistic valuation of the business (Sahlman, 1990). Therefore, venture 
capitalists are expected to rely heavily on reports issued by independent 
auditors, to validate the numbers and information produced by the 
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management team. Moreover, due to the innovative nature of most 
businesses and little historical background, business projections are hard to 
estimate (Manigart et at., 1997). 
In respect of fair valuation assessment of management buy-out candidates, 
investment banks may use both a variety of information and techniques in 
order to produce a range of values within which an acceptable investment 
price can be negotiated (DeAngelo, 1990). This section draws on models of 
the venture capital process (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Wright and Robbie, 
1996), focusing particularly on information used for valuation and the relative 
importance of different valuation methods. The actions of venture capitalists in 
these areas concern attempts to deal with potential adverse selection 
problems and to value investments at entry prices that will permit them to 
achieve their target rates of returns. Therefore, Karsai et al. (1998) believe 
that access to information is a general problem in these evaluation processes. 
Significant differences also appear in the pricing of transactions in developed 
and developing countries (HBS, 2000). 
Before applying any of the valuation techniques, information is gathered from 
a variety of sources. It is this information that forms possible business 
scenarios. In a survey of 17 Hungarian venture capitalists, Karsai et al. (1995) 
found that these venture capitalists place strongest emphasis on conducting 
their own due diligence report for valuation, followed by sales and marketing 
information. Information contained in the Business Plan rated third while 
report from accounting and consulting firms was placed fourth. On the 
valuation techniques, DCF topped the list followed by the EBIT multiple, while 
prospective and historic price/earnings multiples were rated third and fourth. 
In an empirical study of valuation process in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France, Manigart et al. (1997) found that the most important information 
source is venture capitalists' own due diligence report, followed by the overall 
coherence of the business plan, and the balance sheet and Profit and Loss 
account. The next preferences were financial statements and (audited or 
unaudited) accounting numbers, both historical as well as projected. Overall, 
product characteristics and marketing information come only in ninth place, 
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except France where it ranked sixth. This might indicate that 'the information 
used for valuation purposes is different from the information used in the 
overall due diligence process' (p. 35). 
In a follow up survey which was extended to Poland and Slovakia, Karsai et 
al. (1998), confirmed that apart from Slovakia, greatest importance is still 
attached to the due diligence report, followed by accounting/consulting firm's 
report. Business Plan financial data also figured highly, especially in Poland 
and Hungary. However, typically characterising transition markets, all three 
countries placed significantly greater emphasis than their UK counterparts on 
sales and marketing information, product information, and production 
capacity/technology information. Also, the DCF based valuation method was 
most popular among all the three countries, followed by the EBIT multiple 
(together historic and prospective). Similarly, there is significantly greater 
emphasis on dividend yield technique in the three countries. 
Further extending their study to include the US, Manigart et al. (2000) 
supported most of the results of their earlier survey and concluded that, for 
valuation, the most important source of information in each country is the own 
due diligence report, except in France where this item is rated second. The 
overall coherence of the business plan is the first in France, second in US and 
third in UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. Similarly, different parts of a 
business plan, such as Profit and Loss account, balance sheet and un-audited 
management projections were found important in the European countries. 
Long term management projections, together with due diligence by outside 
experts such as consultants or accounting firms, are significantly more used in 
Continental Europe compared to the US and UK. Information on sales, 
marketing, product, production and technology was generally less important, 
except in France. 
Wright and Robbie (1994) surveyed 66 venture capitalists in the UK. Their 
study established the importance of due diligence reports in preparing 
valuation, followed by personal references. Independent accountant's reports 
ranked third. The most commonly used valuation methods employed were 
variations of the price earnings ratio multiple. Overall the technique with the 
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best score was capitalised maintainable earnings on a prospective basis, 
while capitalised maintainable earnings (EBIT multiple) was the third most 
common. In the light of the existing research, it is hypothesised that: 
5.5.1.2 Hypothesis (1): In order to arrive at a valuation, venture 
capitalists in India rely on their 'Own Due Diligence Report' more than 
other sources of information to minimise adverse selection. 
5.5.1.3 Valuation Techniques: Manigart et al. (1997), argue that practitioners 
and theorists offer several, sometimes conflicting valuation methods. They 
classify them into three categories. Methods based on: (i) expected future 
cash income; (ii) accounting numbers; and (iii) rules of thumb. Accounting- 
based techniques include all types of accounting valuations of the firm's 
assets, such as historic cost, replacement value of the assets, or the book 
value of the equity. Rule of thumb methods may encompass multiplying the 
sales of the company by some factor. The factor should be influenced by the 
profit-generating potential of that type of business, or recent transaction prices 
for comparable companies. This method is often sector specific. Recent 
examples can be drawn from the transactions executed in some cable and 
internet businesses in the US, where valuation was determined by a certain 
multiple of number of subscribers on roll. The above two methods are very 
easy to use but they lack theoretical rationale. Moreover, they require historic 
information, which is not available for start-up companies' (p. 31). 
Manigart et at. believe that only discounted free cash flow and the discounted 
dividend yield are theoretically correct valuation methods, because the current 
investment is compared with the expected future cash inflows generated by 
the investment. However, they rule out the use of dividend yield method, as 
venture capital investments are usually directed at young ventures where the 
possibility of paying dividend is rare. They argue that most of the investee 
companies are initially cash-starved. Therefore, expected the increase in 
business value is not reflected in a dividend stream in the short term. Hence, 
venture capitalists hope to make significant capital gains at the time of exit. 
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Discounted free cash flow methods have the advantage that they do not rely 
on historic information to make forecasts about the value of the company 
(Chandra, 1989). This makes them very useful valuation methods for new 
ventures, as they do not yet have a track record (Manigart et al., 1997). 
However, this approach is not perfect either. It is not easy to predict future 
cash flows in a highly uncertain business environment, this will increase the 
expected error of forecast (Waldron and Hubbard, 1991). But this problem 
may be overcome by sensitivity analysis (Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
Another deficiency in this method is that, when the time horizon used in the 
projections is short, an important part of the value of the company is captured 
by the residual value (Copeland and Weston, 1983). This value is quite 
sensitive to the expected growth rate beyond the projected time horizon. Even 
a minor change in the growth percentage may have a substantial impact on 
the projected value of the company (Manigart et al., 1997). 
Dixit and Pindyck (1995) argue that the real option approach may be better 
adapted to valuing start-up companies in highly uncertain environments. 
Manigart et at. (1997) while accepting this as very promising in theory, believe 
that it is not well known among practitioners yet, and also being very difficult 
to compute, due to the assumptions that have to be made. 
Research conducted by Porta et al. (1999), using a sample of 371 large firms 
from 27 wealthy economies, concluded that better shareholder protection is 
associated with higher valuation of corporate assets. They also found 
evidence that higher incentives from cash flow ownership are associated with 
higher valuations. The existence of a potential adverse selection problem 
leads to the expectation that, in making a valuation, venture capitalists will use 
a wide range of information and techniques (Wright and Robbie, 1996). Most 
of the practitioner-oriented papers (Sharp, 1993; Walker, 1990) indicate that 
valuations of potential investees are used as a basis for determining the most 
appropriate financing structure and therefore for calculating the projected IRR, 
the most commonly used performance benchmark in the venture capital 
industry (Lorenz, 1989). 
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Likewise, the stage of financing is significantly more important in determining 
project risk and hence the targeted IRR, than the state of technology involved 
(Murray and Lott, 1995). Given the established track record of later stage 
investments, venture capitalists focusing on such projects may place greater 
emphasis on valuation methods, which utilise historic information, and place 
greater emphasis on financial and accounting sources of information in 
preparing valuations (Wright and Robbie, 1996). By contrast, 'early stage 
companies have short or no histories to examine and are difficult to evaluate' 
(Gompers, 1995; p. 1473). The pricing of venture capital at the origination 
stage is based in great part on forecasts of valuation at the time of exit. One 
of the principal valuation techniques involves taking current public market 
price/earnings multiples and applying them to forecasted earnings at exit 
(Burger and Udell, 1998). 
On the other hand, Arnold and Moizer (1984) conclude that 'DCF although 
mathematically very appealing is far too precise an estimate of a company's 
worth, given the inexact nature of investment (p. 201). Pike (1988) examined 
the capital budgeting practices employed in 100 large UK firms over an 11- 
year period. He concluded that managers prefer to employ a combination of 
appraisal methods. However, 'DCF techniques, of which the IRR and NPV 
methods are the best known, have greatly increased in usage' (p. 346). 
McIntyre and Coulthrust (1986) have shown payback method to be highly 
popular among smaller firms. Manigart et al. (2000) concluded that 'all 
countries scoring highest in choosing one particular valuation method and 
using the others as a check' (p. 16). 
On valuation techniques, capitalized maintainable earnings - price/earning 
multiple on a historic or prospective basis - scored highest in the UK and 
France while DCF methods topped the list in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
DCF was ranked second in the UK, Rule of thumb in France, while Multiples 
in the Netherlands and Belgium. Rule of thumb was ranked third in the UK, 
the Netherlands and Belgium, while DCF in France. Dividend Yield and 
Replacement cost, incidently, came fourth and fifth in all the four countries 
(Manigart et al., 1997). 
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Manigart et al. (2000) also found 'wide variation between the countries in the 
use of valuation method' (p. 14). For instance, the most popular method in the 
UK continued to be prospective or historic price/earnings multiples, whereas 
EBIT multiples and recent transaction prices in the sector in the US, DCF 
techniques in Belgium and the Netherlands and recent transaction prices in 
France were the top tanked valuation tools. Wright and Robbie (1998) believe 
that very 'little work is available on valuation in venture capital investments, 
particularly relating to international comparisons in markets at differing stages 
of development' (p. 558). Given this research to date, it is hypothesised that: 
5.5.1.4 Hypothesis (2): Venture capitalists in India use DCF based 
valuation methods more than any other method. 
5.5.2 Structuring: 
'Responding to the call for more process research which examines the deal 
structuring and post-investment stages of venture capital environment' (Steire 
and Greenwood, 1995; p. 337), this research will attempt to identify 
structuring characteristics namely, contractual features like covenants in 
shareholders' agreements; product features like preferences for financial 
products; and finally, whether or not staging of investments is a control 
mechanism used by venture capitalists in India. 'To be successful, venture 
capital investors ought to utilise appropriate control procedures to safeguard 
themselves against the most threatening risks' (Fiet and Hellriegel, 1995; p. 
25) because the entrepreneur's skill is unknown to all at the time of contract 
negotiation and capital investment (Chan et al., 1990). Since venture capital 
investment takes place in an environment of uncertainty and un-measurable 
risks, venture capital investors utilize a variety of strategies to help to identify 
and to limit such risks (Ruhnka and Young, 1991). 
The theory of optimal contract under conditions of uncertainly has received 
considerable attention (Harris and Raviv, 1979). Highlighting the significance 
of contracts, Jensen and Meckling (1978) argue that 'millions of individuals 
voluntarily entrust billions of dollars, francs, pesos etc., of personal wealth to 
the care of managers on the basis of a complex set of contracting 
relationships which delineate the rights of the parties involved' (p. 357). 
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Corporate control is a fundamental concern of investors. If individuals knew all 
potential outcomes, state contingent contracts would eliminate potential 
agency cost. But such complete knowledge does not exist, and investors must 
minimize potential agency costs. Mechanisms in financial contracts between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs directly account for potential agency 
costs and private information associated with high-risk, high-return projects 
(Gompers, 1995). Therefore, 'agency problems can be regulated more 
effectively through contract provisions' (Fiet, 1995; p. 556) where two risk- 
averse parties agree ex ante on a contract that allows them to share the risk 
associated with the common environment in which they operate (Anderlini and 
Felli, 1995). Because of the potential for different overall objectives, 
management styles, and risk preferences, the entrepreneur is likely in many 
cases to choose actions that are consistent with his own best interest but 
inconsistent with the venture capitalist's interest (Amit et at., 1990). Thus, a 
contract allocates control rights and rights to return streams, and may also 
allow a party to convert debt into equity or vice versa (Berglof, 1994). 
Structuring a venture capital deal involves the allocation of economic value 
(Sahlman, 1988). Appropriate structuring of venture capital investments has 
important implications for the ability of venture capitalists to earn their target 
rates of return (Wright and Robbie, 1998). The deal needs to be structured so 
that the investors, investee and VC firms are all comfortable with their 
positions (Gibson and Blake, 1992). Amit et al. (1990) identified five 
distinguishing characteristics of venture capital financing contracts (1) Sharing 
Arrangements (2) Earnout Agreement (3) Buyout Option (4) Performance 
Requirement and (5) Future Financing. Also, the purpose of the contract 
between the investor and the investee is to share risk (Edinburgh, 1992). 'The 
private equity offers highly structured and complex contracts to small 
businesses that are often acutely informational opaque' (Berger and Udell, 
1998; p. 614). Thus, the asymmetry of information between investor and 
investee, and their different attitudes to risk, provide the basis for mutually 
beneficial contracting (Terry and Smith, 1998). 
An agency problem arises in the relationship between venture capitalist and 
entrepreneur in which the latter may expend insufficient effort, exhibit expense 
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preference behaviour, or lack sufficient information skill to make optimal 
production decisions. Berger and Udell (1998) believe that the menu contract 
features that characterise venture capital investing may be explained as 
solutions to this agency problem. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) link the nature 
of the contract with the attitude of the agent. They argue that simple contracts 
can be used where an agent behaves in an honest manner while if the market 
behaves dishonestly 'more complex contracts may be necessary to ensure 
reliable performance' (p. 874). 
But in practice, it is generally difficult to specify precisely future action 
schedules in a contract. Therefore, some important future variables have to 
be left out of the contract if they are difficult or impossible to describe initially 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992). The sophistication of contracts' relevance to the 
modern corporation is the product of a historical process in which there were 
strong incentives for individuals to minimize agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1978). Venture capitalists retain important rights that allow them to 
intervene in the company's operations when necessary (Gompers et al., 
1998). 'Thus, we have the opportunity and the necessity in venture capital to 
learn more about risk, uncertainty and contracting technology' (Barry, 1994; p. 
3). 
5.5.2.1 Contractual Covenants: Covenant use may be determined by the 
extent of potential agency problems, because covenants are costly to 
negotiate and monitor, and they are employed only when the problems are 
severe (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). Considerable research has been 
undertaken in the past, focussing on debt transactions in a lender-borrower 
context. This includes both private market (bank) and public market (bonds). 
'Covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of 
financial contracting' (Rajan and Winton, 1995; p. 1113). Also, control rights 
from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard (Smith 
and Warner, 1979). Contracts with covenants tend to be either too harsh (too 
many good projects are liquidated) or too lenient (too many bad projects are 
permitted to mature). It would be interesting to analyze the complex 
covenants, which may be necessary to control agency problems (Berlin and 
Loeys, 1988). 
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Debt covenants are important in enabling banks to monitor the progress of 
borrowers (Wright et at., 1998). They include accounting based provisions 
involving agreements not to fall below specified levels of financial ratios 
(Beneish and Press, 1993), restrictions on managerial actions involving 
significant acquisition and investment expenditures (Citron et al., 1997), and 
also limits on dividend, taking out additional borrowings and sale of assets 
(Wright et at., 1998). Gompers and Lerner (1996) surveyed 140 venture 
partnership agreements to study the effect of demand/supply on contractual 
covenants used in forming these entities. The nature of relationship is 
somewhat different in these settings compared to the venture fund and 
investee firms. The basic document that governs the relationship between the 
venture capital firm and the investee is the stock-purchase agreement 
(Sahlman, 1990). However, due to the lack of dedicated research on this 
subject, very little is known about the covenants most commonly found in 
venture capitalists' stock-purchase agreements with their investee companies. 
Some of the past papers listed below, have made only passing reference to 
the choice of covenants included in the agreement between the venture 
capitalists and the firms in which they invest. These covenants include the 
appointment of reputable auditors and limitations on the managers' decision 
making powers (Jensen and Meckling, 1978); the staging of investment to 
assure optimal exercise of production options and efficient stopping 
(Sahlman, 1988,1990; Chan et al., 1990); control and the choice of financial 
instrument (Gompers, 1993; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Trester, 1998); 
requirements to maintain minimum working capital, and restrictions on the 
disposition of assets and merger activity (Zender, 1991); entrepreneur 
compensation (Sahlman, 1990); restrictive covenants (Chan et al., 1990; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1996); co-sale and "take me along" clauses which 
require the consent of both parties before selling (Berglof, 1994); board 
representation (Lerner, 1995); the allocation of voting rights (Fenn et al., 
1997); direct access to investees' accounting system (Mitchell and Terry, 
1998), and the right to replace the management (Ruhnka and Young, 1990). 
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In addition, a venture capital deal often includes blocking rights over key 
decisions, including the sale of the company or the timing of an IPO. The 
contract is also likely to contain downside protection in the form of anti-dilution 
clauses or rachets. These aim to protect against equity dilution if a 
subsequent round of financing takes place at lower valuation. In case of an 
under performing company, venture capitalists are offered enough shares to 
maintain their original percentage of equity stake (Zider, 1998). Through 
special financial ratio and activity restrictions linked to periodic submission of 
financial information, covenants limit the firms' ability to change its financial 
conditions or strategy. However, small firms often do not have audited 
financial statements, making it extremely difficult to impose ratio related 
financial covenants (Berger and Udell, 1998). Consequently, the strictest 
covenants are placed on the firms with the most credit risk and greatest moral 
hazard possibility (Berlin and Mester, 1993). Also in order to control the flow 
of funds in the initial phase of the start-up projects'all the money has to be put 
up front, and it goes into an account, and controlled by venture capitalists and 
released on the milestones' (Steire and Greenwood, 1995; p. 346). 
Because contracting is costly, more restrictive contracts are employed when 
the potential for opportunistic behaviour is greater. Therefore, the relative 
benefits of covenants may also increase as the scope of opportunistic 
behaviour rises (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). However, covenants are not 
always written in fine detail. Many covenants are standard boiler-plate, 
fleshed out as much by lawyers as by loan officers (Simpson, 1973). There is 
some evidence suggesting that covenants may not cover all contingencies 
(Beneish and Press, 1994) because 'no contract between an entrepreneur 
and venture capitalist can anticipate every possible conflict' (Sahlman, 1990; 
p. 508). However, from the standpoint of the investor, the explicit contract is 
important which is designed to provide incentives for efforts on the part of the 
investee, and to limit the scope for moral hazard (Mitchell and Reid, 1998). 
Much of the structuring of a deal is established to serve as a means of limiting 
potential losses. For example, performance criteria may be established which 
serve to adjust ownership at a later stage. Management is required to give 
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warranties on issues such as outstanding litigation or major contracts 
(O'Shea, 1996). The contract design also needs to address risk-sharing 
considerations (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). The process of 'financial 
contracting in venture capital focuses on a few simple questions: (a) how is 
cash allocated? (b) how is risk allocated? and (c) what are the incentives for 
both parties in the deal? ' (Sahlman, 1988; p. 27). The question then becomes 
how best to distribute cash flows and the ownership of control to groups of 
investors (Zender, 1991). Covenants are critical for aligning the incentives of 
venture capitalists with those of (Gompers, 1998) investees. Thus, while each 
contract is carefully crafted and may impose specific covenants or 
requirements, investors do not have further involvement with day-to-day 
operations (Ravid and Spiegel, 1997). However, what is important is 'tightly 
defined agreement at first, but trust is crucial' (Mitchell & Reid, 1998; p. 240). 
The contracting theory predicts that contracting parties should balance the 
benefits of restricting activities with the cost of negotiating the provisions, 
writing the contractual clauses and monitoring compliance. Fund and firm 
specific factors increasing the benefits of restrictions or decreasing monitoring 
costs should lead to a greater number of restrictions (Gompers and Lerner, 
1996). The terms of financing must allow the company to obtain the capital 
necessary for survival in (temporary) bad-news scenarios, as well as 
providing for the exploitation of good news scenarios. If the deal is structured 
such that it is almost impossible to raise additional capital - for instance there 
is an implicit 'poison pill' built into the contract - then the financial structure of 
the deal will reduce instead of adding to the value of the project (Sahlman, 
1988). Thus, the research to date leads us to hypothesise that: 
5.5.2.2 Hypothesis (3): Venture capitalists in India use a variety of 
covenants in shareholder agreements to avert moral hazard. 
5.5.2.3 Staging of Investments: Venture capitalists rarely, if ever, invest all the 
external capital that a company will require to accomplish its business plan. 
Instead they invest in companies at distinct stages in their development 
(Ruhnka and Young, 1987; Sahlman, 1990). One of the most challenging 
problems in venture financing is to determine when to release funds for 
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continued development and when to abandon a project (Bergman and Hege, 
1997). Cornelli and Yosha (1997) argue that because of the greater 
uncertainty and high failure risk of new ventures, a widely used financing 
technique is the infusion of capital over time. Each financing round is usually 
related to a significant stage in the development process. At each stage new 
information about the venture is released (Sahlman, 1990). Thus the 
sequential arrival of information supports stage financing as the optimal 
arrangement (Bergmann and Hege, 1998). 
The funds supplied by venture capitalist are allocated by the entrepreneur to 
generate the desired success. Since the allocation of the funds to the project 
is unobservable to the venture capitalist, a moral hazard problem arises 
between financier and entrepreneur (Bergmann and Hege, 1998). Venture 
capitalists typically fund firms in staged capital commitments wherein money 
is dispersed in increments pending the achievement of defined milestones 
(Sahiman, 1988; Steire and Greenwood, 1995; Bergman and Hege, 1997). 
Gorman and Sahiman (1989) provide an explanation for staging: 'to limit 
damage by refusing additional financing if the company is unsuccessful in the 
early stages' (p. 238). Holmstrom and Costa (1986) argue that managerial 
skills are revealed over time and the manager's propensity to influence the 
perception of such skills sometime causes him to over-invest; the principal 
copes with this situation by occasionally rationing capital. Also 'empirical 
evidence indicates that the entrepreneur is indeed penalized if the project 
takes too much time as his equity fraction is diluted from one financing round 
to another' (Bergmann and Hege, 1998; p. 705). 
Also flexibility in future pricing can make the difference between a venture 
succeeding and failing when performance is not as favourable as expected 
(Sahiman, 1988). Sahlman (1990) believes that capital is a scarce and 
expensive resource for individual ventures. Misuse of capital is costly to 
venture capitalists but not necessarily to management. Lerner (1998) in 
commenting on the paper of Bergmann and Hege (1998), states that staged 
financing is one of the most important mechanisms that venture capitalists 
employ to control entrepreneurs. Hence, 'projects are frequently divided into 
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various stages which are defined by the completion of certain intermediate 
results. In such circumstances continued financing may be conditional on the 
successful completion of earlier stages. Thus the entire project simply 
becomes a sequence of such stages' (Bergmann and Hege, 1998; p. 726). 
Sahlman (1988) argues that what is important to note at this point is that 
investors can infer information about the abilities and convictions of 
entrepreneurs by offering different deal terms and gauging the response. The 
ability to signal intentions credibly may enable some entrepreneurs to obtain 
funding that would not have been available were there no means for 
communicating true abilities or convictions. 'Based on his information, the 
venture capitalist makes the decision whether to continue the project or 
abandon it' (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; p. 380) when the likelihood of future 
success becomes sufficiently small (Bergmann and Hege, 1998). 
The process of staging involves periodically evaluating whether to continue 
funding and, if so, on what terms. The right to revalue a given project has 
value when compared to an alternate situation in which the future financing 
terms are decided irrevocably at the start of the venture (Sahlman, 1988). As 
the flow of investment sinks into the project, entrepreneur and investor update 
their assessment of the prospects of the project (Bergmann and Hege, 1998). 
Each new stage of financing should therefore coincide with a significant 
development in the venture, such as a new patent, the final creation of a 
product, a clearer view of the marketability of a product, etc. (Neher, 1999). 
Lerner (1992a) analysed venture capital financing in two industries: 
Biotechnology; and Winchester hard drives. He finds that the likelihood of 
later round venture capital financing increases with the "technological 
progress" (i. e. patents) obtained by the firm, and with rising liquidity in the IPO 
market through which investors often "cash out". 
Mukherji and Nagarajan (1995) argue that an intermediate signal might 
provide both "hard" and "soft" performance measures. Performance measures 
that are verifiable and quantifiable such as cost or profit are termed as "hard". 
While non-verifiable measures like quality and customer satisfaction are "soft". 
Gompers (1992) ties stage timing to agency cost and the creation and value 
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of a strategic option, using an equity contract. Sahlman (1988) argues that 
building such options into venture capital contracts also helps overcome initial 
differences of opinion between venture capitalist and entrepreneur about the 
probability of different outcomes. Sahlman (1990) believes that entrepreneurs 
accept the staged capital process because they usually have great confidence 
in their own abilities to meet targets. If they meet those goals, they will end up 
owning a significantly larger share of the company. However, Bergmann and 
Hege, (1998) argue that if the entrepreneur is promised future funding, then 
diverting the funds today may be considered at the expectation of a promise. 
On the other hand, staging will benefit from additional information. The 
investor will be able to reduce risk before the second round of financing. If the 
progress is in line with the projections, the entrepreneur will have less dilution 
in the second round of financing. Staged capital commitments also keep the 
entrepreneur focused on the task at hand and may motivate a more rapid 
pace of activity (Barry, 1994). However, stage financing may not always work 
as a value enhancing motivating factor. It might induce the entrepreneur to 
aim for short-term success rather than long-term value creation (Gompers, 
1995). Hellman (1993) points out that an unintended consequence of this 
focus could be one of 'myopia' where the entrepreneur could lose sight of the 
larger picture in focussing too narrowly on short-term goals. This problem can 
be addressed by designing short-term performance benchmarks that are 
essentially intermediate steps towards a longer-term objective. Therefore, 'in 
the next step we ask how and when the funds should be released so as to 
maximise the value of the venture' (Bergmann and Hege, 1998; p. 716). 
5.5.2.4 Hypothesis (4): Staging of capital is used as a mechanism to 
control risk in venture capital deals in India and there are several 
conditions for further disbursement in order to reduce moral hazard. 
5.5.2.5 Use of Financial Products: A firm must decide what security to sell to 
raise external capital to finance a profitable opportunity (Nachman and Noe, 
1994). The assumption that outsiders cannot observe the project's payoff 
distribution function implies that (investors) can only control the behaviour of 
the firm through financial structure (Ravid and Spiegel, 1997). However, 
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Hellmann (1998) believes that control rights are independent of financial 
structure. He argues that the separation of control rights from financial 
structure is important, since for any given financial structure it is always 
possible to allocate control rights independently. If control resides with a 
board of directors, then the contract between venture capitalists and investees 
may directly determine the board structure. And if control emanates from 
holding the majority of the voting stock, the voting power can be attached to 
any financial instrument. 
In the presence of asymmetric information between firms and suppliers of 
capital, firms raising external capital face an adverse selection problem in that 
the security designs of firms with highly productive investment opportunities 
may be imitated by those firms with investment opportunities of lower 
productivity, resulting in under-valuation of higher productivity firms and 
overvaluation of lower productivity firms (Nachman and Noe, 1994). Despite 
the information asymmetry, the investment opportunities may still be efficiently 
financed by an appropriate choice of financing instruments that reveals the 
private information of corporate insiders to investors (Bernnan and Kraus, 
1987). Myers (1984) argues that, under asymmetric information, firms will 
prefer to issue fixed claim securities (debt) as opposed to fractional claims 
(equity). 'The structuring of financial claims is, therefore, aimed at achieving 
congruence of interests' (Cooper and Carleton, 1979; p. 718). 
Finance theory implies factors favourable to debt finance include 
collateralizable assets for investor security and the firm's ability to benefit from 
the debt-interest tax shield (Chandra, 1992). Norton and Tenenbaum (1992) 
found positive influence on debt finance in investee companies that are soon 
expected to: generate taxable income; have a large amount of collateral; and 
are latter-stage deals. On the other hand, taking an equity position in the firm 
allows ex post settling up, guaranteeing that the venture capitalist benefits if 
the firm does well (Gompers, 1995). However, where a venture capitalist is 
committing a large portion of financing, common equity would be the least 
desirable financing method to protect the firm's investment (Norton and 
Tenenbaum, 1992). Also common stock is not attractive as an investment 
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mode if investors have concerns about control of the firm's cash flows and 
other potential agency problems (Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). 
Under the assumption of risk-neutral agents and fixed verification costs, 
Townsend (1979) developed a theory that delivers standard debt as an 
optimal contractual form. But 'debt places the investor in the position of 
lender, not owner. Debt may not be appropriate if investors and managers 
want flexibility to deal with intermittent cash flow and other crises. Tax- 
deductible interest payments are usually unimportant to venture capital 
backed firms with little, if any, operating profit. Additionally, the use of debt 
financing may make future equity issues more difficult to sell, as debt holders 
will have a senior claim on firm cash flow and assets. Thus, even an 
investment structure such as zero coupon debt may not generally be 
attractive in a venture capital setting' (Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993; p. 34). 
However, Hansen (1992) derives another model of debt optimality in venture 
finance, and explores issues of conversion and stopping. 
Boyd and Smith (1999) argue that 'the optimal contractual outcome can be 
supported by appropriate quantities of debt and equity' (p. 270). Bergmann & 
Udell (1998) feel that the optimal contract should award the liquidation payoff 
so as to relax the financial constraints on the funding horizon. A combination 
of debt and equity could relax the financial constraints faced by a pure equity 
solution. Common equity is inefficient because equity gives too little of the 
liquidation value to the venture capitalists in case the project fails and pure 
debt is inefficient for exactly the opposite reason. Also, debt may convey too 
much of the liquidation value to the venture capitalist and encourage 
premature liquidation. Therefore, 'the optimal financial contract can then be 
achieved by a mixture of debt and equity or a convertible security' (p. 722). 
Zender (1991) believes that the optimal financial instruments provide that 
control remains in the hands of the shareholder. However, focussing on the 
financial structuring of start-ups, Ravid and Spiegel (1997) conclude that'the 
optimal contract will depend upon the relative importance of the problems 
facing a particular firm and its investors. When the parties can easily verify the 
cash flows from the company but not the distribution function that produced 
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them, the firm will issue mostly equity and collateralized debt' (p. 281). On the 
contrary, Norton and Tenenbaum, (1993) believe that preferred equity 
provides a means to control risk while maintaining the potential for large 
returns, hence it may be especially favored in early stage deals. 
Berglof (1994) argues that, when there are potential state-contingent conflicts 
associated with a sale of the firm, all equity financing may not be optimal. He 
believes that standard control transfers to the venture capitalist if the first 
period debt repayment is not met. But convertible debt protects the venture 
capitalist against dilution in bad states by ensuring the liquidation value of the 
firm under the original entrepreneur. He suggests that 'the optimal strategy is 
to utilize the conversion option in good but not in bad states of nature' (p. 
261). However, he believes that convertible preferred shares and convertible 
debt are the most common forms of contractual arrangements in venture 
capital financing and combined debt-equity financing is always inferior to 
convertible debt. Barry (1994) also finds convertible preferred stocks as the 
most common form of venture capital investment. He argues that the 
conversion price is commonly a function of performance, so that if a venture is 
unsuccessful, the venture capitalist stands a better chance of recovering the 
investment. At the same time, 'the increased conversion price following good 
performance increases the incentives to the entrepreneur (p. 10). 
Existing explanations for the use of convertible debt focus on asymmetries of 
information between managers and investors regarding the firm's value and 
risk (Harris and Raviv, 1985; Stein, 1992; and Nyborg, 1995). However, these 
studies are mainly suitable for publicly traded convertible securities, and do 
not represent venture capital architecture where the focal point is a close 
relationship between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist, and where 
information regarding the quality of the project is revealed gradually to both 
parties (Cornelli and Yosha, 1997). Little theoretical attention has been 
devoted to the range of financial instruments used by venture capitalists 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
The most common types of contracts in venture capital involve debt, equity 
and warrants in various mixtures. The choice between these instruments is 
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motivated by a whole series of considerations, including corporate and 
personal tax laws (Ravid and Spiegel, 1997), and signalling expectations and 
control (Cooper and Carleton, 1979). Recent proliferation of innovative 
security designs greatly expanded the menu of financing choices available to 
firms (Nachman and Noe, 1994). Standard textbooks like Silver (1985) often 
explicitly recommend the use of convertible preferred shares (or convertible 
debt) to mitigate the problems associated with selling the firm. 
Constantanides and Grundy (1989) focus on the ability of convertibles to 
resolve problems associated with asymmetric information. The model 
developed by Stein (1992) also suggests that 'convertibles would be specially 
valuable for firms that: (1) are characterized by significant informational 
asymmetries; and (2) might incur large costs of financial distress if they added 
more debt to their capital structure' (p. 13). Lewis et al. (1998) argue that 
issuers design convertible debt to mitigate asset substitution problems, while 
others design it to reduce adverse selection problems. Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) believe that convertible securities are a cheap way for fast growing 
firms to raise funds since they allow investors to share the potentially high 
returns generated by the firm's investments. On the contrary, there is a 
possibility that the management performs well when the firm is small, but it 
may not be able to handle a much bigger firm. In this scenario, financing 
through convertible securities may enable the investors to take control in 
those contingencies where the firm grows larger. Giammarino and Neave 
(1982) present a model in that the firm and investors share the same 
information about everything except risk. In their argument, equity dominates 
debt, because the only time managers want to issue debt is when they know 
the firm is riskier than investors think. Realising this, investors refuse to buy. 
Therefore, only equity or a convertible security is issued in equilibrium. 
Exceptions are Green (1984), where convertible debt affects the inclination of 
the entrepreneur to engage in risky projects, and is therefore particularly 
useful in start-up financing stages, and Gompers (1996), who also focuses on 
the use of convertible debt in venture capital financing. Gompers (1995) 
identified the use of convertible securities and staging of capital infusion as 
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common control mechanisms in nearly all venture capital financing. Therefore, 
Cornelli and Yosha (1997) argue that 'converti b le debt, which is widely used in 
venture capital financing, can attenuate the incentives to engage in "window 
dressing" on the part of entrepreneurs' (p. 1). 
Bill Fruhan (1979) argues that all financial transactions can be classified into 
three categories: those that create value; those that destroy value; and those 
that transfer value between two or more parties. Sahlman (1991) believes that 
the interaction of entrepreneur and venture capitalist has resulted in the 
evolution of a unique set of financial contracts. And in no other kind of 
transaction does the implied link between value and financial structure appear 
so strong and direct as in the typical venture capital deal. He concludes that 
'an effective financial design may well be the difference between a flourishing 
and a failed enterprise' (p. 23). 
Trester (1998) strongly argues in favour of equity or preferred and convertible 
preferred stock as against debt. He relies on the rationale that the 'foreclosure 
option embedded in a debt contract may actually create an incentive for the 
entrepreneur to behave opportunistically, taking whatever project payoffs are 
available and defaulting on the debt' (p. 677). By structuring an investment in 
the form of preferred stock, a venture capitalist can also profit from a success 
that is too modest to permit a public offering. This is possible by recovering 
capital through redemption of preferred stock and the pay-out of accumulated 
dividends (Sahlman, 1988). An advantage of preferred stock over debt is that 
it does not necessarily harm the firm's ability to reinvest cash in the firm 
(Norton and Tenenbaum, 1992). 
Lerner (1992a) mentioned that biotech and disk drive firms were financed with 
either equity or convertible debt, and most of the equity was preferred. In 
perhaps the first ever research of its type, Trester (1998) investigated the 
evolution of venture capital contracts through the life of the firm. He states that 
'preferred stock is by far the most common contract type used in early stage 
financing. Debt and common equity are used far less frequently. Where they 
do appear it is usually in later stage financing and/or in industries where 
monitoring is less difficult' (p. 678). 
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The venture capital industry has evolved operating procedures and 
contracting practices that are well adapted to environments characterized by 
uncertainties and information asymmetries (Sahlman, 1990). From a survey of 
98 venture capitalists in the US, Norton and Tenenbaum, (1992) conclude that 
'preferred equity is the most frequently used investment mode, as the average 
respondent uses preferred equity investments between 61 and 80 percent of 
the time' (p. 23). Rationalising his argument in favour of preferred equity, 
Trester (1998) contends that 'it is the likelihood of asymmetric information in 
the projects venture capitalists finance which causes them to use preferred 
equity. Banks and other institutions contracting with debt are financing 
projects where monitoring is easier and the probability of asymmetric 
information is smaller' (p. 688). Marx (1993) developed theoretical models of 
venture capital contracting that explain the use of convertible preferred stock. 
He shows that convertible preferred dominates pure equity and debt. He 
argues that convertible preferred can overcome adverse selection and 
prevent excessive risk taking by entrepreneurs. 
Also, the features of preferred equity allow investors to preserve the 
advantage of debt and common equity while retaining few of their drawbacks. 
By investing in preferred stock that has voting rights, investors can exercise 
some control over the firm by having a priority claim over the management 
team from cash flow in case of success and over asset liquidation in the case 
of venture failure. Like debt, preferred equity gives investors protection 
against selfish managers, but without causing the firm to lose financial 
flexibility or cash flow (Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). 
The choice of investment vehicle also differs between developed and 
developing markets. Investors in developed nations use a variety of 
instruments, including common and several classes of preferred stock, debt, 
and convertible preferred. These financial instruments allow investors to stage 
investments, allocate risk, control management, provide incentives to 
executives and demarcate ownership. In many developing countries, private 
equity investors primarily use plain equity (HBS, 2000). There is surprisingly 
little research on deal structuring in terms of the determinants of the 
combinations of the types of financial instruments that are used. Evidence 
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from available studies is that financial structures vary. more according to the 
characteristics of venture capitalists and competition for the deal rather than 
the investee company. This is somewhat puzzling and it appears to warrant 
further research in respect of cross-country and cross-investment stage 
competition (Wright and Robbie, 1998; p. 559). Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
5.5.2.6 Hypothesis (5): To minimise the down side risk, preferred stock 
is the most frequently used financial product in India. 
5.5.3 Monitoring: 
Pre-contractual assessment of agency risk is not sufficient because 
interpersonal and competitive circumstances change and are impossible to 
anticipate fully (Fiet and Hellriegel, 1995). The information asymmetry 
associated with start-up companies makes project governance extremely 
important (Gompers, 1995). Projects that are the targets of venture capital 
investment are characterised by significant informational asymmetries 
compared to publicly quoted companies (Fama, 1991; Wright and Robbie, 
1998). Therefore, the post-investment activities of venture capitalists are also 
extensive (Barry, 1994). While not directly influencing the decision outcome, 
post-decision investment control mechanisms can influence both the 
investment performance and the quality of future investment decision (Pike, 
1988). As a benefit of controlling the firm, the entrepreneur can divert a share 
of the profits from the firm to himself, before he distributes the rest to outside 
shareholders. 'This diversion can take the form of salary, transfer pricing, 
subsidised loans, non-arm length asset transactions, and in some cases 
outright theft' (La Porta et al., 1999; p. 6). Thus, Mitchell and Terry (1998) 
argue that 'close monitoring is indeed viewed by the venture capital investors 
as a means of combating moral hazard' (p. 196). 
5.5.3.1 Monitoring Mechanisms: In pioneering work, Robbie et al. (1997) 
examined the monitoring of venture capital firms by their capital providers. 
They found that reporting requirements were multi-layered, but there was an 
anticipated shift towards the greater use of quarterly reporting as well as more 
frequent direct contact between venture capital firms and their investors. In a 
minority of cases they reported the requirement to provide seats on boards for 
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fund providers. On the other hand, venture capital firms reported that they had 
made major enhancements to their reporting and communication approaches 
and there was growing emphasis on being proactive in providing early 
warning signals about impending problems. 
In considering the question of to why other financial intermediaries like banks 
lack monitoring skills of venture capitalists, Gompers (1995) argues that 
venture capital funds' high powered compensation schemes give them 
incentives to monitor firms more closely because individual compensation is 
closely linked to the funds' returns. Venture capitalists' involvement in 
monitoring their investee companies includes service on the boards of firms in 
their portfolios, frequent informal visits, meeting with customers and suppliers, 
and active involvement in key personnel and strategic decisions (Lerner, 
1995). Consequently, in most agency relationships the principal and the agent 
will incur positive monitoring costs and, in addition, there will be some 
divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions, which would 
maximise the welfare of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1978). Chan et 
al. (1990) suggest that venture capitalists may have advantages over banks in 
providing finance in settings where entrepreneurial skills are highly uncertain 
at the outset and the role of close monitoring is potentially significant. 
Also there is evidence that information asymmetry exists because 
entrepreneurs know their own collateral, industriousness, moral character, 
and business prospects better than do venture capitalists (Fiet, 1996). 
Information asymmetry clearly introduces risk into a deal. When risk is 
present, appropriate contingent actions cannot be fully and accurately 
specified at the outset (Williamson, 1985). The crucial issue arises as to how 
corporate governance systems should develop in order that enhanced 
efficiency may be achieved (Wright et al., 1998). The provision of financial 
resources to enterprises with governance structures, which are inadequate, 
may increase the systemic risk (Filatotchev et al., 1996b). Bergemann and 
Hege (1998) consider monitoring and changing the management as control 
instruments and argue that 'the moral hazard problem is eliminated in the 
periods where monitoring takes place' (p. 723). 
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Venture capital is not just a matter of making a risky loan or purchasing a 
portion of a risky project. It involves extraordinary monitoring problems leading 
to a high probability of information asymmetry, particularly in the high tech 
field (Trester, 1998). Owner-managers are prevented from capturing non- 
pecuniary benefits through monitoring and other control activities. 'These 
methods include auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and the 
establishment of incentivised compensation systems which serve to more 
closely identify the manager's interests with those of the outside equity 
holders' (Jensen and Meckeling, 1978; p. 323). Venture capitalists are often 
active investors, monitoring the progress of firms, sitting on boards of 
directors, and meting out financing based on the attainment of milestones. 
Whereas banks monitor the financial health of firms that they lend to, venture 
capitalists monitor strategy and investment decisions and take an active role 
in advising firms. Additionally, these capitalists 'provide entrepreneurs with 
access to consultants, investment bankers, and lawyers' (Gompers et al., 
1998 p. 4). The actual extent of venture capitalists role in post-investment 
activities may range from 'laissez-faire' to 'close tracker' (Steier and 
Greenwood, 1995). The monitoring activities of venture capitalists appear to 
intensify as the need dictates (Barry, 1994). Reporting requirements involve 
the provision of regular financial and other reports, typically on a monthly 
and/or quarterly basis (Wright et al., 1998). However, experienced managers 
may feel that the time spent in generating frequent reports takes away from 
time dedicated to other activities (Ehrlich et al., 1994). 
The significance of monitoring emanates from a situation where entrepreneurs 
using other people's money and having limited liability, may want to continue 
to invest even after a project ceases to be viable (Barry, 1994). Williams 
(1989) uses a model where the investment produces an outcome that is 
observable only by the firm's manager, who then reports it to outside 
investors. Moral hazard is also generated by the dependence of the 
investment's expected return on the unobservable efforts of the agent 
(Santos, 1997). It must also be borne in mind that 'there are significant 
differences in the nature of established stock market and venture capital 
investments. The latter typically involve smaller firms and more novel products 
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and services. Their risk levels and the information needs are therefore 
considered greater' (Mitchell and Terry, 1998; p. 186). 
The role of outside equity holders in insider-controlled enterprises may pose 
difficulties (Filatotchev et al., 1996a). Even the development of effective 
formal monitoring may be problematic in an environment where enforcement 
of the institutional and contractual infrastructure is weak (Wright et al., 1998). 
There is considerable variation in the manner in which financial institutions 
become involved in active corporate governance, ranging from long-term 
relationship to short term perspectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). There 
have been recent attempts to strengthen the role of institutional investors in 
monitoring quoted companies. However, the operations of venture capital 
firms highlight the prospects for active involvement of investors in unquoted 
companies using both formal and informal mechanisms (Wright et al., 1998). 
Moreover, public signals are less informative than the knowledge gained by 
monitoring, as in the case for small firms (Rajan and Winton, 1995). 
In a study of 12 venture capital investors and investees in the UK, Reid (1998) 
concluded: 'The fuller the information - by frequency, type, detail etc. - 
provided by the firm to the venture capitalist, the better able was the venture 
capitalist to manage risk. This led to a higher level of trust, and a more 
productive relationship' (p. 255). On the contrary, Barry (1994) argues, that 
despite the extensive monitoring, more than one-third of the investments 
made by venture capitalists result in losses. Wright and Robbie (1998) argue 
that an absence or a persistent delay in the provision of information may be 
perceived by the venture capitalists as an unfair violation of an investment 
agreement and to undermine the investor's trust in the entrepreneur. 
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) use procedural justice theory to examine the 
impact of entrepreneur's management of information flows on entrepreneur- 
investor relationship. They identify the significance of timely feedback of 
information in promoting positive relations between investor and investee. 
Mitchell and Terry (1998) report that the central to the information flow were 
the three core financial statements: balance sheet; profit and loss account; 
and cash flow statements. However, the actual form of disclosure extended 
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significantly beyond statutory requirements in six distinct ways: '(1) The 
frequency of their provision was considerably increased from once or twice a 
year to monthly. (2) Their coverage was much more detailed including 
components of cost of sales, identify all overheads, and possibly show 
profitability segmented by product line. (3) They were presented against the 
budgeted forecast on which was based the original investment decision. (4) 
Provision of all this information within a strict time limit from the end of the 
reporting period. (5) To supplement quantitative information, asked for 
qualitative explanatory summary of performance of the management team. (6) 
Further types of information required by venture capitalists from their 
investees included capacity utilization level, capital expenditure analysis, 
order book position etc. ' (p. 187). 
As a moral hazard safeguard, venture capitalists also vet the accounting 
systems of their clients. The objective is to ensure that a reasonable 
information flow would be forthcoming in the post investment period and also 
to ensure that management were able to control and make decisions on an 
informed basis (Mitchell and Terry, 1998). Indeed information inadequacy is 
often associated with business distress and failure in small and medium-sized 
companies (Storey et at., 1987). Conversely, better quality information has 
been associated with success and survival (Hutchison and Ray, 1986). 
Mitchell et al. (1995) show that part of the contractual measures adopted by 
venture capitalists are accounting information demands which are designed to 
deal with moral hazard and information asymmetry problems and provide 
safeguards through bonding arrangements. On the other hand, the firm 
cannot convey that information by saying: 'We have great prospects, but we 
cannot tell you the details'. The firm has to supply verifiable detail sufficient to 
indicate the true state of nature (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, 
covenants based on imperfect information would lead to too many mistakes, 
which may require the services of a monitoring specialist (Berlin and Loeys, 
1988). Sweeting (1991a) adds that accounting information flows are typically 
required on a more regular and more detailed basis than are statutory 
requirements for quoted companies. Timely dissemination of information is 
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crucial for venture capitalists to take corrective actions 'as the value of 
information today is larger than tomorrow' (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; p. 
718). Venture capitalists evaluate this information to anticipate problems and 
respond expeditiously when performance falls short (Sahlman, 1990). 
The quality of information obtained through monitoring depends on the 
resources committed to this activity and the available monitoring technology 
(Harris and Raviv, 1979). The Accounting Information System of the investee 
firms is one important source of such relevant information for control (Mitchell 
and Terry, 1998). Effective information processing also results in high rates of 
financial growth for a firm (McGaffey and Christy, 1975). Similarly, venture 
capitalists can better control the business risk associated with early stage 
investing by remaining in close contact with the venture (Barney et al., 1989). 
Moreover, the possibility of rapidly changing conditions in transition markets 
places considerable importance of timely receipt of information concerning 
problems as well as effective and flexible responses (Karsai et al., 1995). 
Mitchell and Terry (1998) conclude that monitoring reports and budgetary 
control systems are widely used within the investee firms (p. 210). In the work 
of Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996), timely feedback of information from 
investee to investor is shown to promote positive relations between them. 
McGaffey and Christy, (1975) believe that managers who operate businesses 
that are growing rapidly, must increase their capabilities for processing data 
generated because of the increasing complexity in their businesses. 
Therefore, based on preceding discussion, it is hypothesized that: 
5.5.3.2 Hypothesis (6): Indian venture capitalists monitor their Investees 
frequently and extensively to address moral hazard. 
5.5.3.3 Replacement of CEOs in Investee Companies: 
Prior research indicates that, in the funding of new ventures by the venture 
capitalists, one of the most critical factors is the perception of the 
management's capability (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). It was quoted in 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992), that venture capitalists must 'always consider 
investing in a grade A man with a grade B idea. Never invest in a grade B 
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man with a grade A idea' (p. 104). Therefore, Bruton et al. (1997) argue that 
the greater confidence a venture capitalist has that the CEO is appropriately 
monitoring, accurately reporting, and setting a good strategic direction, the 
less time the venture capitalist has to devote to the venture. 
The deal structure gives the venture capitalists the flexibility to make 
management changes, particularly for those companies whose performance 
has been mediocre (Zider, 1998). Venture capitalists can discipline wayward 
managers by firing or demoting them (Sahiman, 1990). In some situations, in 
fact, venture capitalists take complete control over the firm and dismiss the 
original entrepreneur (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). The replacement of the 
top manager at an entrepreneurial firm is likely to coincide with an 
organizational crisis (Lerner, 1995). A conflict arises between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs have information 
unavailable to venture capitalists and because entrepreneurs make choices 
that are not fully known by venture capitalists (Barry, 1994). 
The replacement of a founder CEO is a widespread phenomenon. In a study 
of entrepreneurial companies in Silicon Valley, Hannan et al. (1996) find that 
in the first 20 months of a company's life, there is a 10 percent possibility of 
the appointment of a non-founder CEO, this likelihood increases to about 40 
percent in 40 months and over 80 percent after 80 months. Hellmann (1998) 
argues that, in running the company, entrepreneurs realize a private benefit 
that cannot be transferred to another party. A change of management entails 
a conflict of interest, since entrepreneurs want to protect their own private 
benefits while venture capitalists want to maximise their financial returns. He 
further demonstrates that venture capital control is more likely, and a change 
of management more frequent if venture capitalists have greater influence. 
It is quite evident that many venture capital firms in the UK and the US are not 
hesitant in replacing the entrepreneurial team if the investee company is 
under-performing (Macmillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; 
Sweeting, 1991; Kanellos, 1996). In his UK study, Hall (1998) found that 73 
percent of venture capitalists interviewed had replaced management when 
necessary. While in the US, Carter and Van Auken (1994) concluded that 
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28.86 percent of venture capital investment, they studied, required a change 
of management. This degree of venture capital control over investee 
companies was in support of a previous study by Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989) that states 'The venture capitalist, acting through the board of 
directors, typically gains the power to fire senior management in the initial 
negotiation. We asked venture capitalists how often they resorted to this final 
privilege. The answer is, "frequently". The mean (in the statistical sense) 
venture capitalist has initiated the firing of three CEO/Presidents per 2.4 years 
of venture investing experience' (p. 241). 
A recognition of the significance of the top managers to new venture success 
is indicated in the fact that a major criterion for venture capital funding is the 
quality of the CEO (Fried et al., 1993). This recognition leads the venture 
capital to focus on the CEO when any dissatisfaction with the new venture 
develops (Bruton et al., 1997). But Fiet (1990) argues that venture capital 
investors attach more importance to market risk than to agency risk. They are 
less concerned with agency risk because they have learned how to protect 
themselves from it using stringent boilerplate contractual provisions. 
Boilerplate allows them to perfunctorily replace an entrepreneur who under- 
performs, is guilty of malfeasance or who is found to be incompetent' (p. 566). 
James and Soref (1981) attribute the dismissal of CEOs in mature firms to 
poor financial performance. But Fredrickson et al. (1988) argue that a decline 
in specific financial indicators is not the only cause of CEO removal. So far 
there does not exist a strong evidence as to whether operational or strategic 
skills of a CEO are more crucial. Some argue that operational skills of the 
CEO are more important (Longenecker and Moore, 1991). Without 
operational skills like marketing or engineering, the firm cannot survive 
(Bruton et al., 1997). Expressing contrasting views, Andrews (1980) argues 
that in mature organisations, setting the strategic direction of the firm is far 
more important than the operational skills of the CEO. 
Research on the causes of CEO dismissal has so far focussed on CEOs of 
established companies (Bruton et al., 1997). Poor organisational performance 
is the given cause, with the issue being how organisational performance is 
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measured (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Bruton et al. (1997) took a 
different approach in that they directly looked at the CEO's performance. 
Previous research did not explain the skill areas in which dismissed CEOs 
were deficient. Bruton et al. argue that a failure by the CEO in those skills 
most valued by venture capitalists will be the cause of their removal. 
In a study of bank and investment fund monitoring in Russia, Wright et at. 
(1998) found evidence that outside investors may seek ways of dealing with 
ineffective management, by exerting pressure to replace them. Kunze (1990) 
notes that the replacement of the CEO is the single most critical development 
in the life of a young start-up company. The time spent hiring the new CEO, 
the shock to the organisation when the changeover takes place, the lack of 
direction in the interim, the quality of the new person hired, and the speed with 
which he or she seizes command, all impact heavily on the health and 
potential of the company. In the best of circumstances, replacing a CEO is a 
wrenching experience and companies can easily fail at this juncture. 
Therefore, we 'consider next the possibility of replacing the current manager, 
entrepreneur, by a new manager (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; p. 724). 
5.5.3.4 Hypothesis (7): Venture Capitalists in India replace CEOs of their 
investee companies to streamline corporate governance and control 
moral hazard. 
5.5.3.5 Hypothesis (8): A CEO's failure in strategic skills leads to his/her 
dismissal. 
5.6 Conclusion: 
After setting out the objectives and scope of this research, we conducted an 
extensive literature review in the key areas of this research i. e. Valuation, 
Structuring and Monitoring. With venture capital being risky, equity-based 
investment, often in start-up, small enterprises, the significance of addressing 
principal-agent, adverse selection, moral hazard and corporate governance 
issues is evident. Therefore, the literature review also covered existing 
research in these theoretical areas in reference to venture capital investment. 
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In order to trigger the further growth of venture capital in emerging markets 
like India, there is a need to provide higher returns to risk taking investors 
through better risk management techniques. Very little international research 
has been undertaken in the three key areas above and no research has been 
conducted in India. Based on the empirical evidence of limited academic 
research so far, hypotheses were developed. The next chapter will present 
the research methodology adopted for developing an appropriate survey 
instrument, successfully conducting the empirical survey, analysing the data, 
and presenting the results. 
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CHAPTER VI - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction: 
Having established the analytical framework, this chapter discusses the 
methodology that needs to be adopted for this research. Methodologies are 
important but it must be borne in mind that they provide generic guidelines rather 
than firm prescriptions as to how research should be conducted (Remenyi and 
Williams, 1995). Therefore, methodology, which is the entire process of the study 
Creswell (1994), refers to the procedural framework within which the research is 
conducted. It only describes an approach to problems that may be operationalised 
into a research programme (Remenyi and Williams, 1995). 
Some researchers have difficulty understanding these terms while others find it 
difficult to distinguish between them. Hence, it is imperative at this stage to identify 
the differences between them. Bryman (1984) found out that methodology and 
methods become confused with each other by researchers. Therefore, methodology, 
whether described as qualitative or quantitative, refers to an epistemology stance. 
Method, on the other hand, refers to the way of gathering data. Methodology can 
also be defined as the process, principle and procedure by which researchers 
approach problems and seek answers (Wagner, 1997). 
6.2 Research Method: 
In social science there are two main types of empirical research, the qualitative 
approach and the quantitative approach (Al-Sudairy, 2000). The quantitative 
approach draws on techniques such as experiments, surveys, histories and analysis 
of archival information. Qualitative, on the other hand, utilises techniques such as 
case studies, participation observations and interviews (Wagner, 1997). The 
quantitative emphasises fixed measurement, and hypothesis testing of causal 
relations, whereas the qualitative seeks to understand the social world (Bryman, 
1984). Quantitative methods provide a wide but shallow emphasis, while qualitative 
methods give a narrow but more detailed focus (Bell, 1991). 
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Both qualitative and quantitative approaches have advantages and disadvantages. 
Creswell (1994) sees the advantages and disadvantages between the 
methodologies in terms of reality stance and as the relationship between the 
researcher and the topic. He argues that quantitative approach uses a deductive 
form of logic wherein theories and hypotheses are tested to see how they affect 
relationships. Concepts, variables and hypotheses are chosen before the study 
begins and remain 'constant until the end of the study. The intent is to develop 
generalisations that contribute to the study or theory and that enable better 
prediction, explanation and understanding of a phenomenon. These findings are 
enhanced if the instruments used are valid and reliable. Conversely, in qualitative 
methods inductive logic prevails. Data emerges from informants rather than being 
identified before the research by the researcher. This provides valuable information, 
which leads to an explanation of the phenomenon. 
Qualitative methods, as described by March (1988) are accurate, provide facts that 
are comprehensive but slower. Also, these are more expensive and complicated. On 
the other hand, quantitative methods are cheaper, simpler and provide useful 
overviews but are subjective and prone to bias in the interpretation of the results (Al- 
Sudairy, 2000). Wagner (1997) stated that quantitative and qualitative approaches 
acknowledge different trade-offs regarding external validity, reliability and precision. 
While arguing on the difference between the two methods, he states that qualitative 
measurements are qualitatively accurate; quantitative evaluations are always subject 
to the errors of human judgement. Gill and Johnson (1993) consider that quantitative 
approach is high in internal validity and reliability due to its highly structured nature. 
In contrast, the qualitative approach is low in internal validity and reliability because 
of its weak structuring. 
6.3 Research Design: 
Knowledge about any phenomenon is a very important determinant of the purpose 
of the research (Mohammad, 1999). The design decisions become more rigorous as 
we proceed from the exploratory stage, where we try to explore new area of 
organisational research, to the descriptive stage, where we try to describe certain 
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characteristics of the phenomena we are interested in knowing about, to the 
hypothesis testing stage, where we examine whether or not the conjectured 
relationships have been substantiated and an answer to the research questions' 
(Sekaran, 1992; p. 92). 
Essentially it is the nature of the problems that determines the research design (Al- 
Sudairy, 2000). There are three types of research: exploratory, descriptive and 
causal (Aaker and Day, 1990; Zikmund, 1994). The primary objective of exploratory 
research is to provide insights into and an understanding of the problem confronting 
the researcher (Selltiz, 1976). In general, exploratory research is meaningful in any 
situation where the researcher does not have enough understanding to proceed with 
the research project. Exploratory research is characterised by flexibility and 
versatility with respect to the methods because formal research protocols and 
procedures are not employed (Malhotra, 1996). A descriptive study deals with 
questions of What are things like' or What is going on' while the exploratory study 
deals with the question Why is it going on' (De Vause, 1993). A descriptive study is 
undertaken in order to ascertain and describe the characteristics of variables in 
situations. The goal of the descriptive study is to describe relevant aspects of the 
phenomena of interest to the researcher from an individual, organisational, industrial 
or other perspective (Sekaran, 1992). The main method of causal research is 
experimentation (Unnava et al., 1994). It is concerned with determining cause-and- 
effect relationships that typically take the form of experiments because experiments 
are best suited to determine cause and effect (Churchill, 1995). 
This research concentrates upon the first two types. In fact, the exploratory stage 
was covered partially by this study, with additional information being obtained from 
the literature where the knowledge base about the study area in developed countries 
has been selectively researched. 'A question was raised at this stage as to whether 
it is acceptable to use knowledge about a research area in developed countries and 
test it in developing countries which differ economically and socially' (Muhammad, 
1999; p. 146). It is important to have prior knowledge of the subject to provide 
sufficient information for framing testable hypotheses through the variables 
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measured in this research. Therefore, the exploratory phase of this research 
comprised a search of the existing literature that gave a sufficient base for framing 
hypotheses about the subject. 
6.4 Research Strategies: 
Several research studies have been used in venture capital research in the past. 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) argues that 'traditional financial research methodologies are 
not well suited to an examination of the venture capital examination process. The 
transactions involved are private; whatever little information is available comes from 
secondary sources' (p. 29). However, this problem was overcome in this study 
through a carefully drawn-out strategy that resulted in the collection of data from 
primary sources. The literature review reveals that most of the mainstream 
researchers use primary sources of data for their research including: 
(1) Observations; 
(2) Case studies; 
(3) Personal/ Telephone interviews; 
(4) Questionnaires. 
However some researchers have used secondary sources of data also. For 
instance, Lerner (1992a), analysed the post-listing stock performance of venture 
capital backed companies vis-ä-vis non venture capital backed companies in the US. 
Similarly, Robbie et al. (1997) examined the ways in which contributors monitor their 
investments in venture capital funds in the UK. Gompers and Lerner (1996) studied 
the covenants used by venture capital investors while committing investments to 
venture capital funds in the US. Similarly, Steire and Greenwood (1995) examined 
the venture capitalists' relationships in the deal structuring and post-investment 
stage in Canada. 
6.4.1 Observational Research: 
A researcher can collect data by directly observing people in their natural work 
environment. This can be performed in two ways: 
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(a) Participant observer in that the observer/researcher is involved in the natural 
work environment. 
(b) Un-participant observer where the observer/researcher watches the things 
happening without any personal participation (Sekaran, 1992). 
Both of these methods can be either structured or unstructured observations that are 
affected by the researcher's knowledge about the particular aspects under study. 
This method of research offers some advantages that lead to the elimination of the 
respondent's bias by his involvement in answering questions in survey methods 
(Muhammad, 1999). Therefore, 'there is no need to depend on "second hand" 
accounts of phenomena from respondents who put their own interpretation on 
events' (Saunders et al., 1997; p. 199). On the other hand, this technique entails 
certain drawbacks. For instance, the observer may show bias in data collection, 
especially if he/she has not been adequately trained. Also the behaviour of 
respondents may be affected by observation and this problem can be more 
pronounced if observation takes place only for a short period (Sekaran, 1992). 
Since this research focuses on certain industry-wide practices rather than a 
company, this method was not suitable for this research. Also, the venture capital 
investment and monitoring process is conducted over a long period of time. 
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to spend that much time in observing the 
behaviour of venture capitalists. Even if it is attempted in a single company or a few 
of them, the cost of adopting this method may be prohibitive because the researcher 
may have to spend months in collecting the required information. 
6.4.2 Case Study based Research: 
The case study approach involves an in-depth analysis of the unit to be studied 
including archives, interviews, questions and observations. Thus it facilitates the 
collection of meaningful information (Lang and Heiss, 1984). This method represents 
an intensive analysis and focuses on a single organisation. In addition, it may be 
used in a comparative case study where 'organisations are chosen to represent 
different possible positions or stances, regardless of the relative frequency of these 
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stances in the population' (Jankowics, 1995; p. 180). This is clearly different from the 
survey approach, in that organisations are chosen to be representative of some 
population. In order to generalise results, a case study's findings need multiple 
studies, which combine theory building and theory testing empirical studies 
(Eisenhards, 1989). 
There have been some venture capital studies using this technique. For instance, 
Steir (1994) in Canada and Boocock and Woods (1996) in the UK used this 
approach. However, this method does not meet the requirements of the present 
research. The focus of this thesis is to build the profile of fund management teams 
and then benchmark their Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring practices. Thus, this 
would not have given a comprehensive picture of the industry-wide practices. 
6.4.3 Interviews based Research: 
Interviewing is often claimed to be the best method of gathering information, 
however its complexity is sometimes underestimated (Easterby-Smith et at., 1996). It 
is defined as a direct verbal contact between the researcher and the sampling 
population. Interviews may be conducted either face-to-face or through telephone. 
Saunders (1997) classified interviews according to the structural nature of questions 
such as structured interviews, semi-structured interviews or unstructured interviews. 
Each one of these serves to address a specific research problem. The driving force 
behind choosing between a structured and an unstructured interviews is largely the 
researcher's understanding of the research problems and variables. Based on 
studies by Babbie (1973), Lang (1984), and Robin and Babbie (1989), some of the 
advantages of an interview can be summarised as: 
 The rate of response is expected to be high; 
 The presence of the interviewer can eliminate 'don't know' answers and 
confusion over certain questions that require elaboration or clarification; 
 It gives an opportunity to the researcher to observe the non-verbal language of 
the respondent. 
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Conversely, interviewing as a research method also presents some disadvantages: 
V It is time consuming and costly when geographically large areas are covered; 
V It is not always easy to get the appointments with the respondents, if he/she 
happens to be the head or a senior functionary of the organisation. 
V There is potential for interviewer bias. 
Right from the formative stage, this research relied on interviews. The objective of 
these interviews was to gather basic understanding of the important issues related to 
the international venture capital industry in general and India in particular. This 
approach helped, together with the literature, in the development of the study 
instrument. Initial interviews were conducted with those academics in the UK who 
have been involved in the venture capital research in the past (Boocock, Wright and 
Robbie). Inputs from these interviews provided useful leads about the possible focus 
of this research. Since the Indian venture capital industry is at a very nascent stage, 
there is virtually no academic research available. Therefore, a broad area of 
research was identified within India that would also have global relevance. 
These interviews also helped in developing a basic knowledge of the research 
variables about venture capital practices in India. This proved to be vital to the 
development of the draft questionnaire. Efforts were made to control bias in the 
interviewing method through various techniques developed by Easterby-Smith et al. 
(1996). 
6.4.4 Questionnaire based Research: The questionnaire is a highly structured 
method for collecting specific information as a response to highly directed questions 
(Remenyi and Williams, 1995). A questionnaire is a pre-formulated written set of 
questions to which respondents record their answers, usually within rather closely 
defined alternatives. It is an efficient data collection mechanism for the researcher 
who knows what is required and how to measure the variables of interest (Zikmund, 
1994). 'Designing a questionnaire is an art rather than a science. The process 
begins by specifying the information needed and the type of interviewing method. 
The next step is to decide on the content of individual questions' (Maihotra, 1996; p. 
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350). The questionnaires provide quick, inexpensive, efficient and accurate means 
of assessing information about the organisations (Sheatsely, 1974; Clover and 
Basley, 1978; Remenyi and Willians, 1995). 
This method can be used through either of the two approaches: 
  Personally administered questionnaires; 
  Mail questionnaire. 
Each of these has its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of 
personally administered questionnaire is that the respondents can be reached at a 
relatively low cost, provided they are closely located. It also gives the respondents 
the freedom to express their viewpoint (Zikmund, 1994). The disadvantage with 
personally administered questionnaire is that a wide geographical area and a large 
sample can be very difficult to cover (Sekeran, 1992). In this study, a mail 
questionnaire was used to reach the target sample population. Since the mass 
mailing method was not feasible for reaching target population, a list of all the active 
venture capitalists in India was compiled to identify the respondents. 
Either approach can include open or closed-ended questions. This study benefited 
from the systematic nature and subsequent analysis provided by closed-ended 
questionnaire. 
6.5 Data Collection: 
The entire data collection in this research went through broadly five stages: 
(a) Instrument Development; 
(b) Pre-testing; 
(c) Finalising the Instrument Structure 
(d) Sampling; 
(e) Instrument Distribution. 
6.5.1 Instrument Development: 
After determining the method of data collection i. e. questionnaire, the next stage is 
to design the questionnaire itself, keeping the research objectives and data 
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requirements in mind. The measurement and scaling procedures need to be 
decided. Measurement means assigning numbers or other symbols to 
characteristics of objects according to certain pre-specified rules (Gofton, 1997). 
While scaling involves creating a continuum on which measured objects are located 
(Malhotra, 1999). Scaling may be considered as an extension of measurement. 
There are four primary scales of measurement; nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio 
(Srinivasan and Park, 1997). 'in many situations it is desirable to use more than one 
scaling technique' (Malhotra, 1999; p. 285). The survey instrument adopted in this 
research was a close-ended questionnaire, structured in a mixed format of nominal, 
ordinal and ratio. 
The scaling techniques commonly employed in marketing research can be classified 
into comparative and non-comparative scales. 'Non-comparative scaling is the most 
widely used scaling technique in marketing research' (Malhotra, 1999; p. 255). Non- 
comparative techniques comprise continuous and itemised rating scales, namely, 
the Likert, semantic differential and Stapel scales. Named after its developer, Rensis 
Likert, the Likert scale is a widely used rating scale that requires the respondents to 
indicate a degree of agreement or disagreement with each of a series of statements 
(Albaum, 1997). A questionnaire based on the Liked scale is easy to construct and 
administer. Respondents easily understand how to use the scale, making it suitable 
for mail, telephone, or personal interviews (Malhotra, 1999). Also, data from the 
closed-ended questions would be relatively easier to process and analyse so that 
the researcher could take advantage from the standard format of the answers for 
subsequent statistical tests. 
Open-ended questions can be time-consuming when administered to a large 
sample. In the absence of the uniformity of received answers, the researcher may 
also misinterpret some of them and therefore miscode the responses. In contrast, 
because standard answers are selected from multiple-choice questions in a Liked 
scale closed-ended questionnaire, these are coded with greater accuracy far more 
easily and quickly. 
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At the preliminary stage of the questionnaire development, the researcher gathered 
and reviewed several questionnaires previously used in venture capital research. 
The purpose was to understand the correlation between their research objectives 
and the information they gathered, which is the ultimate objective of this exercise. 
Beginning from Tyebjee and Bruno (1988), Sapienza, (1989), Gompers, (1998) with 
their US focussed research, to Wright and Robbie, (1996), Reid (1998), with 
European focus, a number of questionnaires were examined and a fundamental 
structure of the instrument was developed. Additionally, many PhD theses, 
dissertations, articles and exploratory surveys about venture capital were consulted, 
in order to develop a valid and effective questionnaire. 
The instrument development also benefited from many suggestions proposed by 
Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method or TDM. The first step suggested in TDM 
focuses on writing the question in order to strengthen validity. This includes 
determining the question structure, whether open-ended or closed-ended, which 
could best generate valid data. It should also devise wording that is clear, accurate 
and nonbiased. 
TDM provides many suggestions to avoid wording related problems: 
  Keep the wording simple; 
  Avoid unconventional phrases; 
  Do not be vague; 
  Avoid objectionable questions that are too personal; 
  Avoid implicit alternatives; 
" Avoid implicit assumptions (Malhotra, 1996). 
Considerable attention is given to the physical design of the questionnaire 
(Mohammad, 1999). The format, spacing, and positioning of questions can have a 
significant effect on the response rate (Mayer and Piper, 1982). The TDM also 
stresses the need to present an attractive, well-organised questionnaire that looks 
easy to complete: 
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  No questions should be placed on the front and the back page; 
  Questions related to one subject should be grouped together; 
  Questions eliciting personal information must be placed at the end; 
  Clear directions must be given to answer the questions; 
  The front and back pages should be carefully designed; and 
  The size of the questionnaire should not exceed 12 pages. 
Pre-testing is an essential in TDM. A specific set of TOM suggestions in pre-testing 
this study questionnaire were followed with the following objectives: 
  Is the terminology used in the questionnaire fully understood by respondents? 
  Are questions interpreted in the same manner as the researcher intends? 
" Does any aspect of the questionnaire suggest bias on the part of the researcher? 
  To find out the time taken by respondents to complete the questionnaire. 
In order to maximise the rate of response, TDM has suggested the following 
procedures during the data collection stage: 
" Minimising the cost of filling in the questionnaire in terms of time and money; 
  Request to respondents and appreciation of their co-operation in the research; 
  Reassuring the confidentiality of information disclosed; 
  Convincing the respondents about the significance of their participation; 
  Maintaining complete anonymity of the respondents; 
  Three mailing follow-ups. 
6.5.2 Questionnaire Pre-testing: It refers to testing the questionnaire on a small 
sample of respondents to identify and eliminate potential problems (Hunt et al., 
1982). Even the best questionnaire can be improved by pre-testing (Malhotra, 1996). 
Generally, a questionnaire should not be used in the field survey without adequate 
pre-testing (Zelnio and Gagnon, 1981). 'A pre-test should be extensive. All aspects 
of the questionnaire should be tested, including question content, wording, sequence 
and layout, question difficulty and instructions' (Malhotra, 1996; p. 341). The 
respondents in the pre-test should be similar to those who will be included in the 
168 
Chapter 6 Research Methodology 
actual survey in terms of background characteristics, familiarity with the topic, and 
attitudes and behaviours of interest (Diamantopoulos et al., 1994). 
Validity is the main concern at this stage (Muhammad, 1999). To begin with, the 
clarity and the focus of the questionnaire with regard to the research variables were 
extensively considered. The first draft of the questionnaire that was developed after 
extensive literature survey was then given a trial test. After showing the first draft to 
the research supervisor, it was circulated among two faculty members of 
Loughborough University, Business School, and a few PhD students. One of the 
faculty members is a Senior Lecturer who specialises in venture capital and the 
second one is Director, who teaches Marketing Research. After receiving preliminary 
inputs from them, the contents of the questionnaire were sharpened and the second 
draft was prepared. This draft was circulated to a wider circle, including the Director, 
Centre for Management Buy-Out Research (CMBOR), Business School, The 
University of Nottingham. After holding extensive discussion with the participants, 
the structure, the contents and the language was significantly improved. 
At this stage, it was considered necessary to test the questionnaire in the field itself. 
This move was driven by dual objective: 
> This being the first-ever doctoral research on venture capital in India, the only 
risk factor this research expected was the co-operation of the sample population. 
Also, the information required for the focus areas of this research namely, 
Valuation, Structuring, and Monitoring are considered confidential in nature. 
Therefore, it was decided to assess the initial response of the market. 
> At the same time, the questionnaire was primarily based on the literature drawn 
from past research conducted, primarily, in the US and Europe. Therefore, it was 
deemed essential to test it directly in India, which is an emerging market and 
possesses distinct characteristics. 
Since pilot studies cannot be conducted through mail survey, it was decided to visit 
India and meet senior venture capital functionaries in major cities. A list of potential 
participants was obtained from the researcher's personal sources. There are about 
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forty two regular venture capital investment companies or funds in India. Twenty 
major venture capital investors were identified from that list for possible meetings in 
India. The pre-testing visit commenced on March the 5th , 2000 from New Delhi. 
Meetings were arranged with CEOs of seven venture capital companies based in the 
city. They were requested not to answer the questions, but to comment on the 
contents with regard to clarity, language, and interpretation of the questions. 
Also the objective was to gauge the interest of the respondents and the amount of 
time taken in going through the entire questionnaire. Their views on the length of the 
questionnaire were taken, besides assessing the strength of the questionnaire to 
cover all the important variables that meet the research objectives. Similarly, two 
CEOs from Bangalore and eight CEOs from Bombay also participated in this 
exercise. At the end of about an eight week long visit to India, a total seventeen 
CEOs out of the targeted twenty CEOs were personally interviewed. Given the fact 
that the year 2000 was by far the busiest year of investment activity for the Indian 
venture capitalists, receiving such a response and co-operation from top industry 
players was considered an encouraging signal for the future. A copy of the pre- 
tested questionnaire is attached as appendix A. 
At the end of this visit to India, a detailed Activity Report was prepared listing all the 
suggestions made by the participants. A copy of this report is attached as appendix 
B. In the light of this report, another round of discussion with academic staff at 
Loughborough University Business School and the Director, CMBOR at the 
Nottingham University Business School was held. After carefully considering the 
research objectives, many useful suggestions were incorporated into the final 
version of the questionnaire. Contrary to the most pilot studies that report 'minor 
changes' after pre-testing, it is evident that the pilot survey for this research resulted 
in'affecting major changes in the draft questionnaire. 
Appendix C shows the final version of the questionnaire based on the inputs 
gathered during the pilot study. Besides making changes across the entire 
questionnaire, the section on valuation in particular was significantly expanded. After 
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making all the necessary changes, the questionnaire was again circulated among 
the academic staff of Loughborough University Business School. At this stage also, 
a copy of the questionnaire was sent to the Director, CMBOR, Nottingham 
University. On the basis of minor fine-tuning, the questionnaire was frozen in 
October 2000 for the final administration. 
An important factor in questionnaire evaluation is that evaluators were requested to 
look into it to ensure a fairly meaningful computer output. The objective was to make 
sure that the data gathered are compatible with Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS) for its processing and analysis. This aspect was kept in mind 
throughout the instrument development process. At the final stage, a lecturer and a 
PhD student with a statistics background (from the Loughborough University 
Department of Economic) were inducted into the evaluation team. They scrutinised 
the entire questionnaire and passed it for final administration. 
6.5.3 Questionnaire Structure: 
The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter that was jointly signed by 
the Director and the Supervisor of this research as shown in appendix D. The letter 
briefly introduced the researcher, the research and then assured the confidentiality 
of individual responses. It also promised to share the results of this research with all 
the participants. 
The ten page long questionnaire was divided into five sections. First section covered 
five questions eliciting general information about the profile of funds managers, and 
the investment portfolio. This section was termed as 'General'. The second section 
contained six questions covering valuation-related issues under Valuation'. The 
third section listed six questions looking into the structuring part of the investigation 
under 'Structuring' The fourth section covered eleven monitoring related questions 
under 'Monitoring' Finally, the last section that was termed as 'Bottomline' 
contained eleven questions. In this section, an attempt was made to correlate the 
effects of the practices conducted through the first four sections. The instrument 
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structuring described above was sequential and was based on the suggestions 
made by Dillman (1978). 
6.5.4 Sampling Approach: 
The sampling process used in this study was based on the reported experience of 
other researchers (Muhammad, 1999). Due to time, money and other logistical 
constraints, it is impossible for the researcher to collect data that covers the entire 
population. Therefore, the solution is found in the form of sampling where a 
researcher chooses a significant sample that represents the population. Wright and 
Robbie (1998) contend that the private nature of venture capital investment means a 
general absence of publicly available information. They believe that relatively small 
number of venture capital firms in most countries has implications for the extent to 
which these firms can be surveyed and consequent small and potentially biased 
sample sizes. On the other hand, Sekaran et al. (1992) and Saunders et al. (1997) 
argue that using sampling gives a better understanding of a phenomenon because 
with a small and more representative sample, the researcher can devote more time 
and attention in designing, piloting, collecting and analysing the data. Also with a 
smaller sample more detailed information can be obtained and a better quality of 
interviewer can be hired (Muhammad, 1999). 
6.5.4.1 Sample Size: Sampling size is one of the most important elements in 
reducing sampling error. While there are other reasons for sampling as mentioned 
above, the primary reason for sampling in the population of venture capitalists in 
India is apparent because the precise population is not known. In this study, the aim 
is to maximise the sample size to be able to test our hypotheses and to be able to 
compare the results to previous studies. Roscoe (1975) provides rules of thumb for 
determining sample size: 
1. Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most research. 
2. Where samples are to be broken into sub-samples (Males/females, 
juniors/seniors etc. ) a minimum size of 30 for each category is necessary. 
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3. In a multivariate research - including multiple regression analysis - the sample 
size should be several times - preferably 10 times or more - as large as the 
number of variables in the study. 
4. For simple experiment research with tight experimental control (matched pairs) 
successful research is possible with samples as small as 10 to 30 in size. 
In September 2000, the research supervisor wrote a letter to the Chairman, Indian 
Venture Capital Association (IVCA), introducing him the researcher and the research 
project and requesting him to issue a letter to all the IVCA members to co-operate in 
this research. IVCA has 30 members including both the domestic and overseas 
investors in the form of Funds and Companies. Two of these 30 members are 
professionals. Having not received any response from the IVCA, another reminder 
was sent in October 2000. On the 19th of October 2000, the Chairman of the IVCA 
sent out letters to all the IVCA members requesting them to co-operate in this 
research. A copy of the letter is attached as appendix E. 
Additionally, there are more than 12 venture capital funds, mainly overseas, which 
are not the members of the IVCA. The researcher's 10 year experience in the 
industry facilitated in tracking down these non-IVCA members. As these venture 
capitalists were not covered by IVCA request, the researcher had to use personal 
contacts in the industry to approach them. After carefully screening their current 
level of activities, in consultation with some venture capitalists, a list of 47 potential 
participants was finalised that included both IVCA and non-IVCA members. After 
arriving in India in the 4th week of October 2000, the researcher reviewed the list of 
participants once again. It was found that at least five of these had either closed their 
operations or merged with other funds. Therefore, it was decided to approach 42 
venture capitalists based in 8 largest Indian cities, namely, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, 
Bombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Madras, New Delhi, and Pune. 
6.5.5 Instrument Distribution: 
In the beginning, it was decided to mail the questionnaire in advance and then 
arrange a personal meeting with the participants. Therefore, the questionnaires were 
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mailed to all the 42 participants in three batches. The covering letter attached with 
the questionnaire requested the participants to fill in the questionnaire as far as 
possible in advance. They were informed that the researcher would travel to each of 
the eight cities and meet each of the participants to ensure that all the questions are 
correctly interpreted and completely answered. 
The mailing batch was planned in such a manner that the questionnaires would 
reach the target population about 3 weeks prior to the researcher's planned visit to 
these cities. Not completely relying on the Indian postal system, copies of the 
questionnaire, together with the recommendation letter from IVCA Chairman, was 
sent as an attached file through e-mail also. The country was divided into four 
regions, namely the West, the South, the East and the North. 
The first set of questionnaires was mailed to the West, covering Ahmedabad, 
Bombay and Pune, in the first week of November. The researcher visited these three 
cities between the fourth week of November 2000 and the fourth week of December 
2000. During this period 20 personal meetings were held with either the number one 
functionary or the number two of the organisation. One interview was conducted 
through telephone due to extremely tight schedule of one participant. Thus, almost 
90 percent of the fund managers in the West, managing more than 95 percent of the 
funds out of this region participated in this exercise. 
The second set of questionnaires was sent through post, in the third week of 
December 2000, to the South and the East that included Calcutta, Madras, 
Bangalore and Hyderabad. The researcher personally visited the last three Southern 
cities between the second and the third week of January, 2001. Telephone contacts 
were established with one venture capitalist based in Calcutta. During this visit to the 
South, the researcher met with 10 venture capitalists in the three Southern Indian 
cities of Madras, Bangalore and Hyderabad. In the South more than 90 percent of 
the fund managers, managing more than 95 percent of the funds in this region also 
participated in this research. 
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The third set of questionnaires was despatched to New Delhi, the seat of Indian 
federal government, in the third week of January 2001. Again, a second set of 
questionnaires was sent to each of the potential participants through e-mail in the 
last week of January 2001. The researcher then personally visited New Delhi in the 
first week of February 2001 to meet all the potential participants. During this last leg 
of the Indian tour, the researcher managed to meet all eight fund managers who 
operate out of New Delhi, resulting into a regional response rate of 100 percent. 
6.5.5.1 Response Rate: Previous researchers using questionnaires to investigate 
venture capital sector have typically received a fairly low response rate due to the 
privacy in which this business is conducted. For instance, Fiet (1995) obtained 141 
usable responses from a total of 245 subjects representing a response rate of 57%. 
Wright and Robbie's (1996) survey of UK venture capitalists received a response 
from 66 of the 114 contacted venture capitalists representing 57.9%. In their 
research of major European venture capital markets, Manigart et al. (1997) received 
a response rate of 58% in the UK (66 out of 114), 24% in France (32 out of 133), 
41% in the Netherlands (24 out of 58), and 50% in Belgium (14 out of 28). While 
conducting a survey of Central and East European countries, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia, Karsai et al. (1998) received a weighted average response from 18 
venture capitalists out of a total of 29, at a rate of 62%. 
The unusually high response rate for this study, where 40 venture capitalists 
responded out of the 42 contacted (95%), is partially due to the personal meetings 
that were followed by the mailing. Following the approach of Clarke (1997), it was 
decided to conduct semi-structured, face-to-face interviews around the questionnaire 
format. Although this method was expensive and time consuming, owing to the 
inexperience of venture capitalists in participating in such surveys, it was decided to 
personally meet them and explain the significance of this study. However, adopting a 
similar approach, Sarika (1999) generated a response of only 50% in an earlier 
survey of venture capitalists in India. 
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The date and the time of the meetings were fixed by phone after arriving in each of 
the above cities. Most of the respondents had already filled-up the questionnaire, 
partially, before the meetings commenced. Questions in which they had doubts of 
misinterpretation were left for discussion during the meetings. The minimum time 
spent on a meeting was 35 minutes while the maximum time was 125 minutes with 
average time spent on each meeting was 105 minutes. 
6.6 Data Preparation: 
After the research problem has been defined and a suitable approach developed, an 
appropriate research design formulated and the field work conducted, the research 
moves on to data preparation and analysis (Malhotra, 1999). The first step of data 
preparation process, as figure 5-A shows, was to check for acceptable 
questionnaires, followed by editing, coding and transcribing the data. Then the data 
was cleaned and a treatment for missing responses prescribed. Finally, an 
appropriate data analysis strategy was selected (Malhotra and Birsk, 1999). 
Figure 5-A: Data Preparation Process 
Check Questionnaire 
Edit 
Code 
Transcribe 
Clean Data 
Select an Analysis 
Strategy 
Sources Mahotra, N. K. (1999, p. 420) 
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6.7 Data Analysis Techniques: 
The data are analysed by using a number of techniques, ranging from conceptual 
analysis (Roure et al., 1990) to regression analysis (Macmillan et al., 1987). The 
selection of a particular technique depends upon the sample size (Allison, 1999), 
and the nature, complexity and source of data. The next section will briefly discuss 
the primary data analysis methods. 
6.7.1 Descriptive: 
We began the analysis by developing a descriptive profile of the Indian venture 
capital sector. Since we collected general information about the fund managers' 
characteristics, it helped to build a general profile of the venture capitalists in terms 
of their age, qualification, previous experience etc. Then we conducted a frequency 
analysis, and calculated the mean and standard deviation of almost all the data that 
we gathered. This was the first step towards testing the hypotheses that were 
developed in Chapter Four. These results are presented in Chapter Seven. 
6.7.2 Cluster Analysis: 
Next, we conducted Cluster Analysis to see if there is any clustering in terms of their 
behaviour. Cluster Analysis is meant to classify objects or cases into relatively 
homogeneous groups, hence clusters. Objects in each cluster tend to be similar to 
each other and dissimilar to objects in the other clusters (Malhotra, 1996). Cluster 
analysis is also called classification analysis of numerical taxonomy (Tonnenberger, 
1992). Because the objective of clustering is to group similar objects together, some 
measure is needed to assess how similar or different the objects are. The most 
common approach is to measure similarity in terms of distance between pairs of 
objects (Malhotra, 1996). There are several ways to compute the distance between 
two objects (Malhotra, 1987). The most commonly used measure of similarity is the 
Euclidean distance or its square (Steenkamp et al., 1994). Other distance measures, 
like Manhattan and Chebychev, are also available, but we preferred the Euclidean 
due to its wide-spread acceptability. Similarly, clustering procedures can be 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical. We used the former. It is characterised by the 
development of a hierarchy or tree like structure. Hierarchical clusters can be further 
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divided into agglomerative clustering and divisive clustering. We used agglomerative 
which starts with each object in a separate cluster. Then, clusters are formed by 
grouping objects into bigger and bigger clusters (Hair et. al., 1995). 
Cluster analysis involves several judgements, hence no clustering solution should be 
accepted without some assessment of its reliability (Malhotra, 1996). However, 
formal procedures for assessing the reliability of clustering solutions are complex 
and not fully defensible (Funkhouser 1983). The cluster analysis results presented in 
Chapter Seven clearly show the emergence of different groups in terms of their 
preferences towards various techniques of valuation, structuring and monitoring by 
venture capitalists in India. 
6.7.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): 
As an extension of cluster analysis, we conducted ANOVA tests to see where 
exactly the differences lie in terms of variables. ANOVA is used for examining the 
differences among means for two or more populations (Martin, 1978). However, 
researchers are often interested in examining the differences in the mean values of 
the dependent variable for several categories of a single independent variable. This 
can be determined by conducting one-way analysis of variance (Malhotra, 1996). 
The salient assumptions in ANOVA are: (a) The categories of the independent 
variable are assumed to be fixed. Inferences are made only to the specific 
categories considered. (b) The error term is normally distributed, with a zero mean 
and a constant variance. Further, the data can be transformed to satisfy the 
assumption of normality. The error terms are uncorrelated. If they are correlated, the 
f value can be seriously distorted (Wasserman and Kutner, 1985). In this analysis, 
the variables that are causing the formation of clusters were identified by f value. All 
the f values that were greater than the critical value listed in f distribution table 
were identified as the variables responsible for cluster formation. These results are 
presented in chapter seven. 
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6.7.4 Chi Square: 
It was also decided to further investigate the responses, and to conduct Chi Square 
tests by splitting the sample on demographic characteristics like'Foreign Vs. Indian', 
Early Stage Investors Vs. Late Stage Investors', 'Smaller Funds Vs. Larger Funds', 
'Funds with More Investments Vs. Funds with Fewer Investments'. Chi Square Tests 
are performed to test the statistical significance of an observed association in cross 
tabulation. It assists us in determining whether a systematic association exists 
between the two variables (Malhotra, 1996). 
The null hypothesis, Ho, is that there is no association between the variables. The 
test is conducted by computing the cell frequencies that would be expected if no 
association were present between the variables, giving the existing row and column 
totals (Brenson and Levine, 1992). However, there are some limitations in using this 
technique. First, the data should be converted from percentage to absolute counts. 
Also an underlying assumption of the chi-square is that the observations are drawn 
independently. Similarly, chi-square analysis should not be conducted when the 
expected frequencies in any of the cells is less than five, or when the table has two 
rows and two columns (Malhotra, 1999). However, some statisticians disagree with 
this restriction (Overall, 1980). Nevertheless, chi-square tests revealed some 
interesting but general differences in terms of venture capitalists' behaviour towards 
Valuation, Structuring, and Monitoring practices. These results are presented in 
Chapter Nine. 
6.7.5 Logistical Regression: Logistic regression is a regression on a dependent 
variable that transforms non-linear relationships into linear relationships (Pampel, 
2000). It is used to describe the relationship of several independent variables to a 
dichotomous dependent variable (Klienbaum, 1994). It is a very popular regression 
method for dichotomous dependent variables (Menard, 1995). 
The fact that the logistic function ranges between 0 and 1 is the primary reason that 
logistic regression is so popular (Klienbaum, 1994). It is set up to ensure that 
whatever estimate of risk obtained, it will always be between 0 and 1. This is not 
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always true for other possible models, which is why the logistic model is first choice 
when a probability is to be estimated (Demaris, 1995). 
Ordinary regression uses the least square method, while logistic regression relies on 
maximum likelihood procedures to obtain the coefficient estimates. However, as a 
general and flexible strategy, maximum likelihood estimation applies to a variety of 
models (Eliason, 1993). Maximum likelihood estimation finds estimates of model 
parameters that are most likely to give rise to the pattern of observations in the 
sample data (Pampel, 2000). 
There is another way to carry out hypothesis testing in logistic regression without 
using a likelihood test. This method is called the Wald test. The likelihood ratio static 
and its corresponding squared Wald statistic give approximately the same value in 
very large samples. But in small to moderate samples, the two statistics may give 
very different results. Statisticians have shown that the likelihood ratio statistic is 
better than the Wald statistic in such a situation (Klienbaum, 1994). Therefore, the 
likelihood estimation is used in the subsequent analysis presented in Chapter Nine. 
6.7 Conclusion: This chapter began by discussing the methodologies available for 
research in general before choosing the best method of data collection for this study. 
Then, the research design was briefly examined, followed by a discussion on various 
research strategies. Next, the five-stage data collection process was reviewed in the 
light of the famous TDM proposed by Dillman (1978). The actual process of data 
collection in this research was then discussed in detail, including the timing, the 
approach, the hurdles, the challenges and the response rate. 
The data had to be transformed into a usable form for further analysis. This process 
was briefly presented as suggested by Malhotra (1999). Finally, the statistical 
techniques most appropriate to meet the research objectives were briefly discussed. 
This research primarily used four statistical techniques in order to meaningfully 
analyse the collected data. Prior to this, however, the descriptive analysis results, 
together with the basic hypotheses tests are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter VII - DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction: 
This chapter presents the results produced after analysing the data collected 
from 40 venture capitalists in India between November 2000 and February 2001. 
This is by far the largest academic research ever conducted on the Indian 
venture capital sector. In the previous two surveys, Sarika (1999), examined only 
18 active venture capitalists and Mitra (2000) covered 16. First, a general 
description of the findings of this empirical research will be presented. This will 
be followed by various statistical test results pertaining to Valuation, Structuring, 
and Monitoring practices prevalent in India. 
Besides the above three areas, there was a conscious attempt to gather some 
additional data to identify useful linkages with the hypotheses developed in 
chapter five. The objective of this exercise was to develop a wider understanding 
of the behaviour of venture capitalists in India, in the context of their demographic 
background. 
7.2 General Results: 
The data was collected from 40 of the 42 most active venture capitalists in India. 
A list of participants is attached as appendix F. Out of the 40 participants, 16 
were foreign (40 percent), while 24 of them (60 percent) were Indian. This 
classification was based on the definition of the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India that funds that are subsidiaries of foreign banks, foreign financial 
institutions or multilateral financial agencies are classified as foreign funds. All 
funds fully sponsored by Indian financial institutions, banks, high net-worth 
individuals or business houses (or if the majority contribution came from one or 
more of these sources) are classed as domestic investors. 
Sarika (1999) covered 18 funds that included 8 foreign funds (45%) and 10 
(55%) Indian funds. Mitra's (2000) study included 4 foreign funds (25%) and 12 
(75%) Indian funds. The results of this research are therefore expected to be 
more representative of the industry than the previous two studies. 
184 
Chapter 7 Descriptive Analysis - Results l 
7.2.1 Fund Size: 
'Commitments are defined as the pledges that venture capitalists receive for 
investment over the lifetime of the fund' (Gompers et al. 1998; p. 156). The 
combined commitment of these forty funds - as shown in figure 7-A was US$ 
2.95 billion while their combined investment till February 2001 was US$ 2.17 
billion, which represented 73.39 percent of the total committed funds. The total 
committed amount is roughly five times more than the amount committed in total 
by the 20 IVCA members (US$ 664 million). Similarly, the total amount invested 
is about 7 times higher than the amount (US$ 279 million) invested by IVCA 
members (Venture Activity, 1998). The largest fund was US$ 400 million while 
there were two small funds, each with US$ 3.26 million. Not unexpectedly, the 
former was a foreign fund while the latter two were Indian. The average amount 
committed per fund was US$ 73.77 million, while the average amount invested 
was US$ 54.14 million. 
A closer examination reveals that only four (10 percent) of the 40 funds had 
committed US$ 1.4 billion (47 percent of the total commitments) and invested 
about US$ 1.2 billion (56 percent of the total investments). Sahlman (1990) also 
reported the concentration of the industry resources in the US, in that 13.5 
percent of the firms controlled approximately 58 percent of the total capital. Three 
of the top four funds in India were foreign. They together invested in only 39 
deals, representing about 4 percent of the total number of deals. Conversely, the 
only Indian player in the top four invested in 310 deals. This reflects the focus of 
foreign investors towards larger and fewer deals compared to their Indian 
counterparts, who apparently preferred to invest smaller amounts across a larger 
number of deals. 
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Figure 7-A 
Figure 7-B 
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7.2.2 Amount Invested: 
Out of all the participants, only four (10 percent) had fully invested their funds 
and were in the process of raising other funds, while the remaining 36 (90 
percent) had invested 7 percent to 89 percent of their funds. However, a vast 
majority had invested over two third of their fund (73.39 percent), as indicated in 
figure 7-B. 
7.2.3 Number of Investments: 
The entire amount of US$ 2.95 billion was invested in 1020 transactions, spread 
across several sectors. There were two funds with the minimum number of 
investments at 3 each, while the maximum number of investments by a single 
fund was 310. All these three funds were Indian. The average number of 
investments per fund was 25.5. This is slightly less than the average of 27 
reported by Terry and Smith (1998) in the UK, while Lockett and Wright (1999) 
reported close to 88 investments per fund in a survey of 63 venture capitalists in 
the UK. In India, the average amount per investment was US$ 2.12 million, 
showing a mid size pattern, targeted at typical SMEs. Sahlman (1990) reported 
that the US venture capitalists' average investment in companies with high 
payoffs was approximately $1 million, and $ 366,000 for the losers (p. 487). 
On the other hand, according to Venture Activity (1998), IVCA members invested 
in 728 transactions up to 1998, with an average of 36.4 deals per investor. 
Similarly, IVCA members averaged a mere US$ 0.383 million per investment 
until 1998. This compares well with the average investment size of US$ 0.228 
million reported in a survey of 130 US venture capitalists (Huntsman and Hoban, 
1980). However, significant time differences resulting in a substantial inflationary 
effect should be borne in mind. Nevertheless, these numbers reveal a 
conservative attitude of the IVCA members compared to the aggressive foreign 
funds that have entered the Indian market recently. It seems that non-IVCA 
members commit a larger amount per investment, which brings down the 
average investment per fund from 36.4 in 1998 to 25.5 presently. 
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7.2.4 Fund Age: 
The oldest fund has been in operation for over 20 years while the youngest (two) 
are one year old. The average age (period of operation in India) was 5.5 years, 
demonstrating that the venture capital sector is relatively young, despite the fact 
that it was conceptualised 20 years ago. Lockett and Wright (1999) reported an 
average age of over 15 years in the UK. However, 29 of the forty funds in India 
(72.5 percent) have been launched within the last 5 years. Six funds (15 percent) 
had been in operation for 10 years or more, while the remaining five funds (12.5 
percent) were between 5 to 10 years old. 
7.2.5 Stage of Investments: 
Venture capital investments are characterised by different stages in the financing 
of the firm: seed capital, start-up, expansion, and financing prior to going public' 
(Lam, 1991; p. 137). In a US study, Sahlman (1990) found that 15 percent of the 
capital went to early stage ventures, 65 percent was invested in later-stage 
companies, while 20 percent was invested in LBOs or acquisitions. In India, as 
figure 7-C shows, the highest proportion of investment at US$ 766.10 million 
(35.37 percent) is invested at the expansion stage. Closely behind is early stage 
investment at US$ 694.60 million (32.08 percent). It validates the argument of 
Murray (1994) that mature markets are characterised by greater competition, 
reduced rates of return and a shift to later stage investments. His argument was 
also validated in the UK where buy-outs accounted for over half of the value of 
venture capitalists' portfolio (Wright et al., 1992). 
Aylward (1998) points out that the investment distribution is weighted towards 
start-up and turn-around finance in the East European countries, while expansion 
and mezzanine financing dominate in the developing countries in Asia. This 
research shows that seed stage attracted US$ 341.26 million, representing only 
15.8 percent of the total amount invested. While MBOs, pre-IPO, and Secondary 
Purchase received US$ 81.6 million (3.77 percent), US$ 126 million (5.81 
percent), and US$156.2 million (7.21 percent) respectively. This pattern ratifies 
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the argument of Sarika (1999) that 'it may be plausible to expect expansion / 
development types of investment to dominate investment activity' (p. 19). 
These results also confirm the argument of Mitra (2000), that'private funds tend 
to have fewer and larger investments in later stage ventures' (p. 68), while 
dispelling the view of IVCA that the nascent state of the Indian venture capital 
industry suggests limited prospects for late-stage investments. In addition, 'there 
may not be discernible preference for any particular stage and only a general 
trend in certain stages may be expected (Venture Activity, 1997). In reality, there 
is a perceptible trend towards the early or expansion stage investments in India. 
In terms of the number of investments made at each of the six stages, the early 
stage topped the list with 571 transactions representing more than half (56 
percent) of all the deals executed. Seed stage with 214 investments represented 
about a fifth (21 percent) of the total number of investments. Expansion stage, 
that emerged on the top in terms of the amount invested is third in terms of 
number of investments with only 191 deals (19 percent). There were just seven 
MBOs (0.69 percent) executed in India. A very low level of buy-out activity 
support the argument of Wright et al., (1992) that the more mature markets are 
likely to witness this activity more than the emerging markets. However, there are 
at least four possible avenues that can trigger hectic Buy-out activity in India: 
1. India has a large number of listed but not actively traded companies that are 
actually performing well. They have somehow failed to catch the attention of 
the investors at stock markets (The Economic Times, June 10,2001). 
Venture capitalists can offer a better valuation of these assets by taking these 
companies private through Management Buy-Outs or Management Buy-Ins. 
2. There are a large number of potentially good, but financially distressed, 
companies that are registered with The Bank for Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR) as sick companies (equivalent to Chapter 11 in US). 
The reason for their ailment is not that they are bad projects, but bad 
promoters. 'Securities of most bankrupt companies trade at bargain prices' 
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(Platt, 1985; p. 107). They can be revived by venture capitalists by backing 
more efficient management teams. 
3. There is a move to bring efficiency in state-owned, large public sector 
companies through restructuring by part/full privatisation programmes. To 
prevent large-scale layoffs, efficient management teams from within or 
outside can be funded by venture capitalists to manage these companies. 
4. Many large industrial houses made diversified investments during the period 
of protected economic policies. In the face of increased competition mounted 
by large multinational companies in the post-liberalisation scenario, these 
industrial houses are searching for core competence. As a result, 'many 
groups have disposed of companies in sectors where they are weak' (The 
Economist, June 2,2001; p. 20) to leverage their competitive position. 
Venture capitalists can identify these opportunities and fund efficient teams to 
continue running the same business as owners and not as employees. 
Additionally, 30 investments were made at pre-IPO stage representing 3 percent 
of the total number of deals. Seven deals were executed at secondary market 
accounting for less than one percent of the total number of investments as shown 
in figure 7-D. This pattern is precisely in line with the risk and return theory 
discussed in chapter 4. As venture capital is by definition risk capital, investors 
aim at higher returns by focussing less at pre-IPO and secondary stages and 
more on seed, early and expansion stages in emerging markets. In other words, 
they are not mutual funds, rather they are venture funds. In comparison, Scheela 
(1994) showed that in Singapore: 13% was invested in seed; 27% in start-ups; 
37% in Expansion and 23% in Pre-IPO stages. However, these results were 
slightly different from a previous study by Choy (1990) that concluded that'most 
venture funds prefer to invest in a firm that is already in its growth stage, 
preferably pre-IPO' (p. 274). Pandey and Jang (1996) discovered a similar pattern 
in Taiwan where only 7.1% was invested at seed, with 25.2% in start-up, 40% in 
expansion, a higher 25.5% in Pre-IPO, and 2.2% in turnaround financing. 
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7.2.6 Sectors of Investment: 
In India, an overwhelming amount (US$ 1.05 billion) was invested into the 
Information Technology, Media and Telecom sectors (combined as 'ITMT). 
Figure 7-E shows that this amount represents 48.66 percent of total investments. 
This result validates the argument by Reddy (1998) that one may expect a 
preference for the high-tech software industry, in view of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act restricting venture capital companies from investing in the 
services sector, barring the computer software industry. Similarly, Verma (1997) 
argues that there is a clear need for venture capital to finance technological 
investment in areas such as information technology, software, electronics, 
communication, biotechnology and healthcare. Sarika (1999) also concluded that 
'telecommunication and IT/Software comprise the universally preferred sectors 
for investment in India' (p. 49). 
This was, surprisingly, followed by the Infrastructure sector as the second largest 
recipient at US$ 461.49 million (21.31 percent). Considering the sheer size and 
capital requirements of infrastructure projects like energy, transportation, and 
telecommunications, this is understandable. Foreign investors dominate this 
sector due to their overseas exposure in such projects, and higher capitalisation. 
The third category is combined as 'Manufacturing'. This includes the consumer, 
industrial, processing and food/beverages industries. This category accounted for 
an aggregate investment of US$ 368.33 million (17 percent). This conflicts with 
the picture given by Venture Activity (1998) that puts this sector right on top of 
the list. There could be two possible explanations for this: (a) thirteen, out of the 
total 40 participants in this research were not members of IVCA; a majority of 
these were foreign funds, focussing on either ITMT or Infrastructure sectors, and 
(b) their mean fund size was much larger compared to 27 IVCA members 
covered in this research. There is also a possibility that the focus of even IVCA 
members has shifted to ITMT sectors in the last two years. This indicates that 
there is a major shift in the investment pattern in India. 
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In the fourth category, healthcare, life sciences, pharmaceutical, retail and other 
services were combined as 'HC+Ret+Ser'. These sectors together attracted US$ 
223.24 million representing close to 10 percent of all the investments. However, 
owing to a major shake-up in the IT sector worldwide, most respondents 
suggested that these three sectors together will be a major focus in the coming 
few years. According to a recent report of the Confederation of Indian Industry, 
the $ 17 billion healthcare sector is expected to grow at 13 percent annually for 
the next 10 year (Economic Times, 14 May, 2001) offering significant 
opportunities to venture capitalists. Except in life sciences, there is certainly less 
volatility and consequently risk in the remaining sectors in this category, that 
make it even more attractive to late-stage venture capitalists. 
Finally, US$ 61.48 million was invested in the category labelled as 'others'. This 
covers all the remaining sectors. As only 3 percent is invested in this category, it 
demonstrates that all the major sectors were adequately classified. One 
interesting fact to emerge from the analysis is that, despite agriculture's share of 
more than 25 percent in India's GDP, venture capital investment is hardly 
directed to this sector. Given the agricultural strengths of India, bringing in 
appropriate technology by venture capital funded projects can add real value. 
In their Korean study, Rah et al. (1994) found that 38.9% funds were invested in 
the machinery and metals sector, 29.4% in electricity and electronics and 31.7% 
in chemicals and others. This pattern is more in line with IVCA members reported 
in Venture Activity (1998). However, Pandey and Jang, (1996) revealed similar 
patterns to these found in this study. In Taiwan, they found that about 65% funds 
were invested in ITMT related activities, about 14% in manufacturing sector, 
8.6% in healthcare and other services, with 12.4% in others. 
With regard to the number of investments made in each of the above categories 
figure 7-F shows that ITMT again attracted the maximum number (480 deals), 
accounting for about 47 percent of all the 1020 deals executed. This was 
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followed by the Manufacturing sector with 340 investments (33 percent). 
HC+Ret+Ser accounted for 97 deals representing 9.60 percent. 81 investments 
were made in the 'Others' category (7.94 percent). The Infrastructure sector, 
though ranked second in terms of the amount invested, accounted for only 22 
deals representing just 2.15 percent in terms of numbers. 
We deliberately refrained from making comparison of these findings with the 
IVCA report because their formula of classification was too detailed, and hence 
not comparable. Due to the shortage of questionnaire space, it was decided to 
track only the general investment trends rather than identifying specific sectors. 
Broadly, this part of the research confirms the results/estimates reported in 
previous studies conducted on India (Sarika, 1999; Mitra, 2000). 
Figure 7-E 
Sector-wise Breakup Amount (%) 
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Figure 7-F 
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Information Technology (IT) sector has been largely responsible for putting India 
on the global technology map. The software industry, which is a sub-segment of 
IT sector, registered a CAGR of 56 percent in the last five years. While the 
domestic market grew at 46 percent, the export market grew at a phenomenal 
rate of 62 percent during the same period. Software exports accounted for a 
substantial 10.5 percent of India's total exports in 1999-2000. Among the most 
prominent factors for this growth are: 
Trained IT Professionals: India has the second largest pool of technically 
qualified, English speaking manpower. Due to its diverse manpower, India is able 
to offer the entire range of services from labour intensive support services to 
quality solutions involving sophisticate software systems. According to a recent 
Business India report, India boasts 400,000 software engineers compared to only 
35,000 in China. 
Low Costs: Indian IT capital is available to the worldwide market at significantly 
lower costs. The average annual wage rate for software professionals in India is 
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about 15 to 20 percent of their counterparts in the developed nations. Even 
among developing nations, Indian programmers were paid the least. While this 
advantage is gradually eroding as wages in India continue to rise, the wage rate 
differential is anticipated to remain a substantial competitive advantage for Indian 
IT industry in the foreseeable future. 
This is also amplified by a 1999 World Bank study showing India as the only 
country that figures in the high-quality-low-cost segment of the quality-cost 
matrix. Countries like China, Hungary and Philippines are low cost, but they offer 
low quality. On the other hand, Israel, Ireland and Singapore occupy the high- 
quality-high-cost segment. 
Location Advantage: The US is the largest importer of Indian IT products and 
services. In 2000-01, almost 62 percent of exports were to North America. The 
advantage India enjoys over other countries is a 12-hour difference with this 
market. This, together with US operations, enables companies to offer round the 
clock services. According to US government estimates, more than 260 of Fortune 
1000 companies outsourced their mission critical software development to India 
in the year 2000. 
Infrastructure, Regulatory and Tax Benefits: In addition to a strong regulatory 
framework, constantly improving infrastructure and government support have 
aided to the growth of this sector. An independent ministry of IT is created within 
the political governance system. The minister exclusively oversees the industry. 
This is the first ever sector within the Indian economy that, due to its economic 
and strategic significance, has attracted such attention from the government. An 
independent regulator, the National Association of Software & Service 
Companies (Nassocom), has been created for enforcing intellectual property 
rights among other tasks. 
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Specialised export facilities in many parts of the country benefit from waivers of 
duties on certain imported equipment, exemptions from local sales taxes and 
certain excise duties, a corporate tax holiday for ten years from the 
commencement of operations and subsidized rents. The same set of benefits is 
also available to the IT enabled services like call centers, content developers, 
providers of accounting / data entry / data conversion and transcription services. 
Outlook: The McKinsey-Nassocom report estimates that the Indian IT industry 
will grow from a present US$ 5.7 billion to a US$ 87 billion by 2008 at a CAGR of 
39 percent. With the slowdown in the US economy and other global events 
unfolding elsewhere, these estimates have been revised downwards to 40 
percent from 50 percent for the current year. However, it is important to note that 
the US economic meltdown will affect the IT sector selectively rather than on a 
comprehensive scale. Projects involving capital expenditure by manufacturing, 
retailing, and financial services companies for increased hardware to support 
software may be put on hold. But the requirements of these companies are likely 
to be in the area of application maintenance, hence total expenditure is not likely 
to be affected. This expectation is mirrored by the fact that two of the largest 
software companies in India have declared an increase of over 30 percent in 
their net profits while their global competitors continue to report earnings in 
decline. 
According to a survey conducted by Forrester Research in November 2001, a 
large number of companies will engage offshore providers. Budget for offshore 
services are expected to grow rapidly over the next 2 years, from 12 percent of 
technology budget today to 28 percent in 2003. An October 2001 survey, by 
McKinsey, indicates that the cost of doing offshore software development in India 
was almost 30 - 80 percent lower as compared to development in Europe or the 
US. These developments in the global markets are expected to provide a 
considerable edge to India. 
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7.2.7 Human Capital: 'The most important element for the venture capital fund is 
the quality of the team, the people who run the fund' (Fasson, 1998; p. 133). We 
aimed at developing their profile by identifying their educational qualifications, 
age, and previous work experience. The participants were requested to provide 
information about the fund management professionals only, as information about 
back-office or support functionaries was irrelevant for this research. 
A total of 279 investment executives were employed in total by the forty venture 
capitalists. The lowest number being one and the highest 20, with an average of 
almost seven investment executives per fund. Lockett and Wright (1999) 
reported 12 executives per fund. The average amount of funds committed per 
fund manager was US$ 10.58 million, while the equivalent amount invested in 
India was US$ 7.76 million. 
Next, we enquired about the academic qualifications of the fund managers. They 
were categorised as MBA, 'MBA + Engineer, Chartered Accountants, 'Chartered 
Accountants + MBA', Engineers, and Others. The results show that the most 
preferred academic combination sought by venture capitalists is 'MBA + 
Engineer' with 99, accounting for 36.48 percent of the entire fund management 
community in our sample. The second most preferred was MBA with 66 
executives, representing 23.7 percent. The combined share of these two, with 
the MBA being a common degree, is over 63 percent. The third most preferred 
choice was Chartered Accountants at 38 (13.62 percent). Engineers shared the 
last preference with 'Others', where Cost Accountants, PhDs, and Lawyers were 
all grouped together. The last two categories constituted close to 11.5 percent 
each. Figure 7-G has the break down of this data. 
Venture capital is considered a profession led by comparatively younger teams 
(Hoffman, 1972). We also requested the respondents to furnish the age of the 
fund managers. In order to judge the range rather than the exact age, we 
requested them to indicate the number of team members in the following 
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categories: Under 25 years; between 25 - 35 years; between 35 - 45 years and 
over 45 years. With 148 fund managers falling within the range of 25 - 35 years 
(over 53 percent), followed by 79 executives within the range of 35 - 45 years 
(28.31 percent), the results adequately confirm that relatively younger 
professionals manage venture capital funds. There were more fund managers 
under the age of 25 years, 29 (10.39 percent) than over 45 years, 23 (slightly 
over 8 percent). This data are shown in figure 7-H. Hoffman, (1972) concluded 
that 'venture capitalists with the greatest propensity to invest in new companies 
are likely to be between 30 and 39(p. 182). 
Finally, we enquired about their previous major experience. The reason to 
confine this query to major is that there were many fund managers with multiple 
types of experience. This question was developed under seven broad categories 
namely, commercial bank, merchant bank, stock brokers, consultants, industry, 
venture capital and others. The idea was to identify the type of background most 
venture capitalists prefer in their team members. These categories were finalised 
after a fairly comprehensive pilot study, taking into account the inputs received 
from the potential participants. 
Hoffman (1972) found that venture capitalists had had more than one job, 
employed typically as a manager of a manufacturing, wholesale company or as a 
provider of professional services, and they exhibit entrepreneurial tendencies. In 
this study, 82 (29.39 percent) fund managers had previous industrial experience, 
confirming the argument of Dossani and Kenney (2001). A study conducted by 
Peat Marwick McLintock (1987) also confirmed that previous line management 
would appear to be a strong asset. A long track record in industry, or previous 
experience as a venture capitalist, would give the venture capital manager 
credibility. In India, the second largest source of human capital for the venture 
capital industry was merchant banks, with 67 of fund managers (24%) having this 
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background. The combined strength of these two categories was over 53 %. 
Also, we found that only 37 fund managers (13.26) worked in a venture capital 
company before coming to their present jobs. 31 professionals (11 %) came from 
accounting, auditing and management consultancies. 23 fund managers (8.24%) 
had commercial banking experience. Stock brokers were at the bottom of the 
recruitment list for venture capitalists with only 11 fund managers (3.94%) 
coming from this background. 21 fund managers (about 7%) came from other 
backgrounds like Development Financial Institutions, Law firms and Regulatory 
Authorities etc. Figure 7-I shows this break-down. Scheela (1994) reported that 
all fund managers had 'significant management experience in different areas, 
primarily manufacturing, but also venture capital, finance and banking' (p. 82). 
Figure 7-I 
Previous Background of Fund Managers (No) 
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The above composition reflects the typical nature of venture capital investments. 
The vast majority of fund managers from industry, merchant banking and 
consultancies signifies that making equity investments in small, young and 
unlisted companies requires a different set of skills than the skills required for 
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lending. Commercial bankers and other term lending institutions are more 
concerned about assessing the debt servicing capacity of the cash flows, 
together with the asset coverage ratio to safeguard their own exposure. 
Conversely, venture capitalists make equity investments in low asset-based and 
small companies. Therefore, they need to look much deeper into the business 
potential and the capabilities of the management to meet projected targets. 
Developing such a skill-set is possible by working only in either an industrial 
environment or through intermediaries who closely work with the industry as 
advisers. Fund managers with industry background often understand the 
challenges of start-up and expanding projects better due to their prior experience 
in handling such projects. These projects require excellent project management 
skills that fund managers with industry backgrounds can bring on board 
compared to only financial expertise from bankers. 
Swartz (1991) argues that, in venture capital, the premium is kept on people, and 
the added value of personal service, not on the amount of money invested. 
Patricof (1985) believes that financial skills are not as essential a talent as would 
initially seem. While he admits that an understanding of balance sheet and 
income statements and the way profits are developed are necessary, he believes 
people skills are crucial. Thus, the choice of Indian venture capitalists in 
selecting the team format is based on sound logic. Next, basic statistical 
techniques will be used to find answers to the hypotheses developed in chapter 
V. 
7.3 Preliminary Hypotheses Tests: 
The statistical analysis began by using frequency distributions. 'The objective is 
to obtain a count of the number of responses associated with different values of 
one variable and to express these counts in percentage terms' (Malhotra and 
Birks, 2000, p. 452). These tests will focus on areas related to hypotheses. 
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7.3.1 Hypothesis (1): Venture Capitalists in India prefer their own due 
diligence reports as a Source of information for Valuation: The frequency 
distribution was calculated with regard to their own due diligence as a source of 
information. Table 7.17 in appendix G shows that 85 percent of the participants 
consider this as an essential source and 10 percent view this as important while 
only 5 percent think it is desirable. Thus, the hypothesis that venture capitalists 
prefer their own due diligence in India is accepted. 
In terms of frequency, this is followed by interview with the entrepreneur and key 
employees as shown in table 7.18. The third and fourth most important sources 
were the CV of the management team and product, technical, and marketing 
information provided by the entrepreneurs, as tables 7.19 and 7.20 show. 
Technically, though, all the three are a part of the venture capitalists' own due 
diligence report. Surprisingly, cohesiveness of business plan jointly ranks fifth 
with audited balance sheet and profit and loss account. But, as table 7.21 shows, 
the 'essential' and 'important' combined gives cohesiveness of business plan an 
edge over the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account. 
Although important, the audited financial statements carry more weight for 
established businesses with a performance history. The vast majority of venture 
capital investments flow into businesses when there is nothing much to show in 
terms of balance sheet and profit and loss account. However, late stage 
investors targeting buy-outs and expansion level capital choose them as an 
important source of determining the valuation of the business. 
The results in table 7.1 below seem logical in that venture capitalists, after relying 
on their own due diligence, place maximum emphasis on interviewing key 
employees, the CV of the management, product, technical, and marketing 
information, cohesiveness of the business plan and audited financial statements, 
if any. All this information is technically a part of 'their own due diligence' process 
and therefore should follow, in more or less that order. 'Due diligence by financial 
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advisers' has a relatively high mean, yet the higher standard deviation indicates 
that some venture capitalists attach greater significance to this. 
Table - 7.1: Sources of Information for Valuation 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Own Due Diligence 40 1.00 3.00 1.2000 . 
5164 
Interview with Key Employees 
CV of the Management 
40 
40 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
3.00 
1.2250 
1.3000 . 
4797 
. 
5639 
Product, Technical, & Marketing info 40 1.00 3.00 1.3750 . 
5401 
Cohesive Business Plan 
udited Balance Sheet & P&L Accts 
40 
40 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
1.4500 
1.6750 
. 
5524 
. 
8883 
Un-audited Management Projection 40 1.00 3.00 1.8500 . 8022 
Exit Timing and Mechanism 
Due Diligence by Advisers 
40 
40 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
4.00 
1.9250 
2.1500 
. 
8286 
1.0013 
Other Venture Capitalists 40 1.00 4.00 2.5250 . 
9604 
1= Essential; 2= Important, 3= Desirable; 4= irrelevant 
In Hungary, Karsai et al. (1996) found venture capitalists' own due diligence at 
the top of the list. However, product, technical and marketing information came 
second. While interviews with key employees and management CV are ranked 
second and third in India, they were ranked fifth and sixth in Hungary. Other 
venture capitalists as an information source for valuation purposes is more or 
less ranked at the bottom of the list in both Hungary and India. In a similar 
research covering the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, Manigart et al. 
(1997) also reported that 'the most important information source in the valuation 
process is the venture capitalists' own due diligence report, followed by the 
overall coherence of the business plan, and the balance sheet and P&L account' 
(p. 34). Product and marketing related information ranked ninth in Europe, while 
it is rated higher at fourth place in India. Therefore, hypothesis (1) that own due 
diligence is used by the venture capitalists in India as the main source of 
valuation information to minimize adverse selection is accepted. 
7.3.2 Hypothesis (2): Venture Capitalists in India use DCF based 
quantitative valuation techniques: In order to test the second hypothesis about 
their use of valuation techniques, we asked all the venture capitalists to choose 
their most preferred quantitative technique for determining the entry price of their 
investments. As table 7.22 in appendix G shows, 29 respondents (72.7 percent) 
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considered the discounted cash flow based method Internal rate of Return (IRR) 
as 'essential'. This is followed by the Net Present Value (NPV) method, as 16 
respondents (40 percent) chose it as 'essential', as table 7.23 shows. 
However, it is important to note that the NPV is only inverse of the IRR. 
Therefore, the choice of these as top two techniques demonstrates that an 
overwhelming majority of venture capitalists in India prefer DCF based valuation 
techniques compared to accounting based techniques like Earning Before 
Interest Tax, Depreciation, and Amortisation (EBITDA) multiple (25 percent 
considered it as essential), Accounting Rate of Return (ARR) (25 percent 
considered it as essential) or Net Asset per Share (NAPS) (15 percent 
considered it as essential) and payback period (only 10 percent considered it as 
essential). Economic Value Added (EVA) method that, for the first time, takes 
into account the cost of capital is also not very popular among the venture 
capitalists in India, with only 5 (12.5 percent) considering it essential. 
Table - 7.2: Valuation Techiniaues used by Venture Capitalists 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Internal Rate of Return 40 1.00 4.00 1.4750 . 9055 Net Present Value 40 1.00 4.00 1.9750 1.0250 
EBITDA Multiple 40 1.00 4.00 2.3500 1.0513 
Economic Value Added 40 1.00 4.00 2.8500 1.0266 
Payback Period 40 1.00 4.00 2.9250 1.0225 
Book Value 40 1.00 4.00 3.1250 1.1137 
Accounting Rate or Return 40 2.00 4.00 3.3000 . 8533 Dividend Yield 40 1.00 4.00 3.4000 . 8712 I= tssentlal; 2= Important; 3= Desirable; 4= Irrelevant 
As table 7.2 highlights, further analysis shows venture capitalists in India prefer 
discounted cash flow based methods, followed by a multiple of EBITDA. This is 
in line with the findings of Karsai et al. (1998). However, one important revelation 
is the use of economic value added (EVA) coming before payback period 
technique, and book value methods in India. EVA also takes into account the 
cost of capital (which is high in low-geared capital structures) in its valuation of 
the business. Dividend yield at the bottom of the list is not surprising as venture 
capitalists the world over invest for capital gains and not for earning dividend 
(Bovaird, 1990 ; Locket and Wright, 1999). Interestingly, investors in Hungary, 
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Poland, and Slovakia ranked it fourth (Karsai et at, 1998). Presenting the results 
for the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, Manigart et al. (1997) reported 
EBIT multiple as the top choice for venture capitalists in the UK and France, and 
second in the Netherlands and Belgium. DCF based techniques were reported as 
top choice in the Netherlands and Belgium, number two in the UK and number 
three in France. Dividend yield, quite understandably, rated at number four in all 
the four countries. The findings of the present research confirm a major part of 
the previous resurch results. Also the hypothesis that DCF is the most preferred 
valuation technique in India is accepted. 
7.3.3 Other Relevant Findings not directly related to Valuation Hypotheses: 
Qualitative Valuation Techniques: Besides asking the venture capitalists about 
their preferences for quantitative techniques, we further probed their choice for 
qualitative techniques. As venture capital investing is more about supporting 
start-up companies, there is evidence that venture capitalists, in addition to 
sophisticated quantitative methods, apply a variety of qualitative techniques to 
determine the entry price (Wright and Robbie, 1996). 
Table 7.3 shows that multiple of initial investment on exit is considered as 
'essentiar by 20 respondents (50 percent) while 11 respondents (27.5 percent) 
believe it as 'important'. Similarly, 14 venture capitalists (35 percent) view 
industry benchmarks, wherever they exist, as essential while 19 of them (47.5 
percent) believe they are important. Tyebjee & Bruno (1984) argued that price is 
also determined by comparable opportunities that have recently been financed. 
The frequency analysis shows that other qualitative methods like turnover 
multiple, brand equity and rule of thumb are not significantly favoured by venture 
capitalists in India. Tables 7.24 and 7.25 In appendix G confirm the above 
results in that multiple on exit is followed by industry benchmarks. These results 
demonstrate that every single investment is quantitatively and qualitatively 
analysed in India. However, Manigart et al. (1997) reported that European 
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venture capitalists rely on the rule of thumb so much that it ranked second in 
France, and third in the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium. One possible 
explanation could be that European markets are more mature and therefore 
European venture capitalists judge potential deals on the basis of their past 
experience, but not many benchmarks presently exist in India. 
Table - 7.3: Qualitative Valuation Methods used by Venture Capitalists 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Multiple on Exit 40 1.00 4.00 1.8500 1.0513 
Industry Benchmarks 40 1.00 4.00 1.8750 
. 
8224 
Subscriber Multiple 40 1.00 4.00 2.4000 1.0077 
Brand Equity 40 1.00 4.00 2.4250 1.0099 
Thumb rule 40 1.00 4.00 2.5750 . 9842 Valid N listwise 40 
1= tssential; 2= Important; 3= Desirable; 4= Irrelevant 
It was also investigated whether venture capitalists in India use more than one 
valuation technique for determining the entry price of investments. Table 7.4 
shows that 20 respondents (50 percent) believe it is 'essential' to apply more 
than one valuation technique, while 15 venture capitalists (37.5 percent) consider 
it 'important'. Further analysis shown in table 7.5 confirms previous results 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998; Karsai et al., 1998) that venture capitalists rely heavily 
on more than one valuation method. These results are also in line with the 
European study conducted by Manigart et al. (1997). 
Table - 7.4: Venture Capitalists Usina More than One Valuation Technique 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 20 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Important 15 37.5 37.5 87.5 
Desirable 3 7.5 7.5 95.0 
Irrelevant 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Tota 1 40 100.0 100.0 
Further, Indian venture capitalists prefer the lowest valuation out of a range of 
possible pricing. However, most of the venture capitalists revealed during the 
discussion that they rarely strike a deal at the lowest price. Thus, applying more 
than one valuation method gives them a range, and the final price is always 
arrived at after prolonged negotiations. 
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Table - 7.5: Use of more than one Valuation Method 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Maximum Weight on 1 Method and 
Use Other as a Check 
40 1.00 4.00 1.6750 . 8286 
Use Lowest Valuation 40 1.00 4.00 3.0250 . 
9997 
Use Average Valuaiton 40 1.00 4.00 3.1000 . 
9282 
Use Median Valuaioin 40 1.00 4.00 3.3250 . 
8286 
Use Highest Valuation 40 2.00 4.00 3.6250 . 5401 
1= Essential; 2= Important; 3= Desirable; 4= irrelevant 
Corporate finance theory assumes a higher rate of return for high-risk 
investments (Chandra, 1992). This is the case in venture capital investments 
where early stage investors tend to expect higher returns due to the risks 
involved (Lam, 1991). The discount rates used by venture capitalists vary by the 
company's stage of development (Plummer, 1987) and also by sectors in which 
the investment is made (Karsai et. al., 1996). 
Stage-wise Rate of Discounting: We investigated whether venture capitalists 
apply different discount rates in determining the value of their investees. Tables 
7.6 and 7.26,7.27 and 7.28 in appendix G confirm that venture capitalists in 
India apply different discounting rates at different stages of investment. 
Plummer (1987) reported 50%-70% discount rate for seeds, 40%-60% start-ups, 
30%-50% expansion and 25%-35% for Pre-IPO. A similar pattern emerges in 
India, as shown in table 7-F. Similarly, investors at Buy-out and pre-IPO stage, 
were found to be applying between 10 to 50 percent discount rates on the 
prospective cash flows, to reflect reduced risk. 
Sector-wise Rate of Discounting: Variability is also found in discount rates in 
investments targeting different sectors (Karsai et. al., 1996). A vast majority of 
investors focussing on ITMT sectors expect the highest rates of return by 
applying higher discount rates. Table 7.7 shows that 38 out of 40 participants (95 
percent) had exposure in one of these sectors. Since there is always a higher 
level of risk in the rapidly changing technological sector, investors aim to recover 
their investments quickly as almost 67 percent of the respondents chose 
between 36 to 65 percent discounting. Murray and Lott (1995) argue that high 
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technology and early stage projects are considered riskier by the venture 
capitalists, resulting in higher discount rates. 
As shown in table 7.7 the second most preferred group of sectors for investment 
is 'Retail, Healthcare and Services' with 25 respondents (62 percent) having 
made some investments. However, it is evident from the choice of discount that 
these sectors are perceived to be less risky and therefore 60 percent of investors 
apply between 10 to 50 percent discount rates. 
All manufacturing and processing industries together were the third most 
preferred choice of investments for venture capitalists in India, with 60 percent of 
the respondents providing funds to these sectors. Table 7.29 in appendix G 
shows, however, that the risk profile of this group of industries is considered even 
better than the previous two and therefore over 58 percent of respondents opted 
for a discount rate between 10 to 35 percent. Finally, a majority of the investors 
(73 percent) focusing on the infrastructure sector were content with a discount 
rate of between 10 to 35 percent. This is understandable, because infrastructure 
projects are universally regarded as risk-free investments. Poindexter (1976), in 
a survey of 90 US venture capital firms, found that they expected to receive 
about 1.6 times the return available in traditional equity markets (60% premium 
on the return on S&P's 500 Stocks). 
Table - 7.6: Stage-wise Discount Rate 
Stages N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Pre - IPO 21 1.00 4.00 2.2381 . 7003 
Secondary Purchase 13 1.00 4.00 2.3077 . 
8549 
Management Buy-Outs 11 1.00 4.00 2.4545 . 
8202 
Expansion 33 1.00 5.00 2.7273 . 
8013 
Early Stage 37 2.00 5.00 3.3243 . 9444 Seed Stage 34 2.00 5.00 3.9412 1.1532 
1= 10 to 2U%; 2=21to 35%; 3= 36 to50%; 4= 51 to 65lf6; 5=>b5% 
The mean and standard deviation of the discount rate applied by venture 
capitalists in different stages and sectors were explored. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 list 
their preferences in terms of both the sector and the stage, further confirming the 
results of frequency analysis above. 
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Table - 7.7: Sector-wise Discount Rate 
Sectors N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Infrastructure 15 1.00 3.00 2.1333 . 5164 Manufacturing 24 1.00 3.00 2.2500 . 6079 
Retail, Healthcare & Services 25 1.00 5.00 2.7200 . 8426 Others 10 2.00 5.00 2.8000 1.0328 
IT, Media, and Telecom 38 2.00 5.00 3.2368 . 
9425 
1= 10 to 20%; 2=21 to35%; 3= 36 to 50%; 4=51 to 65%; 5=>65% 
7.3.4 Summary of Valuation Related Findings: 
In order to address the adverse selection problem, the descriptive analysis 
demonstrates that 95 percent of participants in this research considered their 
'own due diligence report' for the purpose of preparing the valuation 
memorandum as either 'essential' or 'important'. The remaining 5 percent 
considered it as 'desirable'. Similarly, a 1.2 mean and a 0.52 standard deviation 
re-confirms that venture capitalists in India prefer their'own due diligence reports' 
as source of information for valuing their investee companies. Thus, Hypothesis 
1 is accepted. 
Still in relation to avoiding adverse selection and correctly valuing the investee 
companies, 87.5 percent of respondents considered IRR as either 'essential' or 
'important' valuation technique. Also, 75 percent considered NPV as either an 
'essential' or'important' valuation technique. As discussed above, latter is simply 
the inverse of the former. These descriptive results are re-validated with IRR 
showing a mean of 1.48 and a standard deviation of 0.91, proving that venture 
capitalists in India use DCF based valuation techniques more than any other 
quantitative valuation technique. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also accepted. 
Indian venture capitalists also apply a number of qualitative methods to assess 
the value of business proposals. In line with the earlier studies, they typically use 
more than one valuation method to minimise the adverse selection problem. 
Since DCF methods are widely used, Indian venture capitalists apply different 
discount rates, depending upon their risk perception, hurdle rate, and the cost of 
capital. It was evident that early stage and technology sector investors apply 
higher discount rates than their counterparts focussing on late stage, more stable 
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and asset based sectors. This is commensurate with the theory of risk and 
return. The technology sector, due to its dynamism and early stage investments, 
owning to their lack of track record are perceived as high-risk investments. 
Therefore, discounting is higher than later stage investments in safer sectors. 
7.3.5 Structuring Related Hypotheses Tests: After an extensive literature 
survey, together with the share subscription agreements gathered during the pilot 
survey despite 'venture capitalists reluctance in allowing outside researchers 
access to term sheets and contracts' Norton and Tenaunbaum (1992; p. 20), a 
list of 25 covenants, used by venture capitalists to minimise the moral hazard 
problem, was prepared. The hypothesis was designed to test whether venture 
capitalists in India use such covenants while structuring the transactions. 
Venture capitalists often retain important rights that allow them to intervene in the 
company's operations when necessary (Sahlman 1988; Gompers et. al, 1998). 
The deal is consummated only if the venture capitalists and the entrepreneur are 
able to structure a mutually acceptable investment agreement (Golden, 1981). 
Protective covenants can be established which limit capital expenditure and 
management salaries. Covenants also establish the basis under which the 
venture capitalists can take control of the board, force a change in management 
or liquidate the investment by forcing a buyback, a merger, acquisition or public 
offering even though the venture capitalist holds a minority position (Tybejee and 
Bruno, 1984). The covenants may also restrict the power of the venture 
management to dilute the equity of the original investors by raising additional 
capital elsewhere (Glassmeyer, 1981), restrict investments in financial assets 
(treasury operations), the disposal of assets, and restructuring and consolidation 
(Zender, 1991). Covenants may also offer ratchets to investees (Reid, 1998) and 
permit changes in Articles and Memorandum of Association (Wright et al., 1999). 
7.3.5 Hypothesis (3): Venture capitalists in India use many restrictive 
covenants In their contracts to control moral hazard: The participants were 
asked whether they considered the 25 covenants as essential, important, 
desirable or irrelevant. 
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It is surprising to note that, contrary to previous findings (Gompers et al., 1998), 
the right to proportional board representation was number eight and nominating 
the chairman was second from the bottom in table 7.8. There are seven tight 
covenants that safeguard the interest of venture capitalists before the role of the 
director comes into the picture. This shows that direct equity investment deals do 
not necessarily require physical presence of the investors as a paramount 
condition. Rather, a tightly structured deal with stringent covenants can provide 
sufficient protection against moral hazard as suggested by Gompers and Lerner 
(1996) and Mitchell and Reid (1998). 
Table - 7.8: List of Structuring Covenants used in India 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Approval for Borrowing and Equity Dilution 
Approval for Restructuring & Consolidation 
40 
40 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.2250 
1.2500 . 
4229 
. 
5430 
Approval for Changing Memorandum and 
Article of Association 
40 1.00 3.00 1.3250 . 5723 
Right to Inspect Books and Visit Facilities 40 1.00 4.00 1.4250 . 6751 Exit Timing and Mechanism 40 1.00 4.00 1.4250 . 7472 
Drag-along & Tag-along Rights 40 1.00 4.00 1.4500 
. 
7143 
Right of First Refusal 40 1.00 4.00 1.5000 . 
7161 
Proportional Board Representation 40 1.00 4.00 1.5500 . 
8149 
Approval for Capital Expenditure 40 1.00 4.00 1.5500 . 7143 Intellectual Property Right in Investee 
Company's Name 
40 1.00 4.00 1.5500 . 
8756 
Approval for Appointing Auditors 40 1.00 4.00 1.6000 -- . 7779 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan 40 1.00 3.00 1.6000 
. 
6718 
Approval for Selling Major Assets 40 1.00 4.00 1.6750 . 8883 Equity Ratchet for Entrepreneurs 40 1.00 4.00 1.8750 . 7906 Right to Appoint Key Functionaries 40 1.00 4.00 1.8750 . 8825 Right to Send Observers in Important 
Meetings 
40 1.00 4.00 1.9000 . 
9282 
Monthly Reporting 40 1.00 4.00 1.9250 . 
9443 
Stain of Investments 40 1.00 4.00 2.0750 . 
9711 
Approval for Major Contracts 40 1.00 4.00 2.1250 . 8825 Ri ht to Set Executive Remuneration 40 1.00 4.00 2.1500 
. 
8638 
Post Completion Audit 40 1.00 4.00 2.1750 1,0099 
Approval for Treasury Operations 40 1.00 4.00 2.7500 
. 
8987 
Maintenance of Escrow Account 40 1.00 4.00 2 7500 8697 
Nominating the Chairman 40 1.00 4.00 2 8000 
. 
9923 
InstallingAccountin Package 40 1.00 4.00 3.2000 
. 
8829 
1= tssential; 2= Important; 3= Desirable; 4= Irrelevant 
Similarly, maintaining an escrow account, as reported by Steire and Greenwood 
(1995), is way down the list of widely used covenants by venture capitalists in 
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India. This was explained by many venture capitalists in the context of using 
approval for capital expenditure by the investees. They argued that a major part 
of the funds flow into the capital expenditure and, when that is closely monitored, 
there is no need to maintain such an account. However, the hypothesis that 
venture capitalists in India include a variety of covenants in their shareholder's 
agreement to minimise the moral hazard is accepted. 
Over 70 percent of respondents considered 18 of the 25 covenants (72 %) as 
either 'essential' or 'important'. Further investigation shows the same pattern. As 
table 7.8 shows, 21 of the 25 covenants returned a mean that represents either 
'essential' or 'important' and all of them have a standard deviation lower than 1. 
Therefore, H-3 that venture capitalists use a variety of covenants in structuring a 
transaction for controlling post-investment moral hazard is accepted. 
7.3.6 Hypothesis (4): Venture capitalists use staging of investments in 
order to control the problems of agency and moral hazard: Staging of 
investments is considered by venture capitalists to be a major tool to avert moral 
hazard. There are a number of studies focussing this aspect of venture capital 
investment (Cooper and Carleton, 1979; Sahiman, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1994; Wright and Robbie, 1998; and Muhammad, 1999). We developed a 
hypothesis to test whether venture capitalists in India resort to this practice. 
Table 7.9 shows that 70 percent of respondents considered staging as either 
'essential' or 'important'. Another 20 percent believed that the staging of 
investments is desirable and only 10 percent viewed it as irrelevant. Thus, the 
hypothesis that staging of investments is commonly used in India to minimise the 
moral hazard is accepted. 
Table - 7.9: Venture Capitalists' Preference for the Staging of Investments 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 13 32.5 32.5 32.5 
_Important 
15 37.5 37.5 70.0 
Desirable 8 20.0 20.0 90.0 
Irrelevant 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
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We further investigated the practice of staging by asking the participants about 
those specific milestones that they expect their investees to achieve before 
further releasing the funds. As tables 7.31 and 7.32 in appendix G show, 
'achievement of budgets' and 'recruitment of key employees' were the two most 
prevalent conditions that venture capitalists seek to satisfy before disbursing the 
funds further. This is in line with the arguments (Sahiman, 1988; Bergmann and 
Hege, 1998; and Neher, 1999) discussed earlier. Therefore, it is possible to 
achieve superior returns by employing effective, differentiating strategies' 
(Swartz, 1991; p. 90). 
Through eam-out arrangement, where the entrepreneur's equity share is 
determined by meeting agreed performance objectives, the venture capitalist is 
able to assess the entrepreneur's expectations of the venture (Leland & Pyle, 
1977). Hoffman, (1972) argues that investors placed a number of financial 
constraints on the companies in which they invest as a way to assist the firm in 
achieving its projected levels of sales and profits. 
7.3.7 Hypothesis (5): Preferred Stock is the most widely used Financial 
Product by venture capitalists in India: Previous research clearly 
demonstrates that venture capitalists have preferences for various financial 
products (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), in order to exercise significant control on the 
enterprise and minimise the moral hazard. Based on an extensive literature 
survey, chapter 5 developed a hypothesis that suggested that venture capitalists 
in general take a preferred stock route for making their investments. In order to 
arrive at a firm conclusion, the respondents in this research were asked about 
their product choice in relation to each of the popular investment stages in 
venture capital investment. The objective was not only to present a general 
choice of financial products, rather, we aimed at bringing out product choice 
differences, had they existed, from one stage to another. 
However, contrary to the views of Trester (1998), tables 7.33,7.34, and 7.35 in 
appendix G show that: 82.9 percent respondents have preference for plain 
equity at Seed Stage; 84.2 percent respondents prefer investing through equity 
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at Early Stage; and 87.9 percent at Expansion Stage. Similarly, equity is the most 
preferred product across all the sectors. Thus, our hypothesis that venture 
capitalists in India widely use preferred stock is rejected. 
In reality, every single investment usually consists of a blend of financial products 
depending on the risk-return perception of each investor and the projected cash 
flows of the project. This dimension was factored into the questionnaire and 
respondents were specifically given the option of multiple choice. Further data 
analysis demonstrates that venture capitalists in India use a combination of 
financial products, which almost always includes equity, as shown in table 7.10. 
Thus, these results find some support for the argument of Norton and 
Tenenbaum (1992,1993) that preferred stock may go hand-in-hand with equity 
and Bergemann and Hege (1998) that equity and convertible instruments are 
used together. Use of a high percentage of convertible instruments also confirms 
the contention of Gompers (1997) that convertible securities are widely used in 
venture capital financing. Cooper and Carleton (1979) suggest that 'the choice 
between these instruments is motivated by a whole series of considerations, 
including tax-savings, signalling expectations, and control' (p. 525). 
Table - 7.10: Use of a Combination of Financial Products 
Combination of Financial Products No. of Responses Percentage 
Equity + Preferred Stock + Convertible Debt 12 32.43 
Equity + Convertible Debt 9 24.32 
Equity + Convertible Preferred Stock 9 24.32 
Only Equity 7 18.91 
However, the use of non-voting equity (Berglof, 1994) is not yet legally 
permissible in India. One possible reason for this is the prevalence of archaic 
corporate laws, although there have been recent initiatives to upgrade such laws 
in the face of increased integration of Indian corporate and financial sectors into 
the global markets. The reason for the preference of venture capitalists in India 
for equity was explained by a respondent: 'obviously, we are risk capital 
providers, if we invested in debt or convertible debt, we would rather be a lender 
than a venture capital company'. 
215 
Chapter 7 Descriptive Analysis - Results 
7.3.8 Summary of Structuring Related Findings: 
A large number of restrictive covenants are applied in order to address the moral 
hazard problem. It is noticeable that the restrictions are placed regardless of the 
share of equity held by the investors. The most stringent and common covenants 
were aimed at preventing the dilution of investors' equity and ensuring close 
monitoring of investees performance. Thus, the hypothesis relating to the usage 
of a variety of restrictive covenants is accepted. 
Further, staging of investment is used to address the moral hazard problem, and 
a variety of milestones are required to be achieved before releasing further 
funds. The hypothesis related to staging is also accepted. The main staging 
milestones are the 'achievement of budgets' and 'recruitment of key employees'. 
Equity is the most dominant financial product, irrespective of the sector or stage 
of investments. Even when deals are structured by using a mixed bag of financial 
products, equity almost always remains a part of structuring. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that preferred stock is the most favoured choice as a financial 
instrument is rejected. 
7.3.9 Hypothesis (6) Venture capitalists In India conduct frequent and 
extensive monitoring of their investee companies as a solution to 
Information asymmetry: Monitoring is used by venture capitalists to address 
the agency problem and manage the information asymmetry, which is widely 
prevalent in a principal-agent relationship like venture capital contracts. Similarly, 
governance is also made effective through effective monitoring processes. 
Earlier, Ehrlich et al. (1994) used reporting and operational controls for their 
venture capital research under several heads namely, 'sales, profitability, cost 
controls, capital expenditure, personnel and accounts receivable' (p. 77). In this 
section, we will ascertain the frequency with which venture capitalists monitor the 
performance of their investee companies and explore the monitoring instruments 
used. 
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Monitoring Financial Performance: For tracking the financial side of the business, 
table 7.36 in appendix G shows that over 57 percent of respondents monitor the 
performance of their investee companies through a monthly profit and loss 
statement. The remaining 43 percent receive these statements on a quarterly 
basis. Reid (1998) contends that no venture capitalists would allow information to 
be received at less than quarterly intervals. 
The emphasis on budgeting and cash flow analysis reinforces the venture 
capitalists' prime concern for the viability of their investee enterprises (Reid, 
1998). Tables 7.37 and 7.38 demonstrate the monitoring of the balance sheet 
and the cash flow statements. This clearly indicates that the venture capitalists in 
India keep a close eye on the financial progress of their investee companies. 
Monitoring Sales & Marketing: Looking at the sales side, venture capitalists in 
India seem to give a considerable weight to monitoring this function closely. 
Tables 7.39 and 7.40 in appendix G show that sales reports and sales budgets 
are tracked closely. Similarly, respondents were asked how often they seek 
information related to order booking, product costing and marketing expenses in 
the periodic statements from their investee companies. Table 7.41 shows that 
over 94 percent of respondents either 'always' or 'mostly' asked for information 
on order booking. Table 7.42 shows that 87 percent respondents 'always' or 
'mostly' asked for product costing. Finally, table 7.43 shows that 95 percent of 
respondents asked either 'always' or'mostly the details of marketing expenses. 
Monitoring Current Assets: Efficient working capital management plays an 
important role in reducing the costs and boosting the profitability of the business 
(Platt, 1985). Indian venture capitalists keep a close watch on the management 
of current assets. Tables 7.44 and Z. 45 show that over 65 percent of 
respondents monitor current assets on a'monthly' or a 'quarterly' basis. 
Monitoring Human resources: As mentioned above, human resources are crucial 
in a venture capital backed environment. Thus, tables 7.47,7.48, and 7.49 in 
217 
Chapter 7 Descriptive Analysis - Results 
appendix G show that venture capitalists in India give due importance to this and 
closely monitor key parameters related to human capital performance. 
Monitoring Capital Expenditure: Venture capital investments are primarily made 
at either start up or expansion stages of business. Therefore, the investee 
companies tend to raise a greater part of funds for meeting their capital 
expenditure requirements. In order to avoid cost and time overruns, it is 
important that capital expenditure is tightly monitored and the possibility of moral 
hazard is minimised. Similarly, building up adequate capacity gives competitive 
advantage to companies in terms of achieving economies of scale. However, 
having idle capacity can result in huge financial losses (Platt, 1985). Tables 7.50, 
7.51, and 7.52 in appendix G further show that venture capitalists in India strictly 
monitor the capital expenditure during the project implementation. They also 
closely watch the capacity utilisation after the project is up and running. 
Monitoring of Costs: Venture capitalists do not seem to be very much concerned 
about the cost of capital and the cost of raw material, as shown in tables 7.53 
and 7.54. The most likely reason for this is that both these costs are carefully 
assessed at the time of preparing the valuation. Moreover, these costs usually 
remain constant for a longer time and do not change in the short term. However, 
a majority of them do ask for overhead expenses in their periodic statements as 
shown in table 7.55 in appendix G. 
Monitoring Statutory Compliances: Table 7.56 in appendix G shows that venture 
capitalists in India closely monitor whether their investee companies have been 
regular in making their debt and interest payments, as well as other statutory 
payments like provident fund. Though, venture capitalists do not focus on 
discussing these subjects when they meet the management of their investment 
companies in person, as shown in table 7.57. 
Further analysis of the data in table 7.11 shows that the profit and loss account, 
together with the sales report, are monitored on almost a monthly basis. Cash 
flow, balance sheet, default reports, sales budget, and joining and leaving reports 
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of key employees are required on almost a quarterly basis. These results provide 
support to the argument of Wright et al. (1998). However, it is surprising that 
current assets (creditors, debtors, and inventory) are not monitored even on a 
'quarterly' basis. 
Table - 7.11: Monitorina Reports used by Venture Capitalists in India 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Profit and Loss Account 40 1.00 2.00 1.4250 . 
5006 
Sales Report 40 1.00 4.00 1.5250 
. 
7157 
Cash Flow Statement 40 1.00 3.00 1.6250 . 6279 Balance Sheet 40 1.00 3.00 1.6750 . 6558 Project Implementation Report 40 1.00 4.00 1.7500 
. 
7425 
Budgets versus Actual 40 1.00 4.00 1.7500 . 8086 Default Reports 40 1.00 4.00 2.0500 . 8149 Sales Budget 40 1.00 4.00 2.0500 . 9323 Working Capital Reports 40 1.00 4.00 2.0750 . 8883 Joining & Leaving Reports of Key 
Personnel 
40 1.00 4.00 2.1250 1.1808 
Capacity Utilisation Report 40 1.00 4.00 2.1250 
. 
9658 
Creditors and Debtors Report 40 1.00 4.00 2.2000 . 8228 Invento Report 40 1.00 4.00 2.3750 
. 
9524 
Market Share Analysis 40 1.00 4.00 2.4000 
. 
8102 
Payroll Sheet 40 1.00 4.00 3.1000 1.0813 
1= mommy; z= uuaneny; s= Yeany; 4= never 
Similarly, participants were asked how often they seek the specific breakdown of 
items listed in table 7.12 in their monitoring reports. Respondents virtually 
'always' monitored the order booking and 'mostly' marketing expenses, product 
costing, and overhead expenses. These findings are compatible with Mitchell 
and Terry (1998). Again, their monitoring of raw material costs and cost of capital 
is not as frequent as expected. These findings further confirm the results of 
frequency analysis presented in appendix G. 
Table -7 . 
12: Breakdown of Information in Monitoring Reports 
Values 
Order Booking 
N 
40 
Minimum 
1.00 
Maximum 
4.00 
Mean 
1.5000 
Std. 
Deviation 
. 
6794 
Marketing Expenses 40 1.00 3.00 1.6000 . 5905 Product Costing 40 1.00 4.00 1.7000 
. 
7579 
Overhead Expenses 40 1.00 3.00 1.7250 
. 
5986- 
Capital Expenditure Analysis 40 1.00 4.00 1.7750 
. 
8002 
Profit per Employee 40 1.00 4.00 2.1500 . 
9753 
Turnover per Employee 40 1.00 4.00 2.2000 . 
9392 
Cost of Capital 40 1.00 4.00 2.3750 . 
8679 
Raw Material Costs 40 1.00 4.00 2.4000 1.2362 
- -Y.. <- --,. y ,i- "a .. Y, v-- 
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Venture capitalists do not simply rely on receiving the reports from their 
investees. They often visit and meet the management in person for performance 
discussions (Arnold and Moizer, 1984). Thus, there is adequate evidence of 
multi-layered monitoring, as discussed by Robbie et al. (1997). Venture 
capitalists were asked about their focus of discussion when they meet investee 
companies. Table 7.13 illustrates their mean response and standard deviation. 
Besides overall performance appraisal, the discussion mainly focuses on 
strategic planning, and sales and product development related issues. Start-up 
businesses encounter many teething problems and venture capitalists, quite 
understandably, do the 'trouble shooting' (Terry and Smith, 1998; p. 181) with the 
management of their investees. Thus, the Hypothesis that venture capitalists in 
India monitor their investees extensively and frequently for improving information 
asymmetry and controlling moral hazard is accepted. 
Table - 7.13: Focus of Discussion during the Personal Meetings 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Performance Appraisal 40 1.00 3.00 1.3000 . 
5164 
Strategic Planning 40 1.00 2.00 1.3250 . 
4743 
Sales, Marketing & Billings 40 1.00 3.00 1.6500 . 
6998 
Fund Raising Plans 40 1.00 3.00 1.6500 . 6998 
Discuss Product Development 40 1.00 4.00 1.9250 . 7299 
Trouble Shooting 40 1.00 3.00 1.9500 . 7143 Planning Acquisitions 40 1.00 4.00 2.0250 . 
8619 
Exit Plans 40 1.00 3.00 2.0250 . 
7675 
Profile Management (Building) 
Status of Statutory Compliances 
40 
40 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
4.00 
2.0500 
2.1000 . 
8149 
. 
8102 
Status of Contract Adherence 40 1.00 4.00 2.2000 . 8829 1= Always; 2= Mostly; 3= Rarely, 4= Never 
Other Relevant Findings not Directly Related to Monitoring Hypotheses: We 
further investigated the use of all the information gathered from investee 
companies, as there is enough evidence of deeper involvement of venture 
capitalists in their investee companies (Bygrave, 1987; Bruton et al., 1997; 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989) and doing more than 'just monitoring' (Reid 1998). 
Table 7.14 shows that the information is further processed after discussing it with 
the board members of the investing company (Ehrlich et al., 1994). MacMillan et 
al. (1988) also found that VCs serve as a sounding board to their investee 
companies. As one venture capitalist said during the data collection meeting: 'I 
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invariably send five questions to the Chief Financial Officer, after examining the 
periodic statements'. 
Table - 7.14: Use of Information Gathered from the Investee Companies 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Discuss the Information at Investors' 40 1.00 4.00 1.2500 . 
6304 
Board Meeting 
Analyze the Information 40 1.00 3.00 1.2750 . 
5057 
Give Feedback to Investee Companies 40 1.00 3.00 1.4000 . 
5454 
Develop Performance Enhancing 40 1.00 3.00 1.5000 . 
6405 
Strategies for Investees 
Compare with Competitors 40 1.00 3.00 1.8500 . 
6222 
Just File Routinely 40 1.00 4.00 3.2750 1.0619 
i= fuways; z= mostly; s= Rarely; 4= never 
7.3.10 Hypothesis (7) Venture Capitalists in India replace the under- 
performing CEOs of their investee companies in order to improve 
corporate governance: Replacement of CEOs in an investee company is a 
common practice in mature venture capital markets (Macmillan et al., 1988; Hall, 
1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Sweeting, 1991; Fiet, 1995; 
and Kanellos, 1996). This practice is also prevalent in an emerging market like 
Russia (Wright et al., 1998). 
Table 7.15 illustrates that 60 percent of respondents replaced CEOs in their 
investee companies. These results provide a partial support of our hypothesis 
that CEO replacement is a tool exercised by venture capitalists in India to control 
moral hazard and improve corporate governance. However, the reason for a very 
low percentage of CEO replacement, compared to higher percentages reported 
in previous studies like Fiet and Hellriegel (1995), is admitted by many venture 
capitalists in India one comment was: 'we would like to replace more CEOs, but 
finding a suitable replacement is difficult'. 
Table - 7.15: Percentage of CEOs replaced by the venture capitalists 
% of CEOs Replaced Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 -5% 20 50.0 83.3 83.3 
6-10% 
> 10% 
1 
3 
2.5 
7.5 
4.2 
12.5 
87.5 
100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 
Total 
16 
40 
40.0 
100.0 
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7.3.11 Hypothesis (8): Lack of strategic skills lead to CEO dismissals: The 
underlying reasons that led to the replacement of the CEOs were also 
investigated. Tables 7.58,7.59,7.60,7.62, and 7.62 in appendix G list the 
reasons for their replacement. It is evident that operational and strategic skills are 
considered more critical for replacement than financial and interpersonal skills. 
However, the mean response rate as listed in table 7.16 indicates that 
operational skills were the primary reasons for the dismissal of CEOs, followed 
by strategic skills. These results give a partial support to the arguments offered 
by Longenecker and Moore (1991) and Bruton et al. (1997). Inter-personal skills 
come way down the list after financial skills, lack of drive and vision, and integrity. 
Table - 7.16: Lack of Skills that Lead to Dismissals of Investee's CEOs 
Values N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Operational 24 1.00 4.00 1.8750 
. 
8999 
Strategic Skills 24 1.00 4.00 2.0417 1.0417 
Financial 24 1.00 4.00 2.2083 1.0206 
Drive & Vision 24 1.00 4.00 2.2500 1.1132 
Integrity 24 1.00 4.00 2.5417 1.3825 
Inter -personal 24 1.00 4.00 2.5833 1.1765 
Communication 24 1.00 4.00 2.8750 
. 
9470 
1= Aways; f= mossy, 3= Kareiy; 4= Never 
7.3.12 Summary of Monitoring Related Findings: 
Venture capitalists in India monitor the performance of their investee companies 
on a monthly and/or quarterly basis. As principals, after they have provided the 
funds to the agents, the only way they can overcome the asymmetric information 
problem is through a close monitoring of their investments. This is achieved not 
only by the frequency of performance reports, but also the way in which they 
cover all the critical aspects of business having a bearing on the bottom-line. 
Thus, the hypothesis of frequent and extensive monitoring is accepted. 
Venture capitalists regard the quality of the management as a key to their 
success, hence they monitor closely the performance of the Chief Executive 
Officers of the investee companies. In the last hypothesis, it was expected that 
venture capitalists in India would frequently replace under-performing CEOs. The 
analysis proves that, though this practice exists, it is not followed very religiously. 
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A majority of funds (60%) did replace CEOs of their investee companies, but the 
rate of replacement was rather low. Thus, the hypothesis concerning CEO 
replacement is only partially accepted. The reasons for CEO replacement were 
primarily their inability to achieve operating results and drive growth. One 
possible reason for this cautious approach in replacing CEOs is that most 
venture capitalists reported problems in finding a suitable replacement. 
7.4 Conclusion: This chapter has used fundamental statistical tools like 
Frequency Analysis, Mean and Standard Deviation in order to conduct the 
hypotheses tests and draw preliminary conclusions about the. The descriptive 
results present an aggregate picture of the elementary data analysis. In other 
words, descriptive results reveal very little whether there was a group of 
respondents - small or big - that behaved differently from the rest. If so, where 
exactly do they differ, and what is the degree of difference? 
In the next chapter, I shall investigate whether all investors behave in the same 
manner, or whether they can be divided into different groups on the basis of their 
behaviour. This will be done by first performing Cluster Analysis to determine if 
the sample is divided into one or more clusters. However, Cluster Analysis only 
reveals the formation of groups. It will not throw light on the factors that make 
venture capitalists behave differently. Therefore, in order to pin down the 
differences, the same set of data will be further analysed using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA). Finally, in case of the existence of various clusters within the 
sample, an initial attempt will be made to identify their demographic 
backgrounds, as a prelude to conducting further statistical tests based on those 
demographic characteristics. 
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CHAPTER - VIII: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS I 
8.1 Introduction: 
After completing the preliminary descriptive analysis, and hypotheses testing, the 
data will be analysed by using a set of more sophisticated statistical techniques 
available in SPSS (see also Norton and Tenaunbaum, 1992). The objective is to 
develop an understanding of whether or not any sub-group existed in the sample 
that responded differently from the rest. If so, this might pose some further 
questions regarding the size of such a group and the degree of its variance. 
We begin with cluster analysis for all the data directly related to our hypotheses. 
Venture capital researchers Timmons and Bygrave (1986), Manigart et al. (1997) 
and Muhammad (1999) have previously used cluster analysis. 'The objective of 
cluster analysis is to create two or more groups based on the responses' 
Muhammad (1999; p. 216) to various questions. According to Norusis (1994), 
the popular method for forming clusters is agglomerate hierarchical cluster 
analysis where clusters are formed by grouping cases into bigger clusters until all 
cases are members of a single cluster. An important issue in clustering 
techniques is to decide the number of clusters. However, Hair et al. (1998) 
concede that no standard objective selection procedure exists. 
However, cluster analysis only provides evidence of differences, without telling 
us the factors that caused differentiation. We used the Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) to identify the variables that were responding differently. Ehrlich et al. 
(1994) used ANOVA as a test of means for two or more populations (Malhotra, 
1996). Therefore, while conducting Cluster analysis, the three clusters were 
saved as a separate variable and used as an independent variable for ANOVA. 
An effort to find further answers was made by employing multinomial regression 
analysis. However, as Luk (1996) suggested, a smaller sample size limits the 
scope for further analysis. 
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After grouping various participants together, based on their response pattern 
through Cluster Analysis, assessing the size of such groups and identifying the 
degree of variance that these groups demonstrate in their choice of answers 
through ANOVA, an attempt will be made to identify these groups on the basis of 
certain demographic parameters. The aim is to ascertain whether a group's 
different behaviour is caused by some identifiable demographic characteristics. 
8.2 Demographic Characteristics: In contrast to the heterogeneous venture 
capital markets across the economies suggested by Manigart et al. (1996), 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) presented an important case for in-country 
heterogeneity: 
The venture capital industry is generally perceived as an agglomeration of 
homogeneous firms, whereas, in fact, they are quite heterogeneous. Different 
objectives, strategies, resources, locations, associations, and organisational 
forms result in a great deal of variety within the venture capital industry. This 
diversity needs to be understood and incorporated into well-focused research 
design if studies of the venture capital industry are to be most productive' 
(Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; p. 163). 
In order to identify the common characteristics of all the venture capitalists that 
are a part of the same cluster, we broke down the entire sample on the basis of: 
(1) Fund Origin - Indian Vs. Foreign - in the light of the argument of cultural 
differences advanced by Karsai et al. (1996) and Sarika (1999); 
(2) Stage - Early Vs. Late - from the argument of possible stage-wise behavioural 
differences advanced by Wright and Robbie (1996,1998), Karsai (1998); 
(3) Sectors - Tech-Focussed Investors Vs. Non Tech - this classification is 
developed in this research, perhaps for the first time, considering that venture 
capital industry globally has given birth to some of the most successful 
technology companies [Tyebjee and Vickery (1988), Sahlman (1990), Pandey 
and Jang (1996), Wright and Robbie (1998), Gompers (1998)]. We wanted to see 
if the behaviour of tech-focussed investors differed from their non-tech-focussed 
counterparts; 
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(4) $ Million Invested per Fund Manager, Gompers (1996) points out that 
larger amounts of funds managed by each Fund Manager puts increased 
pressure on them. Therefore, it will be ascertained whether fund size managed 
by per Fund Manager makes any difference on their behaviour, 
(5) Size (Smaller Vs. Larger) to examine if the resources at the disposal of the 
fund has any impact on prevalent practices [as suggested by Timmons and 
Bygrave (1986), Scheela, (1994) and Elango et al. (1995)]. In a survey of 63 UK 
venture capitalists, Lockett and Wright (1999) sub-divided the sample between 
deals of up-to £5 million and investments of £5 million and greater, 
(6) Age (Older Vs. Newer) to investigate whether newer funds -a large number 
in India are part of this category - are any different from funds operating for a 
longer period. This is in line with Chiampou and Kallett (1989) who divided 55 
venture capital funds into old and newer funds; 
(7) Number of Investments Made (Greater Vs. Fewer) to analyse if the funds 
pursuing an aggressive investment policy and making a large number of 
investments behave differently from the more conservative investors. 
The cut-off for each of the above categorisations was made by (a) first taking the 
average, and (b) by dividing the entire sample as above and below average, and 
(c) assigning the below average as 'smaller, 'fewer; Younger' etc. All the 
above averages were assigned as 'larger, 'older, 'greater' etc. The table 
presented in appendix H illustrates an example of the method adopted in 
identifying the cluster members, and showing their most common characteristics. 
Table 8.1 shows a snapshot of the entire sample. It is evident that in three sub- 
categories, namely size, number of investments and $ Million invested per 
fund manager, the data are skewed. This bias could have been overcome by 
dividing the sample on the basis of median rather than mean. However, the 
objective of this exercise is not to make the sample statistically more efficient. 
The aim, essentially, is to find out the underlying behavioural characteristics of 
larger, older, bigger portfolio based funds. 
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Table - 8.1: The division of entire sample between the seven sub-groups 
Total Origin Size Age No. of Inv Sector $M I/FM Stage 
40 1=24 S=30 Y=23 Fe=32 T=25 M=12 La=20 
F=16 L=10 0=17 G=8 N=15 Le=28 E=20 
Pix-iian; F=Foreign, S'SmaII; L= Large; Y=Yangs ; 0=Older, Fe-Fewer, G=Greater; T=Technology, N-Norf 
Tedi dopy; M=More; Le=Less; La=Later, E=Eady 
Therefore, it was decided to divide the data on the basis of mean, barring sub- 
categories based on origin, sector, and stage. The fund origin category is based 
on actual numbers. The division of sector was determined by comparing the 
amount invested in 'ITMT' sector with the remaining sectors. All those investors 
whose investment in the 'ITMT' sectors accounted for more than sixty percent of 
the total investment were classified as 'technology sector investors'. The rest 
were classified as 'non-technology investors'. Similarly, the stage was 
determined by combining the 'seed' and 'early stage' investments. Where these 
two stages together accounted for more than sixty percent of the total amount 
invested by each venture capitalist, they were classified as 'early stage 
investors'. Where more than sixty percent of the total investments were made at 
stages other than these two, they were classified as 'late stage investors'. 
Wdhout resorting to rigorous analysis, this approach will indicate whether a 
particular cluster has proportionately more representation of a specific 
demographic characteristic compared to the sample as a whole. If the answer is 
affirmative, then this will justify further analysis for finding statistical evidence 
supporting or otherwise the outcome of this approach. Thus, should the need 
arise, further statistical analysis will be performed in a subsequent chapter. 
This chapter will only focus on (i) identification of clusters, (ii) where they differ 
and their degree of variance; (iii) whether the demographic background of each 
cluster differs from the demographic characteristics of the entire sample. If so, it 
will present a case for further statistical analysis to explore how venture 
capitalists with such demographic characteristics relate to a particular 
hypothesis. All those clusters that have up to 5 percent variability from the entire 
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sample pattern are classified as 'Slightly Different', between 5-10 percent 
variability are classified as 'Different', and with 10 percent and more variability 
are classified as 'Substantially Different'. 
8.3 Hypothesis (1): In order to minimise the adverse selection problem, 
venture capitalists use 'their own due diligence' as a source of information 
for valuation: From the elementary analysis, 'Own Due Diligence' emerged as 
the most favoured source. However, it was not clear whether some venture 
capitalists showed a different pattern of preference and therefore answered 
differently. Cluster analysis was conducted to assess the differences in 
responses, if any. A sample Cluster figure in appendix H shows that there are 
primarily three distinct clusters of venture capitalists. The largest cluster has 26 
members, the second one with 8 members, while the smallest cluster has 6 
members. This indicates that venture capitalists differ from one another in their 
choice of using information sources for assessing the valuation of their investees. 
In ANOVA, statistical significance of variables is depicted through those f-value 
figures that are higher than the proxy value of the degree of freedom distribution 
of that variable. Table 8.2 shows that 7 out of 10 variables are statistically 
significant in terms of f-value. The threshold figure in f-value distribution for the 
degree of freedom 2,37 is approximately 3.23. Therefore, the fvalues of 'Own 
Due Diligence', 'Audited Balance Sheet', 'Audited Management Projections', 'Exit 
Timing and Mechanism', 'Due Diligence by External Advisers', 'Interviews with 
the Entrepreneurs and Key Functionaries', and 'Other Venture Capitalists' are all 
greater than 3.23. This indicates that the three groups differ in their responses 
with regard to these seven variables. 
However, it is still not clear which clusters are behaving differently from one 
another. This is explained in table 8.3. The mean response varies substantially, 
between cluster 2 and cluster 3 compared to cluster 1 and 2, with regard to all 
the statistically significant variables except 'Un-audited Management Projections' 
and 'Other Venture Capitalists'. Cluster I considers almost all types of sources 
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necessary, including 'Due Diligence by External Advisers' and 'Other Venture 
Capitalists', before arriving at a fair valuation. This leads us to conclude that 
members of cluster 1 are 'information hungry'. 
Table 8.2: ANOVA - Information Sources for Valuation (H-1) 
Sum of Squares df can Square F Sig- 
Own Due Diligence Between Groups 3.105 2 1.553 7.875 . 
001 
Within Groups 7.295 37 
. 
197 
Total 10.400 39 
Cohesive Business Plan Between Groups . 
413 2 
. 
206 
. 
665 
. 
520 
Within Groups 11.487 37 
. 
310 
Total 11.900 39 
ud. Balance Sheet, P&L Acct. Between Groups 9.480 2 4.740 8.236 . 001 Within Groups 21.295 37 . 576 Total 30.775 39 
CV of the Management Between Groups . 285 2 . 142 . 435 . 651 Within Groups 12.115 37 
. 
327 
Total 12.400 39 
Un-audited Mgt. Projections Between Groups 5.263 2 2.632 4.909 
. 
013 
Within Groups 19.837 37 
. 
536 
Tota 1 25.100 39 
Exit Timing and Mechanism Between Groups 6.557 2 3.279 6.000 . 
006 
Within Groups 20.218 37 . 
546 
Total 26.775 39 
Due Diligence by Ext. Advisers Between Groups 10.267 2 5.133 6.587 . 
004 
Within Groups 28.833 37 
. 
779 
Total 39.100 39 
Int'view with Entrep. & Key Em Between Groups 1.603 2 . 
802 4.023 
. 
026 
Within Groups 7.372 37 . 
199 
Total 8.975 39 
Prod., Tech. & Marketing Info. Between Groups . 
654 2 
. 
327 1.128 
. 
334 
Within Groups 10.721 37 
. 
290 
Total 11.375 39 
Other Venture Capitalists Between Groups 
Within Groups 
16.488 
19.487 
2 
37 
8.244 
. 527 
15.65 . 000 
Total 35.975 39 
However, cluster 2, which is the largest in size, appears very selective in terms of 
choosing the information sources for assessing the valuation. They seem to rely 
more on their'Own Due Diligence' and undermine the utility of 'External Advisers' 
as some members of this group replied 'never' to this option. Similarly, they do 
not rely on the inputs from 'Other Venture Capitalists'. Therefore, the members of 
this cluster can be classified as 'guarded investors'. 
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Table 8.3: ANOVA (Descriptive) - Information Sources for Valuation (H-1) 
Variables Cis. N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Own Due Diligence 1 8 1.2500 
. 
4629 
. 
8630 1.6370 1.00 2.00 
2 26 1.0385 
. 
1961 
. 
9592 1.1177 1.00 2.00 
3 6 1.8333 
. 
9832 
. 
8015 2.8651 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.2000 . 5164 1.0348 1.3652 1.00 3.00 Cohesive Business Plan 8 1.5000 
. 
7559 
. 
8680 2.1320 1.00 3.00 
2 26 1.3846 
. 
4961 1.1842 1.5850 1.00 2.00 
3 6 1.6667 
. 
5164 1.1247 2.2086 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.4500 . 5524 1.2733 1.6267 1.00 3.00 
udited Balance Sheet, P&L Acct. 8 1.5000 . 9258 . 
7260 2.2740 1.00 3.00 
2 26 1.4615 
. 
6469 1.2003 1.7228 1.00 3.00 
3 6 2.8333 . 9832 1.8015 3.8651 1.00 4.00 Total 40 1.6750 . 8883 1.3909 1.9591 - 
1.00 4.00 
CV of the Management 8 1.2500 . 4629 . 8630 1.6376 
1700 
- -- - - 
2-. 6-0- 
2 2 26 1.2692 
. 
5335 1.0537 1.4847 1 
. 
00 3.00 - 
3 6 1.5000 
. 
8367 
. 
6220 2.3780 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.3000 . 5639 1.1197 1.4803 1.00 3.00 Un-audited Mgt Projections 1 8 1.1250 
. 
3536 
. 
8294 1.4206 1.00 2.00 
2 26 2.0385 
. 
8237 1.7058 2.3712 1.00 3.00 
3 6 2.0000 . 6325 1.3363 2.6637 1.00 3.00 Total 40 1.8500 . 8022 1.5934 2.1066 1.00 3.00 Exit Timing and Mechanism 1 8 1.5000 . 5345 1.0531 1.9469 1.00 2.00 2 26 1.8462 
. 
7317 1.5506 2.1417 1.00 3.00 
3 6 2.8333 
. 
9832 1.8015 3.8651 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 1.9250 . 8286 1.6600 2.1900 1.00 4.00 Due Diligence by Ext'nal Adviser 1 8 1.7500 
. 
8864 1.0089 2.4911 1.00 3.00 
2 26 2.0000 
. 
9381 1.6211 2.3789 1.00 4.00 
3 6 3.3333 
. 
5164 2.7914 3.8753 3.00 4.00 
Tota11 40 2.1500 1.0013 1.8298 2.4702 1.00 4.00 
Int'view with Entrep. & Key Empl. 1 8 1.0000 . 
0000 
-- 
1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
2 26 1.1 223 
. 
4019 ---- 1.0300 
. 
546 1-3 1.00 2.00 
3 6 1.6667 
. 
8165 
. 
8098 2.5235 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.2250 . 4797 1.0716 1.3784 1.00 3.00 Prod., Tech. & Marketing Info. 1 8 1.1250 . 3536 . 
8294 1.4206 1.00 2.00 
2 26 1.4231 
. 
5038 1.2196 1.6266 1.00 2.00 
3 6 1.5000 . 8367 . 6220 
--- 2.3780 ------ 1.00 -- 3.00 
Total 40 1.3750 . 5401 1.2023 1.5117 
-1-. 0-0 3.00 
Other Venture Capitalists 1 8 1.2500 
. 
4629 
. 
8630 1.6370 1.00 2.00 
2 26 2.8846 
. 
6528 2.6209 3.1483 2.00 4.00 
3 6 2.6667 1.2111 1.3957 3.9376 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.5250 . 
9604 2.2178 2.8322 1.00 4.00 
Finally, members of cluster 3 appear not to consider any of the sources of 
valuation as 'essential', except, perhaps, 'cohesiveness of business plan' and 'CV 
of the Management' and 'Product, Technical, and Marketing Information'. These 
are essentially a part of the business plan. Probably, members of this cluster are 
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either too experienced to judge everything on the basis of just a business plan, or 
they might rely on other sources like personal references that were not included 
in the questionnaire. Therefore, they could be classified as a 'distinct class of 
investors' because of their very different approach. But the lowest overall mean 
(1.20) re-confirms earlier findings that venture capitalists in India rely on their 
'Own Due Diligence'. 
8.3.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: At this stage, we only know 
that venture capitalists differ from one another as a group. However we have no 
information about the underlying characteristics that are possibly causing them to 
behave in a different manner. We will try to ascertain this by comparing the ratio 
of the demographic division of the entire sample (table 8.1) with the ratio of 
demographic split of each of the clusters. Thus, we will be able to see if members 
of some clusters are demographically significantly different from the original 
demographic pattern of the entire sample. If so, those demographic 
characteristics would be considered as possible underlying reasons for their 
distinct behaviour. Then there will be further analysis to determine the statistical 
significance of each of such characteristic vis-ä-vis Hypothesis related questions. 
Therefore, we begin with the demographic characteristics of venture capitalists in 
the largest cluster in table 8.4. It is noticeable that there are fewer Indian venture 
capitalists compared to their proportion in the entire sample. Similarly, there are 
fewer members of smaller size than the original ratio of 1: 3. Slightly fewer 
members of this cluster are younger in age. Again, venture capitalists with a 
greater number of investments have slightly larger representation in this cluster 
compared to the original sample. There are more technology investors in 
comparison to their representation in the original sample. Likewise, this cluster 
has a higher ratio of members managing more million dollars per fund manager, 
against the entire sample ratio. The stage split in this cluster is also slightly in 
favour of late stage investors compared to the 1: 1 ratio of the entire sample. 
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Table 8.4: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin º Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
Largest Cluster Ratio 53 47 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 75 25 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
Fund Size ---1111. small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
Largest Cluster Ratio 69 31 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 88 12 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 83 17 Substantially Different 
Fund Age -º Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
Largest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
Portfolio Size Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
Largest Cluster Ratio 77 23 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 75 25 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 100 00 Substantially Different 
Investment Sector Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
Largest Cluster Ratio 69 31 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
$ MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
Largest Cluster Ratio 38 62 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 12 88 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 17 83 Substantially Different 
Investment Stage-º Late Early Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
Largest Cluster Ratio 54 46 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 88 12 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 50 50 
The second largest cluster shows different characteristics with regard to Fund 
Origin, Size and Age. The ratio of Investment Sector also varies from the original 
ratio. Additionally, there are many more members who invested fewer million 
dollars per fund manager than the original ratio. One obvious reason for this 
behaviour is that almost 80 percent of members in this cluster are Government 
owned funds. They tend to be older as the Government took the initiative in 
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launching the earliest venture funds. Also, Government organisations employ 
more human resources than the private sector. 
Similarly, the smallest cluster with six members has all members making fewer 
investments, despite the fact that 2 of the cluster members are over 5 years old 
(greater than the threshold age). Also, like the previous cluster, this group also 
has equal number of members focussing on both technology and non-technology 
sectors. Members are evenly divided between early and late stage investors. 
One possible answer is that this cluster includes both IT-specific, early stage 
investors; and also the'old economy, late stage investors. Interestingly, ANOVA 
table 8.3 shows that the smallest cluster members have replied 'essential' to 
almost every information source. This is perhaps due to the presence of more 
Government sponsored funds who may not want to be dubbed as 
'unprofessional'. 
8.3.2 Summary of H (1) Findings: The findings of the preceding discussion can 
best be summarised as: 
A. Lowest overall mean in ANOVA table 8.3 demonstrates that 'Own Due 
Diligence' is still the most reliable means for Indian venture capitalists to 
arrive at a valuation to determine the entry price of an investment. 
B. But a look at table 8.2 suggests that the f-value of 'Own Due Diligence' 
is considerably high. As a result, table 8.3 presents three different 
clusters each responding to this question differently. The only way to 
ascertain the possible cause of these differences is through tracing the 
demographic characteristics of each of these clusters. Therefore, in table 
8.4 an elementary attempt is made to see if the demographic ratio of 
these clusters differed from the demographic ratio of the entire sample. It 
is clear that almost all clusters in each demographic category differ from 
the original ratios. Therefore, it is important to perform further statistical 
tests to assess the demographic impact on earlier hypotheses results. 
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8.4 Hypothesis (2): For addressing the adverse selection problem, venture 
capitalists use DCF based valuation techniques to arrive at the correct 
valuation of the business: In the previous chapter, frequency analysis showed 
that the discounted cash flow (DCF) based techniques (IRR & NPV) are most 
preferred by the venture capitalists in India. However, it was not clear whether 
some venture capitalists showed a different pattern of preference. Cluster 
analysis was conducted to assess the differences in response, if any. This 
resulted in three distinct clusters with 7,22 and 11 members respectively. 
ANOVA was again conducted to ascertain which of the 8 variables are 
statistically significant. Table 8.5 shows that Dividend Yield, Net Asset Per Share, 
EVA, EBITDA Multiple, and Payback Period methods have an f-value far greater 
than the f distribution critical value of 3.23. Even DCF / NPV have a greater value 
than the f distribution, but most researchers believe that, in order for it to be 
statistically significant, it should ideally be at least double the critical f distribution 
number (Malhotra, 1996). Hence they were excluded from further analysis. 
Table 8.6 shows that the two largest clusters consider Dividend Yield and Net 
Asset Per Share techniques as virtually 'irrelevant', while the smallest cluster 
members view these as 'important'. However, there are more similarities in 
responses of the largest cluster and the smallest cluster members with regard to 
'IRR' and 'DCF' techniques as 'essential' and 'important' respectively. Both these 
groups consider ARR as 'desirable'. Their response is similar even with regard to 
EVA, EBITDA Multiple, and Payback Period. These similarities could be 
explained, partially, by the common demographic characteristics that these 
clusters share with each other as shown in table 8.7 in that most of these are 
Indian, smaller in size, have made fewer investments, and manage fewer million 
US$ per fund manager. 
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Table 8 5: ANOVA - Valuation techninues (H-21 
Vatiiables Sum of 
S uares 
df Mean 
S uare 
F Sig. 
Dividend Yield Between Groups 20.743 2 10.371 43.326 . 000 Within Groups 8.857 37 
. 
239 
Total 29.600 39 
Net Asset Per Share Between Groups 31.265 2 15.632 33.804 
. 
000 
Within Groups 17.110 37 
. 
462 
Total 48.375 39 
Internal Rate of Return Between Groups 2.884 2 1.442 1.834 . 
174 
Within Groups 29.091 37 
. 
786 
Total 31.975 39 
Discounted Cash Flow / NPV Between Groups 8.592 2 4.296 4.908 . 013 Within Groups 32.383 37 . 875 Total 40.975 39 
Economic Value Added Between Groups 10.243 2 5.121 6.141 . 005 Within Groups 30.857 37 
. 
834 
Total 41.100 39 
EBITDA Multiple Between Groups 19.671 2 9.836 15.533 
. 
000 
Within Groups 23.429 37 
. 
633 
Tota 1 43.100 39 
Payback Period Between Groups 17.502 2 8.751 13.913 . 000 Within Groups 23.273 37 . 629 Total 40.775 39 
Accounting Rate of return Between Groups 2.945 2 1.473 2.141 . 
132 
Within Groups 25.455 37 . 688 Total 28.400 39 
Apparently, cluster 1 consists of 'cautious investors' who want to apply a variety 
of valuation techniques before finally arriving at a desirable valuation. Cluster 2 
has 'modestly cautious investors' giving importance to fewer techniques, 
compared to cluster 1. Finally, cluster 3 can be classified as a 'different class of 
investors' who do not consider any of these valuation techniques as essential. 
We could have conjectured that these are incubators who invest at 
conceptualisation stage of a business. But 3 out of seven members of this cluster 
investing in late stage deals dispel even that possibility. 
Significantly, the smallest cluster members have shown preference for 'Dividend 
Yield' and 'Net Asset per Share' as techniques of valuation. The only link 
between their age and choosing these techniques is that possibly these venture 
capitalists are sitting on investments for longer duration. This may be due to 
frequent depressions in the capital markets, which often delay IPOs and hence 
limit exit options. Therefore, they may have learnt to give due consideration to 
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'Dividend Yield' which ensures regular income in case of their inability to exit. 
Another possible lesson from experience is that stronger book value provides 
extra comfort, if invested in the form of preferred stock or convertible bonds, 
when the investee company is headed towards liquidation. 
Tnhla R R- ANCIVA mescrintivPl - Valuation Techniques 
(H-2) 
CIs. N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Dividend Yield 1 7 1.8571 . 6901 
1.2189 2.4953 1.00 3.00 
2 2 3.6364 . 4924 3.4181 
3.8547 3.00 4.00 
3 11 3.9091 . 
3015 3.7065 4.1116 3.00 4.00 
Total 40 3.4000 . 8712 3.1214 
3.6786 1.00 4.00 
Net Asset Per Share 1 7 1.2857 . 4880 . 8344 1.7370 
1.00 2.00 
2 22 3.3182 . 
8387 2.9463 3.6901 1.00 4.00 
3 11 3.9091 . 3015 3.7065 4.1116 
3.00 4.00 
Total 40 3.1250 1.1137 2.7688 3.4812 1.00 4.00 
Internal Rate of Return 1 7 1.0000 . 0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 2 22 1.4545 . 8004 1.0997 1.8094 1.00 
4.00 
3 11 1.8182 1.2505 . 
9781 2.6582 1.00 4.00 
Tota 1 40 1.4750 . 9055 1.1854 17646 
1.00 4.00 
Discounted Cash Flow / NPV 1 7 1.7143 . 
7559 1.0152 2.4134 1.00 3.00 
2 22 1.6818 . 
8387 1.3099 2.0537 1.00 4.00 
3 11 2.7273 1.1909 1.9272 3.5273 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 1.9750 1.0250 1.6472 2.3028 1.00 4.00 
Economic Value Added 1 7 2.8571 1.0690 1.8684 3.8458 1.00 4.00 
2 22 2.4545 . 
9625 2.0278 2.8813 1.00 4.00 
3 11 3.6364 . 6742 3.1834 4.0893 2.00 4.00 Total 40 2.8500 1.0266 2.5217 3.1783 1.00 4.00 
EBITDA Multiple 1 7 2.2857 . 
4880 1.8344 2.7370 2.00 3.00 
2 22 1.8182 . 
9069 1.4161 2.2203 1.00 4.00 
3 11 3.4545 . 6876 2.9926 3.9164 
2.00 4.00 
- - - Total 40 2.3500 1.0513 2.0138 2.6862 1.00 4 . 00 
Payback Period 1 7 2.0000 1.0000 
- 
1.0752 2.9248 1.00 4.00 
2 22 2.7273 . 882 2.3359 3.1187 1.00 4.00 3 11 3.9091 . 3015 3.7065 4.1116 3.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.9250 1.0225 2.5980 3.2520 1.00 
- - 
4.00 
Accounting Rate of return 1 7 3.0000 1.0000 2.0752 14Z48 . 
9248 2.66 2.00 4.00 
2 22 3.1818 . 
8528 2.8037 3.5599 2.00 4.00 
3 11 3.7273 . 
6467 3.2928 4.1617 2.00 4.00 
Total 40 3.3000 . 8533 3.0271 3.5729 2.00 4.00 
8.4.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.7 reveals major 
differences between the largest cluster ratio and the entire sample ratio with 
regard to Fund Size, Fund Age, Amount Invested per Fund Manager and 
Investment Stage. However, the ratio based on Fund Origin and Investment 
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Sector is virtually representative of the entire sample. In the second largest 
cluster, the representation of Indian investors is high. This cluster has a 
significantly higher ratio of smaller investors than the original sample ratio. There 
are more, younger investors in this cluster, and more members with a smaller 
Portfolio Size. They also manage fewer US$ per fund manager, and are Late 
Stage investors focussing more on Technology sector, compared to the entire 
sample ratio. 
Table 8.7: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin No Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
Largest Cluster Ratio 59 41 Slightly-Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 64 36 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Slightly Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
Largest Cluster Ratio 64 36 Substantially Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 91 09 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 86 14 Substantially Different 
Fund Age ---0. Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
Largest Cluster Ratio 64 36 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 64 36 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 29 71 Substantially Different 
Portfolio Size Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 
Largest Cluster Ratio _ 
80 20 
82 18 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 82 18 Slightly Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Different 
Investment Sector 0 Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
Largest Cluster Ratio 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 
64 36 
64 36 
Slightly Different 
Slightly Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 57 50 Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
Largest Cluster Ratio 36 64 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 18 82 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 29 71 Slightly Different 
Investment Stage--* Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
Largest Cluster Ratio 55 45 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 55 45 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 43 57 Different 
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The ratio of smallest cluster with regard to Fund Origin and US$ investment per 
fund manager differs slightly from the entire sample ratio. The ratio of Portfolio 
Size, Investment Sector and Investment Stage varies reasonably compared to 
the original ratio. But the differences between the smallest cluster members and 
the entire sample are substantial in terms of Fund Size and Fund Age. 
8.4.2 Summary of H (2) Findings: Theoretically, the lowest mean response with 
regard to 'IRR' and 'DCF/NPV' re-confirms that H (2) is further accepted. But, 
table 8.6 demonstrates some differences between the three clusters, each 
responding somewhat differently to the hypothesis that DCF is the most widely 
used valuation technique by venture capitalists in India. Table 8.7 shows that all 
the three clusters have dissimilar demographic backgrounds. Therefore, further 
statistical tests are required to find the demographic significance of such 
differences and their impact on the hypotheses. 
8.5 Hypothesis (3): Venture capitalists in India use a variety of restrictive 
covenants in order to address moral hazard: In a typical venture capital 
setting, Gompers and Lemer (1996) argue that 'the terms and conditions that 
govern the contractual relationship between the two parties are critical to limiting 
opportunistic behaviour and ensuring allocational efficiency' (p. 469). But, 
Anderlini and Felli (1995) point out that 'no contract can be infinitely long' (p. 
1086). Norton and Tenaunbaum (1992) suggested 'specific term sheet 
provisions' (p. 27) as a future research area. However, such a study has not, 
apparently, been conducted so far. 
The result of preliminary hypothesis test in chapter VII confirmed that the venture 
capitalists in India use a variety of covenants drawn from the literature [Sahlman 
(1990), Barry (1994), O'Shea (1996), Wright and Robbie (1998), Reid (1998), 
Berger and Udell (1998), Zider (1998)] and also from the share subscription 
agreements obtained from the venture capitalists in India during the pilot study. 
The data were again further analysed by using cluster analysis. The results show 
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three clusters. The largest cluster has 23 members, the second largest 15, while 
the smallest cluster has just two members as table 8.9 shows. 
Table 8.8: ANOVA - List of Covenants for Structuring Subscription Agreements (H-3) 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Importance of Casting Vote Between Groups . 
458 2 
. 
229 
. 
223 
. 
801 
Within Groups 37.942 37 1.025 
Total 38.400 39 
Importance of Proportional Board Representation Between Groups 2.132 2 1.066 1.659 . 
204 
Within Groups 23.768 37 
. 
642 
Total 25.900 39 
Approval for the Appointment of Key Employee Between Groups 2.758 2 1.379 1.847 . 
172 
Within Groups 27.617 37 
. 
746 
Tota 1 30.375 39 
Approval for the Appointment of Auditors Between Groups 10.932 2 5.466 15.964 . 
000 
Within Groups 12.668 37 
. 
342 
Total 23.600 39 
Post Completion Audit Between Groups 7.065E- 2__ 3.533E- . 033 . 968 Within Groups 39.704 37 1.073 
Total 39.775 39 
Approval for Restructuring & Consolidation Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1.941 
9.559 
2 
37 . 
970 
. 
258 
3.756 
. 
033 
Total 11.500 39 
Approval for Capital Expenditure Between Groups 
Within Groups 
6.532 
13.368 
2 
37 
3.266 
. 
361 
9.039 
. 
001 
Total 19.900 39 
Approval for Borrowing and Equity Dilution Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1.416 
5.559 
2 
37 . 
708 
. 
150 
4.711 
. 
015 
Total 6.975 39 
Installing Specific Accounting Package Between Groups 
Within Groups 
4.300 
26.100 
2 
37 
2.150 
. 
705 
3.048 
. 
060 
Total 30.400 39 
Monthly Financial Reporting Between Groups 
Within Groups 
11.203 
23.572 
2 
37 
5.601 
. 
637 
8.792 
. 
001 
Total 34.775 39 
Staging of Funds Disbursement Between Groups 
Within Groups 
3.933 
32.842 
2 
37 
1.966 
. 888 
2.215 
. 123 
Tota 1 36.775 39 
Approval for Signing Major Contracts Between Groups 
Within Groups 
8.433 
21.942 
2 
37 
4.216 
. 
593 
7.110 
. 
002 
Total 30.375 39 
Approval for Disposing Major Assets Between Groups 
Within Groups 
_. 12.740 
18.035 
_ 2 
37 
6.370 
. 
487 
13.069 . 000 
Total 30.775 39 
Approval for Setting Executive Remuneration Between Groups 
Within Groups 
11.297 
17.803 
2 
37 
5.649 
. 
481 
11.739 
. 
000 
Total 29.100 39 
Employee Stock Option Plans Between Groups 
Within Groups . 
149 4--149- 
13.451 
2 2- 
37 
2.075 
. 
364 
5.707 
. 
007 
Total 17.600 39 
Equity Ratchets for Entrepreneurs Between Groups 5.163 2 2.582 4.972 
. 
012 
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Within Groups 19.212 37 
. 
519 
Total 24.375 39 
Exit Timing and Mechanism Between Groups 3.462 2 1.731 3.497 . 
041 
Within Groups 18.313 37 . 495 Tota 1 21.775 39 
Drag-along and Tag-along Rights Between Groups 9.674 2 4.837 17.501 . 000 Within Groups 10.226 37 
. 
276 
Total 19.900 39 
Right of First Refusal Between Groups 4.632 2 2.316 5.576 . 
008 
Within Groups 15.368 37 
. 
415 
Total 20.000 39 
IPRs in the Name of Investee Company Between Groups 12.358 2 6.179 13.033 . 
000 
Within Groups 17.542 37 
. 
474 
Tota 1 29.900 39 
hanging Memorandum & Article of Association Between Groups 2.833 2 1.416 5.272 . 
010 
Within Groups 9.942 37 . 
269 
Total 12.775 39 
Approval for Treasury Operations Between Groups 4.828 2 2.414 3.348 
. 
046 
Within Groups 26.672 37 
. 
721 
Total 31.500 39 
Maintaining an Escrow Accountant Between Groups 5.788 2 2.894 4.516 . 
018 
Within Groups 23.712 37 . 641 Total 29.500 39 
Right to Send Observers in Important Meetings Between Groups 10.214 2 5.107 8.081 
. 
001 
Within Groups 23.386 37 
. 
632 
Total 33.600 39 
Right to Inspect Books & Visit Offices, Factories Between Groups 6.233 2 3.116 9.990 
. 
000 
Within Groups 11.542 37 
. 
312 
Total 17.775 39 
F-values in table 8.8 show that 10 out of a list of 25 covenants are statistically 
significant. However, the importance of these differences is undermined by 
examining table 8.9 that shows that the smallest cluster with just two members is 
responding very differently in a majority of these 10 statistically significant 
variables. Thus, the hypotheses results of the previous chapter are further 
supported by ANOVA that shows that 21 of the 25 covenants have overall mean 
responses as either 'essential' or 'important'. Only 4 variables were considered 
close to 'desirable' but none of these 25 covenants were regarded as 'irrelevant'. 
8.5.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Each cluster was again 
analysed individually by splitting its members into 7 different demographic 
categories and comparing the ratio of each of these categories with the ratio of 
the same demographic characteristics in the entire sample. 
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Table 8.9: ANOVA (Descriptive) - List of Covenants for Structuring Contracts (H-3) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Importance of Casting Vote 1 23 2.8696 1.0576 2.4122 3.3269 1.00 4.00 
2 15 2.6667 
. 
9759 2.1262 3.2071 1.00 4.00 
3 2 3.0000 
. 
0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.8000 . 9923 2.4827 3.1173 1.00 4.00 Proportional Board Representation 1 23 1.7391 
. 
9638 1.3224 2.1559 1.00 4.00 
2 15 1.3333 
. 
4880 1.0631 1.6036 1.00 2.00 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
Total 40 1.5500 . 8149 1.2894 1.8106 1.00 4.00 Approval for the Appointment of Key Employee 1 23 1.6522 . 8847 1.2696 2.0347 1.00 4.00 2 15 2.2000 
. 
7746 1.7710 2.6290 1.00 4.00 
3 2 2.0000 1.4142 10.706 14.7062 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.8750 . 8825 
1.5928 2.1572 1.00 4.00 
Approval for the Appointment of Auditors 1 23 1.2609 . 5408 1.0270 1.4947 1.00 3.00 2 15 1.8667 
. 
6399 1.5123 2.2211 1.00 3.00 
3 2 3.5000 
. 
7071 -2.8531 9.8531 3.00 4.00 
Tota 1 40 1.6000 . 7779 1.3512 1.8488 1.00 4.00 Post Completion Audit 1 23 2.1739 1.1140 1.6922 2.6557 1.00 4.00 
2 15 2.2000 
. 
8619 1.7227 2.6773 1.00 4.00 
3 2 2.0000 1.4142 10.706 14.7062 1.00 3.00 
Tota11 40 2.1750 1.0099 1.8520 2.4980 1.00 4.00 
Approval for Restructuring & Consolidation 1 23 1.0870 . 
2881 
. 
9624 1.2115 1.00 2.00 
2 15 1.5333 
. 
7432 1.1217 1.9449 1.00 3.00 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 
- 
1.00 
Total 40 1.2500 . 5430 1.0763 1.4237 . 4237 
1-6 0- 1.00 3.00 
- Approval for Capital Expenditure 1 
- 
23 1.2609 
. 
4490 1.0667 1.4550 1.00 2.00 
:i 15 2.0 667 
. 
7988 1.6243 2.5090 1.00 4.00 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1 0000 1.00 1.00 
Total 40 1.5500 . 7143 1.3215 1.7785 1.00 - - 
4.00 
Approval for Borrowing and Equity Dilution 1 23 1.0870 . 
2881 
. 
9624 1.2115 1 0 0 2.00 
2 15 1.4667 
. 
5164 1.1807 1.7526 1.00 2.00 
3 2 1.0000 . 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
Total 40 1.2250 . 4229 1.0897 1.3603 1.00 2.00 Installing Specific Accounting Package 1 23 3.0000 . 
9045 2.6089 3.3911 2.00 4.00 
2 15 3.6000 
. 
5071 3.3192 3.8808 3.00 4.00 
3 2 2.5000 2.1213 16.559 21.5593 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 3.2000 . 8829 2.9176 3.4824 1.00 4.00 Monthly Financial Reporting 1 23 1.5217 
. 
5931 1.2653 1.7782 1.00 3.00 
2 15 2.3333 1.0465 1.7538 2.9129 1.00 4.00 
3 2 3.5000 --Jul -2.8531 9.8531 3.00 4.00 
Tota 1 40 1.9250 . 9443 1.6230 2.2270 - 
1.00 4.00 
Staging of Funds Disbursement 1 23 1.8696 . 
9679 1.4510 2.2881 1.00 4.00 
2 15 2.4667 
. 
9155 1.9597 2 9736 1.00 4.00 
3 2 1.5000 
. 
7071 -4.8531 7.8531 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 2.0750 
. 
9711 1.7644 2.3856 1.00 4.00 
Approval for Signing Major Contracts 1 23 1.8696 
. 
7570 1.5422 2.1969 1.00 4.00 
2 15 2.6667 
. 
8165 2.2145 3.1188 1.00 4.00 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
Total 40 2.1250 
. 
8825 1.8428 2.4072 1.00 4.00 
Approval for Disposing Major Assets 1 23 1.2609 
. 
4490 1 0667 1.4550 1 001 2.00 
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2 15 2.4000 
. 
9856 1.8542 
3 2 1.0000 . 0000 1.0000 Total 40 1.6750 . 8883 1.3909 Approval for Setting Executive Remuneration 1 1.6957 . 5588 1.4540 2 2.7333 
. 
8837 2.2439 
3 
r 
3.0000 . 0000 3.0000 Total 4O 2.1500 . 8638 1.8737 Employee Stock Option Plans 1 1.3478 
. 
5728 1.1001 
2 15 1.8667 
. 
6399 1.5123 
3 2 2.5000 
. 
7071 -3.8531 
Total 40 1.6000 . 6718 _ _1.3852 Equity Ratchets for Entrepreneurs 23 1.6087 . 7223 1.2963 2 15 2.1333 
. 
6399 1.7789 
3 2 3.0000 1.4142 -9.7062 
Total 40 1.8750 . 7906 1.6222 Exit Timing and Mechanism 23 1.2174 . 5184 . 9932 15 1.8000 
. 
9411 1.2788 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 
Tota 1 40 1.4250 . 7472 1.1860 Drag-along and Tag-along Rights 1 23 1.0870 . 2881 . 9624 2 15 1.8000 
. 
6761 1.4256 
3 2 3.0000 1.4142 -9.7062 
Tota 1 40 1.4500 . 7143 1.2215 Right of First Refusal 23 1.2609 . 4490 1.0667 
2 15 1.9333 . 8837 1.4439 3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 
Total 40 1.5000 
. 
7161 1.2710 
IPR in the Name of Investee Company 23 1.1304 . 
3444 
. 
9815 
2 15 2.2667 1.0328 1.6947 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 
Tota 1 40 1.5500 . 
8756 1.2700 
Changing Memorandum & Article of Association 1 23 1.1304 . 4577 . 9325 2 15 1.6667 
. 
6172 1.3249 
3 2 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 
Total 40 1.3250 . 
5723 1.1420 
Approval for Treasury Operations 23 2.5217 . 
8458 2.1560 
2 15 2.9333 
. 
8837 2.4439 
3 2 4.0000 . 0000 4.0000 Total 40 2.7500 . 8987 2.4626 Maintaining an Escrow Accountant 1 23 2.6087 . 
8388 2.2460 
2 15 3.1333 
. 
7432 2.7217 
3 2 1.5000 
. 
7071 -4.8531 
Total 40 2.7500 . 8697 2.4719 Right to Send Observers in Important Meeting 1 23 1.5652 . 
7878 1.2246 
2 15 2.5333 . 8338 2.0716 3 2 1.0000 . 0000 1.0000 Total 40 1.9000 
. 
9282 1.6032 
Right to Inspect Books & Visit Offices, Factories 1 23 1.1304 . 
3444 
. 
9815 
2 15 1.9333 
. 
7988 1.4910 
3 2 1.0000 0000 1.0000 
Total 40 1.4250 . 6751 1.2091 
2.9458 1.00 4.00 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
1.9591 1.00 4.00 
1.9373 1.00 3.00 
3.2227 1.00 4.00 
3.0000 3.00 3.00 
2.4263 1.00 4.00 
1.5955 1.00 3.00 
2.2211 1.00 3.00 
8.8531 2.00 3.00 
1.8148 1.00 3.00 
1.9210 1.00 3.00 
2.4877 1.00 3.00 
15.7062 2.00 4.00 
2.1278 1.00 4.00 
1.4416 1.00 3.00 
2.3212 1.00 4.00 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
1.6640 1.00 4.00 
1.2115 1.00 2.00 
2.1744 1.00 3.00 
15.7062 2.00 4.00 
1.6785 1.00 4.00 
1.4550 1.00 2.00 
2.4227 1.00 4.00 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
1.7290 1.00 4.00 
1-2793 1.00 2.00 
2.8386 1.00 4.00 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
--- - -- --- 1.8300 1.00 4.00 
1.3284 1.00 3.00 
2.0085 1.00 3.00 
1 0000 1.00 1.00 
1.5080 1.00 3.00 
2.8875 1.00 4.00 
3.4227 1.00 4.00 
4.0000 4.00 4.00 
3.0374 1.00 4.00 
2.9714 1.00 4.00 
3.5449 1.00 4.00 
7.8531 1.00 2.00 
3.0281 1.00 4.00 
1.9059 1.00 3.00 
2.9951 1.00 4.00 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
2.1968 1.00 4.00 
1.2793 1.00 2.00 
2.3757 1 0014.00 
1.0000 1 . 
00 1-00 
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Table 8.10 shows insignificant differences between the Fund Origin and Fund 
Size ratios of the larger cluster and the entire sample. But the differences are 
noticeable with regard to Fund Age, Portfolio Size and US$ invested per fund 
manager, while they are substantial in Investment Stage split. 
Table 8.10: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin º Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
LargerCluster Ratio 57 43 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 60 40 
Fund Size --º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
LargerCluster Ratio 78 22 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 66 34 Different 
Fund Age -º Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
LargerCluster Ratio 52 48 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 73 27 Substantially Different 
Portfolio Size -f Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
LargerCluster Ratio 74 26 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 93 07 Substantially Different 
Investment Sector No Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
LargerCluster Ratio 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 
57 43 
73 27 
Different 
Substantially Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
LargerCluster Ratio 35 65 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 27 73 Slightly Different 
Investment Stage --º Late Eady Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
LargerCluster Ratio 39 61 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 60 40 Substantially Different 
Members of the smaller cluster show exactly the same Fund Origin ratio as the 
entire sample. This group has a slight under-representation of members 
managing more million US$ per fund manager. However, compared to the entire 
sample, this cluster has substantially different representation in terms of Fund 
Age, Fund Size, Investment Sector and Investment Stage. 
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There are just 2 members in the smaller cluster. Interestingly, their behaviour is 
similar, possibly because both of them are owned by the government, they are 
smaller in size, older in age, and are late stage investors. The only differences 
are that one is technology focussed while the other is not and one has made 
more investments than the other. But the most surprising factor is that both these 
companies have a common chairman! 
8.5.2 Summary of H (3) Findings: The cluster analysis produced three different 
clusters indicating variance in the response pattern of all participants. However, 
subsequent ANOVA highlights that the differences in the responses of the largest 
and the second largest clusters are small compared to the smallest cluster with 
just two members. The demographic patterns of each cluster demonstrate 
considerable differences compared to the entire sample. This, therefore, calls for 
further analysis to derive conclusive results whether or not the differences are 
attributable to their demographic backgrounds. 
8.6 Hypothesis (4): Staging is widely used by venture capitalists in India to 
address moral hazard: This hypothesis was accepted in the previous chapter, 
in line with earlier studies (Gompers 1992b, 1996; Bergemann and Hege, 1998). 
We further investigated the major milestones that are set for the entrepreneurs 
before releasing more funds. The cluster analysis presents two clusters 
responding differently to five variables. The larger cluster has 27 members while 
the smaller one has 13 members. This necessitated the use of ANOVA to 
ascertain the areas not only where differences lie but also the degree of 
variation. Table 8.11 shows that there is across-the-board variability, and all the 5 
variables are statistically significant, as indicated by very high level of f-values 
compared to the f-distribution critical value of 4 at a degree of freedom of 1,38. 
At this stage, it was necessary to identify the clusters behaving differently. Table 
8.12 shows that the larger cluster members have mostly responded to the values 
that are closer to 'important' while the members of the smaller cluster have 
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'rarely' used those milestones for staging. Having identified the variables where 
the two clusters differ, it will be ascertained if these two clusters have 
demographically different backgrounds that may possibly explain their distinct 
behaviour. 
Table 8.11: ANOVA - List of Milestones for Staaina Investments (H-4) 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Using Subscribers/Turnover Between Groups 12.744 1 12.744 20.847 
. 
000 
Within Groups 
Total 
23.231 
35.975 
38 
39 . 
611 
Achievement of Budgets Between Groups 16.479 1 16.479 34.225 . 000 Within Groups 
Total 
18.296 
34.775 
38 
39 . 
481 
Operating Cash Breakeven Between Groups 11.282 1 11.282 19.651 . 000 Within Groups 
Total 
21.818 
33.100 
38 
39 . 
574 
Achieving Projected Revenue Between Groups 23.878 1 23.878 57.075 . 000 Within Groups 
Tota 1 
15.897 
39.775 
38 
39 
. 
418 
Recruitment of Key Employees Between Groups 11.001 1 11.001 13.496 . 001 Within Groups 
Total 
30.974 
41.975 
38 
39 . 
815 
Table 8.12: ANOVA (Descriptive) - List of Milestones for Staaina Investments (H-4) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Using Subscribers/Turnover 1 
2 
27 
13 
2.3333 
3.5385 . 
8771 
. 5189 
1.9864 
3.2249 
2.6803 
3.8520 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Total 40 2.7250 . 9604 
2.4178 3.0322 1.00 4.00 
Achievement of Budgets 1 
2 
27 
13 
1.6296 
3.0000 
. 
5649 
. 
9129 
1.4062 
2.4484 
1.8531 
3.5516 
1.00 
1.00 
3-00 
4.00 
Total 40 2.0750 . 9443 
1.7730 2.3770 1.00 4.00 
Aerating Cash Breakeven 1 
2 
27 
13 
2.4815 
3.6154 
. 
8490 
. 
5064 
2.1456 
3.3094 
2.8173 
3.9214 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Total 40 2.8500 . 9213 2.5554 ---- -- 
3.1446 
- 
1.00 4.00 
- Achieving Projected Rev. 1 
2 
27 
13 
1.8889 
3.5385 
. 
6980 
. 
5189 
1.6128 
3.2249 
------ 2.1650 
3.8520 
---- 1.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
Total 40 2.4250 1.0099 2.1020 2.7480 1.00 4.00 
Recruitment of Key Emp'e 1 
2 
27 
13 
2.1111 
3.2308 . 
9337 
. 
8321 
1.7418 
2.7280 
2.4805 
3.7336 
1.00 
2.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Total 40 2.4750 1.0374 2.1432 2.8068 1.00 4.00 
8.6.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.13 illustrates that the 
representation ratio in the larger cluster is slightly different from the entire sample 
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representation with regard to Fund Origin, Portfolio Size and Investment Sector. 
However, it is reasonably different in terms of Fund Size, Fund Age, US$ million 
invested per fund manager and Investment Stage pattern. On the other hand, the 
ratio of smaller cluster is slightly different only with regard to Portfolio Sizes and 
different in terms of Fund Origin. In all the remaining demographic categories, it 
differs substantially from the entire sample ratios. 
Table 8.13: Comparison of the Demooraohic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin 0 Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
LargerCluster Ratio 63 37 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 54 46 Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
LargerCluster Ratio 81 19 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 62 38 Substantially Different 
Fund Age Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
LargerCluster Ratio 52 48 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 73 27 Substantially Different 
Portfolio Size Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
LargerCluster Ratio 81 19 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 77 23 Slightly Different 
Investment Sector '-f Tech. Non tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
LargerCluster Ratio 63 37 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 62 38 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
LargerCluster Ratio 22 78 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 46 54 Substantially Different 
Investment Stage º Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
LargerCluster Ratio 44 56 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 62 38 Substantially Different 
8.6.2 Summary of H (4) Findings: Table 8.12 explicitly shows that the two 
clusters attach different degree of significance to each of the milestones. Also, 
table 8.13 shows that the demographic pattern of both the clusters varies from 
'slightly different' to 'substantially different, compared to the demographic pattern 
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of the entire sample. Therefore, further analysis may statistically explain if any of 
these demographic characteristics are responsible for such behaviour. 
8.7 Hypothesis (5): Venture capitalists In India use preferred stock to 
control moral hazard and the agency problem: In the previous chapter, equity 
emerged as the most preferred financial instrument used by the venture 
capitalists in India, hence the hypothesis developed on the basis of previous 
studies was rejected (Barry, 1994 and, Norton and Tenanbaum, 1992,1993). 
The original data were converted into four categories namely, 'Equity only', 
'Equity + Preferred Stock', 'Equity + Convertible Debt, and 'Equity + Preferred 
Stock + Convertible Debt'. As we were not sure which venture capitalists qualify 
for each of these categories, we performed Cluster analysis to group the venture 
capitalists using similar financial products and then to identify the underlying 
characteristics of each of these 4 groups. This analysis resulted in 4 clusters. 
Two clusters with 12 and 10, and two clusters with 9 members each. 
8.7.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.14 demonstrates that 
the largest cluster has a slightly different representation with regard to Portfolio 
Size and Investment Sector profiles, compared to the entire sample. In terms of 
Fund Origin, Fund Age, US$ million invested per fund manager and Investment 
Age, the ratio of this cluster differs from the original sample. However, there are 
substantial differences in terms of Fund Size. 
The second largest cluster that uses only 'equity has a substantially different 
ratio of Fund Origin, Fund Size, Investment Sector, US$ million invested per fund 
manager and Investment Stage. Its ratio of Fund Age is different and Portfolio 
Size slightly different. A cluster of 9 venture capitalists that uses a combination 
of 'Equity and Convertible Debt' has a different ratio in terms of US$ million 
invested per fund manager and Investment Stage in comparison to the entire 
sample. In all the remaining characteristics, this cluster has a substantially 
different ratio. 
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Table 8.14: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin º Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
Largest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 80 20 Substantially Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 33 66 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 56 44 Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
Largest Cluster Ratio 75 25 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 90 10 Substantially Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 89 11 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 44 56 Substantially Different 
Fund Age -º Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
Largest Cluster Ratio 42 58 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 89 11 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 56 44 Slightly Different 
Portfolio Size P Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
Largest Cluster Ratio 75 25 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 70 30 Slightly Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 100 00 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 78 22 Slightly Different 
Investment Sector r Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
Largest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 80 20 Substantially Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 44 56 Substanbally Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 56 44 Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
Largest Cluster Ratio 17 83 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 20 80 Substantially Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 
22 78 
56 44 
Different 
Substantially Different 
Investment Stage -º Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
Largest Cluster Ratio 33 67 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 70 30 Substantially Different 
3rd Largest Cluster Ratio 44 56 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 56 44 Different 
Another group of nine venture capitalists uses a combination of 'Equity and 
Preferred Stock'. This cluster has a slightly different ratio in terms of Fund Age 
251 
Chapter 8 Statistical Analysis /- Results 11 
and Portfolio Size; a different ratio in terms of Fund Origin, Investment Sector 
and Investment Stage; and a substantially different ratio in terms of Fund Size 
and US$ million invested per fund manager. Therefore, the arguments of Norton 
and Tenenbaum (1992,1993), Barry (1994) and Berglof (1994) that preferred 
stock is used together with equity and convertibles are partially accepted. 
8.7.2 Summary of H (5) Findings: Venture capitalists with an early stage focus 
use a combination of equity, preferred stock, and convertible debt. This is 
understandable, as early stage investments are associated with a higher degree 
of risk. Proportionately more Indian venture capitalists with a late stage focus use 
only equity. This trend is in line with the above argument in that late stage 
investments present a better risk profile. 
There are more foreign investors, proportionately smaller in size, younger in age 
and with only fewer investments, that use a combination of equity and convertible 
debt. It is interesting to note that even foreign investors use more convertible 
debt against the globally popular preferred stock. A possible explanation is that 
the guidelines with regard to the enforceability of preferred stock in India were 
vague until recently. Therefore, venture capitalists were taking a simpler route of 
convertible debt. This is expected to change in the light of recent clarifications by 
the Finance Ministry about the rights of preferred stock investors. However, 
differences in demographic characteristics between each of the clusters and the 
sample as a whole calls for further analysis. Such analysis may assist 
researches to derive firm conclusions with regard to demographic influences on 
the choice of financial products. 
8.8 Hypothesis (6): Venture capitalists in India monitor their investees 
frequently and extensively to reduce information asymmetry and avert 
moral hazard. Through elementary analysis, this hypothesis was accepted in the 
previous chapter. Our findings also confirmed the results of Michell and Terry 
(1998) that 'close monitoring is indeed viewed by the venture capitalists as a 
means of combating moral hazard' (p. 196). 
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The data were further analysed through cluster analysis to see whether any 
group answered differently. The enquiry was presented in three stages: 
(1) Participants were asked the type and frequency of monitoring reports 
sought from the investee companies, as suggested by Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) and Berger and Udell (1998) among others. 
(2) The breakdown of information that these periodic reports contain 
because 'the predominant view is that more information helped the 
investors in risk management' (Reid, 1998; p. 227) and finally....... 
(3) The focus of discussion during their regular meetings with the 
functionaries of the investee companies. The significance of personal 
contacts with investees is well documented [Tyebjee and Bruno (1986), 
Sahlman (1990), Barry (1994), O'Shea (1996), Wright and Robbie (1998)]. 
The results are also presented under these three sub-headings: 
Monitoring Reports: The result of cluster analysis shows that there are broadly 3 
different groups who have responded this question differently. Further 
investigation through the ANOVA shows that, out of a list of 15 variables, the 
respondents showed statistically significant behaviour in 11 variables. This is 
evident as the f-values of these 11 variables are more than double the critical 
f-value for 2,37 degree of freedom shown in table 8.15. 
Further analysis to ascertain which of these three groups respond differently 
reveals, as listed in table 8.16, that cluster 2, with 17 members, consistently 
chose the frequency at 'quarterly' intervals except for payroll sheets. The 
response of cluster 1 is at variance with the other 2 clusters. However, the overall 
low mean response for all the reports tends to confirm earlier results that venture 
capitalists in India monitor their investee companies frequently and extensively. It 
is, though, to be seen whether these clusters have different demographic ratios 
compared to the entire sample. 
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Table 8.15: ANOVA - List of Reoorts Used for Monitorina Investments (H-6) 
Sum of 
S uares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Profit and Loss Account Between Groups 4.697 2 2.349 17.114 . 
000 
Within Groups 5.078 37 
. 
137 
Total 9.775 39 
Balance Sheet Between Groups 3.123 2 1.562 4.232 
. 
022 
Within Groups 13.652 37 
. 
369 
Total 16.775 39 
Cash Flow Statement Between Groups 4.196 2 2.098 6.945 
. 
003 
Within Groups 11.179 37 
. 
302 
Total 15.375 39 
Sales Budget Between Groups 8.486 2 4.243 6.177 . 005 Within Groups 25.414 37 
. 
687 
Total 33.900 39 
Sales Report Between Groups 12.567 2 6.283 31.383 
. 000 Within Groups 7.408 37 
. 
200 
Total 19.975 39 
Inventory Report Between Groups 8.852 2 4.426 6.174 
. 
005 
Within Groups 26.523 37 
. 
717 
Total 35.375 39 
Payroll Sheet Between Groups 28.539 2 14.270 30.946 
. 000 Within Groups 17.061 37 
. 
461 
Total 45.600 39 
Creditors and Debtors Report Between Groups 5.631 2 2.815 5.015 . 012 Within Groups 20.769 37 
. 
561 
Total 26.400 39 
Budgets versus Actuals Between Groups 8.792 2 4.396 9.735 . 
000 
Within Groups 16.708 37 
. 
452 
Total 25.500 39 
Market Share Analysis Between Groups 2.892 2 1.446 2.356 . 109 Within Groups 22.708 37 . 614 Tota 1 25.600 39 
Capacity Utilisation Report Between Groups 12.602 2 6.301 9.807 
. 
000 
Within Groups 23.773 37 
- . 
643 
Tota 1 36.375 9- 3 
Working Capital Reports Between Groups 4.683 2 2.341 3.320 . 047 Within Groups 26.092 37 
. 
705 
Total 30.775 39 
Default Reports Between Groups 6.950 2 3.475 6.786 . 003 Within Groups 18.950 37 
. 
512 
Total 25.900 Y9- 
Joining & Leaving Reports of Key Personnel Between Groups 20.173 2 10.086 10.911 . 000 Within Groups 34.202 37 
. 924 Total 54.375 39 
Project Implementation Report Between Groups 6.977 2 3.488 8.887 
. 
001 
Within Groups 14.523 37 
. 
393 
Total 21.500 39 
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Table 8.16: ANOVA (Descnntive) - List of Reoorts for Monitoring Investments (H-6) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Profit and Loss Account 1 7 1.142 . 3780 . 
7933 1.4924 1.00 2.00 
2 17 1.823 
. 
3930 1.6215 2.0256 1.00 2.00 
3 16 1.125 . 
3416 
. 
9430 1.3070 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.425 . 5006 1.2649 
1.5851 1.00 2.00 
Balance Sheet 1 7 1.428 . 
5345 
. 
9342 1.9229 1.00 2.00 
2 17 2.000 . 
6124 1.6851 2.3149 1.00 3.00 
3 16 1.437 . 
6292 1.1022 1.7728 1.00 3.00 
Tota 1 40 1.675 . 
6558 1.4653 1.8847 1.00 3.00 
Cash Flow Statement 7 1.285 . 
4880 . 8344 
1.7370 1.00 2.00 
2 17 2.000 . 
6124 1.6851 2.3149 1.00 3.00 
3 16 1.375 . 
5000 1.1086 1.6414 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.625 . 
6279 1.4242 1.8258 1.00 3.00 
Sales Budget 1 7 1.285 . 
4880 
. 
8344 1.7370 1.00 2.00 
2-T -1 7 2.529 . 8745 2.0798 
2.9790 1.00 4.00 
3 16 1.875 . 
8851 1.4034 2.3466 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.050 . 
9323 1.7518 2.3482 1.00 4.00 
Sales Report 1 7 1.000 . 0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
- 2 17 2.176 . 
6359 1.8495 2.5034 1.0 4.00 
3 16 1.062 . 
2500 
. 
9293 1.1957 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.525 . 7157 1.2961 
1.7539 1.00 4.00 
Inventory Report 7 1.428 . 
5345 
. 
9342 1.9229 1.00 2.00 
2 17 2.7 44 . 
8314 2.3373 3.1922 2.00 4.00 
3 16 2.375 . 
9574 1.8648 2.8852 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.375 . 
9524 2.0704 2.6796 1.00 4.00 
Payroll Sheet 1 7 1.285 . 4880 . 
8344 1.7370 1.00 2.00 
2 17 3.352 
- . 
8618 2.9099 3.7960 2.00 4.00 
3 T6- 3.62 .5 
000 3.3586 3.8914 3.00 4.00 
Total 40 3.100 1.0813 2.7542 3.4458 1.00 4.00 
Creditors and Debtors Report 1 7 1.571 . 
5345 1.0771 2.0658 1.00 2.00 
2 17 
- 
2.588 . 
7123 2.2220 2.9545 2.00 4.00 
3 16 -f062 . 
8539 1.6075 2.5175 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.200 . 8228 1.9369 
2.4631 1.00 4.00 
Budgets versus Actual 7 1.285 . 4880 . 8344 1.7370 1.00 2.00 2 17 2.294 . 8489 1.8577 
2.7306 1.00 4.00 
3 16 1.375 
- . 
5000 1.1086 1.6414 1.00 2.00 
Total -4-0- 1.750 . 8086 1.4914 2.0086 1.00 4.00 Market Share Analysis 1 7 2.285 1.1127 1.2566 3.3148 1.00 4.00 
2 17 2.705 
- - - . 
7717 2.3091 3.1027 2.00 4.00 
3 i-6 2 12 5 . 
6191 1.7951 2.4549 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.400 . 
8102 2.1409 2.6591 1.00 4.00 
Capacity Utilisation Report 1 7 1.428 . 5345 . 9342 1.9229 1.00 
2.00 
2 17 2.764 . 
9034 2.3002 3.2292 2.00 4.00 
3 16 1.750 . 
7746 1.3372 2.1628 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.125 . 
9658 1.8161 2.4339 1.00 4.00 
Working Capital Reports 7 1.857 . 
6901 1.2189 2.4953 1.00 3.00 
2 17 2.470 . 
8745 2.0210 2.9202 1.00 4.00 
3 16 1.750 
. 
8563 1.2937 2.2063 1.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.075 . 8883 1.7909 2.3591 
1.00 4.00 
Default Reports 7 1.571 
. 
5345 1.0771 2.0658 1.00 2.00 
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2 17 2.529 
. 
7174 2.1605 2.8983 2.00 4.00 
3 16 1.750 . 7746 1.3372 
2.1628 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.050 . 8149 1.7894 
2.3106 1.00 4.00 
Joining & Leaving Reports of Key 
Personnel 
1 7 1.000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
2 17 2.882 1.2187 2.2557 3.5090 1.00 4.00 
3 16 1.812 
. 
8342 1.3680 2.2570 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.125 1.1808 1.7474 2.5026 1.00 4.00 
Project Implementation Report 1 7 1.428 
. 
5345 
. 
9342 1.9229 1.00 2.00 
2 17 2.235 
. 
7524 1.8484 2.6222 1.00 4.00 
3 16 1.375 
. 
5000 1.1086 1.6414 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.750 . 7425 1.5125 1.9875 1.00 4.00 1=monthly; 2=quarterly, 3=yearly; 4=never 
8.8.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.17 shows that the 
largest cluster has a slightly different ratio in terms of Fund Size, Fund Age, 
Portfolio Size and Investment Sector. Its ratio of US$ million invested per fund 
manager is different, and it has a substantially different ratio in terms of Fund 
Origin and Stage. The explanation for the markedly different Stage ratio lies in 
table 8.16, where the mean response of this group is consistently higher than the 
second largest group, which has more early stage investors. It is evident that late 
stage investors monitor extensively, but the frequency is less than the early stage 
investors due to the improved risk profile of their investees. 
The second largest cluster has slight differences in terms of Fund Size, Fund 
Age, Portfolio Size and Investment Sector. The differences in the ratio of US$ 
invested per fund manager are noticeable. In contrast to the original sample ratio, 
the presence of a very large number of early stage investors in this cluster is 
evident. The answer to this behaviour is found by examining the ANOVA table 
8.16. It shows that the mean response of this group is consistently lower than the 
largest group, which has more late stage investors. Thus, it further proves that 
the monitoring frequency of early stage investors is higher than the late stage 
investors as they are considered riskier. 
The ratio of the smallest cluster with regard to Fund Origin is slightly different 
compared to the ratio of the entire sample. The ratios with regard to Portfolio 
Size, Investment Sector and Investment Stage are also different. With regard to 
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Fund Size, Fund Age and US$ million invested per fund manager, the ratios of 
this cluster are substantially different. However, members of this cluster monitor 
their investees even more frequently than the largest cluster, as indicated in table 
8.16. This raises questions about the conclusion drawn regarding the behaviour 
of the second cluster, but the size of this cluster must be considered before ruling 
out the above conclusion. 
Table 8.17: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin No Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
Largest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Substantially Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Slightly Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
Largest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 81 19 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Substantially Different 
Fund Age --ý Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
Largest Cluster Ratio 59 41 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Substantially Different 
Portfolio Size º Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
Largest Cluster Ratio 76 24 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 81 19 Slightly Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 86 14 Different 
Investment Sector Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
Largest Cluster Ratio 59 41 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 63 37 Slightly Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
_ Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
Largest Cluster Ratio 35 65 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 31 69 Slightly Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 17 83 Substantially Different 
Investment Stage -º Late EarIIº Remarks 
-- Entire Sample Ratio _ -- ---- - 50 50 ---- 
Largest Cluster Ratio 65 35 Substantially Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 31 69 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Different 
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8.8.2 Summary of Findings on Monitoring Reports: All the venture capitalists use 
several monitoring reports. However, their frequency varies from one cluster to 
another. The analysis indicates that early stage investors monitor their investees 
more frequently than their late stage counterparts. There is also indication of 
demographic factors influencing the monitoring practices. 
Breakdown of Information: A list of 9 variables was presented to the respondents 
in order to ascertain the frequency of their seeking these specific items of 
information. The descriptive analysis in the previous chapter confirmed that all 
participants monitor these details 'mostly'. However, 3 different clusters emerged 
when cluster analysis was performed. This led to further analysis of the data, in 
order to identify the variables that result in different responses. 
Table 8.18: ANOVA -I ist of f etail. d Rreakrlnwn in Mnnitnrinn Rennrts (H-6) 
Sum of 
S uares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Raw Material Costs Between Groups 35.906 2 17.953 28.036 
. 
000 
Within Groups 23.694 37 
. 
640 
Total 59.600 39 
Cost of Capital Between Groups 1.637 2 . 818 1.092 . 346 Within Groups 27.738 37 
. 
750 
Total 29.375 39 
Marketing Expenses Between Groups 3.073 2 1.537 5.400 
. 
009 
Within Groups 10.527 37 
. 
285 
Total 13.600 39 
Overhead Expenses Between Groups 4.377 2 2.188 8.435 . 001 Within Groups 9.598 37 . 259 Tota 1 13.975 39 
Product Costing Between Groups 5.848 2 2.924 6.536 
. 
004 
Within Groups 6.552 16.552 37 --S7-- 
. 
447 
Total 22.400 39 
Turnover per Employee Between Groups 18.006 2 9.003 20.320 . 
000 
Within Groups 16.394 37 . 443 Total 34.400 39 
Profit per Employee Between Groups 22.473 2 11.237 28.424 . 000 Within Groups 14.627 37 . 395 Total 37.100 39 
apital Expenditure Analysis Between Groups 
Within Groups 
5.534 
19.441 
2 
37 
2.767 
. 
525 
5.266 
. 
010 
Total 24.975 39 
Order Booking Between Groups 
Within Groups 
3.202 
14.798 
2 
37 
1.601 
. 
400 
4.002 
. 
027 
Total 18.000 39 
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Table 8.18 above shows that 5 out of 9 variables are statistically significant. 
Further analysis using ANOVA reveals, as table 8.19 shows, that all the three 
clusters answered differently to 'Raw Material Costs'. This difference is possibly 
due to the focus of many investors on the technology sector where virtually no 
raw materials are involved. For all the remaining statistically significant variables, 
the smallest cluster with 9 members has chosen almost 'always' as an answer, 
while the remaining 2 clusters have chosen closer to 'mostly'. 
Takle 8 19: ANCwA (Descrintivel - List of Breakdown Details in Monitorinq Reports (H-6) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Raw Material Costs 1 9 1.2222 . 
4410 
. 
8833 1.5612 1.00 2.00 
2 21 2.1905 1.0305 1.7214 2.6595 1.00 4.00 
3 10 3.9000 . 
3162 3.6738 4.1262 3.00 4.00 
Total 40 2.4000 1.2362 2.0046 2.7954 1.00 4.00 
Cost of Capital 1 9 2.0000 1.1180 1.1406 2.8594 1.00 4.00 
2 21 2.4762 . 
8729 2.0789 2.8735 1.00 4.00 
3 10 2.5000 . 5270 2.1230 
2.8770 2.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.3750 . 8679 
2.0974 2.6526 1.00 4.00 
Marketing Expenses 1 9 1.1111 . 
3333 
. 
8549 1.3673 1.00 2.00 
2 21 1.8095 . 
5118 1.5766 2.0425 1.00 3.00 
3 10 1.6000 . 6992 1.0998 
2.1002 1.00 3.00 
Tota 1 40 1.6000 . 5905 
1.4111 1.7889 1.00 3.00 
Overhead Expenses 1 9 1.1111 . 3333 . 
8549 1.3673 1.00 2.00 
2 21 1.9048 . 
4364 1.7061 2.1034 1.00 3.00 
3 10 1.9000 . 
7379 1.3722 2.4278 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.7250 . 
5986 1.5336 1.9164 1.00 3.00 
Product Costin 1 9 1.0000 . 0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.00 1.00 
2 21 1.9524 . 
7400 1.6155 2.2892 1.00 4.00 
3 10 1.8000 . 7888 1.2357 
2.3643 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 1.7000 . 7579 1.4576 1.9424 1.00 
4.00 
Turnover per Employee 1 9 1.2222 . 
4410 
. 
8833 1.5612 1.00 2.00 
- - 2 21 2.8095 . 
7496 2.4683 3.1507 2.00 4.6 0 
3 10 1.8000 . 
6325 1.3476 2.2524 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.2000 . 9392 1.8996 2.5004 1.00 4.00 Profit per Employee 1 9 1.2222 . 4410 . 
8833 1.5612 1.00 2.00 
2 21 2.8571 . 
7270 2.5262 3.1881 2.00 4.00 
3 10 1.5000 . 5270 1.1230 
1.8770 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 2.1500 . 
9753 1.8381 2.4619 1.00 4.00 
Capital Expenditure Analysis 1 9 1.1111 . 
3333 
. 
8549 1.3673 1.00 2.00 
2 21 2.0476 . 
8047 1.6813 2.4139 1.00 4.00 
3 10 1.8000 . 
7888 1.2357 2.3643 1.00 3.00 
Tota 1 40 1.7750 . 8002 1.5191 2.0309 1.00 4.00 Order Booking 1 9 1.1111 . 3333 . 
8549 1.3673 1.00 2.00 
- 2- 2-1 1.7619 . 7684 1.4121 2.1117 1.00 4.60 
3 10 1.3000 . 4830 . 9544 
1.6456 1.00 2.00 
Total 40 1.5000 . 6794 1.2827 1.7173 1.00 
4.00 
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8.8.3 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.20 shows that the 
ratio of Fund Origin and Investment Stage differs slightly between the largest 
cluster and the entire sample. The ratios of Fund and Portfolio Size and 
Investment Sector are different, but the ratios of Fund Age and US$ investment 
per fund manager vary substantially against the entire sample ratios. 
Table 8.20: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin No Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
Largest Cluster Ratio 62 38 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 50 50 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
Largest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 90 10 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 78 22 Slightly Different 
Fund Age Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
Largest Cluster Ratio 43 57 Substantially Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 90 10 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 56 44 Slightly Different 
Portfolio Size Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
Largest Cluster Ratio 71 29 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 100 00 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 78 22 Slightly Different 
Investment Sector º Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
Largest Cluster Ratio 57 43 Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 70 30 Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 67 33 Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
Largest Cluster Ratio 43 57 Substantially Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 10 90 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 22 78 Different 
Investment Stage 0 Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
Largest Cluster Ratio 48 52 Slightly Different 
2nd Largest Cluster Ratio 70 30 Substantially Different 
Smallest Cluster Ratio 33 67 Substantially Different 
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The second largest cluster differs only with regard to the Investment Sector. In 
the remaining areas, it has a substantially different demographic profile 
compared to the entire sample. Interestingly, ANOVA (table 8.19) demonstrates 
that members of this cluster do not place high emphasis on monitoring costs of 
raw materials and capital. This is despite the fact that a majority of this cluster 
are late stage investors who usually keep a careful eye on all costs. 
The smallest cluster varies slightly from the entire sample with regard to Fund 
Size, Fund Age and Portfolio Size ratios. Its Fund Origin, investment Sector and 
US$ million invested per fund manager are different compared to the entire 
sample, but the Investment stage ratio is substantially different. ANOVA (table 
8.19) shows that this group 'mostly' monitors a variety of details. It is plausible 
because many of them are early stage investors with a technology focus. 
8.8.4 Summary of Breakdown Details Findings: The largest cluster has more 
larger and older funds. Surprisingly, these funds do not peg the human resources 
performance monitoring of their investee companies. Because of their larger size, 
they are possibly investing in large technology-based infrastructure projects like 
telecom, which are usually labour intensive. Ideally, members of this cluster 
should have tracked these costs more closely. 
Members of the second largest cluster are primarily late stage investors with 
proportionately more focus on technology. Their emphasis on 'order booking', 
'overhead' and 'marketing expenses' is understandable. These pieces of 
information are used to control costs and maintain or accelerate the target 
profitability. However, this group is collectively averse to monitoring 'raw material 
costs' because its technology investees rarely rely upon raw material. Finally, the 
smallest group monitors almost every factor fairly frequently. A smaller portfolio 
size allows more focussed and extensive monitoring compared to large 
portfolios. 
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Focus of Discussion: The significance of personal monitoring and the extent of 
venture capitalist involvement is highlighted by MacMillan et al. (1988), Ehrlich et 
al. (1994) and Lerner (1995). The areas of possible discussion, between the 
venture capitalists and the investee management were categorised into 11 
topics. It was argued in the previous chapter that a vast majority of venture 
capitalists in India 'mostly' discuss all the variables. Cluster analysis was 
performed to analyse the data to check if there existed for variance among the 
respondents. Two clusters emerged from this exercise, confirming that the 
venture capitalists responded differently. 
Table 8.21: ANOVA - List of Areas for Focus of Discussion (H-6) 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Performance Appraisal Between Groups 
. 
731 1 
. 
731 2.872 
. 
098 
Within Groups 9.669 38 
. 
254 
Total 10.400 39 
Strategic Planning Between Groups 1.011 1 1.011 4.946 
. 
032 
Within Groups 7.764 38 
. 
204 
Total 8.775 39 
The Status of Adherence to Contract Between Groups 7.763 1 7.763 13.032 . 
001 
Within Groups 22.637 38 
. 
596 
Total 30.400 39 
Status of Statuto Compliances Between Groups 4.773 1 4.773 8.708 . 
005 
Within Groups 20.827 38 
. 
548 
Total 25.600 39 
Trouble Shooting Between Groups 933 1 
. 
933 1.868 
. 
180 
Within Groups 18.967 38 
. 
499 
Total 19.900 39 
Profile Management (Buildin) Between Groups 
-111 
1 
. 
111 
. 
163 
. 
689 
Within Groups 25.789 38 . 679 Total 25.900 39 
Product Development Between Groups 3.116 1 3.116 6.705 . 
014 
Within Groups 17.659 38 
. 
465 
Tota 1 20.775 39 
Sales, Marketing & Billings Between Groups 
. 
554 1 
. 
554 1.134 
. 
294 
Within Groups 18.546 38 
. 
488 
Total 19.100 39 
Planning Acquisitions Between Groups 7.201 1 7.201 12.566 
. 
001 
Within Groups 21.774 38 
. 
573 
Total 28.975 39 
Fund Raising Plans Between Groups 10.739 1 10.739 48.809 
. 
000 
Within Groups 8.361 38 
. 
220 
Total 19.100 39 -- - 
Exit Plans Between Groups 9.000 1 9.000 24.473 
. 
000 
Within Groups 13.975 38 
. 
368 
Total 22.975 39 
262 
Chapter 8------------------------------Statistical Analysis I- Results 11 
ANOVA demonstrates, as shown in table 8.21, that 5 out of 11 variables are 
statistically significant at 1,38 degree of freedom. The data were further analysed 
to establish which of the two clusters responded differently. Table 8.22 illustrates 
that the larger cluster with 21 members replied between 'mostly' and 'rarely' 
about these 5 statistically significant variables, while the smaller cluster members 
answered between 'always' and 'mostly'. However, the possible reasons for 
these differences are still not known. The researcher tried to establish if each 
cluster individually differed from the entire sample demographically. 
Tnhle R 77" AN(1VA tnp-r-rintival -I ist of Areas for Focus of Discussion 
(H-6) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min. Max. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Performance Appraisal 1 21 1.4286 . 
5976 1.1565 1.7006 1.00 3.00 
2 19 1.15 99 . 3746 . 9773 
1.3385 1.00 2.00 
Tota 1 40 1.3000 . 5164 1.1348 
1.4652 1.00 3.00 
Strategic Planning 1 21 . 
762 
. 
5118 1.2432 1.7091 1.00 2.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.1579 
1.3250 
. 
3746 
. 
4743 . 
9773 
1.1733 
1.3385 
1.4767 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
Contract Adherence Status 1 21 2.6 990 . 
7400 2.2822 2.9559 1.00 4.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.7368 
2.2000 . 
8057 
. 
8829 
1.3485 
1.9176 
2.1252 
2.4824 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
- Status of Statutory Compliances 1 21 2.4286 
- - - . 
6761 
- - - - 
2.1208 
- 
2.7363 
- 
1.00 4.60 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
-1 13 6 8 
2.1000 
78 0 57 
. 8102 
34H 1 
1.8409 
Z1 262 
2.3591 
1 60 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
Trouble Shooting 1 21 2.0952 . 
6249 1.8108 2.3797 1.00 3.00 
2 
Tota 1 
19 
40 
1.78 55 
1.9500 
. 
7873 
. 
7143 
1.4100 
1.7215 
2.1690 
2.1785 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
3.00 
Profile Management (Building) 1 21 2.0000 . 
7746 1.6474 2.352_6 1.00 3.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
2.1053 
2.0500 . 
8753 
. 8149 
1.6834 
1.7894 
2.5271 
2.3106 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Product Development 1 21 2.1905 . 
6796 1.8811 2.4998 1.00 4.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.6316 
1.9250 
. 
6840 
. 
7299 
1.3019 
1.6916 
1.9612 
2.1584 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
4.00 
Sales, Marketing & Billings 1 21 1.7619 -7003 
1.4431 2.0807 1.00 3.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.5263 
1.6500 
. 
6967 
. 
6998 
1.1905 
1.4262 
1.8621 
1.8738 
1.00 
1.00 
- 
3.00 
3.00 
Planning Acquisitions 1 21 2.4286 . 
5976 2.1565 2.7006 
. 
00 1 3.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.5789 
2.0250 . 
9016 
. 
8619 
1.1444 
1.7493 
2.0135 
2.3007 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Fund Raising Plans 1 21 2.1429 . 
5732 
- 
1.8819 2.4038 1.00 3.00 
2 
Total 
19 
40 
1.10 3 
1.6500 
. 
15 3 - 
. 
6998_ . 
9533 
1.4262 
- 
1.2572 
1.8738 
- 
1.00 
1.00 
- 
2.00 
3.00 
Exit Plans 1 21 2.4 662 . 
5118 2432 2 2 7091 2.00 3.00 
2 19 1.5263 . 
6967 1.1905 1.8621 1.00 3.00 
Total 40 2.0250 . 7675 1.7795 2.2705 1.00 3.00 
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8.8.5 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.23 demonstrates that 
the larger cluster has slight differences in terms of the Fund Age and US$ million 
invested per fund manager ratios. However, it is the differences in the ratios of 
Fund Origin, Fund Size, Portfolio Size, Investment Sector and Investment Stage 
that are noticeable compared to the entire sample ratios for these demographic 
features. 
Table 8.23: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin No Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
LargerCluster Ratio 52 48 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 68 32 Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
LargerCluster Ratio 81 19 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 68 32 Different 
Fund Age -f Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
LargerCluster Ratio 62 38 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 53 47 Different 
Portfolio Size -t Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
LargerCluster Ratio 86 14 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 74 26 Different 
Investment Sector No Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
LargerCluster Ratio 57 43 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 68 32 Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
LargerCluster Ratio 29 71 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 32 68 Slightly Different 
Investment Stage º Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
LargerCluster Ratio 43 57 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 58 42 Different 
ANOVA table 8.22 shows that members of this cluster almost 'always' discuss 
'performance appraisal', 'strategic planning' and issues related to 'sales and 
marketing' during their meetings with the investee companies. This is logical 
because more early stage investors are present in this cluster. However, they do 
not focus too much on 'adherence to contract'. This was explained by one of the 
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venture capitalists as follows: 'You can't win a war with the entrepreneur. You 
have to bury the contract and show that it's your business. The contract is un- 
wrapped only in distress situations'. 
The smaller cluster has only a slightly different ratio with regard to US$ 
investment per fund manager. In all the remaining demographic categories, this 
cluster is reasonably different from the sample as a whole. It is noticeable in 
ANOVA table 8.23 that, having more late stage investors, members of this cluster 
tend to focus more on 'planning acquisitions', 'fund raising' and 'planning exits' of 
their investee companies compared to the larger cluster which has more early 
stage investors. The exercises above are conducted in a typically stable and late 
stage business that seeks to consolidate its position in the market. 
8.8.6 Summary of H (6) Findings: The larger cluster has relatively more foreign 
and early stage investors. Their focus of discussion is comparatively more on 
'strategic planning', 'performance appraisar, and 'sales and marketing' as these 
issues are invariably more important in the earlier stages of a project's life. 
There are more Indian and late stage investors in the smaller cluster. When 
meeting with the management of the investee companies, they tend to discuss 
'product development', possible 'acquisitions', 'further fund raising', and 'exit from 
the investment' compared to the larger cluster members. The latter group has 
more early stage investments where the question of these factors usually does 
not arise. The emergence of different cluster having a distinct demographic 
profile calls for further statistical tests in order to re-validate H (6) that venture 
capitalists in India extensively and frequently monitor their investee companies 
as a solution to addressing information asymmetry. 
8.9 Hypothesis (7): Venture capitalists In India replace under-performing 
CEOs of their investee companies in order to improve corporate 
governance: Replacement of CEOs is a consequence of close monitoring and 
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realisation on the part of the venture capitalists that a CEO's performance is 
below expectation (Lemer, 1996). The hypothesis test in the previous chapter 
confirmed that venture capitalists in India do, albeit rarely, replace the CEOs of 
their investee companies in order to improve corporate governance. This 
confirms the results of previous studies by Barry (1994), Bruton et al. (1997), 
Zider (1998) and Hellmann (1998). 
Cluster analysis produced two groups each responding differently to this issue. 
However, one cluster was much larger with 20 members, than the other with only 
4 members. Further analysis using the ANOVA showed that the larger cluster 
members gave a mean response of 2, which means that they replaced a 
maximum of 5 percent of CEOs in their portfolio companies. On the contrary, the 
mean response of 3.75 of the smaller cluster members demonstrates that they 
replaced 10 percent or more of the CEOs in their portfolio companies. 
8.9.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.24 below reveals 
interesting characteristics about the members of the larger cluster. Surprisingly, 
there are more Indian funds despite a general impression that foreign fund 
managers are more stringent. Even though the members in this cluster are 
smaller in size, they are not afraid of taking this drastic step. They are, 
understandably, older in age, as it requires a certain period to pass before the 
performance of CEOs can be objectively assessed and dismissal implemented. 
They have made fewer investments and therefore concentrate on monitoring a 
smaller portfolio. They have invested almost evenly across the technological and 
non-technological sectors. Many more members in this group have invested 
fewer million US$ per fund manager. This confirms the argument that more fund 
managers are available to monitor closely the investee companies and take 
corrective measures. Also, they are primarily early stage investors. At the earlier 
stages of the project, the potential challenges are blurred. As the project grows, 
the realities begin unfolding that usually necessitate changes at the top. 
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Table 8.24: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin --P Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
LargerCluster Ratio 75 25 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 00 100 Substantially Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
LargerCluster Ratio 80 20 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 75 25 
Fund Age -P Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 
LargerCluster Ratio 
58 42 
45 55 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 75 25 Substantially Different 
Portfolio Sire º Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
LargerCluster Ratio 70 30 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 100 00 Substantially Different 
Investment Sector Tech. Non-tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
LargerCluster Ratio 55 45 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 75 25 Substantially Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
LargerCluster Ratio 25 75 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 50 50 Substantially Different 
Investment Stage P Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
LargerCluster Ratio 30 70 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 50 50 
Interestingly, all the 4 members of the smaller cluster as shown in table 8.24 are 
foreign funds. This is plausible in the light of the general impression about the 
foreign funds being more aggressive, as members of this cluster have replaced 
10 percent or more CEOs from their portfolio companies. They are smaller in 
size, and younger in age. All of them have made fewer investments, and have 
invested more in technology sector. However, any conclusion from this should be 
drawn with due caution due to the fewer number of members in this cluster. 
8.9.2 Summary of H (7) Findings: More Indian venture capitalists replace the 
CEOs of their investee companies. However, the percentage of replaced CEOs 
in portfolio companies is higher in case of foreign funds, as they are perceived to 
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be more aggressive in their approach. Nevertheless, substantially different 
demographic splits between the two clusters and the original sample raises 
questions about H (7) that many venture capitalists in India replace the CEOs of 
their investee companies in order to improve corporate governance. 
8.10 Hypothesis (8): Lack of strategic skills lead to the dismissal of CEOs in 
India: It was clear from the hypothesis test in the previous chapter that venture 
capitalists in India replace the CEOs of their investee companies, primarily due to 
their lack of operational skills, followed by strategic skills. However, it was still 
unclear whether all the participants responded in that manner or some 
responded differently. Cluster analysis showed the emergence of two clusters 
proving that all of them did not respond uniformly. 
The ANOVA performed on the same set of variables suggested that the f-value 
of 'financial skills' and 'integrity' as reasons for their replacement were much 
higher than the critical distribution value at 1,22 degree of freedom. This is shown 
in table 8.25. Further analysis in table 8.26 reveals that the larger cluster with 14 
members considered 'financial' reasons as 'mostly' for the CEOs replacement 
while the smaller cluster with 10 members considered it 'rarely'. Conversely, 
members of the larger cluster 'never considered 'integrity' as a reason for 
replacement, while the smaller cluster members considered it 'always'. 
8.10.1 Identification of Demographic Characteristics: Table 8.27 shows that 
members of the larger cluster are smaller in size, have proportionately made 
more investments, and are slightly more focussed towards the technology sector. 
A majority of them have invested fewer million dollars per fund manager, and are 
mostly early stage investors. The last characteristic may explain why they 
consider a lack of financial skills as 'mostly' the reason for the CEO's dismissal. 
Being early stage investors, they are concerned about efficient financial 
engineering and its effect on the profitability of their investee companies. 
Surprisingly, the larger cluster members virtually 'never considered 'integrity' as 
a reason for replacement. To identify the reasons for this behaviour a further 
investigation is required. 
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Table 8.25: ANOVA - List of Reasons for CEO Dismissal (H-8) 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Strategic Between Groups 1.144 1 1.144 1.057 
. 
315 
Within Groups 23.814 22 1.082 
Total 24.958 23 
Inter-personnel Between Groups . 805 1 . 805 . 571 . 458 Within Groups 31.029 22 1.410 
Total 31.833 23 
Operational Between Groups 1.071E-02 1 1.071E-02 
. 
013 
. 
911 
Within Groups 18.614 22 
. 
846 
Total 18.625 23 
Financial Between Groups 8.201 1 8.201 11.450 
. 
003 
Within Groups 15.757 22 . 716 Total 23.958 23 
Communication Between Groups . 868 
1 . 868 . 966 . 336 Within Groups 19.757 22 . 898 
Total 20.625 23 
Integrity Between Groups 40.744 1 40.744 278.870 
. 
000 
Within Groups 3.214 22 . 146 Tota 1 43.958 23 
Drive and Vision Between Groups 4.286E-02 1 4.286E-02 . 033 . 857 Within Groups 28.457 22 1.294 
Total 28.500 23 
Table 8.26: ANOVA (Descriptive) - List of Reasons for CEO Dismissal (H-8) 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Min Max 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Strategic 1 14 1.8571 1.0271 1.2641 2.4502 1.00 4.00 
2 10 2.3000 1.0593 1.5422 3.0578 1.00 4.00 
Total 24 2.0417 1.0417 1.6018 2.4815 1.00 4.00 
Inter-personnel 1 14 2.4286 1.0894 1.7996 3.05 6 -1.00 4.00 
2 10 2.8000 1.3166 1.8582 3.7418 1.00 4.00 
Total 24 2.5833 1.1765 2.0866 3.0801 1.00 4.00 
Operational 1 14 1.8571 
. 
7703 1.4124 2.3019 1.00 3.00 
2 10 1.9000 1.1005 1.1127 2.6873 1.00 4.00 
Total 24 1.8750 . 8999 1.4950 2.2550 
_ 1.00 4.00 
Financial 1 14 1.7143 
. 
7263 1.2949 2.1336 1.00 3.00 
2 10 2.9000 
. 
9944 2.1886 3.6114 1.00 4.00 
Total 24 2.2083 1.0206 1.7774 2.6393 1.00 4.00 
Communication 1 14 2.7143 
. 
9945 2.1401 3.2885 
--- 
1.00 4.00 
2 10 3.1000 . 8756 2.4736 3.7264 
-- 2.00 ---- 4.00 
Total 24 2.8750 . 9470 2.4751 3.2749 1.00 4.00 Integrity 1 14 3.6429 
. 
4972 3.3558 3.9300 3.00 4.00 
2 10 1.0000 
. 
0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
Total 24 2.5417 1.3825 1.9579 3.1254 1.00 4.00 
Drive and Vision 1 14 2.2857 1.2044 1.5903 29811 1--bo- -- ;f , 
-Ob 
2 10 2.2000 1.0328 1.4612 2.9388 1.00 - - 4.00 
Total 24 2.2500 1.1132 1.7800 2.7200 1.00 4.00 
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Table 8.27: Comparison of the Demographic Pattern of the Entire Sample with Each Cluster 
Fund Origin ti Indian Foreign Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 60 40 
LargerCluster Ratio 57 43 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 70 30 Substantially Different 
Fund Size -º Small Large Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 75 25 
LargerCluster Ratio 71 29 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 90 10 Substantially Different 
Fund Age Younger Older Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 58 42 
LargerCluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 50 50 Different 
Portfolio Size --*' Fewer Greater Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 80 20 
LargerCluster Ratio 90 10 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 100 00 Substantially Different 
Investment Sector Tech. Non tech Remark 
Entire Sample Ratio 62 38 
LargerCluster Ratio 64 36 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 50 50 Substantially Different 
MM Invested per Fund Manager More Less Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 30 70 
LargerCluster Ratio 29 71 Slightly Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 30 70 
Investment Stage -º Late Early Remarks 
Entire Sample Ratio 50 50 
LargerCluster Ratio 36 64 Substantially Different 
Smaller Cluster Ratio 30 70 Substantially Different 
As is evident from table 8.27 members of the smaller cluster are mostly Indians, 
smaller in Size, and having a smaller Portfolio. Significantly, the Age and sectoral 
preference for the cluster members are evenly divided. Surprisingly, however, the 
last factor negates the argument presented earlier; even as members of this 
cluster are mostly early stage investors, yet they assign different reasons for 
CEO dismissals. Therefore, the only contrasting factor between the 2 clusters 
appears to be the origin, in that Indians are apparently different factor for 
replacing the under-performing CEOs of their investee companies compared to 
their foreign counterparts. 
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8.10.2 Summary of H (8) Findings: Members of both the clusters demonstrate the 
same patterns except in terms of age, where surprisingly both the clusters have 
equal members. These clusters take extreme views towards 'integrity' of CEOs 
as a reason for their replacement. For the smaller cluster, it is 'always' the case, 
while larger cluster members view it as 'never'. It might be the case that larger 
cluster members have been lucky to get CEOs with a high level of integrity, while 
the smaller cluster members were not. However, this is unlikely and the point 
requires further investigation in order to present a statistically strong case. Thus, 
the H (8) finding that CEOs are replaced, partly, due to their lack of strategic 
skills will be further analysed. 
8.11 Conclusion: This chapter has undertaken rigorous statistical analysis to 
probe the venture capitalists' responses with regard to the hypotheses questions. 
Cluster Analysis proved consistently productive in that almost all the venture 
capitalists responding in a certain way to each hypothesis formed a distinct 
group. This indicates a clear collective pattern of responses. However, Cluster 
Analysis demonstrates only the presence of various groups with regard to a 
particular variable or a set of variables. 
ANOVA investigates not only the variables where differences lie, but also the 
degree of variance between each of the formed clusters. ANOVA helped to 
alleviate our concern that, though differences exist between various venture 
capitalists, these differences are still not conclusive enough to reject the 
preliminary hypotheses results arrived earlier. 
The next step was to divide the entire sample into seven demographic 
characteristics, as the literature indicates that venture capitalists act in 
accordance with their demographic background. Thereafter, in relation to each 
hypothesis question, each cluster member was individually identified and 
compared with the entire sample ratios on the basis of their demographic 
characteristics. This exercise shows that the demographic ratio of individual 
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clusters in each hypothesis is usually different from the entire sample ratio. 
However, further analysis was required to explore statistically the significance of 
demographic characteristics for the hypothesis related questions. 
Chi Square and Logistical Regression, two sophisticated statistical techniques, 
are used in the next chapter to determine the statistical significance of each 
demographic characteristic, both individually and collectively in relation to each 
hypothesis. This exercise provides conclusive evidence on the role of a number 
of these demographic factors in determining the Valuation, Structuring and 
Monitoring practices of venture capitalists in India. 
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CHAPTER IX: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS II 
9.1 Introduction: 
Having competed cluster analysis and ANOVA, different statistical techniques will 
be used to assess whether some demographic characteristics differentiate the 
venture capitalists from each other. The analysis aims to identify if fund 
managers' behaviour varies on the basis of any of those demographic features 
used in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, the demographic 
dimension was not analysed through statistical tools. In this chapter, Chi Square 
and Regression will be used. Results in this chapter will either revalidate the 
hypothesis results derived earlier or throw new light on the findings. 
Chi Square is a statistical technique used in financial research such as Arnold 
and Moizer (1984). It was also used in one of the earliest studies on the venture 
capital industry, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), through to the most recent studies 
like Robbie et al. (1997) and Muhammad (1999). Chi Square has the ability to 
present statistically significant variables on the basis of two or more groups. 
Regression analysis, on the other hand, is a statistical method for studying the 
relationship between a single dependent variable and one or more independent 
variables. Within regression, statisticians have introduced a number of more 
sophisticated methods in the last 30 years, such as Logit analysis (Allison, 1999). 
Logit analysis - also known as logistical regression analysis - is a very popular 
regression method for dichotomous dependent variables (Menard, 1995; Long, 
1997). Although, logit analysis has many advantages, the coefficients can be 
more difficult to interpret than ordinary regression coefficients (Allison, 1999). 
Nevertheless, we will use logistic regression in order to see the collective effect 
of independent variables (Fund Origin, Size, Age, etc. ) on the dependent 
variables related to Valuation, Structuring, and Monitoring practices. Regression 
analysis has been widely used in financial research, for example Pike (1988), 
and venture capital research [Fiet (1995), Lerner (1995) and Gompers (1996)]. 
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In this chapter, instead of sequentially analysing all the eight hypotheses as in 
earlier chapters, the subsequent analysis is classified around the three focus 
areas: Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring. Thus, each hypothesis related 
discussion is highlighted and presented in italics for quick identification. 
9.2 Fund Origin Based Differentiation: 
The entire sample was divided on the basis of Fund Origin. The same principle 
was applied as in chapter 7. There were 16 foreign and 24 Indian funds. 
9.2.1 Valuation: Chi Square tests 
Based on their origin, all the 40 respondents were divided into two groups 
namely, Indian and foreign funds. Table 9.1 highlights that one of the groups 
assigns > 99 percent significance to EBITDA multiple -a quantitative valuation 
technique - for determining the valuation of their investee companies. Also, 
there are differences between foreign and Indian investors in choosing the lowest 
valuation, after determining a range for the potential value at a significance level 
of > 96 percent. Similarly, the application of discount rates for ITMT sector also 
differed on the basis of fund origin at > 98 percent. It is noticeable that there were 
no differences between the fund managers in using varying sources of valuation 
information. The above differences on the basis of fund origin have emerged 
while analysing each variable individually using the Chi square technique. 
Table - 9.1: Chi Square Valuation Results 
Value df As m. Sig. (2-sided) 
EBITDA multiple Pearson Chi-Square 11.763 3 . 
008 
Lowest Valuation Pearson Chi-Square 8.627 3 _ . 035 ITMT Discount Pearson Chi-Square 10.013 3 . 018 
9.2.2 Logistical Regression: 
Not finding any differences between Indian and foreign funds in using 
information for valuation through Chi Square tests, we assessed the impact of 
the fund origin on one set of valuation related variables collectively, using 
logistical regression. We continued to leave the least significant variable off until 
all the remaining variables were collectively significant. Even then, there were no 
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statistically significant results. It shows that fund managers use similar sources of 
information regardless of their origin. These results support the hypothesis test in 
that a vast majority of respondents used 'their own due diligence'. 
Again logistical regression was performed to ascertain if valuation techniques 
used by fund managers vary on the basis of fund origin. Initial analysis showed 
statistically insignificant results. Repeated elimination of the most insignificant 
variables related to valuation method eventually drew significant results, in that 
dividend yield, IRR, and ARR were each significant at > 96 percent level. Here 
too, previous hypothesis results are re-validated, in that a vast majority of venture 
capitalists use DCF based valuation techniques regardless of fund origin. 
After having ascertained the areas where statistically significant results emerged 
between venture capitalists, divided on the basis of various demographic 
characteristics, an attempt was made to find out if the two groups invariably differ 
from each other or whether there are some overlapping responses. This was 
done by saving predicted probabilities and predicted group membership values in 
the form of tables, while performing the logistic analysis. Predicted probabilities 
and group membership project the probability of a venture capitalist behaving like 
the opposite group. A specimen is attached as table 9-A in appendix I. 
Interestingly, plotting the logistic regression result on a graph illustrates that there 
are some Indian venture capitalists who are behaving like their foreign 
counterparts in using similar valuation techniques, while there are some foreign 
funds behaving like Indian funds. On the far right hand side of the graph 9-A 
below, two Indian venture capitalists are present that are behaving more like 
foreign investors with a probability of over 75 percent. One of these is a state- 
owned fund that has recently been privatised, and the majority ownership is now 
held by a group of US based non-resident Indians. This is the most likely reason 
why despite being an Indian fund, it is identified more with foreign funds. 
However, the other fund is a purely Indian organisation and part of a large 
financial group. 
277 
Chapter 9------------ Analysis 11- Results Ill 
On the other hand, there is a large multi-lateral development agency that is 
shown behaving like Indian venture capitalists with regard to their application of 
quantitative valuation techniques. This is one of the oldest private equity 
providers in the region and might have adapted to local conditions. Another 
foreign fund behaving like an Indian investor is primarily a subsidiary of an Arab 
bank. Although, this is registered as a foreign investor, there is apparently no 
local corporate culture in the Middle East. This is possibly the reason why this 
venture capitalist is behaving more like an Indian investor. 
Graph - 9-A: Fund Origin-based Differentiation in Valuation Techniques 
16 
F 
R 12 
E 
Q F 
U F 
E8 F 
N F 
C I 
Y I 
4 I F 
I F IF F 
I II IFF FI 
II I I II IIF III FG 
Pr di t d I e c e 
Probab. 0 . 
25 .5 . 
75 1 
Group: IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Symbols: I- Indian; F- Foreign Each Symbol Represents 1 Venture Capitalist. 
Individual analysis, using the Chi Square test, showed that the discount rates 
applied for valuing ITMT sectors varied on the basis of fund origin at a 
significance level of > 98 percent. Further analysis, using logistic regression to 
verify the results of Chi Square tests, showed collectively insignificant results in 
using distinct discount rates based on fund origin. One possible explanation for 
this outcome is that a major concentration of investment is directed towards 
these sectors. Thus, the risk perception of foreign investors for this sector may 
have been different because of their cross-border exposure and their early 
understanding of the pending downturn. Their Indian counterparts may have 
continued to believe that this sector would never witness a decline in growth. 
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Since all the remaining sectors are less volatile, both Indian and foreign funds 
had similar risk ratings. 
9.2.3 Summary of Valuation/Fund Origin Findings: It may be concluded that fund 
origin has no effect, either individually or collectively, on the sources of 
information used by venture capitalists in India for addressing adverse selection. 
However, quantitative valuation techniques, when analysed individually using Chi 
Square tests, showed that one technique was statistically significant. Additionally, 
by using logistic regression, another three techniques emerged as statistically 
significant. This signifies that, collectively, different valuation techniques are used 
by Indian and foreign funds to address adverse selection. But the two groups did 
not differ in using their 'own due diligence' as a source of information for 
valuation and DCF based valuation techniques. This analysis therefore re- 
validated both hypotheses relating to Valuation practices. 
9.2.4 Structuring: Chi Square Tests 
The Chi Square analysis conducted on the basis of fund origin shows that it has 
limited bearing on using structuring covenants, except that one group included 
an Escrow account as a covenant in the share subscription agreement, at a 
significance level of approximately 93 percent, as shown in table 9.2. An escrow 
account is usually used in financing long gestation infrastructure projects, to 
monitor the use of funds. It is possible that all those Indian venture funds that 
were subsidiaries of Development Financial Institutions were using this as an 
element of composite restrictive covenants. 
Table - 9.2: Chi Square Structuring Results 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Escrow Account Pearson Chi-Square 7.024 3 . 071 
9.2.5 Logistical Regression: Initially, the results were statistically insignificant as 
such variables were eliminated, one by one. Eventually, this exercise was 
stopped when seven covenants showed individual significance levels between > 
91 percent and > 99 percent (and collective significance level of > 96 percent). 
Allison (1999) argues that 'because it is difficult to get statistically significant 
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results in small samples, regression analysts are often tempted to raise the level 
of p values that they will accept as statistically significant, say from . 05 to . 10' (p. 
58). Therefore, considering a relatively smaller sample used in this study, it was 
considered appropriate to raise the level of significance from . 05 to . 10. These 
collectively statistically significant covenants are listed in table 9-B of appendix I. 
Graph 9-B below shows that there are at least three Indian venture funds, 
among those who differed with regard to seven structuring covenants, 
behaving more like foreign funds with a probability of more than 60 percent. 
Similarly, there is one foreign fund following the behavioural pattern of Indian 
venture capitalists, having a probability of about 22 percent. 
It is plausible to suggest that the senior team of one fund consists of either 
foreigners or Indians having worked in the US. However, one puzzling area is 
that two partially government owned venture capital funds behave like foreign 
funds. Of these two, the CEO of one fund educated in the US and a number of 
senior functionaries regularly visit the US for short management programmes. 
However, it is difficult to explain the behaviour of the third fund without making 
further enquiries. On the other hand, one foreign fund on the extreme right hand 
side of the graph is a large US investor. While validating the results during the 
third trip to India, this researcher asked a senior functionary of a similar US fund 
why there are fewer cases of CEO replacement in India -a practice very 
common in the western markets - despite the existence of such a high number of 
foreign funds. She replied'though we are an American fund, we have a very easy 
going approach towards our investee companies'. This remark might explain the 
behaviour of this US fund. 
Interestingly, there were no differences between foreign and Indian funds in 
using milestones for staging the investments and using financial products. One 
possible reason for this symmetric behaviour is that the differentiating factor for 
different staging milestones might not typically be the fund origin, but the stage of 
investment. It is more likely that early stage investors would place tighter 
milestones compared to their later stage counterparts. Similarly, it emerged from 
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the descriptive analysis in chapter 7 that the choice of financial products is 
heavily in favour of equity in India. Therefore, it was unlikely that, irrespective of 
their origin, funds will differ significantly in their choice of financial products. 
Graph - 9-B: Fund Origin-based Differentiation in Structuring Covenants 
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9.2.6 Summary of Structuring/Fund Origin Findings: Individually, there were 
insignificant differences in using a particular set of structuring covenants by 
foreign and Indian venture capitalists, while regression showed mediocre 
differences. Also, there was no evidence that foreign and Indian fund managers 
use different milestones for staging of investments and/or different financial 
products to address the moral hazard problem. These results revalidate the 
Structuring related hypotheses results derived in chapter seven. 
9.2.7 Monitoring: Chi Square tests 
Table 9.3 shows that fund origin has some influence on the monitoring reports 
received by fund managers. To begin with, one group with a significance level of 
almost 94 percent, focuses on cash flow statements as an instrument of 
monitoring. It is possible that foreign investors rely more on using cash-flow 
statements, while Indian fund managers assign almost equal significance to both 
cash flow and income statements. 
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Table - 9.3: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Cash flow Statements Pearson Chi-Square 5.655 2 
. 059 Raw Material Cost Pearson Chi-Square 12.334 3 
. 
006 
Order Booking Pearson_Chi-Square 11.473 3 009 
CEO Replacement 
_ 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.000 2 . 018 
Similarly, one of the groups tracks the raw material costs of their investee 
companies at a significant level of > 99 percent. It is very likely that this cluster 
consist of primarily non-technology and Indian investors, as only manufacturing 
sector investors keep a close watch on the movement of raw material costs. 
There is yet another group that monitors the order booking position of the 
investee companies at a significance level of > 99 percent. It is possible that 
these respondents are technology investors, primarily software development and 
value-added service and solution providers, as they operate on an order-booking 
basis. By contrast, manufacturing sector companies show their turnover growth 
through sales reports. There is also a difference in approach towards replacing 
the CEOs of investee companies. Table 9.3 highlights that one group replaced 
CEOs at a significance level of > 98 percent. This appears in line with the 
descriptive results in that, contrary to expectations, proportionately more Indian 
funds replaced CEOs in their investee companies than equivalent foreign funds. 
9.2.8 Logistical Regression: Having analysed the monitoring behaviour 
individually, we performed logistical regression to assess the collective level of 
significance between foreign and Indian fund managers. As usual, all the 
insignificant variables from the monitoring report list were eliminated, one by one, 
until all the remaining variables became significant. Table 9-C in appendix I 
shows the list of significant monitoring variables. In addition to Cash flow 
statements, regression analysis shows that the respondents also differed in their 
monitoring practices with regard to sales budget, performance versus budgets, 
working capital, and joining and leaving reports of key employees. These results 
show that the differences of venture capitalists that were not captured by using 
Chi Square tests are secured by using regression. 
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Graph 9-C: Fund Origin Based Difference in Monitoring Reports 
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The above graph 9-C shows that two Indian companies are behaving more like 
foreign venture capitalists in their monitoring reports, with a probability of over 
80 percent. Incidentally, one of these is the same fund that was also identified 
with similar behaviour in terms of valuation practices. We mentioned that the top 
management of this fund consists of Americans. The same argument is tenable 
in this case also. However, the other fund is a purely Indian fund, even owned by 
the Government of India. It is surprising that this fund has a significantly high 
probability of being classified as a foreign fund in terms of using monitoring 
reports. On the contrary, there is a foreign fund - on the far left hand side of the 
above graph - behaving more like an Indian fund with a probability of about 16%. 
This is an American fund investing in large infrastructure projects, often with 
Government owned institutions as co-investors. It is possible that there are 
common monitoring requirements by all the investors and, therefore, its own 
monitoring practices are influenced by the culture of Indian financial institutions. 
Seven variables listed for focus of discussion during the meetings with the 
management of investee companies are also collectively influenced by the fund 
origin at a significance level of about 95 percent. However, these variables listed 
in table 9-D of appendix I are individually insignificant. 
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9.2.9 Summary of Monitoring/Fund Origin Findings: Difference in monitoring 
practices for cash flows, raw material costs and order booking emerged between 
the foreign and Indian funds, through Chi Square tests. While logistic regression 
showed some additional variables within the monitoring reports, including sales 
budgets, working capital reports, and joining and leaving report of key 
employees, no differences emerged between the two groups with regard to 
detailed breakdowns and focus of discussion. This shows that fund origin has no 
significant role in shaping the monitoring practices and re-confirms previous 
hypotheses results derived in chapter seven. 
9.3 Fund Size based Differentiation: 
The entire sample was split into two groups on the basis of fund size. The 
division was done after calculating the average size of each fund. After 
determining the average size (US$ 73 million), two groups were created. 30 
venture capitalists having less than (<) US$ 73 million of committed capital were 
classified as small funds, while the other group of 10 venture capitalists having a 
fund size of more than (>) US$ 73 million were labelled as large funds. This data 
split led to some interesting revelations between the venture capitalists. Again 
the analysis is conducted under the three focus areas of this research: 
9.3.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests did not demonstrate any significant differences, based on the 
size of venture capital funds, pertaining to their using diverse information sources 
for valuation. However, table 9.4 shows that while applying quantitative 
valuation techniques, size influenced the use of the ARR at a significance level 
of about 98 percent. Similarly, they differed in applying discount rates while 
evaluating manufacturing sector projects, at a significance level of 94 percent. 
Chi Square tests show only the difference between the two groups, without 
explaining which group differed from the other. But, there is a possibility that 
larger funds usually investing in large infrastructure projects, use ARR as a 
valuation technique, primarily based on the Income statement, as against the 
IRR that has its basis on cash flow statements. Similarly, it is very likely that 
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larger funds investing in larger projects discount these companies at a lower rate 
while the smaller funds, investing in smaller projects discount at a higher rate due 
to the higher risk profile of smaller projects. 
Table 9.4: Chi Square Valuation Results 
Value df Asy m. S_ (2-sided) 
ARR as a Valuation Pearson Chi-Square 7.648 2 . 022 Technique 
Discount for Valuing the Pearson Chi-Square 5.598 2 
. 061 Manufacturing Sector 
9.3.2 Logistical Regression: 
While no individual differences surfaced in using different information sources 
for valuation, there is evidence of differences when we performed the 
regression analysis to assess the collective impact of all the variables. After 
leaving out the most insignificant variables, we found that the requirement of 
smaller and larger investors varied - in terms of Cohesive Business Plans, 
Product, Technical and Marketing Information, and taking inputs from Other 
Venture Capitalists for arriving at a valuation - at a collective significance level of 
about 95 percent. Individual significance levels of these three variables are listed 
in table 9-E of Appendix I. 
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Graph 9-D shows the presence of one smaller venture capitalist on the right 
hand side of the scale with a probability of over 58 percent. A European country 
that also manages large venture capital funds elsewhere in the world set up this 
fund. It is possible that this smaller Indian unit follows the policies of its foreign 
parent. Similarly, there is one larger venture capitalist within the group of smaller 
funds on the far left hand side of the graph, with a probability of about 15 percent. 
This fund was until recently, an adviser to the private equity investors and has 
recently set up a large fund of its own. Therefore, it might have adopted some of 
the practices of its smaller clients. 
9.3.3 Summary of Valuation/Fund Size Findings: No differences appeared 
between the smaller and larger funds with regard to valuation information 
sources using Chi Square tests. However, logistical regression showed that 
different sizes had different views in using Cohesive Business Plan, Product, 
Technical and Marketing information, and Other Venture Capitalists as sources 
of information for preparing valuations. But the two groups did not differ in 
conducting 'their own due diligence' for preparing the valuation memorandum. 
On the other hand, Chi Square tests showed different attitudes towards using 
ARR as a valuation technique, and also the discount rate applied to the 
manufacturing sector. However, collective analysis through regression did not 
show these differences, hence the use of DCF techniques reconfirms the 
hypothesis result derived in chapter 7. 
9.3.4 Structuring - Chi Square Tests: 
The results of the Chi Square tests listed in table 9.5 show that both large and 
small funds have responded in the same manner towards using structuring 
covenants except making investee companies using a specific accounting 
package in order to bring transparency, at a significance level of over 94 percent. 
lt is difficult to link this behaviour with the size of the fund, except possibly that 
smaller funds with more start-up investee companies attempt to put some kind of 
formal information systems in place, as concluded by Reid (1998). 
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The same table also shows the Chi Square results of the staging milestones. 
Firm size differs with regard to putting 'Achievement of Budgets' as a milestone 
at a significance level of over 95 percent. It is unusual to see one of the groups 
responding differently to 'Achievement of Budgets', as this is one of the most 
common milestones in a staging structure (Sahiman, 1990). However, the results 
of regression analysis explore the collective effect. 
Table 9.5: Chi Square Structuring Results 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided 
Use of a Specific Accounting Package Pearson Chi-Square 7.240 3 . 
065 
Achievement of budgets Pearson Chi- Square 8.034 3 . 
045 
9.3.5 Logistical Regression: 
Having seen the results of individual structuring covenants, based on fund 
size, logistical regression was performed to see its effect on all the structuring 
variables collectively. All the variables that were insignificant were eliminated one 
by one, until the remaining two variables: Post-completion Audit and IPR in the 
investee company's name became statistically significant at almost 90 percent 
level. Possibly, large investors use 'Post-completion Audit' as a covenant, as the 
completion of large sized complex projects requires this type of mechanism. On 
the other hand technology investors that are usually smaller in size use 'IPR in 
the name of Investee' as a covenant. 
Graph 9-E shows the presence of one smaller fund among a cluster of large 
funds, with a probability of 56 percent. This US based private equity provider has 
small-sized operations in India. However, it is a part of one of the largest banking 
groups in the world and is possibly following the practices of its parent 
organisation. On the other hand, there exist two large funds on the extreme left 
hand size of the graph with a probability of about 5 and 15 percent respectively. 
One of them is the largest Indian venture capital group, which basically manages 
more than four small to medium size funds independently. Since the focus here 
is on company wide practices, and past studies Boocock (1996), assume uniform 
policies for all funds under one management, the data were collected from the 
CEOs on the entire group. The identification of its behaviour with the smaller 
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funds reflects that, at the top level, the fund follows structuring practices more 
akin to the smaller fund. The other fund is a large US based private equity fund 
launching a number of other retail financial products with domestic companies. 
Although large in size, it is primarily focussing on SMEs, hence, it is probably 
behaving more like a small fund. 
Graph 9-E: Fund Size Differences in Using Structuring Covenants 
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Similarly, when a collective view on the milestones for staging was taken, two 
variables, namely Achievement of Budgets and Recruitment of Key Functionaries 
had a collective significance level of 98.5 percent. The former validates the Chi 
Square result presented above, while the latter has a positive correlation with the 
regression results of the list of covenants, in that the difference between large 
and small investors with regard to the IPR was noted, basically a technology- 
related phenomenon. In this case also, the emergence of 'recruitment of key 
employees' as a significantly differing factor reflects the same underlying factor 
that recruitment of key employees is a critical milestone only in knowledge based 
industries like technology. 
Graph 9-F shows the presence of one large size fund on the extreme left side 
of the graph with a probability of about 3 percent. This is the same large foreign 
fund that was behaving like smaller funds with regard to covenants above. It is 
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likely that the same factors are driving its behaviour, as discussed above. There 
is a smaller size fund, on the far right side among the cluster of larger funds, with 
a probability of approximately 61 percent. Ironically, while responding to the 
questions related to stages and sectors of investment, this fund gave some 
unusual replies. For instance, it reported the maximum number of Buyouts 
among all the respondents. Similarly, with regard to its investment sectors, 
almost 58 percent of its investments were in 'other' sectors, while only 42 percent 
in the mainstream sectors like manufacturing, ITMT, Retail, Healthcare and 
services! It is difficult to draw any conclusion here, without doing some additional 
research on this fund. 
Graph 9-F: Predicted Probabilities for Staging Milestones based on Fund Size 
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9.3.6 Summary of Structuring/Fund Size Findings: The use of a specific 
accounting package as a covenant was the solitary difference between the 
smaller and larger fund managers using Chi Square tests. While regression 
analysis demonstrates that, collectively, they differ in using post-completion audit 
and intellectual Property Rights. However, these findings largely revalidate the 
hypotheses results derived earlier. 
Achievement of budgets is used by one set of investors as a milestone for 
staging investments, when analysing the data individually. Nevertheless, 
289 
Chapter 9 Statistical Analysis II - Results Ill 
recruitment of key employees emerged as a differentiating factor between the 
smaller and larger funds when analysed collectively through regression. The use 
of staging as a strategy to avert moral hazard is again accepted. 
9.3.7 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests failed to reveal any differences between small and large funds 
in their monitoring practices. However, this result is not surprising given the 
fact that the smaller and larger funds hardly differ in using valuation and 
structuring techniques. A list of multiple choices was presented, but no 
differences emerged between them in terms of 'their own due diligence'. They 
differed in just valuation technique - ARR - which is very rarely used 
internationally by the venture capitalists. Therefore, it was an insignificant 
difference. Again, in structuring, they differed in using the Installation of Specific 
Accounting Package as a covenant, not a prime risk mitigation covenant. 
Furthermore, they did not differ in using different financial products. 
9.3.8 Logistical Regression: 
Regression analysis takes a collective view on all the significant variables within 
the monitoring techniques. Therefore, the monitoring results based on fund size 
are different from the Chi Square test results. Table 9-F in Appendix I lists all the 
monitoring reports that are collectively significant at > 99 percent. Graph 9-G 
shows that there are two smaller funds on the right hand side of the spectrum, 
with a probability of 63 and 65 percent respectively. Interestingly, these funds 
share three common characteristics, namely they are information technology 
funds, they are sponsored by government owned financial institutions and are 
less than 2 years old. The last factor may have some inbuilt explanation in that 
they may not have spent enough time in the industry to learn the monitoring 
practices of small size funds. However, the sponsor of one of them is one of the 
oldest venture capital organisations in India. 
Similarly, there are two large investors among many smaller investors, with a 
probability of 10 and 11 percent respectively, on the left hand side of the graph. 
Two large development financial institutions sponsor these funds. One is a new 
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entrant, while the other manages four medium size funds and consistently shows 
this tendency of behaving like its smaller counterparts. 
Graph 9-G: Predicted Probabilities of Monitoring Reports Based on Fund Size 
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Graph 9-H: Focus of Discussion Predicted Probabilities Based on Fund Size 
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Then, focus of discussion between the fund managers and their investees was 
analysed. The analysis shows a collective significance level of five variables at > 
98 percent. These variables are listed in table 9-H of appendix I. However, as 
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graph 9-I illustrates, there is one smaller fund behaving like large funds with a 
probability of over 83 percent. This fund is technology focussed and promoted by 
large foreign investors. In line with the earlier argument, it is likely that this fund is 
also following the policies of its larger parent. 
9.3.9 Summary of Monitoring/Fund Size Findings: There were insignificant 
differences between the monitoring practices of large and small funds based on 
Chi Square tests. However, overall differences emerged in their monitoring 
practices when the data were analysed through logistical regression. Similarly, in 
monitoring through personal discussions, some differences in approach surfaced. 
However, there was no difference of opinion in relation to reasons for CEO 
replacement. Even the differences related to monitoring practices are too 
insignificant to challenge the hypotheses results derived earlier. 
9.4 Fund Age based Differentiation: 
Similarly, the average age (the number of years they are operating in India) was 
determined (5.5 years) by dividing the cumulative number of years of their 
operations in India, by the size of total sample. Then the sample was split into 
two groups: one group with 23 members had operated for less than 5.5 years 
and was denoted as younger (Y), while 17 members was in business for more 
than 5.5 years were classified as older (0). This division yielded some interesting 
differences between the venture capitalists. 
9.4.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
The analysis began with the age-influenced differences on individual variables 
through Chi Square tests. Table 9.6 shows that one group differs from the other 
group regarding Management CV as a source of information for valuation, at a 
significance level of over 98 percent. It is possible that this group relies more on 
personal interviews and references from the industry, as these are very popular 
evaluation criteria demonstrated in past studies (Muhammad, 1999). However, 
unanimity of both the groups in their choice for'Own Due Diligence' as a source 
of information for valuation confirms our hypothesis result. 
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Table 9.6: Chi Square Valuation Results 
Value df Asyrr 
Management CV Pearson Chi-Square 8.593 2 
Internal Rate of Return Pearson Chi-Square 7.240 3 
Turnover Multiple Pearson Chi-Square 7.112 3 
P. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
. 
014 
. 
065 
068_ 
The two groups also differ in their application of IRR as a valuation technique, 
at a significance level of over 93 percent. There is a possibility that younger 
funds focussing on the technology sector and seed level investments make less 
use of the IRR technique, as it is often irrelevant in such a scenario. But the 
funds' unanimity in selecting 'DCF/NPV technique' for valuation re-validates 
previous hypothesis results. 
9.4.2 Logistical Regression: 
After analysing individual variables through Chi Square tests, Regression 
analysis was conducted to ascertain the effect of fund age on each valuation- 
related set of variables collectively. This exercise confirms that even fund age 
has no effect in their preference for 'Own Due Diligence' collectively. This 
further ratifies the results of Chi Square tests and elementary results in chapter 7. 
However, contrary to Chi Square results, regression analysis reveals that the age 
of venture capital funds influences their decision to use 'DCF/NPV' based 
valuation techniques. We derived this result after eliminating the most 
insignificant results from regression analysis until all the remaining variables 
became statistically significant. Table 9-H in Appendix I shows that their 
response to DCF based techniques is significant at > 98 percent. This questions 
the hypothesis results in chapter 7 and also Chi Square tests above. However, 
before drawing any conclusion, one must recognise that IRR technique is 
missing from Regression results. Therefore, it only partially challenges the 
elementary hypothesis results arrived in chapter 7. 
Graph 9-I shows that there is one younger venture capitalist on the far right 
hand side, with a probability of over 90 percent of being older. This Mid-East 
based investor is a part of a large banking group. Similarly, there is another 
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younger fund with a probability of over 76 percent behaving like older funds. A 
long established development financial institution sponsors this fund. 
Additionally, their focus sectors of investment are non-technology and they are 
also mostly late stage investors. These factors could possibly throw some light 
on their behaviour. 
On the other hand, there are three older venture capitalists behaving like younger 
ones, with almost the same probability of over 22 percent, on the left hand side of 
the X-axis. Interestingly, all of them are foreign investors and based in New 
Delhi. Two of them are technology-focussed investors while the third one invests 
across a wide spectrum of industries, including technology. This is, perhaps, the 
reason why they are identified, in terms of their choice of valuation techniques, 
with younger investors, as they are primarily technology investors that primarily, 
with a few exceptions, are younger funds. 
Graph 9-I: Predicted Probabilities of Age-based Differences in Valuation Techniques 
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9.4.3 Summary of Valuation/Fund Age Findings: The data split based on fund 
age accepts the hypothesis results that 'Own Due Diligence' report is the most 
preferred source of information for valuing the investee companies. Similarly, 
DCF based valuation techniques are used by venture capitalists regardless of the 
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fund age. However, there is some variance in Chi Square results in terms of IRR, 
and in Regression about DCF/NPV techniques, suggesting some friction of 
opinion in these choices based on fund age. Therefore, one has to be cautious in 
drawing a firm conclusion here. 
9.4.4 Structuring: Logistical Regression 
Chi Square tests to assess the impact of fund age on the structuring practices 
failed to produce any significant results. Logistical regression was conducted to 
assess whether this division influences the set of structuring variables 
collectively. Table 9-I in appendix I shows that there are four structuring 
covenants where older funds differ from their younger counterparts, collectively 
at a significance level of > 99 percent. 
These funds can be identified by the fact that the approval for selling major 
assets is an irrelevant covenant for technology investors as there are hardly any 
assets in such projects. Technology investors are relatively younger funds, and 
this difference can be more attributed to younger funds. Similarly, primarily 
technology investors prefer equity ratchets for entrepreneurs rather than seek 
approval for selling assets. 
On the other hand, establishment of an escrow account is more frequently used 
as a covenant by older funds that are promoted by development financial 
institutions, as this is a typical 'project finance' covenant. However, the different 
attitude of older and younger funds towards using the right of first refusal as a 
covenant is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation is that funds are 
increasingly using 'tag along and drag along' clauses in their shareholder 
agreements which gives them a right either to force the entrepreneurs to sell a 
part of their holding to an outside investor when venture funds are selling their 
own holdings, or to sell their stake at the same price if the entrepreneur is 
divesting at an attractive price. These two options, taken together, offset the 
value dilution risk. 
295 
Chapter 9 Statistical Analysis 11- Results Ill 
Graph 9-J shows that there is one younger fund on the right hand side among 
the cluster of older investors with a probability of over 79 percent. One possible 
reason for this younger fund behaving like older funds is that it is a purely non- 
technology fund. Since a majority of older funds were non-technology focussed, 
possibly this is why it is identified with older funds. 
Graph 9-J: Predicted Probabilities of Older Funds towards Structuring Covenants 
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Similarly there are two investors on the left hand side of the graph, with a 
probability of 3 and 14 percent each. One of them is almost fully invested. 
Presently, it is investing on behalf of other financiers. Possibly, these new 
funding sources have a relatively new approach towards structuring the deals 
compared to their older peers. As mentioned earlier, the other one is a large 
Indian venture capital group managing more than four funds simultaneously. 
Though the fund managing company is old, they might be reframing their 
structuring strategies with the launch of every new fund. 
9.4.5 Summary of Structuring/Fund Age Findings: For the vast majority of 
covenants, there is no difference in the approach of either of these two groups. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that venture capitalists in India use a variety of 
structuring covenants as a guard against moral hazard is further accepted. Also, 
there is no diversity of opinion, based on fund age, with regard to the use of 
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financial products and the staging of investments. Therefore, these two 
hypotheses related to moral hazard are also accepted. 
9.4.6 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests 
There were no differences between the two groups with regard to either 
monitoring reports or the focus of discussion during their personal meetings 
with the investee companies. Only within the list of breakdown details, the Chi 
Square results in table 9.7 show one group at variance with the other in respect 
of information on turnover per employee and profit per employee. This difference 
indicates that the 'old economy' investors, mostly older funds might be asking for 
these details in order to compare human resource costs with the competition. 
Table 9.7: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
Value df sm_ Sig. (2j sided 
Turnover per Emplo ee Pearson Chi-Square 8.542 3 . 036 Profit per Employee Pearson Chi-Square 12.456 3 . 006 
9.4.7 Logistical Regression: 
Examined collectively, fund age has a bearing on the frequency of monitoring 
reports. Regression results suggest that there are six types of reports - listed in 
table 9-J of appendix I- that are statistically significant at > 99 percent. 
Graph 9-K shows that there is one older fund behaving like younger funds, with 
a probability of about 8 percent. This is one of the oldest, closely held, private 
equity providers with a recent refocusing on technology sector. On the other 
hand there are two younger funds that are behaving like older funds. One of 
them is sponsored by one of the oldest venture capital companies, in partnership 
with the Government of India. It is likely that this fund is following the monitoring 
practices of its parent organisation. The other fund is led by one of the most 
senior venture capitalists in the country. He spent about 20 years managing one 
of the oldest and the largest Indian venture capital funds. This could perhaps be 
an explanation for the behaviour of his fund more like an old fund. 
In addition to monitoring reports, some differences between the older and the 
younger funds also emerged regarding the breakdown of details that investors 
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seek in the monitoring reports. Regression results, after eliminating each 
insignificant variables one by one, show that there are four variables, as listed in 
table 9-K in appendix I, which are collectively significant at about the 99 percent 
level. It is evident that marketing and overhead expenses are important to older 
funds that have investee companies with stabilised operations. On the other 
hand, information related to order booking must be of interest to both older and 
newer funds. Capital expenditure related information is probably more important 
to non-technology (older) funds, as there is comparatively less capital 
expenditure per se in technology sector. 
Graph 9-K: Predicted Probabilities of Monitoring Reports based on Fund Age 
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Graph 9-L shows tha t there are four younger funds on the right hand side of the 
x-axis, with a probability of over 58 percent. Also, there is an older fund among a 
cluster of younger funds, with a probability of about 13 percent. All four new 
funds are foreign investors with long established parents in this sector. It is likely 
that they are following the policies of their sponsors. On the other hand, there are 
reports of the older fund's portfolio companies not doing well. Therefore, it is 
possible that this fund is shifting its strategy and learning some techniques from 
more sophisticated younger (foreign) funds. 
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Graph 9-L: Predicted Probabilities of Breakdown Details based on Fund Age 
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9.4.8 Summary of Monitoring/Fund Age Findings: Chi Square analysis shows no 
difference between the old and the new funds in terms of their receiving 
monitoring reports and their focus of discussion with their investee companies. 
There were very marginal differences in receiving the detailed breakdown of 
information. Thus, the hypothesis related to monitoring practices as a tool to 
addressing information asymmetry is again accepted. 
However, regression analysis show considerable differences with regard to 
monitoring practices of younger and older funds. Though these differences are 
not significant enough to reject the hypothesis results of chapter 7, the analysis 
certainly raise questions about those results. 
9.5 Portfolio Size based Differentiation: 
In order to further validate the hypothesis test results, the average number of 
investments per fund (25.5) was determined as a first step. Then, all the 
investors were divided into two categories based on below and above average 
number of investments. There were only 8 investors that made more than 
average number (25.5) of investments, while 32 investors made less than the 
average number (25.5) of investments. This skewed pattern reflects that the 
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industry is still at a very nascent stage and there are very few investors that have 
taken a substantial exposure in India. 
9.5.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests were performed to assess if portfolio size influenced the 
outcome of the hypotheses results. Table 9.8 demonstrates that only the 
qualitative valuation method (turnover multiple) is answered differently by these 
two groups at a significance level of about 97 percent. It is possible that funds 
with smaller portfolio size, with a technology focus, use turnover multiple as a 
qualitative technique for valuing technology investee companies like internet 
service providers and cable TV operators. However, this outcome further ratifies 
our hypothesis results that by splitting the data on the basis of portfolio size, 
there is no change in hypotheses related to information sources for valuation 
and the use of DCF based valuation techniques. 
Table 9.8: Chi Square Valuation Results 
mover mumme I Pearson Chi-Square 
Value I df 
9.5.2 Logistical Regression: 
The Chi Square results above take only individual variables into account and 
ignore the effect of portfolio size on a set of variables collectively. Logistical 
regression was performed to identify any differences in valuation approaches 
based on the number of investments made. Regression results on two key 
valuation-related hypotheses (sources of information for valuation and 
quantitative valuation methods) failed to produce statistically significant results. 
This outcome reconfirms our previous hypotheses results related to adverse 
selection tools used by venture capitalists in India. 
9.5.3 Summary of Valuation/Portfolio Size Findings: There is no difference in 
using their 'Own Due Diligence' reports as a source of information for preparing 
valuations, based on the data split by portfolio size. Similarly, the two groups do 
not differ in using DCF based valuation techniques for valuing their investee 
companies, thus further accepting previous hypotheses results. 
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9.5.4 Structuring: Chi Square Tests 
The same sample split was applied on structuring related hypotheses: 
Structuring Covenants, Staging of Investments and use of Financial Products. 
First, using Chi Square tests and then Logistical Regression, table 9.9 shows that 
the two groups differed only with regard to using three structuring covenants. It 
appears that investors with fewer investments prefer the first two variables, as 
they tend to focus on technology sector. Both these covenants are usually used 
in knowledge-based sectors like information technology and biotechnology. While 
the use of escrow account, as mentioned above, is a favourite covenant in 
project financing structures. Therefore, it is possibly used by older funds 
sponsored by development financial institutions having larger portfolios. 
However, no differences emerged with regard to the other two hypotheses. 
Therefore, the previous hypotheses results regarding stage financing and use 
of financial products are endorsed. 
Table 9.9: Chi Square Structuring Results 
Value df As m. Sig. 2-sided 
Appointment of Key 
Functionaries 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.634 3 . 054 
Drag-along and Tag-along Pearson Chi-Square 8.029 3 . 045 Escrow Account Pearson Chi-Square 8.983 3 . 
030 
9.5.5 Logistical Regression: 
Regression analysis was again performed to assess the impact of portfolio size 
on the structuring practices of venture funds collectively. All the insignificant 
variables were eliminated one by one until all the remaining variables collectively 
were statistically significant at > 99 percent level. These structuring covenants 
are listed in table 9-L of Appendix I. It is interesting to note that the covenant on 
staging of investments is statistically significant at > 97 percent. This indicates 
that one of the groups either does not practice staging or does not use it in the 
same manner as the other group in terms of frequency. Even within this group, 
there are some investors responding differently, as shown in graph 9-M. 
On the far right hand side of the graph, there are two investors with smaller 
portfolios being identified with the investors of larger portfolios, with a probability 
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of 58 and 66 percent respectively. Both these funds are based in South India, 
having a clear focus on technology. As mentioned earlier, one of the CEOs of 
these two has served at the top level of one of the largest Indian venture capital 
groups. It is possible that he pursues the structuring policies of his former 
employers. The other one is a small fund recently privatised but originally 
sponsored by a sate owned financial institution. The reason why it is identified 
with a group of venture capitalists with larger portfolio-size is probably influenced 
by the induction of new management that is dominated by US based non- 
resident Indians. 
Graph 9-M: Predicted Probabilities of Staging Practices based on Portfolio Size 
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There is one fund with larger portfolio that is identified with smaller portfolio 
investors, with a probability of 13 percent. Again, as mentioned earlier, this fund 
is reported to be doing badly and may be in the process of changing its strategy. 
However, since the above data split is highly skewed in favour of smaller size 
portfolio investors, any firm conclusion requires caution. 
9.5.6 Summary of Structuring/Portfolio Size Findings: Chi Square and Logistical 
Regression analysis confirms that there are no substantial differences between 
the larger portfolio and smaller portfolio venture capitalists with regard to the 
three structuring related hypotheses, namely extensive use of covenants, staging 
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of investment and use of financial products. This reconfirms the results of the 
moral hazard related hypotheses derived earlier. 
9.5.7 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests 
Through Chi Square tests, we attempted to ascertain if there existed any 
difference in larger and smaller portfolio-sized venture capitalists' approach with 
regard to monitoring practices. Table 9.10 shows that the two groups differ only 
in monitoring 'raw material costs' at a significance level of about 95 percent. This 
difference is understandable, as most of the smaller portfolio-sized investors are 
technology investors and there is no raw material in this sector to track. 
Table 9.10: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
Raw Material Cost I Pearson Chi-Square 17 
9.5.8 Logistical Regression: 
Logistical regression analysis showed that four types of monitoring reports 
were collectively significant at a level of > 99 percent. As table 9-M in appendix I 
shows, even individually these four reports are statistically significant. This 
demonstrates that one group of fund managers has distinct monitoring 
requirements from the other. It is very likely that balance sheets, creditor/debtor 
and default reports, are preferred by large portfolio investors who are usually 
managing old investments, primarily in the 'old economy'. On the other hand, 
small portfolio investors are managing mainly 'new economy' investments where 
payroll sheet is the most crucial ingredient in knowledge-based sectors for 
managing salary costs within reasonable limits. 
However, graph 9-N shows some discrepancies even within the response 
pattern of these groups. Two large portfolio investors are identified with smaller 
portfolio investors on the left hand side of the x-axis, with a probability of 9 and 
19 percent respectively. There is one small-sized portfolio investor consistently 
behaving like its opposite numbers. As discussed earlier, this fund is perhaps 
changing its strategy in order to turnaround its poor performance. By contrast, 
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the large Indian venture capital group, managing more than four smaller funds, is 
the other fund behaving more like funds with smaller portfolios. 
Graph 9-N: Predicted Probabilities in Monitoring Practices based on Portfolio Size 
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9.5.9 Summary of Monitoring/Portfolio Size Findings: The data split based on the 
portfolio size of the venture capitalists failed to produce any significant 
differences between funds with regard to their monitoring practices. Similarly, 
there was no change in their responses for the reasons of CEO replacement. 
Thus, our hypotheses results related to information asymmetry and corporate 
governance are further revalidated. 
9.6 Size of Funds Managed per Fund Manager based Differentiation: 
The entire sample was again split into two groups, based on the size of funds 
managed per fund manager within the company. This is primarily a parameter to 
judge if over-stretched fund managers behave differently from their less stressed 
counterparts. Again, the average amount of funds managed by each fund 
manager in the entire sample was calculated. Those funds where each fund 
manager is managing more than the average of US$ 7.76 million and those 
managing less than this amount per fund manager were divided. Even this 
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division was skewed. There were only 12 funds with more than average and 28 
funds below the average line. 
9.6.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests in table 9.11 show difference in opinion with regard to the use of 
Management CV as an information source for valuing the investee companies 
at a significance level of over 96 percent. Similarly, the difference with regard to 
ARR as a valuation technique emerged only at a significance level of over 96 
percent. These results clearly show that the two groups individually do not differ 
with regard to our hypotheses related to sources of information for valuation, and 
valuation techniques. Therefore, Chi Square tests confirm our hypotheses results 
presented in an earlier chapter. 
Table 9.11: Chi Square Valuation Results 
Value df As mp. Sic . __ 
2-sided 
Management CV Pearson Chi-Square 5.516 2 . 
063 
Accounting Rate of Return Pearson Chi-Square 5.487 2 . 
064 
9.6.2 Logistical Regression: 
The same data split was again analysed through regression. Even then, there 
were no differences with regard to the sources of information used for 
valuation. The regression results relating to valuation techniques in table 9-N 
of appendix I also demonstrate that there are five techniques that are collectively 
statistically significant at a level of over 97 percent. However, this list does not 
include the DCF/NPV technique; IRR is included in the list, but this is not 
statistically significant at an individual level. 
9.6.3 Summary of Valuation/Amount Per Fund Manager Findings: Both Chi 
Square tests and Logistical Regression did not show any statistical evidence 
suggesting that the two groups differed in gathering information for the valuation 
of investee companies. Similarly, statistical results showing differences in using 
valuation techniques did not apply to DCF based techniques. Therefore, the 
previous valuation related hypotheses results are further accepted. 
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9.6.4 Structuring: Chi Square Tests 
Surprisingly, Chi Square tests did not produce statistically significant differences 
regarding the structuring practices of the two groups. This complete unanimity of 
the two groups with regard to all three structuring related hypotheses requires 
further investigation to understand this phenomenon better. 
9.6.5 Logistical Regression: 
Logistical regression was performed to see if variables associated with 
structuring hypotheses produced significant results collectively. Three sets of 
variables related to the structuring hypotheses namely covenants, staging, and 
financial products were analysed separately. After leaving out all the 
insignificant variables one by one, a set of eleven structuring covenants 
appeared collectively significant at a level of 98 percent. These variables are 
listed in table 9.15 in appendix I. Still, no differences emerged relating to 
staging, and financial products. 
Graph 9-0 shows that this division of opinion is not unanimous. There are two 
funds with smaller amounts per fund manager among a group of investors with 
larger amounts per fund manager with a probability of over 70 and 80 percent 
respectively. One of them is a small fund with a very small team of fund 
manager, while the other one is a large fund with a large team of fund managers, 
bringing the size of funds per fund manager down. One apparent reason for their 
behaviour is their focus on technology sector, indicating that the structuring of 
deal is partly determined by the nature of investee company, rather than the size 
of investments managed by each fund manager. 
On the other hand there are two funds with larger amounts per fund manager 
behaving like their smaller counterparts, with a probability of 13 and 20 percent 
respectively. One of them is the same Indian venture capital group, where the 
entire group is taken as one single entity, but it is consistently defying its 
classification. The other one is a large foreign investor operating with a relatively 
small team of fund managers. Their focus of investment is also primarily 
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technology. This is one possible explanation for its identification with the smaller 
amount per fund manager group. 
Graph 9-0: Predicted Probabilities for Structuring Covenants based on Amount Managed/FM 
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9.6.6 Summary of Structurinq/Amount Per Fund Manager Findinas: No 
differences emerged individually and collectively relating to the structuring 
hypotheses, except collectively significant results in structuring covenants. 
Regression results show divergent practices relating to eleven covenants that are 
significant enough to question the results of this hypothesis, arrived in chapter 7. 
However, staging and financial products analyses reconfirmed the results of 
these hypotheses derived earlier in chapter 7. 
9.6.7 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests: 
We also analysed the monitoring practices on this data split to ascertain any 
difference in the approach of over-stretched fund managers vis a vis others. Chi 
Square tests demonstrate in table 9.12 that the two groups differ in terms of their 
usage of two monitoring reports, namely balance sheet and cash flow 
statements only, at significance levels of 94 and 93 percent respectively. This 
differentiation may have linkage with the focus of funds with a smaller amount 
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invested per fund manager on technology sectors. These investors finance 
smaller amounts at an early stage of project development, compared to the old 
economy investors. The technology investors usually require cash flow 
statements, as very little amount of capital goes into asset creation, therefore 
balance sheet assessment is irrelevant. 
Table 9.12: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
Value df As m. Sig. 2-sided 
Balance Sheet Pearson Chi-Square 5.679 2 . 
058 
Cash Flow Statement Pearson Chi-Square 5.539 2 . 063 Raw Material Cost Pearson Chi-Square 11.074 3 . 011 
The 'old economy' investors may seek balance sheets to monitor the 
performance of their investee companies as capital expenditure in non- 
technology projects create tangible assets that are reflected in balance sheets. 
Unlike technology projects, such projects invariably use 'raw material'. Therefore, 
the same group of 'old economy' investors might be monitoring raw material 
costs, which show a significance level of about 99 percent. Interestingly, there 
were no differences in the focus of discussion between the two groups. 
9.6.8 Logistical Regression: 
Logistical regression was performed to assess the effect of amount invested per 
fund manager on their monitoring practices collectively. There are seven 
monitoring reports, shown in table 9-P of appendix I, that are collectively 
significant at about 98 percent level. However, as graph 9-P shows the groups 
are not unanimous in their response to these reports. 
There is one investor with smaller amount of investments per fund manager 
among the larger counterparts, with a probability of over 69 percent. This is the 
same large Indian investor behaving like its smaller peers for the reasons 
explained above. Similarly, there are three investors with smaller amount of 
investments per fund manager behaving like their larger opposite numbers with a 
probability of 12,17 and 20 percent respectively. One of them is a large Indian 
development financial institution, that makes venture capital investments as a 
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part of composite funding package including long term debt and leasing etc. 
Therefore, it is possible that its monitoring requirements are substantially 
different from the other investors in its category. One of the other two investors is 
the same, thought to be recasting its strategy. While the third one, as reported 
earlier, was an adviser to smaller investments until recently. Lately, it has set up 
a large fund of its own, which is managed by a small team of fund managers. It is 
possible that this investor has still to evolve a strategy akin to its profile. Similarly, 
as shown in tables 9-Q and 9-R in appendix I, there are six monitoring 
breakdown details and three focus areas of discussion that emerged 
statistically significant at > 95 percent. 
Analysing the data regarding the reasons for CEO replacement - the last 
hypothesis of this study - also showed collectively significant results at > 97 
percent. However, table 9-S in appendix I shows that the two groups do not 
differ on strategic failure as being the primary cause of CEO replacements. This 
further validates our previous hypothesis result derived in chapter 7. 
Graph 9-P: Predicted Probabilities in Using Monitoring Reports 
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9.6.9 Summary of Monitoring/Amount Per Fund Manager Findings: Chi Square 
results did not show any significant differences in the monitoring practices based 
on the amount managed per fund manager. However, regression analysis 
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showed some significant differences in the monitoring approach of the two 
groups. Therefore, based on regression, the hypothesis results relating to the 
monitoring of investee companies can be questioned. But, regression analysis 
with regard to the reason of CEO replacement confirmed the earlier results. 
9.7 Stage of Investment based Differentiation: 
In order to further validate the earlier hypotheses results, the entire sample was 
divided into early and late stage investors. This was done by first combining the 
seed stage investments with early stage investments, and expansion stage 
investments with MBOs and pre-1130 investments. The first combination was 
called 'early stage' and the second one 'late stage investors'. Then it was 
arbitrarily determined that any combination that exceeds 60 percent of the total 
investment be defined as early or late stage investors. 
9.7.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
We began with Chi Square tests to determine if the stage of investments has any 
bearing on the valuation practices of venture capitalists. Surprisingly, none of the 
results related to valuation hypotheses, namely sources of information for 
valuation and valuation techniques were statistically significant. This outcome 
re-validates the previous hypotheses results that information sources and 
valuation techniques do not differ on the basis of early or late stage investments. 
9.7.2 Logistical Regression: 
In order to see the effect of stage of investment on a set of valuation-related 
variables collectively, we performed logistical regression. Table 9-T in appendix 
I shows that there are four sources of valuation that are collectively significant 
at > 95 percent level. However, these variables do not include'own due diligence' 
which is directly linked to this hypothesis. 
Opinion is divided within the two groups as demonstrated by graph 9-Q. There 
are two early stage funds on the right hand side of the spectrum, with a 
probability of over 76 percent each, behaving like later stage fund. Examining the 
predicted group and predicted probability table reveals that one of them is the 
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same large Indian investor with smaller funds under management behaving like a 
late stage funds. This fund deserves! The other early stage investor identified 
with the late stage investors is a less than two year old joint venture between the 
Government of India and one of the state owned development financial 
institutions, catering to a specific segment of the industry. This fund is too young 
to establish a pattern of its practices. 
Graph 9-Q: Predicted Probabilities of Sources for Valuation Information 
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On the other hand, there is one late stage investor behaving like its early stage 
couterparts with a probability of about 14 percent. This is the largest 
development financial institution in the country and primarily makes venture 
capital investments, together with long term debt funding. Therefore, not being a 
pure venture capital investor, it is not expected to behave like other late stagers. 
9.7.3 Summary of Valuation/Stage of Investment Findings: Chi Square tests and 
Logistical Regression results further prove that data split in relation to the stage 
of investment provides no proof of different valuation practices. Thus, the 
previous hypotheses results related to valuation practices in India as a means to 
providing adverse selection solutions are revalidated. 
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9.7.4 Structuring: Chi Square Tests 
Then we moved to assess the impact of stage on the structuring of investments. 
There is evidence in the literature that 'formal contracting distinguished between 
different phases of investment involvement' (Reid, 1998; p. 240). Table 9.13 
shows that the two groups differed only about board representation as a 
structuring covenant at a significance level of over 96 percent. However, there 
were no differences between the two groups with regard to using staging and 
financial products for addressing moral hazard. 
Table 9.13: Chi Square Structuring Results 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Board Representation Pearson Chi-Square 8.500 3 . 037 
9.7.5 Logistical Regression: 
We again conducted regression analysis to determine the impact of stage split on 
the structuring practices of venture capitalists. Table 9-U in appendix I shows 
that there are seven covenants where the two groups collectively differ at a 
significance level of 97 percent. 
Graph 9-R: Predicted Probabilities of Structuring Covenants 
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Although this shows some degree of dilution in our earlier hypothesis results 
related to structuring covenants, graph 9-R shows that there are some 
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disagreements for this response within the two groups. There are two early stage 
investors on the right hand side of the graph, with a probability of 68 and 72 
percent respectively. One of them is a recently privatised regional venture fund. 
This is acquired and being managed by a group of US based non-resident 
Indians. It is possible that the new management has brought about some recent 
strategic changes that might have impacted this behaviour of the fund. On the 
other hand, the same large fund that was acting as an adviser until recently is 
also behaving like late stage investors. As suggested earlier, this might be a 
learning time for the management of this fund, before settling down with practices 
that might closely match with the investors of its own category. 
9.7.6 Summary of Structuring/Stage of Investment Findings: Although Chi 
Square analysis has shown one statistically significant difference in a long list of 
structuring covenants, regression results show about 30 percent of covenants 
being statistically significant between the two groups. These differences are 
adequate to challenge the hypothesis results derived earlier. Therefore, the use 
of structuring covenants by early and late stage focussed investors is open to 
further investigations. However, there is no evidence of statistically significant 
differences between the two groups with regard to the staging and financial 
product related practices. Therefore, previous hypotheses results related to 
staging and financial products for addressing moral hazard are again validated. 
9.7.7 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests 
Based on stage split, we analysed the data related to monitoring practices. The 
Chi Square results in table 9.14 show that, during personal meetings with the 
investee companies, the focus of discussion with regard to further fund raising 
varies at a significance level of over 97 percent. But there is no indication, based 
on stage of investments, suggesting significant differences in gathering 
monitoring reports and breakdown details. 
Table 9.14: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
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9.7.8 Logistical Regression: 
In order to ascertain the influence of the stage-based data split on the monitoring 
related variables collectively, logistical regression was performed. Table 9-V in 
appendix I shows that there are 10 types of monitoring reports that are 
collectively significant at > 99 percent level. After structuring related differences, 
this is the second major difference to emerge as a result of splitting the data in 
this chapter so far. On the basis of personal discussion with the venture 
capitalists while validating results during the third trip to India, it can be suggest 
that project implementation reports, and reports containing budget versus actual 
performance are required by early stage investors. The reason is that most of 
these investments are in projects that are at building-up stages. On the other 
hand, all the other eight reports might be of more use to late stage investors, 
indicating areas that concern companies with stabilised operations. 
Graph 9-S: Predicted Probabilities of Monitoring Reports 
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However, as graph 9-S reveals, there are differences with regard to this 
response within both the groups. There is one early stage investor among the 
cluster of late stage investors, with a probability of over 68 percent. Also, there 
are two late stage investors, with a probability of 4 and 8 percent respectively of 
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being early stage investors. One interesting common link between the three is 
that they are all based in Bangalore - the Silicon Valley of India. Two of them are 
also dedicated technology sector investors, while the third one is gradually 
changing its focus to technology. 
Similarly, there are collectively significant results at > 99 percent with regard to 
seven areas of focus of discussion, as shown in table 9-W of appendix I. This 
is the second major finding after splitting the data into various groups in this 
chapter. It is interesting to note that all the significant variables listed in the table 
indicate that they must be the focus of discussion of late stage investors. While 
the only insignificant variable, fund raising, concerns early stage investors who 
invariably focus on subsequent rounds of fund raising. 
9.7.9 Summary of Monitoring/Stage of Investment Findings: Chi Square results 
further validated the previous results establishing the use of monitoring practices 
for addressing information asymmetry and principal-agent problems. However, 
significant differences emerge between the two groups on monitoring related 
variables collectively, using regression. This questions the uniformity in 
hypothesis results derived in chapter 7 and also the consistent results in the 
previous sections of this chapter so far. 
9.8 Investment Sector based Differentiation: 
The sample is again divided between the technology-focused investors and the 
non-technology focused investors. The objective is to assess if the two groups 
differed in their approach towards Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring 
practices. Again, all those funds that had invested more than sixty percent of 
their corpuses in the technology sector were arbitrarily considered as technology 
investors, while the rest were regarded as non-technology investors. 
9.8.1 Valuation: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square results in table 9.15 show that the two groups differed in relation to 
using un-audited managing projections as a source of valuation information, at 
a significance level of over 98 percent. Similarly, there is a difference of 
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perception between the two classes of investors with regard to using the EBITDA 
multiple as a valuation technique, at a significance level of over 97 percent. 
However, both these differences do not challenge the hypotheses results related 
to adverse selection through the valuation process, namely 'Own Due Diligence' 
reports and 'DCF based Valuation Techniques'. 
Table 9.15: Chi Square Valuation Results 
Variables Value df As m. Sig. (2-sided) 
Un-aud. Mgt. Projections Pearson Chi-Square 8.571 2 . 014 
EBITDA Multi le Pearson Chi-Square 9.289 3 . 026 
9.8.2 Logistical Regression: 
Interestingly, the two groups also showed differences in using un-audited 
management projections as a source of information for valuation, at a 
significance level of over 94 percent. However, their opinion on key variables is 
still undivided. Similarly, as table 9-X in appendix I shows there are four 
valuation techniques on which the two groups differed collectively at a 
significance level of over 96 percent. Although the list does not include 
DCF/NPV, it includes IRR. 
Graph 9-T: Predicted Probabilities of Valuation Techniques 
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However, graph 9-T shows that there is no consensus within the two groups on 
these differences also. There are at least three non-technology investors on the 
right hand side of the x-axis, with probabilities of over 76,80 and 83 percent 
respectively. The owners of one of these non-technology funds also have a 
substantial stake in a core technology fund. It is possible that this non-technology 
fund is following the valuation practices of the fund focusing on the technology 
sector. The other two are both large foreign investors. Although, technology is 
not their core focus area in India, they do manage global technological funds in 
different regions of the world. Therefore, it is possible that they also follow the 
valuation practices of their foreign associates. 
9.8.3 Summary of Valuation/Sector of Investment Findings: Although sources of 
valuation and techniques differ between the two groups, the differences do not 
question the hypotheses related variables directly. Therefore, we can conclude 
that adverse selection problems are addressed by both the groups, through the 
valuation process, in line with the results derived earlier in chapter 7 and also the 
results arrived at in the previous sections in this chapter. 
9.8.4 Structuring: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests demonstrate statistically significant variables both among the 
structuring covenants and milestones for staging investments. Similarly, there are 
three significant variables with regard to using financial products by the two 
groups, as table 9.16 illustrates. Among the significant structuring covenants, it 
is possible that non-technology investors use post-completion audit, while the 
technology investors include borrowing and equity dilution approval as 
covenants. Similarly, it appears that operating cash break-even is likely to be 
included by the non-technology investors, while recruitment of key employees as 
a milestone for staging is included by the technology investors because of 
being a knowledge-based sector. There are three significant outcomes in using 
financial products between the two groups. It is possible that technology 
investors use a combination of equity, preferred and convertible bonds, while the 
non-technology investors use only plain equity. 
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Table 9.16: Chi Square Structuring Results 
Value df As m. Sig. (2-sided) 
Post Completion Audit Pearson Chi-Square 10.861 3 . 012 Borrowing and Equity Dilution 
Approval 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.450 1 
. 
063 
OCB as Staging Condition Pearson Chi-Square 8.308 3 . 
040 
Recruitment of Key Empls. as 
a Stain Condition 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.817 3 . 005 
Seed Stage Product Choice Pearson Chi-Square 12.255 2 . 002 Early Stage Product Choice Pearson Chi-Square 6.434 2 . 040 
ITMT Product Choice Pearson Chi-Square 3.509 1 . 061 
9.8.5 Logistical Regression: 
Further analysis through regression shows that the two groups also differ in using 
the structuring covenants collectively. Surprisingly, there are 15 structuring 
covenants that are collectively significant at > 91 percent level, as listed in table 
9-Y of appendix I. This is the third most significant finding after splitting the data 
into various groups. 
Graph 9-U: Predicted Probabilities of Structuring Covenants 
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There are some exceptions within these two categories, as shown in graph 9-U, 
therefore they behaved contrary to their demographic background. There are two 
non-technology funds on the right hand side of the spectrum behaving like their 
counterparts, with a probability of 76 and 79 percent respectively. Both these are 
small and relatively young organizations with an almost regional focus. These 
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could be possible explanations for their unusual behaviour. On the other hand, 
there is one subsidiary of a state-owned bank with a technology focus behaving 
like a non-technology venture capitalists, with a probability of about 6 percent. 
However, regression analysis did not produce any significant results with regard 
to the other two structuring related hypotheses, namely staging of investments 
and use of financial products. 
9.8.6 Summary of Structuring/Sector of Investment Findings: These results 
demonstrate that structuring covenant related results produced earlier in chapter 
7 and also in this chapter cannot be accepted at their face value. Similarly, the 
Chi Square analysis provides evidence that financial product related results 
cannot be confirmed either without further investigation. But, the earlier results 
about staging can be further accepted without any question. 
9.8.7 Monitoring: Chi Square Tests 
Chi Square tests with regard to monitoring reports and the detailed 
breakdown information contain no significant results on the basis of a sector- 
based split of the sample. However, as table 9.17 shows, there are two 
significant variables among a list of discussion foci during the personal 
meetings, at a significance level of over 97 and 98 percent respectively. It 
appears that technology investors might be focusing on strategic planning while 
meeting their investee companies, while both technology and non-technology 
funds check on the overall performance appraisal of their investee companies, 
albeit with a degree of variance in priority. 
Table 9.17: Chi Square Monitoring Results 
Value df As mp. S 
Performance Appraisal as a Pearson Chi-Square 8383 _ 2 - 
Focus of Discussion 
Strategic Planning as a Focus Pearson Chi-Square 4.748 1 .I of Discussion 
i9. (2-sided) 
)15 
)29 
9.8.8 Logistical Regression: 
Having failed to identify significant differences related to monitoring practices, we 
analysed the same variables through logistical regression. Table 9.26 in 
.3 
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appendix I shows that there are five monitoring reports where the two groups 
differed significantly at > 99 percent. Apparently, only joining and leaving reports 
of key employees are of special interest to technology investors owing to the 
significance of human capital in technology sector. The remaining four reports 
are possibly sought by the non-technology funds. 
Graph 9-V: Predicted Probabilities of Monitoring Differences 
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However, there are two non-technology funds on the right hand side of the graph 
9-V that are seeking monitoring reports identical to their technology 
counterparts, with a probability of 86 and 89 percent respectively. Both of these 
are Indian funds and relatively young. The managers of former technology 
focused funds might have staffed these funds. Additionally, there is one 
technology fund behaving more like a non-technology fund, with a probability of 
over 30 percent on the left hand side of the graph. This is a part of a large 
European private equity provider having made many successful technology 
investments in the UK and continental Europe. This could partly explain the 
behavioral pattern of this fund. Also, there are seven aspects of the discussion 
focus (as listed in table 9-Z of appendix I) that are collectively significant at a 
level of 97 percent. 
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Regression results performed on the reasons for CEO replacement, in table 9- 
ZA of appendix I, demonstrate that there are three variables that are collectively 
significant at 95 percent level. However, individually, the strategic reason is 
shown as insignificant; this finding ratifies the results of our previous tests on this 
hypothesis. However, as graph 9-W illustrates, there is one technology sector 
investor on the left hand side of the graph behaving like a non-technology 
investor, with a probability of over 22 percent. This is one of the earliest sector 
specific funds, when the technology sector was still evolving in India, and there 
were no benchmarks available at that time to standardize the behavioural 
pattern. On the other hand, there is one non-technology fund behaving like a 
technology fund with a probability of over 88 percent. This is the same fund 
sponsored by professionals who have also made a substantial investment in a 
separate technology fund. As discussed earlier, this fund might have adopted the 
practices of its sister fund. 
Graph 9-W: Predicted Probabilities for CEO Replacement Reasons 
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9.8.9 Summary of Monitoring/Sector of Investment Findings: 
The division of the entire sample on the basis of sector focus has yielded some 
interesting results. The monitoring practices of technology and non-technology 
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investors demonstrate a perceptible difference in their approach. Although, both 
the groups monitor the performance of their investee companies extensively, it is 
understandable that their focus of gathering information, detailed breakdowns 
and discussion with the management vary. Also, they replace the CEOs of their 
investee companies for different reasons. 
9.9 Conclusion: 
This chapter presented a lengthy process to identify differences between the two 
groups of venture capitalists with regard to a range of hypotheses related 
questions. This process brought conclusive results with regard to Valuation 
practices. However, venture capitalists with certain demographic backgrounds 
differed in terms of Structuring Covenants and use of Financial Products. The 
other major finding of this analysis is the emergence of differences with regard to 
Monitoring practices by venture capitalists with different characteristics. 
These differences are more specifically spelt out in the next, concluding chapter. 
Additionally, implications of this research for the venture capitalists, policy 
makers, entrepreneurs and new entrants are presented, together with areas for 
further research. 
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Chapter X- Conclusion 
10.1 General: There are many important conclusions that can be drawn from 
this research about the macroeconomic status of India in general, and SMEs and 
venture capital in particular. However, the key themes of this thesis are SMEs 
and venture capital, and these two issues are considered first. 
It is virtually a proven phenomenon that SMEs contribute more to employment 
generation, technological innovation and export earnings than their larger 
counterparts. But, unfortunately, this sector has failed to attract the required 
financial resources from increasingly larger banks and financial institutions, as 
they feel comfortable in funding large-size businesses. Venture capital has come 
to the rescue and provided a much-needed source of capital. However, this 
source of funding for young and start-up enterprises still forms less than one 
percent of GDP in all the countries where it is practiced. 
10.2 India: The Indian economy has been growing at about 6 percent per 
annum for the last ten years. But, the service sector has grown at over 7 percent 
over the same period. This sector of the economy traditionally attracts the 
maximum share of the entire venture capital allocation globally. The vibrant 
service sector has accelerated the growth of venture capital funds in India, which 
now stands at close to US$ 3 billion. 
10.2.1 Opportunities: Despite volatile economic growth, India presents a strong 
case for the expansion of the venture capital industry. It has a wide base of over 
three million SMEs that contribute 40 percent to India's industrial manufacture, 
employ 16.7 million persons, and account for 35 percent of its exports. 
Additionally, India has the second largest pool of technical professionals in the 
world after the USA, and the largest English speaking population in the world 
outside the native English speaking countries. The cost of labour is also lower 
than other competing economies. 
India has a strong banking and capital market infrastructure. There are more than 
7,000 companies listed on Indian stock exchanges that provide attractive exit 
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opportunities to private equity investors. A new takeover code has come into 
force that offers additional exit avenues through trade sales. India has a relatively 
independent judiciary, one of the pre-requisites for attracting FDI. It urgently 
requires foreign investment in almost all the sectors of the economy, and 
attracting venture capital or private equity is a priority for the authorities. 
10.2.2 Impediments: Despite the factors mentioned above, India has managed to 
build a venture capital industry that is only 0.004 percent of its GDP, compared to 
0.09 average in the Asia Pacific, 0.45 in the UK, and 0.65 in USA. 
One of the biggest hurdles faced by venture capitalists in India is the 
enforceability of contracts. The judicial system, though independent, is perilously 
slow and inordinate delays in enforcing contracts frighten many serious investors. 
There is also a deficiency of integrity (moral capital) among entrepreneurs, a 
crucial shortcoming in early stage and high-risk venture capital investments. 
Another obstacle is the half-hearted approach by the Government to providing 
necessary impetus in the form of crystal clear guidelines. Venture capitalists 
have to deal with more than one government agency in order to function in India. 
The red-tape effect slows the procedure, despite Government's repeated 
assurances that it wants to provide all that is required for venture capital growth. 
10.3 Present Research: Academic research on venture capital divides the 
investment process into seven distinct stages namely, deal-flow, screening, 
evaluation, valuation, structuring, monitoring and exit. This study, for the first time 
in India, conducted empirical research on Valuation, Structuring and 
Monitoring practices of venture capital investments. Forty of the forty two active 
venture capitalists participated in this research. The data were gathered through 
structured questionnaires combined with personal interviews. The data were 
analysed through Cluster Analysis, ANOVA, Chi Square and Logistical 
Regression. The major findings of this research are summarised in table 10 and 
are elaborated below: 
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10.3.1 General Characteristics: Forty venture capitalists have together committed 
US$ 2.95 billion and have invested US$ 2.16 billion across 1020 transactions. In 
terms of the number of investments, the early stage has attracted 56 percent of 
deals, while in value terms; the expansion stage is on top with 35 percent. In 
terms of sectors, the technology sector, together with media and telecom, ranks 
highest for both value and number of deals. Over US$ 1 billion has been 
channelled into this sector, comprising about 49% of the total investment by VC 
firms, spread across 480 deals, accounting for 47% of total number of deals. 
Box -1: Summary of the Key Findings of this research. 
General 
> Total Amount Committed: US$ 2.95 billion 
> Total Amount Invested: US$ 2.16 billion 
Total No. of Investments: 1020 
> Max. no. of Investments (Stage): 571 Early Stage Investments 
> Max. Amount of Investments: US$ 766 million Expansion Stage Investments 
> Max. no. of Investments (Sector): 480 IT, Media & Telecom 
> Max. Amount of Investments: US$ 1.15 billion in IT, Media & Telecom 
> Most Common Qualification of FMs: Engineering + MBA over 36% 
> Most Common Age Group: 25 - 35 years over 53% 
¢ Most Common Previous Experience: Over 28% in manufacturing sector 
Hypotheses 
> (HI)'Own Due Diligence Report': 85% of Indian VCs agree, II1 Accepted 
> (1-12) DCF based Valuation Tech. ': 73% of Indian VCs agree, 112 Accepted 
> (H3) 'Widespread use of Structuring Covenants': 72% of Indian VCs agree, 113 Accepted 
> (H4)'Staging of Investments': 70% of Indian VCs agree, 114 Accepted 
> (1-15) Maximum use of Preferred Stock': 83% of Indian VCs use Equity, 115 Rejected 
> (1-16) Extensive Monitoring of Investees': 65% of Indian VCs agree, 116 Accepted 
> (H7) Replacement of investee's CEO': 60% of Indian VCs agree. Partially Accepted 
¢ (H8) 'Lack of Strategic Skills causes CEO dismissals': Participants divided, Partially Accepted 
The participants employed a total of 279 fund managers. MBA + Engineering 
qualifications were most sought after with over 35 percent, followed by MBAs 
alone at close to 24 percent. Well over half of them were aged between 25 and 
35. About 29 percent had previously worked in an industrial environment, while 
24 percent had merchant banking experience prior to entering the venture capital 
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sector. Fund managers with industrial background provide the right kind of skills 
for managing early and growth stage businesses. 
10.3.2 Valuation - Source of Information: Although there are some differences 
between the venture capitalists in using various sources of information for 
assessing the value of the company, the vast majority of them always conduct 
their'own due diligence' to counter adverse selection. 
The entire sample was split into seven sub groups, based on their demographic 
characteristics, to explore whether any differences in practice could be linked to 
their demographic background. The first split, based on Fund Origin, confirmed 
'own due diligence' as the preferred way for preparing a valuation memorandum. 
Then, the samples classified on the basis of Fund Size, Fund Age, Portfolio Size, 
Amount of funds managed per Fund Manager and Investment Stage were 
analysed. The result above was confirmed. These results are in line with the 
global studies conducted on this topic (Wright and Robbie, 1996; Manigart et at., 
1996; Karsai et at., 1996). 
However, there are marginal differences between Technology and Non- 
technology investors in using their 'own due diligence'. It is interesting to note 
that rapidly evolving technology makes it virtually impossible to evaluate by fund 
managers themselves. They often need assistance from technology experts in 
order to arrive at an objective decision. 
10.3.3 Valuation - Techniques: Although there are minor differences between the 
venture capitalists in using various valuation techniques, fund managers mostly 
use DCF based techniques for ascertaining the value of their investee companies 
and solving adverse selection problems. 
The division based on Fund Origin showed that there are some differences in 
using valuation techniques. However, the majority relied upon DCF based 
techniques. Similarly, Fund Size, Portfolio Size, Amount managed per Fund 
Manager, Investment Stage and Investment Sector based divisions also used 
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DCF based techniques. The overall results concur with other international studies 
(Wright and Robbie, 1996; Manigart et al., 1996; Karsai et al., 1996). 
Some differences in using DCF based valuation techniques emerged only when 
the sample was split based on Fund Age. One possible explanation for this 
behaviour is that, before the arrival of foreign funds that are relatively young, 
Indian venture capitalists used to value their investee companies through Price 
Earning multiples. But, after the entry of foreign funds, even Indian funds are 
increasingly using DCF based valuation techniques. Therefore, it is likely that 
some of the'Older Funds', which are mostly Indians, may still be using'non-DCF' 
techniques. There was some evidence in support of this argument when the data 
were split on the basis of Fund Origin. 
10.3.4 Structuring - Covenants: The empirical results demonstrate that venture 
capitalists in India use a variety of covenants in order to minimise the moral 
hazard problem. There are insignificant differences between various groups 
depending upon their demographic background. However, all the venture 
capitalist groups, except the demographic splits based on Amount of Investment 
per Fund Manager, Investment Stage and Investment Sector, use over 95 
percent of the covenants. 
Interestingly, the classification of funds according to Amount Invested per Fund 
Manager demonstrates differences in over forty percent of structuring covenants. 
It is puzzling to see that the choice of structuring covenants is influenced by the 
amount of funds managed per manager. One explanation for this behaviour is 
that funds with a smaller amount invested per manager are devoting more time to 
each deal, compared to their busier counterparts. 
Similarly, regression analysis on the division based on Investment Stage 
produced statistically significant results in seven structuring covenants that make 
up almost 30 percent of the entire list of covenants. It is plausible that investors 
focussing on early stage deals may have been using a more comprehensive 
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menu of covenants compared to their late stage counterparts, primarily due to 
the high level of risk involved in the former category. 
Finally, regression analysis again provides collectively significant results for 15 
covenants (60 percent) in a data split based on Investment Sector. It is possible 
that the group classified as 'technology' investors are using a more complex and 
therefore different structuring approach compared to their 'non-technology' 
counterparts. It might be that foreign funds focussing on technology were more 
sophisticated, in comparison to non-technology funds that were mostly Indian 
and focussing on other sectors. Since this area was a new focus of research, no 
research benchmarks are available to compare with these results. 
10.3.5 Structuring - Staging: This study shows that staging of investments is a 
common practice among venture capitalists in India, to address the moral hazard 
problem. Although there are some investors who prefer not to stage investments, 
a vast majority of them choose this approach as a means of risk management. 
This outcome concurs with the studies conducted in the past (Sahlman, 1990; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998; Bergman and Udell, 1998). 
However, some differences existed between various groups of investors with 
regard to the milestones set for the investors prior to the next round of 
investments. Technology funds are linking the 'appointment of key functionaries' 
as a milestone for further disbursement. On the other hand, non-technology 
funds link further funding to achieving 'operating cash breakeven' level within a 
specified time limit. This finding clearly demonstrates the significance of human 
capital in knowledge-based sectors. 
10.3.6 Structuring - Financial Products: Contrary to previous international studies 
(Norton and Tennanbaum, 1992,1993; and Berglof, 1992), venture capitalists in 
India use more equity than preferred stock. However, early stage investors use a 
combination of equity, preferred stock, and convertible debt. As explained earlier, 
most of the technology investors are new entrants onto the Indian venture capital 
circuit. They are mainly investing in early stage technology projects that pose a 
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very high risk-return scenario. As guidelines were vague with regard to the rights 
of preferred stock holders, they are now being used by early stage investors to 
minimise the down side risk of such investments. 
Indian venture capitalists with a late stage focus rely upon equity. Also, foreign 
funds that are Smaller in Size, Younger in Age (operating in India for a relatively 
small number of years) and having a smaller Portfolio Size, use a combination of 
equity and convertible debt. All these demographic characteristics suggest that 
these are possibility less sophisticated investors, making investments mainly in 
'old economy' sectors. Since these sectors provide a fairly stable risk-return 
profile, investors rely upon plain vanilla equity and convertible debt. 
Additionally, regression analysis shows differences between technology and non- 
technology investors in using financial products at the seed and early stages of 
investment, and investments in 'ITMT sector. This reaffirms the Chi Square 
results quoted above. Interestingly, the difference between 'technology' sector 
and 'non-technology' sector stems solely from'ITMT. 
10.3.7 Monitoring - Reports: In order to address information asymmetry and the 
principal-agent problem, all venture capitalists in India seek a large number of 
performance reports from their investee companies. 
Further analysis indicates that early stage investors monitor their investee 
companies more frequently than their late stage counterparts. This behaviour 
reflects the higher risk profile of early stage investors. On the other hand, late 
stage investments are made in projects with relatively stabilised operations. 
Therefore, the chance of losing funds in such projects is lower. 
Likewise, the reports sought by foreign funds differ, to some degree, from Indian 
venture capitalists. However, significant monitoring differences were revealed 
between technology and non-technology funds, and funds with fewer and greater 
dollars managed per fund manager. These results imply that foreign funds, that 
are mostly technology investors, have more investment capacity at their disposal 
for investments. Therefore, they must be investing in different segments of the 
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economy compared to their Indian and non-technology counterparts. It is quite 
possible that the monitoring requirements vary according to the size and sector 
of investees. 
10.3.8 Monitoring - Breakdown Details: All venture capitalists in India ask for 
detailed information in order to minimise information asymmetry. When the 
sample was divided, no differences emerged between the foreign and Indian 
funds, or smaller and larger portfolios, in seeking detailed information. 
Insignificant differences emerged between the younger and older funds, and 
smaller and larger funds. 
However, the differences were significant between late and early stage investors, 
and technology and non-technology funds. Again there is a clear linkage 
between the two groups, in that technology investors might be focussing on 
strategic planning while meeting their investee companies, while both technology 
and non-technology funds perform an overall performance appraisal on their 
investee companies. 
10.3.9 Monitoring - Focus of Discussion: All the venture capitalists in India 
monitor their investee companies through personal discussions. There were no 
differences in their focus of discussion based on fund origin, fund age, and 
portfolio size. 
Nevertheless, early stage investors and late stage investors, technology and 
non-technology investors, fund size per fund manager, and smaller and larger 
funds differ in their 'focus of discussion', when they personally meet the 
management functionaries of their investee companies. These factors present 
more or less the same pattern where early stage, technology funds, small fund 
size, and a lower amount per fund manager behave differently from their 
counterparts. Overall, the practice of extensive monitoring of investee companies 
by Indian venture capitalists is in line with earlier studies (Gompers, 1996; Reid, 
1998) and re-confirms the earlier results that venture capitalists in India monitor 
their investee companies extensively. 
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10.3.10 Monitoring (Corporate Governance) - Replacement of CEOs: In line with 
international practice, the trend of replacing the CEOs of their investee 
companies is catching up in India. Surprisingly, more Indian venture capitalists 
replaced the CEOs of their investee companies than foreign investors. However, 
the percentage of replaced CEOs in their portfolio companies is higher in case of 
foreign funds. However, many venture capitalists made it clear during the course 
of discussion that they would have replaced more CEOs, had they located high 
quality professionals to replace the incumbents. 
10.3.11 Monitoring (Corporate Governance) - Reasons for CEOs Replacement: 
Contrary to international studies, where the CEOs are replaced due to their lack 
of strategic skills, in India operating skills were reported to be the main reason for 
dismissal in India. However, strategic reasons ranked a close second. Ironically, 
very few investors reported the replacement of CEOs due to a lack of integrity. 
There is statistical evidence that technology and non-technology investors 
replace the CEOs of their investee companies for different reasons. 
Interestingly, regression analysis shows that the classification based on amount 
of funds managed per Fund Manager differ across all possible reasons for 
replacing CEOs. This revelation is puzzling and required further investigation to 
reach the bottom of this phenomenon. Similarly, technology and non-technology 
investors differ in terms of assigning strategic skills, commercial skills and 
drive/vision as reasons for replacing their CEOs. However, a mixed response 
towards both a lack of strategic and operational skills as reasons for the 
replacement of CEOs of investee companies still does not provide a clear 
answer. These mixed results are again in line with earlier studies (Andrews, 
1980; Burton et al., 1997; and Longenecker and Moore, 1991). 
10.4 Final Word: Despite breaking the sample into seven demographic sub 
groupings, further analysis reconfirmed almost all the results of previous 
hypotheses. However, the practice of using Structuring Covenants differed based 
on amount managed per fund manager and stage of investment. Similarly, 
investors having early and late stage focus also differed in their monitoring 
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practices. As witnessed in the descriptive analysis, a vast majority of fund 
managers have similar educational qualifications. Also, they come primarily from 
an industrial or merchant banking background. There is very rapid movement of 
human resources from one fund to the other. Therefore, it is likely that the 
venture capital management skills are increasingly generalised. 
10.5 Implications of this Research: 
10.5.1 For Entrepreneurs: This research has a number of important implications 
for entrepreneurs. First, it demonstrates that venture capitalists rely on their own 
due diligence report. Therefore, entrepreneurs must provide as much information 
as possible at an early stage, in order to make their proposal attractive. Second, 
it shows that DCF based valuation techniques are used by the investors. Thus, 
entrepreneurs have to prepare a strong business model, with demonstrated 
strength of cash flows in order to successfully achieve the 'financial closure'. 
Third, through this research, entrepreneurs know the stringent structuring 
requirements of the investors, i. e., a long list of covenants in order to minimise 
the risk and increase the value of the project. This will allow them to make 
provisions in their strategic planning for meeting those requirements. 
Entrepreneurs will also know the milestones that the venture capitalists set for 
releasing further funds and hence they can prepare the ground for meeting such 
milestones in advance. There is always a reluctance on the part of the 
entrepreneurs to dilute their ownership. This research shows that equity is the 
most preferred product used by venture capitalists. Therefore, entrepreneurs 
have to prepare a strong business case that, despite factoring in equity dilution, 
provides sufficient returns to the investors, while retaining control of the business. 
The research also reveals that the venture capitalists monitor their investee 
companies extensively and frequently. This will educate the entrepreneurs about 
the required level of transparency of their business practices in advance. 
Similarly, they will have to build-in a case for eventual replacement / stepping 
down of CEO in the event that growth and valuation is impaired. 
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10.5.2 For Venture Capitalists: The research reveals how venture capitalists 
behave globally with regard to the Valuation, Structuring and Monitoring 
practices. Venture capitalists in India can also benchmark their practices against 
the overall industry practices. Particularly, the breakdown of the entire sample 
into seven sub-groups based on certain demographic characteristics will prove to 
be immensely beneficial. For instance: (a) Structuring covenant practices of 
technology and non-technology investors differ; (b) Structuring covenant 
practices of greater and lower amount managed per fund manager differ, (c) 
Monitoring practices of early and late stage investors differ; and (d) Use of 
Financial Products differs between early and late stage investors, and technology 
and non-technology investors. 
Additionally, venture capitalists can design their human resource policies as they 
know the age and qualifications of fund managers employed elsewhere. The 
average amount of funds managed per fund manager is also established for the 
industry. This finding can also add value to their long term planning. 
Similarly, venture capitalists have a clear picture about the number of deals 
executed in each major sector and stage. Based on this information, they can 
ascertain the demand-supply scenario in future and orchestrate their policies 
pertaining to target sector and stage for future investments. 
10.5.3 For Policy Makers: This research presents adequate evidence that SMEs 
play a significant role in the economic development. It confirms that paucity of 
funds is one of their paramount concerns. Also, it demonstrates that venture 
capital is an effective catalyst to bridge any funding gap, to a certain extent. 
However, venture capital needs a favourable environment to flourish. 
Despite receiving commitments of about US$ 3 billion, and investments of about 
US$ 2 billion through private equity, India remains an investment deficient 
country. In the last 10 years, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of 
gross domestic investment has just been 2.60 percent, while FDI as a 
percentage of GDP is merely 0.50 percent during the same period. These figures 
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are much lower than India's poor neighbours Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. Venture capital forms a part of FDI and therefore this source of 
investment needs to be accelerated. 
According to informed commentators, India requires over US$ 200 billion of 
investment to build its infrastructure over the next 10 years. After the worldwide 
slowdown in the IT sector, there is tremendous opportunity to attract private 
equity for infrastructure replacement. There are also plenty of buy-out 
opportunities by un-locking the value of sick, state-owned and undervalued listed 
companies. In the first half of 1990s, more than 60 percent of funds and more 
than 80 percent of number of investments by the British venture capitalists were 
executed in the form of buy-outs. 
However, this cannot be achieved unless the government ensures an absolutely 
independent regulatory regime, uniform and favourable entry, tax pass-through, 
and exit policies. Similarly, there should be no restrictions on the percentage of 
investment and lock-in period of private equity investments. Also, a substantial 
part of venture capital investments take place in the form of equity. If the 
government continues to provide tax benefits for borrowing and no such gains for 
dividends, then SMEs will persistently suffer, as equity will continue to be more 
expensive for borrowers. Therefore, as an experiment, in order to bring equity at 
par with debt and allow the users of capital to freely choose between the two, the 
same tax benefits should be extended to dividends as well. 
Under the depressed capital market conditions, exits are hard to come by. The 
Over The Counter Exchange of India (OTCEI) has failed to live up to its 
expectations. Also, the requirement of three years profitability track record for 
listing the companies further restricts the exit options for the investors. There is a 
need to develop a second board market that could provide trading facilities for 
unlisted companies, within one of the two premier stock exchanges. This 
small/mid cap board can either takeover the infrastructure of OTCEI or create its 
own within the existing base of the parent stock exchange. Any effort to revive 
OTCEI may not work, as it has lost the faith of the investor community. 
335 
Chapter 10 Conclusions & Implications 
10.6 Areas for Future Research: India is only beginning to witness dedicated 
research in venture capital. Therefore, there are many areas that are open to 
further research. 
Despite a growing venture capital market, exits have been few and far between. 
It is important to study and understand the returns such exits have provided to 
the investors. It will be equally interesting to study the demand side of the 
business by investigating whether or not the value-added investors have really 
added value to their investee companies. If yes, what? This research may focus 
on entrepreneurs who have received venture capital funding. . 
Also, countries like India present tremendous buy-out opportunities for venture 
capitalists to fund. However, it was noticed during this research that this side of 
the deal-flow is almost completely missing. It is worth finding out why, because 
buy-outs (not necessarily leveraged) are proved as an effective means of un- 
locking the value in the US and European economies. 
Finally, venture capital financing is conceptually similar to the profit-loss sharing 
based Islamic financing. Although the focus of this research does not address to 
Islamic finance directly, it does provide answers to some of the hurdles being 
faced by the Islamic financing industry. They are listed in appendix J, together 
with the possible areas for related future research. For facilitating any future 
research in venture capital from an Islamic finance perspective, a list of 
references used in appendix J is provided within the references of this chapter. 
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Appendix A 
Pre-tested Questionnaire 
QUESTIONNAIRE [Draft] 
The questionnaire is being piloted on a small number of academic experts in the 
field, and a selected sample of venture capitalists, in order to assess its coverage 
and precision. Then refinements will be affected as a result of the feedback 
received from the pilot survey. Please tick OR encircle numbers where relevant. 
General: 
1. Does anyone in your team have following qualifications? 
(a) MBA Yes () No () 
(b) Chartered Accountant Yes () No () 
(c) Engineering Yes () No () 
(d) If others, please specify 
2. Is anyone in your team is ? (please tick more than one if appropriate) 
(a) Under 25 Yes () No () 
(b) 25 to 35 Yes () No () 
(c) 35 to 45 Yes () No () 
(d) Over 45 Yes () No () 
3. Does anyone in your team have experience of working for any of the 
following? (Please tick more than one if applicable) 
(a) Commercial bank Yes () No () 
(b) Merchant bank Yes () No () 
(c) Stock broking Yes () No () 
(d) Consultancy Yes () No () 
(e) Industry Yes () No () 
(f) Venture capital Yes () No () 
(g) If others, please specify 
4. Please provide a breakdown of your investments in each of the stage below: 
Stage No. of Investments Amount of Investment (Rs. Million) 
(a) Seed ()() 
(b) Start-up ()() 
(c) Expansion ()() 
(d) Buy-outs ()() 
(e) Secondary Purchase ()() 
Structuring: 
5. What is your policy in structuring investment contracts? 
Xwws Sometimes Rarely Never 
(a) Standard 
(b) Flexible 12344 
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(c) Tailor made 1234 
(d) Industry specific 1234 
(e) Each drafted by Solicitors 1234 
6. In structuring a contract, how important are each of the following: 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Enforceability 12 3 4 
(b) Costs incurred 12 3 4 
(c) Time spent 12 3 4 
7. If use of financial product varies between various stages of investments, 
which of the followi ng financial products do you use at each of the investment 
stages (please circle more than one answer, if appropriate) 
Equity Preference share convertible debt Optionally Convertible Debt Redeemable Debt 
(a) Seed 1 23 4 5 
(b) Startup 1 23 4 5 
(c) Expansion 1 23 4 5 
(d) Buyout 1 23 4 5 
(e) Refinancing 1 23 4 5 
(f) Second round 1 23 4 5 
8. How important are the following covenants in the investment contract: 
(a) Nominating the Chairman 
Essential 
1 
Important 
2 
Desirable 
3 
Irrelevant 
4 
(b) Board representation 1 2 3 4 
(c) Appointment of key functionaries 1 2 3 4 
(d) Appointment of the Auditors 1 2 3 4 
(e) Approval for divestments 1 2 3 4 
(f) Approval for capital expenditure 1 2 3 4 
(g) Approval before raising additional debt 1 2 3 4 
(h) Installing specific accounting package 1 2 3 4 
(i) Monthly financial reporting 1 2 3 4 
(j) Staging of investments 1 2 3 4 
(k) Prior approval of all major contracts 1 2 3 4 
(I) Approval before issuing additional equity 1 2 3 4 
(m) Approval before disposing major assets 1 2 3 4 
(n) Setting executive remuneration 1 2 3 4 
(o) Equity rachets for entrepreneurs 1 2 3 4 
9. If staging of investment is common in investment contracts, how often do you 
peg further investments to each of the following performance benchmarks? 
(a) 
Always 
Profit margins 1 
Mostly 
2 
Rarely 
3 
Never 
4 
(b) Timely project implementation 1 2 3 4 
(c) Earnings per share 1 2 3 4 
(e) Net profit per employee 1 2 3 4 
(f) Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 1 2 3 4 
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(g) If others, please specify 
Valuation: 
10. How relevant are 'the following valuation methods in making investment 
decision? 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Dividend yield 1 2 3 4 
(b) Net asset per share 1 2 3 4 
(C) I. R. R. 1 2 3 4 
(d) Net Present Value 1 2 3 4 
(e) Economic Value Added 1 2 3 4 
(f) E. B. I. T. multiple 1 2 3 4 
(h) Qualitative assessment 1 2 3 4 
(i) Rule of Thumb 1 2 3 4 
0) Industry benchmarks 1 2 3 4 
(k) If others, please specify 
Monitoring: 
11. How often are the following financial statements required from the investees? 
Monthly Quadery Yearly New 
(a) Profit and loss account 1 2 3 4 
(b) Balance sheet 1 2 3 4 
(c) Cash flow statement 1 2 3 4 
(d) Sales budget 1 2 3 4 
(e) Sales reports 1 2 3 4 
(f) Inventory reports 1 2 3 4 
(g) Payroll sheets 1 2 3 4 
(h) Product costing 1 2 3 4 
(i) Creditors' details 1 2 3 4 
Q) Budgeted versus actual 1 2 3 4 
(k) Market share analysis 1 2 3 4 
(I) Capacity utilization report 1 2 3 4 
(m) If others, please specify 
12. How often do your discussions with the investee companies focus on the 
following aspects: 
(a) Performance appraisal 
(b) Strategic planning 
(c) Adherence to contract 
(d) Developing MIS 
(e) Trouble shooting 
(f) Blend of all 
(g) If others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
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13. How often do you ask for the following specific breakdowns in periodic 
financial statements? 
(a) Marketing expenses 
(b) Identification of overheads 
(c) Product line profitability 
(d) Travelling expenses 
(e) Turnover per employee 
(f) Profit per employee 
(g) Entertainment expenses 
(h) Capex analysis 
(i) Order bookings 
(j) If others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
14. For ensuring timely receipt of the information, how often do you use the 
following means? 
(a) Penalty for delays 
(b) Rewards for timely submission 
(c) Personal contacts 
(d) Perseverance 
(e) Legal recourse 
(f) Others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
15. After receiving, how do you use the information provided by the investee? 
Always 
(a) Just go through; and file 1 
Mostly 
2 
Rarely 
3 
New 
4 
(b) Extensively analyze 1 2 3 4 
(c) Compare with the budget 1 2 3 4 
(d) Compare with their competitors 1 2 3 4 
(e) Give feedback to investees 1 2 3 4 
(f) Develop performance enhancing strategy 1 2 3 4 
(g) Others, please specify 
16. In your opinion, do entrepreneurial incentives result into improved 
performance? Always ( ), Mostly ( ), Rarely ( ), Never ( ). 
17. If replacement of CEOs of an under performing investee company is 
common, how many CEOs have you replaced in the last 3 years? 
0( ), 1-5( ), 6-10( ), >10( ) 
18. What were the primary deficiencies in his/their functioning: 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Strategic planning 12 3 4 
(b) Interpersonal skills 12 3 4 
(c) Operational skills 12 3 4 
(d) Financial skills 12 3 4 
(e) Communication skills 12 3 4 
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(f) Others, please specify 
19. How did you find the desired replacement? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Very easily 1 2 3 4 
(b) Fairly easily 1 2 3 4 
(C) Easily 1 2 3 4 
(d) It was very difficult 1 2 3 4 
(e) It was quite difficult 1 2 3 4 
(f) It was difficult 1 2 3 4 
20. How often did the new C EO achieve the desired results in the following 
ways? (Please encircle more than one if necessary) 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Increased market share 1 2 3 4 
(b) Better capacity utilization 1 2 3 4 
(c) Increased cost savings 1 2 3 4 
(d) Increased margins 1 2 3 4 
(e) Better product quality 1 2 3 4 
(f) Others, please specify 
21. Does the performance variation (against projections) increase or decrease 
the information requirement frequency in the following manner? 
Exceeding Just achieving Below Way below 
(a) Weekly 1 2 3 4 
(b) Monthly 1 2 3 4 
(c) Quarterly 1 2 3 4 
(d) Six monthly 1 2 3 4 
(e) Annually 1 2 3 4 
22. How do you cope with potentially bad investments? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Acquire fully and sell 1 2 3 4 
(b) Replace the entire management 1 2 3 4 
(c) Try to revive by capital infusion 1 2 3 4 
(d) Bring in strategic partner 1 2 3 4 
(e) Acquire and strip assets 1 2 3 4 
(f) Book losses and quit 1 2 3 4 
(g) Others, please specify 
23. How often do you attribute the s uccess of your portfolio companies to the 
following factors: 
(a) Management efficiency 
Always 
1 
mostly 
2 
Rarely 
3 
New 
4 
(b) Product features 1 2 3 4 
(c) Market growth 1 2 3 4 
(d) Government policies 1 2 3 4 
343 
(e) Core promoter is also the C. E. O. 
(f) C. E. O. is a professional; holds equity 
(g) Cutting edge Technology 
(h) All senior functionaries hold equity 
(i) Ability to attract quality manpower 
(j) Others, please specify 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
24. How often do you attribute the failure of your portfolio companies to the 
following factors: 
(a) Management inefficiency 
(b) Poor Product 
(c) Market sluggishness 
(d) Poor marketing 
(e) Government policies 
(f) inappropriate technology 
(g) Inability to attract quality manpower 
(g) Lack of funds 
(h) Poor technology 
(i) Labor relations 
(j) Promoter's extravagant lifestyle 
(k) Others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Neuer 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
25. Do you think that the following factors might have averted the failure of your 
investee companies? 
Very sure Quite sure Sure Not sure 
(a) Timely communication 1 2 3 4 
(b) Fund infusion 1 2 3 4 
(c) Quality management 1 2 3 4 
(d) Commitment of promoters 1 2 3 4 
(e) Others, please specify 
26. Number of investments written off: up to 5(), 5- 10 ( ), 10 - 15 ( ), > 15. 
27. Number of investments that lost money: 
upto5( ), 5-10 ( ), 10-15( ) >15( ). 
28. Number of investments that doubled money: 
upto5( ), 5-10( ), 10-15( ), >15( ). 
29. Number of investments that have provided up to 500 % returns: 
upto2( ), 2-5( ), 5-10( ), >10( ). 
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Appendix B 
Report of Pilot Survey 
Activity Report India March 7`" to May 15,2000 
During nine week stay in India, seventeen of the top twenty venture capitalists / private equity 
fund managers were personally interviewed in Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore, while three were 
contacted over the phone due to time and cost constraints. The idea was to meet senior 
functionaries who are either number one or at least number two in the organisation. They were 
invited to just comment on the draft questionnaire and not answerat this stage. 
The objective of this exercise was to assess the precision and coverage of the questionnaire to 
ensure that no key aspect, of the topic of research i. e. structuring and monitoring of private equity 
investments, is left out. Despite their over-stretched schedule, most of the senior functionaries 
offered to spare their precious time and made invaluable suggestions to improve the contents of 
the questionnaire. These inputs will immensely benefit the final version of the instrument when it 
would be administered towards the end of this year or early next year. 
Being practitioners, their suggestions are purely practical and will be considered from academic 
standpoint before being incorporated in the final version of the questionnaire. Each of the twenty 
nine questions were extensively discussed in all the meetings. Placed below is the list of 
suggestions that they viewed were critical on the subject Numbers in this list are the same as 
respective question numbers in the draft questionnaire. 
Dhruva Chaudhurl President & CEO Punjab Venture Fund 
5. Basic term-sheet is produced by the fund managers, later refined by Solicitors 
7. Tax considerations drive instrument of investments. 
- Add optionally convertible preference shares. 
- Zero coupon redeemable bonds are possible with a lower priced equity. 
9. Add turnover in conventional sectors and penetration, head-count, subscribers in IT, Media 
and Internet sectors. 
10. Add turnover multiple for valuation. 
13. Add raw material cost. 
15. Discuss in the board of investor's (venture capital's) company. 
16. CEO concept is rare in India, most of the investee companies are entrepreneur / promoter 
driven. 
21. Replace X axis by Y axis. 
BOTTOMLINE: Structure of the deal varies from sector to sector. 
345 
Donald Peck Chief Executive Commonwealth Development Corp. 
6. (d) Clarity of language. 
9. At each stage of investments, there are fresh sets of requirements. 
- Add revenue growth (absolute turnover), volumes of subscribers. 
17. Put in percentage. 
22. Put it like'if performance varies significantly, then do you increase ...... '. 
23. Add marketing techniques or ability to market 
26 - 29. Convert into percentage. 
Vivek Chachi Associate Vice President Citibank 
7. (a) Sectoral differences drive the type of instrument 
15. Rethink of replacing Y ads of 21 with Y ads of 15 OR keep both. 
Jonathon Bond Chief Representative HSBC 
3. Put number of years experience. 
4. (b) Seed and startup is same, put early stage instead. 
(c) Expansion (In business for 18 months or more). 
8. Add, adoption of GAAP, Pricing, mechanism and timing of exit (IPO). 
- Invest as majority or minority investor. 
. Add drag along and tag along rights. 
- Cash bonuses on net profit above a threshold IRR level for entrepreneurs. 
- Put options in that entrepreneurs agree to buy venture capitalist's equity giving him 10+ dollar 
returns if, for instance, investee company underperforms less than 20% of budgeted figures 
OR no exit opportunity in five years etc. 
9. Achievement of budgets. 
I 0. (b) Multiple of investment on exit. 
11. Add : do you have a dedicated monitoring team? 
- Are board members independent or from the fund management team? Fund managers 
attend board meetings as only observers. 
- How senior is monitoring executive. 
25. (b) Conflict of interest. 
4 Add one question each on exit, the type of venture capitalist's fund management structure, 
how many investments are made every year, do they use local solicitors or International etc. 
decision making criteria like composition of investment committee. 
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Dinesh Sharma General Manager IFCI Venture Fund 
3. Relevant experience in the investee's sector is important for fund managers. 
9. Add growth rate, assessment of budgets versus actual. 
10. Growth potential is critical. 
11. Add working capital management, debtors' management reports, and reports on statutory 
defaults like provident fund, repayment of loans or interest etc. 
12. Internal auditors to put systems in place. 
14. Take offa&b. 
18. Add integrity. 
23. Add vision of promoters / entrepreneurs. 
24. Lack of promoter's /entrepreneurs. 
25. Attitude of venture capitalists' failure in giving comfort to entrepreneurs 
Akhil Awasthi Head of Research Barings Pvt. Equity 
1., 2. And 3. Can be combined, for example: 
Please provide the following details of your team members: 
Person Age Qualifications V. C. Experience Overall Experience 
4. (b) Replace start-up by early stage and ADD (f) as pre IPO stage. 
6. Structuring also varies from sector to sector. 
7. Add optionally convertible equity shares. 
8. Add key men insurance, exit interviews with key functionaries, Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) and Patents. In the case of later two, these rights should remain within the investee 
company. 
9. (a) & (b) may be revenue projections and net profits. 
10. Replace (d) by DCF 
11. Joining and leaving report in knowledge based sectors is essential. 
12. Take off (f) because you are giving an option of an easy answer. 
13. Remove (d). 
15. (a) Say as routine instead. 
19. Put it like this: 
If you replace CEOs, how do you find replacement? 
Very easily () Fairly easily () Quite difficult () Very difficult () 
20. Add facilitated exit (through IPO) etc. 
21. Try to re-phrase the question. 
22. Put 5x instead. It indicates the number of times original investment has grown 
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Puneet Bhatia Head - Equity Investments GE Capital 
-ý Include exit mechanism somewhere. 
-ý If investee company is under performing, we insist on forming an Executive Committee and 
we participate in that. This committee meets more frequently than the Board. 
4 Convertibles do not work in India. 
-ý Standard document can be accessed through www. lzecppital. com by going into GE Equity. 
Sunil Divakar Regional Head ICICI Venture Fund 
7. Say convertible instrument NOT debt. (Conversion depends upon performance milestones). 
8. Add Protection of Intellectual Property as a covenant. VC should be consulted in buying and 
selling of that. IPR should remain within the investee company. 
+ Accounting Information System (AIS) is evaluated during due diligence. 
28. Specify time-frame for returns. 
Gautam Saingal Director American International Group 
6. Add increasing value and decreasing risk. 
8. Add to (n) and equity linked securities + ESOPs. 
- Add change in Memorandum & Article of Association. 
- Add approval for getting into unrelated business. 
- Add approval before any kind of dilution in equity in the form of M&A, consolidation, 
reorganization, restructuring etc. 
4 Independent monitoring cell is very important. 
4 Structuring is well covered, spruce up monitoring side a bit. 
-4 Besides stress on reporting, include other indicators providing early warning for failure or 
potential trouble. 
Pradeep Shah Chairman IndAsia Fund Advisors 
9. Is it follow on investment to salvage previous investment or separate investment on its own 
merits. 
4 Add something to investigate how disagreements are resolved. 
4 Minority protection must be included. 
4 Restrictions on restructuring or sale must be included. 
4 Drag along right is missing. 
4 Trade sale is an exit option practiced very often. 
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Nandan Chakravarty Associate Vice President ILFS 
8. Is the chairman having casting vote i. e final say in an event of equal voting. 
- Add dividend policy. 
10. Put EBITDA multiple NOT EBIT. Or take valuation off. 
11. Add project implementation status. 
12. Add regulatory approvals, specially in infrastructure projects. 
13. After the investment is made or post-investment discussion, clarify? 
- Add perpetual appraisal and valuation of the company. 
21. Put it like this: If there is under performance, what steps do you take: 
(a) Appointment of special management consultants. 
(b) Ask for additional information on specific issues. 
(c) Detailed reports on specific things that are going wrong 
(d) If others, please specify. 
22. Put drag along right. 
24. Failure of investment or company? 
26. Add dispute resolution mechanism. 
Abhay Havaldar Managing Director Draper International 
4 Get source of deal some where. 
4 How much time VCs spend on the investee company. 
4 VCs invest with entrepreneurs and not promoters. 
4 We invest in a company that can start off with little cash. 
S We assess the performance of investee company on the basis of Cash-in Cash-out 
6. Add liquidity. The contract should keep me liquid all the time. Since I'm also an equity 
investor like the entrepreneur, liquidation preference must be given to me i. e I'll get out of the 
project before the entrepreneur in case of winding up. 
7. Preference shares have legal hurdles in India. 
- Add sectors on Y axis in a follow up question. 
9. Development of Patent is important because we invest at seed stage. 
- Add conditions precedent, operating breakeven, cash breakeven. 
16. If we are the only investors then it works, but if there are multiple investors then it is difficult. 
21. We take executive actions, do not ask for additional information. 
25. (d) Add promoters / entrepreneurs. 
Prakash Kamik Director JF Electra Fund 
4 Foreign funds can invest in Dollars, Indian funds cannot 
4 MIS is critical for monitoring our investments. 
4 We align our interest with entrepreneur's. 
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4 We ask for veto rights. 
8. Add approval before using surplus cash i. e treasury operations. 
- Add approval before undertaking any type of restructuring. 
- Add right of proportional board representation. 
10. xtimes of original investment i. e. multiple. 
11. Take off 'financial' from the question and Add employee retention program as (m). 
12. Profile management (building) of the investee company in preparation for IPO or other forms 
of eventual exits. 
13. Add cost of capital. 
14. Bring (a) down to number 4. 
18. Add lack of drive; and vision. 
20. Add increased revenue. 
21. Improve the language. 
25. Add focus, integrity, drive / motivation and put capability instead of quality. 
Vinod Mankad President Small Industries Development Bank 
4 Performance linked conversion of equity is preferred. 
4 Add valuation and make it a win-win situation for both. 
8. Add appointment of internal auditor. 
9. Refine this question such that it does not look like second round on investment. 
- Disbursement according to Progress Report. 
10. Add brand equity. 
13. Add product costing. 
24. (d) Make it Marketing Strategy and ADD team building somewhere. 
Bharat Kewalramani Managing Director Chase Manhattan 
5. Each drafted by solicitor and tailor made is same thing. 
8. Add option plan. 
9. Add recruitment, 
12. Add product development, sales and marketing, acquisition, billings etc. 
17. Put percentage instead of numbers. 
21. Make the question clearer. 
24. Add cheating and theft. 
26 - 29. Convert them into percentage. 
350 
Appendix C 
Final Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Department of Economics 
Loughborough University 
Leicester LE11 3TU 
U. K. 
T aluation, 
, 
Stniclu1711g and, I IonitortiTg of Private I, quill 1 'entz v Copilot lrte('. stnieºrty 
General: 
1. How many members in your team have the following qualifications? 
(a) MBA () 
(b) MBA + Engineering () 
(c) Chartered Accountant () 
(d) Chartered Accountant + MBA () 
(e) Engineering () 
(f) Engineering + Chartered Accountant () 
(g) if others, please specify 
2. How many members in your team are? 
(a) Under 25 years () 
(b) 25 to 35 years () 
(c) 35 to 45 years () 
(d) Over 45 years () 
3. How many members in your team have prior experience of working for any 
of the following? 
(a) Commercial bank () 
(b) Merchant bank () 
(c) Stockbroking () 
(d) Consultancy () 
(e) Industry () 
(f) Venture capital () 
(g) If others, please specify 
4. Please provide a breakdown of your investments in each of the stage 
below: 
Stage No. of Investments Amount of Investment 
(Rs. Million) 
(a) Seed ()() 
(b) Early Stage ()() 
(c) Expansion ()() 
(d) Buy-outs ()() 
(e) Pre IPO ()() 
(0 Secondary Purchase ()() 
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5. Please provide a breakdown of your investments in each of the sectors 
below: 
Sector No. of Investments Amount of Investment 
(Rs. Million) 
(a) Manufacturing ()() 
(b) Infrastructure ()() 
(c) IT, Media & Telecom ()() 
(d) Retail, Healthcare & Other Services ()() 
(e) Others, please specify ()() 
Valuation: 
6. How important are the following sources of information in the valuation 
process: 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Own due diligence report 1 2 3 4 
(b) Overall coherence of business plan 1 2 3 4 
(c) Audited balance sheet and P&L statement 1 2 3 4 
(d) Curriculum vitae of management 1 2 3 4 
(e) Unaudited management projections 1 2 3 4 
(f) Proposed exit timing and mechanism 1 2 3 4 
(g) Due diligence by accounting/consulting firms 1 2 3 4 
(h) Interviews with entrepreneurs/key personnel 1 2 3 4 
(i) Product/technical/marketing information 1 2 3 4 
(j) Other venture capitalists / investors 1 2 3 4 
7. How relevant are the following quantitative valuation methods in making 
investment decision? 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Dividend yield 1 2 3 4 
(b) Net asset per share 1 2 3 4 
(c) I. R. R. 1 2 3 4 
(d) DCF/ NPV 1 2 3 4 
(e) Economic Value Added 1 2 3 4 
(f) EBITDA multiple 1 2 3 4 
(g) Pay Back 1 2 3 4 
(h) Accounting Rate of Return 1 2 3 4 
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8. How relevant are the following qualitative valuation methods in making 
investment decision? 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Turnover / Headcount / Subscribers multiple 1 2 3 4 
(b) Multiple of initial investment on exit 1 2 3 4 
(c) Rule of thumb 1 2 3 4 
(d) Industry benchmarks 1 2 3 4 
(e) Brand equity 1 2 3 4 
(f) If others, please specify 
9. When more than one valuation method is used, how often are each of the 
following approaches used for determining the range of entry price? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Place greatest weight on one and use others as check 1 2 3 4 
(b) Use the average valuation 1 2 3 4 
(c) Use the lowest valuation 1 2 3 4 
(d) Use the median valuation 1 2 3 4 
(e) Use the highest valuation 1 2 3 4 
10. Thinking of the stages, which of the following discount rates (in %) do you 
use at each of the investment stages? (please circle more than one answer, 
if appropriate) 
10-20 21-35 36-50 51-65 above65 
(a) Seed 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Early Stage 1 2 3 4 5 
(C) Expansion 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Buyout 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Pre IPO 1 2 3 4 5 
(f) Secondary Purchase 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Thinking of the sectors, which of the following discount rates (in %) do you 
use in each of the sectors? (please circle more than one answer, if 
appropriate) 
10-20 
(a) Manufacturing I 
(b) Infrastructure 1 
(c) IT, Media & Telecom 1 
(d) Retail, Healthcare & Servicesl 
(e) Others I 
21-35 36 - 50 51-65 above 65 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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Structuring: 
12. What is your policy in structuring investment contracts? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Standard 1 2 3 4 
(b) Flexible - 1 2 3 4 (c) Industry specific 1 2 3 4 
(d) Each drafted by Solicitors 1 2 3 4 
13. In structuring a contract, how importa nt are each of the following: 
Essential Important Desirable Irrelevant 
(a) Enforceability 1 2 3 4 
(b) Costs incurred 1 2 3 4 
(c) Time spent 1 2 3 4 
(d) Increasing value & decreasing risk 1 2 3 4 
(e) Liquidation preference 1 2 3 4 
14. How important are the following covenants in the investment contract: 
(a) Nominating the Chairman (Casting vote) 
Essential 
1 
Important 
2 
Desirable 
3 
Irrelevant 
4 
(b) Proportional board representation 1 2 3 4 
(c) Appointment of key functionaries 1 2 3 4 
(d) Appointment of Auditors (internal & statutory) 1 2 3 4 
(e) Post-completion Audit 1 2 3 4 
(f) Approval for restructuring & consolidation 1 2 3 4 
(g) Approval for capital expenditure 1 2 3 4 
(h) Approval for borrowings and equity dilution 1 2 3 4 
(i) Installing specific accounting package 1 2 3 4 
(j) Monthly financial reporting 1 2 3 4 
(k) Staging of disbursement or drawdown 1 2 3 4 
(I) Approval for all major contracts 1 2 3 4 
(m) Approval for disposing major assets 1 2 3 4 
(n) Setting executive remuneration 1 2 3 4 
(o) Employee Stock Ownership Plan 1 2 3 4 
(p) Equity rachets for entrepreneurs 1 2 3 4 
(q) Exit timing and Mechanism 1 2 3 4 
(r) Drag along & Tag along rights 1 2 3 4 
(s) Right of first refusal in future fund raising 1 2 3 4 
(t) I. P. Rights in investee's name 1 2 3 4 
(u) Approval for changing Memo. & Art. of Assoc. 1 2 3 4 
(v) Approval for treasury operations 1 2 3 4 
(w) Maintaining escrow account for controlling flow of fundsl 2 3 4 
(x) Right to send observers in important meetings 1 2 3 4 
(y) Right to inspect books, records and visit facilities 1 2 3 4 
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15. If staging of disbursement or draw-down is common in investment contracts, 
how often do you peg release of funds to achieving each of the following 
performance benchmarks? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Turnover or Subscribers 1 2 3 4 
(b) Achievement of Budgets 1 2 3 4 
(c) Operating or Cash breakeven 1 2 3 4 
(d) Projected revenue or Net profit 1 2 3 4 
(e) Recruitment of key functionaries 1 2 3 4 
(f) If others, please specify 
16. If use of financial product varies between various stages of investments, 
which of the following financial products do you use at each of the 
investment stages? (please circle more than one answer, if necessary) 
Equity Non Voting Op'naly Con'tible Convertible Debt 
Equity Pref. Shares Debt 
(a) Seed 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Early Stage 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) Expansion 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Buyout 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Pre IPO 1 2 3 4 5 
(f) Secondary Purchase 1 2 3 4 5 
17. If use of financial product varies between various sectors, which of the 
following financial products do you use in each of the sectors? (please circle 
more than one answer, if necessary) 
Equity Non Voting Op'nally Con'tlble Convertible 
Equity Pref. Shares Debt 
(a) Manufacturing 1 2 3 4 
(b) Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 
(c) IT, Media and Telecom 1 2 3 4 
(d) Retail, Healthcare & Services 1 2 3 4 
(e) Others 1 2 3 4 
Monitoring: 
18. Do you have a dedicated monitoring team? Yes () No () 
19. How often are the following statements required from the investees? 
Debt 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Monthly Quartery Yearly Never 
(a) Profit and loss account 1234 
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(b) Balance sheet 
(c) Cash flow statement 
(d) Sales budget 
(e) Sales reports 
(f) Inventory reports 
(g) Payroll sheets 
(h) Creditors' & debtors' reports 
(i) Budgeted versus actual 
(j) Market share analysis 
(k) Capacity utilization report 
(I) Working Capital report 
(m) Statutory defaults report 
(n) Joining & leaving report of key personnel 
(0) Project implementation report 
(p) If others, please specify 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
20. How often do you ask for the following specific breakdowns in periodic 
statements? 
(a) Raw material cost 
(b) Cost of capital 
(c) Marketing expenses 
(d) Identification of overheads 
(e) Product line cost & profits 
(f) Turnover per employee 
(g) Profit per employee 
(h) Capex analysis 
(i) Order bookings 
(j) If others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Neuer 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
-21. For ensuring timely receipt of the information, how often do you use the 
following means? 
(a) Personal contacts 
(b) Perseverance 
(c) Penalty for delays 
(d) Legal recourse 
(e) Others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
22. After receiving the information, how do you use the information provided by 
the investee? 
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(a) Routinely go through and file 
(b) Analyze & compare with budgets 
(c) Discuss in the Investor's board meetings 
(d) Compare with competitors 
(e) Give feedback to investees 
(f) Develop performance enhancing strategy 
(g) Others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
23. How often do your discussions with the investee companies focus on the 
following aspects: 
(a) Performance appraisal 
(b) Strategic planning 
(c) Adherence to contracted covenants 
(d) Status of statutory compliance 
(e) Trouble shooting 
(f) Profile management (building) 
(g) Product development 
(h) Sales, Marketing and Billing 
(i) Acquisitions 
Q) Fund raising 
(k) Exit plans 
(I) If others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
24. In your opinion, do entrepreneuriaVCEO incentives result into improved 
performance? 
Always ( ), Mostly ( ), Rarely ( ), Never ( ). 
25. If replacement of CEOs of an under performing investee company is 
common, how many CEOs, in percentage terms, have you replaced in the 
last 3 years? 
0(), 1-5 ( ), 6-10( ), >10 () 
26. What were the primary deficiencies in his/their functioning that led to the 
replacement of CEOs? 
Always Mostly Rarely New 
(a) Strategic skills 1234 
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(b) Interpersonal skills 
(c) Operational skills 
(d) Financial skills 
(e) Communication skills 
(f) Integrity 
(g) Drive and vision 
(h) Others, please specify 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
27. When you replace CEOs, do you find replacement: 
Very easy () Fairly easy () Difficult () Very difficult () 
28. How often did the new CEO achieve the desired results in the following 
ways? 
(a) Increased market share 
(b) Increased revenue 
(c) Better capacity utilization 
(d) Increased cost savings 
(e) Increased margins 
(f) Increased customer satisfaction 
(g) Facilitated exit 
(h) Others, please specify 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
Bottom-line: 
29. Generally, If there is under performance of investee companies against initial 
projections, what steps do you take? 
Always Mostly Rarely New 
(a) Appoint management consultants 1 2 3 4 
(b) Ask for specific additional information 1 2 3 4 
(c) Take detailed reports on areas facing probleml 2 3 4 
(d) Take executive actions 1 2 3 4 
(e) If others, please specify 
30. Thinking generally about investee companies, how do you co pe with 
potentially bad investments? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Acquire fully and sell 1 2 3 4 
(b) Replace the entire management 1 2 3 4 
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(c) Try to revive by further capital infusion 1234 
(d) Bring in strategic partner 1234 
(e) Acquire and strip assets 1234 
(f) Book losses and quit 1234 
(g) Others, please specify 
31. How often do you attribute the success of your investments to the following 
factors: 
Always 
(a) Entrepreneur's vision 1 
(b) Management efficiency 1 
(c) Product features 1 
(d) Market growth 1 
(e) Government policies 1 
(f) Marketing techniques 1 
(g) Core promoter is also the C. E. O. 1 
(h) C. E. O. is a professional; holds equity 1 
(i) Cutting edge Technology 1 
(j) All senior functionaries hold equity 1 
(k) Ability to attract & retain quality manpower I 
(I) Pure luck 1 
(m) Others, please specify 
Mostly Rarely Never 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
32. How often do you attribute the failure of your investments to the following 
factors: 
Always 
(a) Management inefficiency 1 
(b) Poor Product 1 
(c) Market sluggishness 1 
(d) Poor marketing strategy 1 
(e) Infeasible government policies 1 
(f) Inappropriate technology 1 
(g) Inability to attract & retain quality ma npower I 
(h) Lack of funds 1 
(i) Conflict of interest 1 
(j) Cheating & theft I 
(k) CEO did not hold equity 1 
(I) Bad luck 1 
(m) Others, please specify 
Mostly Rarely New 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
33. Do you think that the following factors might have averted the failure of your 
investment(s)? 
Very sure Quite sure Sure Not sure 
(a) Timely communication 1234 
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(b) Greater fund infusion 1234 
(c) Higher management capability 1234 
(d) Entrepreneur's greater focus, integrity & drivel 234 
(e) Better dispute resolution mechanism 1234 
(f) Others, please specify 
34. How often do you use the following as early warning signals for identifying 
failure or potential trouble? 
Always Mostly Rarely Never 
(a) Shrinking market share 1 2 3 4 
(b) Shrinking margins 1 2 3 4 
(c) High employee turnover 1 2 3 4 
(d) Capacity under utilization 1 2 3 4 
(e) Statutory defaults like PF and Debt/interest 1 2 3 4 
(f) Higher debtor levels 1 2 3 4 
(g) Higher inventory levels 1 2 3 4 
(h) Others, please specify 
35. Percentage of investments completely written off till date: (please tick) 
up to 5(), 6 -15 ( ), 16 - 35 ( ), 36 - 50 ( ), > 50 ( ). 
36. Percentage of investments that lost money: (please tick) 
up to 5(), 6 -15 ( ), 16 - 35 ( ), 36 - 50 ( ), >50 ( ). 
37. Percentage of investments that doubled the value of initial investment within 
3-4 years of investment: (please tick) 
up to 5(), 6 -15 ( ), 16 - 35 ( 36 - 50 ( > 50 ( ). 
38. Percentage of investments that increased in value between 2-5 times initial 
investment within 3-4 years of investment: (please tick) 
up to 2(), 3 -10 ( ), 11 - 20 ( ), 21 - 40 ( > 40 ( ). 
39. Percentage of investments that increased in value by >5 times initial 
investment within 3-4 years of investment: (please tick) 
up to 2(), 3 -10 ( ), 11 - 20 ( ), 21 - 40 ( ), >40( ). 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix D 
Specimen Covering Letter 
John R Presley, Professor of Economics 
Department of Economics 
Loughborough University Leicestershire LEI 13TU UK 
Switchboard: +44 (0)1509 263171 Department: +44 (0)1509 222701 
E-mail: J. R. Presley@lboro. ac. uk 
Mr Puneet Bhatia 
Vice President, Equity Group 
GE Capital Services India Limited 
Block 4A, DLF Corporate Park 
Qutab Enclave Phase III, Mehrauli-Gurgaon Road 
Gurgaon - 122022, Haryana 
INDIA 
18 October 2000 
Dear Mr Bhatia 
IC Loughborough 
University 
Direct Line: + 44 (0) 1509 222702 
Fax: +44(0) 1509223910 
E-mail: J. R. Presley@lboro. ac. uk 
hap: //info. lut. ac. uk/home. html 
Subject - Participation in Doctoral Research in Indian Venture Capital Private Equity 
After spending 10 years in Investment Banking, Venture Capital and Corporate Finance in India, Mansoor 
Durrani is doing a PhD on India Venture Capital/Private Equity under our supervision. 
We understand that Mansoor's PhD is the first ever Doctoral Research on 'Valuation, Structuring and 
Monitoring Venture Capital Deals in India'. Venture Capital or Private Equity is a grossly under-researched 
area in India and we hope that this research, among other things, will help industry in identifying some of the 
most crucial techniques of risk management. We undertake to share the findings of this research with all the 
participants, by strictly maintaining the confidentiality of individual responses. 
We would be grateful if you would respond to the enclosed questionnaire by circling the multiple answers of 
your choice. You will notice that the questionnaire is fairly detailed as it highlights the coverage of a typical 
PhD research project. We understand that your time is extremely precious but we do hope that by sparing an 
hour or so participating in this research you will be able to eventually share the fruits of Mansoor's extensive 
research results. 
The questionnaire is being mailed to you in advance in order for you to complete it, as far as possible, at 
your convenience. Mansoor will contact you as soon as he arrives in India and will request a brief meeting 
with you where you can ask for clarifications regarding certain questions, if any. He will collect the 
questionnaire back in person when he meets you. 
We look forward to receiving your co-operation. 
Best regards. 
Yours sincerely 
Proles John R Presley Professor David T Llewelly 
Appendix E 
Letter of the IVCA Chairman 
Indian Venture Capital Association 
Please reply to . 
Gujarat Venture Flnancs Llmlted 
Ist Floor, Prnmchand House Annex* 
B/h. Popular House, Ashram Road 
AHMEDABAD " 360 009. 
Phone : (079) 6660335 
Fax : (079) 6666226 
1VCA 
October 19,2000 
To: 
All the members of 
Indian Venture Capital Association. 
Dear Member, 
I am sending you a copy of the fax sent to me by Prof. John R. Presley, 
Professor of Economics from Loughborough University, UK regarding Mr. 
Mansoor Durrani's Doctoral Research in Indian Venture Capial/Private 
Equity. Mr. Durrani is coming to India in November for his research 
work. Ilr tttay µrt In loth-11 will' yin" lur Bing ilala. I rt-(guest all the 
members to kindly co-operate with him and help him to finalise the data, 
whenever he contact you. 
Thrnking you, 
Yours faithfully, 
For Indian Venture Capital Association 
Vishnu Varshney 
Appendix F 
List of Participants 
Alphabetical List of Participants 
1. Alliance Venture Capital Advisors, Bombay. 
2. American International Group, Bombay. 
3. APIDC Venture Capital Ltd., Hyderabad. 
4. Barings Private Equity, New Delhi. 
5. Canbank Venture Capital Fund, Bangalore. 
6. Chrylasis Capital, Bombay. 
7. Citibank Private Equity, Bombay. 
8. Commonwealth Development Corp., New Delhi. 
9. ConnectCapital, Bombay. 
10. ElectraPartners Asia Pvt Ltd., Bombay. 
11. eVentures India (P) Ltd., Bombay. 
12. First Capital Private Equity, New Delhi. 
13. GE Capital, New Delhi. 
14. Global Technology Ventures, Bangalore. 
15. Gujarat Venture Fund Ltd., Ahmedabad. 
16. HSBC Private Equity, New Delhi. 
17. ICF Ventures Pvt Ltd., Bangalore. 
18. ICICI Venture Funds Co. Ltd., Bangalore. 
19. IFCI Venture Capital, New Delhi. 
20. IL&FS Sectoral Equity Fund, Bombay. 
21. IL&FS Venture Corporation Ltd., Bangalore. 
22. IndAsia Fund Advisors., Bombay. 
23. IndOcean Chase Capital Advisors, Bombay. 
24. Indus Venture Management, Bombay. 
25. Industrial Development Bank of India, Bombay. 
26. Industrial Venture Capital Ltd., Madras. 
27. Infinity Venture Capital Ltd., New Delhi 
28. International Finance Corporation, Bombay. 
29. Jumpstartup Funds Advisor, Bangalore. 
30. KITVEN Fund Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore. 
31. Liquid Equity Capital, Bombay. 
32. Marigold Capital Management Ltd., Bombay. 
33. National Software Technology Fund, Bombay 
34. Pathfinder Investment Co., Pune. 
35. SICOM Capital Management Ltd., Pune. 
36. SIDBI Venture Capital Ltd., Bombay. 
37. Taib Capital Corp. Ltd., Bangalore. 
38. UshaMartin Venture Fund, Calcutta 
39. UTI Venture Funds, Bangalore. 
40. Walden International, Bombay. 
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Appendix G 
Tables of Descriptive Analysis 
Table 7.17: Venture Capitalists relying on their Own Due Diligence for Valuation 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 34 85.0 85.0 85.0 
Important 4 10.0 10.0 95.0 
Desirable 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.18: Interviews with the Entrepreneur and Key Personnel for Valuation 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 32 80.0 80.0 80.0 
Important 7 17.5 17.5 97.5 
Desirable 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.19: Management CV as a Source for Valuation 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 30 75.0 75.0 75.0 
Important 8 20.0 20.0 95.0 
Desirable 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.20: Product, Technical and Marketing Information as a Source for Valuation 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 26 65.0 65.0 65.0 
_Important 
13 32.5 32.5 97.5 
Desirable 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.21: Cohesiveness of the Business Plan as a Source of Valuation 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 23 57.5 57.5 57.5 
_Important 
16 40.0 40.0 97.5 
Desirable 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.22: Choice of Venture Capitalists for IRR as a Valuation Technique 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 29 72.5 72.5 72.5 
Important 6 15.0 15.0 87.5 
Desirable 2 5.0 5.0 92.5 
Irrelevant 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.23: Choice of Venture Capitalists for NPV as a Valuation Technique 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 16 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Important 14 35.0 35.0 75.0 
Desirable 5 12.5 12.5 87.5 
Irrelevant 5 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
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Table 7.24: Choice of Venture Capitalists for Multiple on Exit as a Valuation Techniaue 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 20 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Important 11 27.5 27.5 77.5 
Desirable 4 10.0 10.0 87.5 
Irrelevant 5 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.25: Choice of Venture Capitalists for Industry Benchmark as a Valuation Technique 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 14 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Important 19 47.5 47.5 82.5 
Desirable 5 12.5 12.5 95.0 
Irrelevant 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.26: Rate of Discount Venture Capitalists Apply at Seed Stacie Investments 
Rate of Discount Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
21 - 35 5 12.5 14.7 14.7 
36 - 50 8 20.0 23.5 38.2 
51-65 5 12.5 14.7 52.9 
Above 65 16 40.0 47.1 100.0 
Total 34 85.0 100.0 
Missing 6 15.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.27: Rate of Discount Venture Capitalists Apply at Early Stage Investments 
Rate of Discount Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
21 - 35 7 17.5 18.9 18.9 
36 - 50 16 40.0 43.2 62.2 
51 - 65 9 22.5 24.3 86.5 
Above 65 5 12.5 13.5 100.0 
Total 37 92.5 100.0 
Missing 3 7.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.28: Rate of Discount Venture Capitalists Apply at Expansion Stage Investments 
Rate of Discount Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
10-20 1 2.5 3.0 3.0 
21 - 35 12 30.0 36.4 39.4 
36 - 50 16 40.0 48.5 87.9 
51 - 65 3 7.5 9.1 97.0 
Above 65 1 2.5 3.0 100.0 
Total 33 82.5 100.0 
Missing 7 17.5 
Total 40 100.0 
363 
Table 7.29: Investors' Preferred Discount Rates for the Manufacturing and Processing Industries: 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
10-20 2 5.0 8.3 8.3 
21 - 35 14 35.0 58.3 66.7 
36 - 50 8 20.0 33.3 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.30: Investors' Preferred Discount Rates for IT, Media, and Telecom Sectors: 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
21 - 35 9 22.5 23.7 23.7 
36 - 50 15 37.5 39.5 63.2 
51 - 65 10 25.0 26.3 89.5 
Above 65 4 10.0 10.5 100.0 
Total 38 95.0 100.0 
Missing 2 5.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.31: Achievement of Budgets as a milestone for Further Disbursement of Funds: 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 12 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Important 17 42.5 42.5 72.5 
Desirable 7 17.5 17.5 90.0 
Irrelevant 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
T-56 1-1 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.32: Recruitment of key personnel as a milestone for Further Disbursement of Funds: 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Essential 7 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Important 16 40.0 40.0 57.5 
Desirable 8 20.0 20.0 77.5 
Irrelevant 9 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.33: Freauencies of Usin4 various Financial Products at Seed Stage 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Equity 29 72.5 82.9 82.9 
Prefrence Share 4 10.0 11.4 94.3 
ConVtible Bond 2 5.0 5.7 100.0 
Total 35 87.5 100.0 
Missing 5 12.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.34: Frequencies of Using various Financial Products at Early Stage 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Equity 32 80.0 84.2 84.2 
Prefrence Share 3 7.5 7.9 92.1 
ConVtible Bond 3 7.5 7.9 100.0 
Total 38 95.0 100.0 
Missing 2 5.0 
Total 40 100.0 
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Table 7.35: Frequencies of Using various Financial Products at Expansion Stage 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Equity 29 72.5 87.9 87.9 
Prefrence Share 2 5.0 6.1 93.9 
Conv'tible Bond 2 5.0 6.1 100.0 
Total 33 82.5 100.0 
Missing 7 17.5 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.36: Frequency of receiving the Profit and Loss Account 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 23 57.5 57.5 57.5 
Quarterly 17 42.5 42.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.37: Frequency of receiving the Balance Sheet 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 17 42.5 42.5 42.5 
Quarter) 19 47.5 47.5 90.0 
Yearly 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.38: Frequency of receiving the Cash Flow Statement 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 18 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Quarter) 19 47.5 47.5 92.5 
Yearly 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.39: Frequency of receiving the Sales Reports 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 23 57.5 57.5 57.5 
Quarterly 14 35.0 35.0 92.5 
Yearly 2 5.0 5.0 97.5 
Never 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.40: Frequency of receiving the Sales Budget 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 13 32.5 32.5 32.5 
Quarterly 15 37.5 37.5 70.0 
Yearly 9 22.5 22.5 92.5 
Never 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.41: Frequency for asking the Order Bookinq position of the investees 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 23 57.5 57.5 57.5 
Mostly 15 37.5 37.5 95.0 
Rarely 1 2.5 2.5 97.5 
Never 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
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Table 7.42: Freauencv for asking the Product Costs & Profits in periodic statements 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 18 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Mostly 17 42.5 42.5 87.5 
Rarely 4 10.0 10.0 97.5 
Never 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.43: Freauencv for askina the Marketing Expenses of the investees 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 18 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Mostly 20 50.0 50.0 95.0 
Rarely 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.44: Freauencv for askina the Inventory Report from the investees 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 6 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Quarter) 20 50.0 50.0 65.0 
Yearly 7 17.5 17.5 82.5 
Never 7 17.5 17.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.45: Freauencv for asking the Creditor and Debtor Reports 
Values Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 7 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Quarterly 21 52.5 52.5 70.0 
Yearly 9 22.5 22.5 92.5 
Never 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.46: Freauencv for asking the Working Capital Report from the investees 
Values Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Quarten 21 52.5 52.5 77.5 
Yearly 5 12.5 12.5 90.0 
Never 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.47: Profit Per Employee 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 12 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Mostly 14 35.0 35.0 65.0 
Rarely 10 25.0 25.0 90.0 
Never 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.48: Turnover Per Employee 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Mostly 16 40.0 40.0 65.0 
Rarely 10 25.0 25.0 90.0 
Never 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
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Table 7.49: Joining and Leaving Report of Key Personnel 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 17 42.5 42.5 42.5 
Quarter) 9 22.5 22.5 65.0 
Yearly 6 15.0 15.0 80.0 
Never 8 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.50: The Frequency of CAPEX Analysis in the periodic statements 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 16 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Mostly 19 47.5 47.5 87.5 
Rarely 3 7.5 7.5 95.0 
Never 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.51: Project Implementation Report required by the venture capitalists 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 15 37.5 37.5 37.5 
Quarter) 22 55.0 55.0 92.5 
Yearly 1 2.5 2.5 95.0 
Never 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.52: Capacity Utilisation Report required by the venture capitalists 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Monthly 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Quarterly 21 52.5 52.5 77.5 
Yearly 3 7.5 7.5 85.0 
Never 6 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.53: Frequency of asking for the Cost of Capital in periodic statements 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 7 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Mostly 14 35.0 35.0 52.5 
Rarely 16 40.0 40.0 92.5 
Never 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.54: Frequency of asking for the Cost of Raw Material in periodic statements 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 13 32.5 32.5 32.5 
Mostly 10 25.0 25.0 57.5 
Rarely 5 12.5 12.5 70.0 
Never 12 30.0 30.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.55: Frequency for asking the breakdown of Overhead E enses 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 14 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Mostly 23 57.5 57.5 92.5 
Rarely 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
367 
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Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Month 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Quarterty 20 50.0 50.0 75.0 
Yearly 8 20.0 20.0 95.0 
Never 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
TnW. 7 97" 9: rv'1l¢inn fha nicriis inn m the Status of the Statutory ComDdiance 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
mostly 17 42.5 42.5 67.5 
Rarely 12 30.0 30.0 97.5 
Never 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0 
T. kl- 7 ! R" 1 -r4 r C4-4onir Clrillc 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 8 20.0 33.3 33.3 
Mostly 11 27.5 45.8 79.2 
Rarely 1 2.5 4.2 83.3 
Never 4 10.0 16.7 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
T.. ML. 7 O. I . ß. d.. 4 n.. nrMi- Q 4f11. 
Values F en Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 10 25.0 41.7 41.7 
Mostl 8 20.0 33.3 75.0 
Rarcqy 5 12.5 20.8 95.8 
Never 1 2.5 4.2 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Týhle 7 A. I A, of M. -i. 1 C4illc 
Values F en Percent Valid Pennt Cumulative Percent 
Always 7 17.5 29.2 29.2 
Mostly 8 20.0 33.3 62.5 
Rarely 6 15.0 25.0 87.5 
Never 3 7.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Tahta 7M Lark of IntPmArsnnal Skills 
Values F uen Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 5 12.5 20.8 20.8 
mostty 8 20.0 33.3 54.2 
Rarely 3 7.5 12.5 66.7 
Never 8 20.0 33.3 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
Missing 16 40.0 
Total 40 100.0 
Table 7.62: Lack of Drive and Vision 
Values Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Always 8 20.0 33.3 33.3 
Mostl 6 15.0 25.0 58.3 
Rarel 6 15.0 25.0 83.3 
Never 4 10.0 16.7 100.0 
Total 24 60.0 100.0 
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Appendix H 
Identification of Cluster Members 
r_ýý_ n -rn w ., s *I.., n............ ný..,..... ýe.: ctiý -f . ý`6 ýctnr'n Uumh r 
VC No. Origin Size Age No. of Inv Sector $M I/FM Stage 
18 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Non-Tec Less Early 
37 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Non-Tec Less Early 
24 Indian Larger Younger Fewer Tech Less Late 
20 Indian Smaller Older Greater Tech Less Late 
4 Foreign Smaller Older Fewer Tech More Late 
32 Foreign Larger Older Fewer Non-Tec More Late 
40 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Early 
3 Indian Smaller Older Fewer Non-Tec Less Late 
27 Foreign Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Early 
35 Foreign Larger Older Fewer Tech More Early 
34 Indian Smaller Older Greater Non-Tec Less Late 
10 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Early 
39 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Late 
9 Indian Larger Older Greater Tech More Early 
16 Foreign Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Late 
31 Foreign Smaller Older Fewer Non-Tec Less Early 
36 Foreign Larger Younger Fewer Non-Tec More Late 
8 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Non-Tec Less Early 
5 Foreign Smaller Older Greater Tech More Late 
28 Foreign Larger Younger Fewer Tech More Early 
6 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Late 
17 Indian Smaller Younger Fewer Tech Less Early 
21 Foreign Larger Younger Fewer Tech More Late 
14 Indian Larger Older Greater Tech More Early 
23 Foreign Smaller Older Greater Tech More Late 
12 Foreign Smaller Younger Fewer Tech More Late 
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A Specimen Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Dendrogram using Ward Method 
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Appendix I 
Tables of Regression Analysis 
Table 9A Identification of Mis-fit Members in Logistical Regression Graph 
. 68868 2.00 . 30024 1.00 . 05202 1.00 
. 61715 2.00 . 46517 1.00 . 66309 2.00 
. 65022 2.00 . 51779 2.00 . 16146 1.00 
. 63384 2.00 . 43709 1.00 . 66184 2.00 
. 68868 2.00 . 66143 2.00 . 99301 2.00 
. 68868 2.00 . 75545 2.00 . 99455 2.00 
. 00000 1.00 . 26603 1.00 . 52989 2.00 
. 48892 1.00 . 17802 1.00 
. 00033 1.00 . 69029 
2.00 . 33133 1.00 
. 00000 1.00 . 35574 1.00 . 
38833 1.00 
. 65022 2.00 . 70268 
2.00 . 55547 2.00 
. 67319 2.00 . 57174 
2.00 . 99413 2.00 
. 55005 2.00 . 84490 
2.00 . 48302 1.00 
. 50316 2.00 . 46517 
1.00 . 15702 1.00 
. 67319 2.00 . 32096 
1.00 . 05956 1.00 
. 43440 1.00 . 46385 1.00 . 77349 2.00 
. 00013 1.00 . 34913 1.00 . 
61465 2.00 
. 59262 2.00 . 44702 
1.00 . 06155 1.00 
. 55005 2.00 . 32096 
1.00 . 43614 1.00 
. 48892 1.00 . 57439 
2.00 . 99313 2.00 
. 48892 1.00 . 68521 
2.00 . 86569 2.00 
. 39975 1.00 . 58955 
2.00 . 64515 2.00 
. 57531 2.00 . 57439 
2.00 . 99716 2.00 
. 43440 1.00 . 58827 2.00 . 
99961 2.00 
. 67319 2.00 . 69771 
2.00 . 63422 2.00 
. 37539 1.00 . 52088 2.00 . 
99046 2.00 
. 68868 2.00 . 07056 1.00 . 12417 1.00 
. 47751 1.00 . 68521 2.00 . 19789 1.00 
. 59262 2.00 . 55642 2.00 . 23692 1.00 
. 63384 2.00 . 83580 2.00 . 71360 2.00 
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Table 9_B- Covenants Differentiating based on Fund Oriqin 
df Sig. 
Appointin Auditors 1 . 074 
Setting Executive Remuneration 1 . 039 
Drag and Tag Along Rights 1 . 089 
Right of First Refusal 1 . 083 
Changing Memorandum & Article of Association 1 . 026 
Right to Visiting Offices & Inspecting Books 1 . 016 
Post-completion Audit 1 . 086 
Constant 1 . 142 
Table 9. C: Monitoring Reports Differences based on Fund Origin 
df Sig. 
Cash Flow Statements 1 . 045 
Sales Budget 1 . 007 
Budget Vs. Actual 1 . 009 
Working Capital Reports 1 . 022 
Joining & Leaving reports of Key Functionaries 1 . 061 
Table 9_D: Monitoring Discussion based on Fund Origin 
df Sig. 
Performance Appraisal . 448 
Strategic Planning 1 . 890 
Status of Statutory Compliances . 029 
Trouble Shooting 1 . 143 
Acquisitions 1 . 363 
Fund Raising 1 . 455 
Exit Plans 1 . 865 
Table 9. E_ Valuation Information Sources Differences Based on Fund Size 
--- ---- - df Sig. 
Cohesive Business Plan 1 . 061 
Product, Technical and Marketing Information 1 . 066 
Other Venture Ca italists 1 . 071 
Table 9_F: significant Renorts Differences Based on Fund Size 
df Sig. 
Cash Flow Statements 1 . 179 
Inventory Reports 1 . 246 
Pay-sheets 1 . 041 
Creditor and Debtor Reports 1 . 166 
Budget Vs Actuals 1 . 054 
Capacity Utilisation Report 1 . 264 
Joining and Leaving reports of Key Employees 1 . 054 
Market Share Analysis 1 . 263 
Table 9. G: Significance Focus of Discussion Differences Based on Fund Size 
df Sig. 
Statutory Compliance 1 . 145 Trouble Shooting 1 . 059 Sales and Marketin g . 067 Acquisitions 1 . 034 Performance Appraisal 1 . 203 
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Table 9. H: Use of DCF/NPV Valuation Technique Based on Fund Aqe 
df Sig. 
Net Asset per Share 1 . 015 Discounted Cash Flow / Net Present Value 1 . 018 Economic Value Added 1 . 013 
Table 9.1: Significance Structuring Covenant Differences Based on Fund Age 
df Sig. 
Approval for Setting Major Assets 1 . 007 Equity Ratchets for Entrepreneurs 1 . 059 Right of First Refusal 1 . 078 Escrow Account for Monitorin Funds 1 . 014 
Table 9. J: Statistically Significant Monitoring Reports Based on Fund Age 
df Sig. 
Profit and Loss Account 1 . 080 Cash Flow Statement 1 . 025 Salesbudget 1 . 052 Working Ca ital Reports 1 . 055 Statutory Default Reports 1 . 011 Joining and Leaving Reports of Key Employees 1 . 045 
Table 9. K: Statistically Significant Monitoring Breakdown Based on Fund Age 
df Sig. 
Marketing Expenses 1 . 026 Overhead Expenses 1 . 057 Capital Expenditure Analysis 1 . 030 Order Booking 1 . 064 
Table 91: Statistically Significant Structuring Covenants Based on Portfolio Size 
df Si . Appointment of Auditors 1 . 108 Post-completion Audit 1 . 027 Staging 1 . 024 Setting Executive Remuneration 1 . 027 Drag-along and Tag-along Rights 1 . 207 Right to Inspect Books and Visit Facilities 1 1.055 
Fit Timing and Mechanism 1 . 219 
Table 9. M: Statistically Sign cant Monitoring Reports Based on Portfolio Size 
df Sig. 
Balance Sheet 1 . 023 Pay Sheets 1 . 059 Creditor and Debtors Reports 1 . 044 Statutory Default Reports 1 . 065 
Table 9. N: Collectively Significant Valuation Techniques Based on Fund Size/FM 
df Sig. 
Dividend Yield 1 . 295 Net Assets Per Share 1 . 491 Internal Rate of Return 1 . 103 EBITDA Multiple 1 . 034 Accounting Rate of Return 1 . 320 
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Table 9.0: Collectively Significant Structuring Covenants Based on Fund Size/FM 
df Sig. 
Approval for Restructuring and Consolidations 1 . 047 Approval for Borrowing and Equity Dilution 1 . 022 Equity Ratchets for Entrepreneurs 1 . 012 Drag-along and Tag-along Rights 1 . 059 Intellectual Property Rights in the Name of Investee 1 . 026 Right to Inspect Books and Visit Facilities 1 . 038 Approval for Major Contracts 1 . 345 Equity Stock Option Plans for Employees 1 . 079 Exit Timing and Mechanism 1 . 246 
Approval for Treasury Operations 1 . 268 Maintenance of Escrow Account 1 . 343 
Table 9. P: Collectively Significant Monitoring Reports Based on Fund Size/FM 
df Sig. 
Profit and Loss Account 1 . 159 
Cash Flow Statements 1 . 327 Sales Budget 1 . 067 Inventory Reports 1 . 075 
Budget Vs Actual 1 . 021 
Capacity Utilisation Reports 1 . 160 
Project Implementation Reports 1 . 096 
Table 9.0: Collectively Significant Breakdown Details Based on Fund Size/FM 
df Sig. 
Raw Material Cost 1 . 089 Cost of Ca ital 1 . 185 Marketing Expenses 1 . 112 Overhead Expenses 1 . 190 
Capital Expenditure 1 . 135 Order Booking 1 . 355 
Table 9. R: Collectively Significant Discussion Focus Based on Fund Size/FM 
df Sig. 
Adherence to Contract 1 . 342 
Ac uisitions 1 . 052 
Fund Raising 1 . 228 
Table 9. S: Collectively Significant CEO Replacement Reasons: Fund Size/FM 
df Si . Strategic Skills 1 . 138 Inter-personnel Skills 1 . 081 Operating Skills 1 . 741 Financial Skills 1 . 064 Commercial Skills 1 . 101 Integrity 1 . 070 Drive and Vision 1 . 116 
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Table 9. T: Collectively Siqnificant Sources of Valuation Information: Stages 
df Sig. 
CV of Management 1 . 059 Exit Timing and Mechanism 1 . 034 Interview with Entrepreneur and Key Employees 1 . 080 Product, Technical and Marketing Information 1 . 105 Due Diligence by Financial Advisers 1 . 161 
Table 9. U: Collectively Significant Structuring Covenants: Stages 
df Sig. 
Board Representation 1 . 031 Approval for Selling Major Assets 1 . 068 Setting Executive Remuneration Package 1 . 020 Exit Timing and Mechanism 1 . 027 Drag-along & Tag-along Rights 1 . 048 Sending Observers in Important Meetings 1 . 061 Monthly Financial Reporting 1 . 125 
Table 9. V: Collectively Significant Monitoring Reports Based on Stages 
df Sig. 
Profit and Loss Account 1 . 073 Sales Budget 1 . 091 Sales Report 1 . 035 Inventory Report 1 . 121 Creditor and Debtor Report 1 . 126 Budget Vs. Actual 1 . 107 Market Share Analysis 1 . 072 Project Implementation Report 1 . 187 Pay Sheet 1 . 210 Statutory Default Report 1 . 216 
Table 9. W: Collectively Significant Focus of Discussion Based on Stages 
df Sig. 
Performance Appraisal 1 . 042 Strategic Planning 1 . 041 Adherence to Contract . 068 Status of Statutory Compliances 1 . 036 Trouble Shooting 1 . 076 Exit Plans 1 . 059 Fund Raising 1 . 198 
Table 9. X: Collectively Significant Valuation Techniques Based on Sector 
df Sig. 
Dividend Yield 1 . 060 Internal Rate of Return 1 . 091 EBITDA Multiple 1 . 123 Pay Back Period 1 . 092 
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Table 9. Y: Collectively Significant Structuring Covenants Based on Sector 
df Sig. 
Board Representation 1 . 046 Approval for Appointing Key Functionaries 1 . 027 Approval for Capital Excess Expenditure 1 . 028 Approval for Borrowing and Equity Dilution 1 . 026 Monthly Financial Reporting 1 . 046 Approval for Major Contracts 1 . 020 Approval for Selling Major Assets 1 . 024 Approval for Setting Executive Remuneration 1 . 025 Equity Ratchets for Entrepreneurs 1 . 033 Exit Timing and Mechanism 1 . 048 Drag-along and Tag-along Rights 1 . 054 Changes in Article and Memorandum of Association 1 . 031 
Approval for Treasury Operations 1 . 035 Right to Inspecting Books and Visitin Offices 1 . 039 Staging of Investments 1 . 080 
Table 9. Z: Collectively Significant Monitoring Reports Based on Sector 
df Sig. 
Profit and Loss Account 1 . 027 Creditor and Debtor Report 1 . 032 Default Report 1 . 017 Joining and Leaving Report of Key Employees 1 . 058 Project implementation Report 1 . 020 
Table 9. ZA: Collectively Significant Focus of Discussion Based on Sector 
df Sig. 
Overall Performance Appraisal 1 . 074 Strategic Planning 1 . 127 Adherence to Contract 1 . 176 Profile Management 1 . 349 Product Development . 604 Ac uisitions 1 . 465 Fund Raising . 270 Fait Plan . 153 
Table 9. ZB: Collectively Significant Reasons for CEO Replacement Based on Sector 
df Sig. 
Lack of Strategic Skills 1 . 227 Lack of Commercial Skills 1 . 053 Lack in Drive and Vision 1 . 263 
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Appendix J 
Islamic Finance 
For Islamic Finance: Conceptually, venture capital is very similar to profit-loss sharing 
based principle of Islamic finance (Anderson, 1994). Venture capital by definition is risk 
capital, and the 'risk-taking is defined as the willingness to commit to a course of action 
which may result in rewards or penalties associated with success of failure' (Welsch and 
Young, 1982; p. 52). Therefore, equity investments (Chapra, 1985; Siddiqi, 1994; Sadr and 
lqbal, 2000) in permissible sectors (Hamdi, 1992) with companies having a zero debt 
(interest-based) capital structure are allowed in Islam (Khan, 1985; Khan, 1995). The focus 
of conventional venture capital investments in SMEs also sits well with Islamic economic 
system, as it advocates the economic development through this approach (Chapra, 1992; 
Ahmed, 2001). 
The Islamic banking industry is almost three decades old and valued at over US$ 70 billion 
(Wilson, 2000), but there are very few product innovations so far (Malaikah, 2000). Although 
excluded from the primary mode of Islamic finance by Chapra (2001), over 65 percent of 
Islamic funds are invested in murabaha type financing (AI-Omar and lqbal, 2000). One of the 
reasons identified for this state of Islamic banking is their lack of expertise in risk assessment 
and risk management (Boocock and Presley, 1993; Lawai, 2000), especially related to moral 
hazard and information asymmetry (Muhammad, 1999). This research addresses the three 
most crucial areas of risk management namely, valuation, structuring, and monitoring of 
investments. Therefore, the results pertaining to each of these areas are immensely 
important to the Islamic banking industry. The more debatable issues are briefly discussed 
below. 
Discounting: Islam recognises the time value of money (Khan, 1995). However, the issue of 
using discount rate, often linked with the prevailing treasury rates of the respective 
economies, has been a subject of intense debate (Siddiqi, 1983, Zarqa, 1983). The global 
venture capital research and also this study clearly show that the discounting rates applied 
by venture capitalists are a factor of perceived risk rather than a linkage with the interest 
based instruments like the rate of government securities that are considered prohibited in 
Islam (Khan, 1985). Thus a very broad band of discount rates used in venture capital 
valuation process is not correlated to any fixed-return securities. Therefore, DCF based 
valuation methods using appropriate discount rate for venture capital investments should be 
perfectly acceptable in Islamic finance. 
Financial Products: A very high proportion of equity use as shown by research results Is 
encouraging from the Islamic perspective. Due to the pre-determined nature of preferred 
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stock dividend together with its accumulation, this instrument resembles with interest bearing 
securities and therefore is considered unacceptable in Islam (OIC Decision 65/1/7). 
However, Islamic finance approves the differential revenue sharing between two classes of 
investors (Siddiqi, 1985), provided one of them contributes finance and also actively 
participates in the functioning of the project (Vogel and Hayes, 1998). This type of value 
addition is very common in venture capital funding. But it is universally recognized that 
venture capitalists do not invest for earning dividend. They rather aim to profit through capital 
gains. It is only psychological protection that this type of structuring provides. Similarly, in 
case of liquidation, priority claim on assets by preferred stock holders does not meet the 
Islamic requirement of economic justice either. But, this is also a theoretical protection as 
venture capital funded projects rarely have a significant realisation value in case of 
liquidation. Therefore, a modified version of preferred stock as suggested by Zarqa (1992) 
may be permissible in Islamic finance that excludes cumulative dividend and liquidation 
preferences but creates two classes of shares claiming different percentage of profits beyond 
a threshold limit. 
But technically, this will only be a zero coupon, redeemable, partially convertible bond. Since 
we noticed that staging of investment is extensively used in venture capital funding in order 
to address moral hazard problem, this vehicle will provide sufficient funds to the entrepreneur 
to achieve business milestones. At the same time, is will offer adequate downside protection 
to the investors should the entrepreneurs fail to meet those milestones. The unconverted 
part of the bond could be redeemed at a meager opportunity loss. If the milestones are 
achieved, the bond can be converted on the basis of a pre-determined conversion formula. 
Khan (1999) seems to have suggested a similar approach 
Ratchets: Coming from the point above, equity ratchets are increasingly offered by venture 
capitalists to the entrepreneurs for motivating them to exceed or at least meet the business 
goals. At the start of the project, investors set tough but achievable time-bound targets for 
entrepreneurs. Depending upon the final performance, entrepreneurs end up owning either 
higher equity stake and more of the company, or lower equity stake and therefore less of the 
company (Sherling, 1999). All the targets and resultant rewards are explicitly laid down at the 
beginning of the deal. Therefore, there is nothing un-Islamic for Islamic Investors to minimise 
their downside risk using ratchets. Essentially, it is a reward in kind rather than a cash 
reward to the entrepreneur for his excellent performance. Similarly, it is a retribution in kind 
for his failure. 
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Stock Options: Fiqh Academy of the Organisation of Islamic Countries has strictly 
prohibited the use of options by Islamic banks (Khan, 1999). Their rationale is that financial 
gains are prohibited in trading an instrument that has no underlying assets. However, the 
widespread use of stock options offered to employees in knowledge based industries, as a 
part of compensation package is different. In this, the employers in order to retain their 
human capital offer the shares of the company at a discount to its employees. The 
employees have the right but not obligation to purchase the shares at a predetermined price 
after a certain time limit (Short et al., 1999). Then, if the employees feel that the market price 
of shares is higher than the exercise price they have been offered, they can exercise their 
option and earn profits. Otherwise, they can let it go and suffer opportunity loss. Therefore, 
this does not apparently violate any Islamic rules. 
Fund Structuring: With regard to the structure of the vehicle, there are suggestions that it 
should be in the form of mudaraba (Muhammad, 1999). However, the case of mudaraba 
presents a constraint on the provider of capital - rabbul mal - by which he cannot place any 
restrictions on the use of funds (Khan, 1995), while we noticed that venture capital is by 
definition a risk investment. The risk is managed through a very tight structuring of the deals. 
Siddiqui (1985) presents a favourable structure known as shirka al-inan. Therefore, it is very 
likely that a hybrid of mudaraba and shir'ka al-inan will adequately overcome the problem of 
structuring a suitable Islamic vehicle for launching a anslamic venture capital fund. Further, 
Cizaka (2000), proposed the use of cash waqf in order to set up venture capital funds. 
Way Ahead: There is a need to develop a viable Islamic venture capital sector in countries 
like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey, as these countries have a 
reasonable industrial and capital market infrastructure. However, it needs to be studied 
whether there is enough appetite for venture capital investments in these countries by 
identifying the factors that breed entrepreneurship. This will help nurture the entrepreneurial 
culture in these countries, together wit estimating the demand for a venture capital industry. 
rom an Islamic perspective, it is important to study the capital structure of the investee 
companies. An empirical evidence of the existence of zero debt capital structure - which Is 
very likely - will accelerate the process of Islamic funds investing in venture capital deals. 
Also, a group of 2 or 3 Islamic countries with reasonable industrial base should be studied 
with an objective to identify the impediments in SME growth. Simultaneously, policy related 
issues should be researched to identify limitations and steps be suggested that can pave the 
way for the development of venture capital sector - that is so close to Islamic finance - In the 
Islamic world. 
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